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Abstract
The Iraqi Kurds have stood firmly at the forefront of many changes and challenges in 
the Middle East and Iraq since 1991, taking the opportunity to stand firm and to 
become a semi-autonomous entity with an establish regional government. Events after 
2003 offered a second historical opportunity to determine their present and future 
position on the Iraqi political map as a major partner constructing the new Iraqi State 
and developing their region. The thesis aims to address and challenge the claim that 
the Kurds have become more integrationist than secessionist since the collapse of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Through a descriptive and analytical narrative of the evolution of the KRG’s situation
and the Kurds’ assertion of their national demands towards Iraq. The study identifies
four major dimensions of KRG policy towards Iraq. These include the need to address 
chronic problems and political disputes through commitment to the new Iraqi 
Constitution; to apply federal system and maintain democratic principles guaranteeing
the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities, through full implementation of Article 
140; to resolve the legitimacy of KRG’s international and regional oil contracts 
through real power sharing between regional governments and the federal 
government; address the dilemma of the rights and duties of the Kurdish forces 
(Peshmerga) vis-a-vis the Iraqi army. As national forces protecting the Kurdish
region, the Peshmerga also fought Saddam Hussein’s regime participated with US 
troops in its downfall and joined in fighting terrorism elsewhere in Iraq.
Iraqi factions and parties need genuine political will to overcome tribal and religious 
differences. Strengthening the current political consensus and implementing a 
constitution to prevent violations by factions or political groups will help to secure 
Iraq as a unified state, and to prevent regional interventions of the sort that have so far 
led to insecurity and destabilisation.
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Dedication
To the Kurdish people, who have been denied the right to establish a state 
on their territory and who struggle constantly to defend their national 
identity.
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1INTRODUCTION
The Kurds knew they had to be a part of Iraq, of the Iraqi 
government. They knew they couldn’t be independent...they 
were adamant that they had to be part of the new Iraq. I never 
saw a movement on their part to be independent. But they did 
demand that they keep their autonomous region, because they 
had written the Constitution back in 1992; they had had their 
first elections back in 1992; they had set up a parliament in the 
early 1990s; and they had their own governmental system. 
They didn't want to take that apart, and I don’t blame them, 
because they had a well-run, well-structured government.1
(Jay Garner, 15 July 2009)
BACKGROUND
The Kurdistan Region, or Iraqi Kurdistan,2 is appearing as a new de facto entity that 
has found territorial authority in one of the most sensitive areas in the Middle East. 
Kurdistan has progressed politically since 1991; it achieved self-rule status in 2003, 
and since 2005 has been a federated region. The elections held in 2005 received 
intense public participation and support for the main Kurdish political parties – the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The
PUK and the KDP have governed and ruled the region since 1991, especially after the 
withdrawal of the Iraqi government (in the form of its military forces and its 
administrative structures) from the region. It is a fact that Kurds benefited from the 
liberation of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, and that this has brought about 
1 Jay Garner is a retired lieutenant general of the US Army. He was first appointed to the Kurdistan 
region following the Gulf War, when he was pulled out of retirement to lead US reconstruction efforts 
in Iraq after 2003. Under the leadership of Paul Bremer, he played a significant role and has remained 
an active commentator on the region and the US strategy there ever since.  See Elizabeth Dickinson, 
“Seven Questions: Jay Garner”. Available at
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010200&lngnr=12&rnr=73&anr=30584>
Access Date: : 15 July 2009
2 According to recent statistics from the Ministry of Planning the population in the Kurdistan Region 
numbers 4,910,742.   See Kurdistan Region Government, Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Region 
Population, 2007; Available at 
<URL: http://www.mop-krg.org/detail.aspx?page=statisticsbysubjects&c=sbsPopulation&id=359>. 
Access Date: 15 August 2010
and also see Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, KRG Population - 2007 , Available at 
< URL: http://www.krso.net/detail.aspx?page=statisticsbysubjects&c=StatisticsbySubjects&id=359> 
Access Date: 15 August 2010.
2the biggest historical opportunity for Iraqi Kurds. From 1991, Kurdistan was 
gradually transformed, both politically and administratively, into a quasi-independent 
entity. Since 2003, Kurds have in addition been actively involved in the 
reconstruction of Iraq, while also maintaining a degree of independence over their 
own affairs.3
The 2009 election in Kurdistan region was different from earlier ones, in that there 
was an opportunity to move closer towards democracy, since the significant success 
achieved in this election was also creating an active opposition within the parliament.4
It should be noted here that most of the parties and groups in the Kurdistan region 
support the adoption of a federal system in Iraq, and that almost no-one has raised the 
slogan of independence. However, this does not mean that they have conceded this 
outcome but rather that practicality has dictated a more realistic approach at this 
stage.5 In addition, the results of the 2009 elections were expected to have an impact 
on internal political and governance developments within the KRG as well as 
affecting relations with the Iraqi government, which had been under stress because of 
Nuri al-Maliki’s aspirations towards centralisation policies on the one hand, and the 
KRG’s gradually increasing moves towards sovereignty on the other. In fact it was 
felt that a stronger and more democratic KRG might have a significant impact on the 
3 In the current period, Kurds in Iraq are dispersed across at least seven governorates in Iraq, of which 
only three are currently under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (Sulaymaniyah, Erbil 
and Dohuk), while more than 45 percent of the Kurdish areas (known as “disputed areas”) remain 
under the control of Iraqi government, pending their final resolution under Article 140 of the Iraqi 
constitution. These areas include the province of Kirkuk, and the towns of Kifiri, Khanaqin and 
Baladrooz in Diyala province; Akra, Shekhan, Al-Hamdaniya, Tel Kaif, Tall Afar and Sinjar in Mosul 
province; Tooz in Salahaddin province; and Badrah in Wasit province. Although the Kurds constitute a 
majority in most of these cities, the Turkmens and the recently settled Arabs claim sole ownership of 
the city concerned.
4 The two major parties unified their candidates into what was called the “Kurdistani List”, which 
might have seen the end of the 50:50 system in the Kurdistan parliament; however, for the first time 
both the major parties found themselves facing genuinely strong opposition, posed by the independent 
“Gorran List” (Change List) led by the former deputy of the PUK, Nawshirwan Mustafa. As well as the 
Change List, four  additional parties, the Islamists in alliance with the Socialists and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ party, made up another opposition list called the “Chaksazi u Xzmatguzari List” (List of 
Service and Reform). Somewhat unexpectedly the Islamists appeared to be less interested in these 
elections, compared with previous ones.
5 The Kurds are aware that the long history of refusal by any country to offer serious help to the Kurds 
was justified on the grounds that Kurdish demands for independence endangered the territorial 
integrity of these countries and threatened their national security. In many cases, they maintained that 
Kurdish legal rights should be respected and protected, but only within an autonomous arrangement in 
an existing state, while separatism would only lead to war, and ultimately would be rejected by the 
international community. 
3Kurds in the neighbouring states, as well as contributing to the stability that peace and 
security would bring to the Middle East.
It is evident that there are several international difficulties as well as regional and 
national obstacles (both economic and social) confronting the Kurds. First, the Kurds 
have been accused by some Arab and Turkmen groups of expanding their territory 
and their control over resources with the intention of building the foundations of an 
independent Kurdish state. The Kurds are also worried about the current political 
approach in Iraq which is focused on sectarian division and political consensus rather 
than on national unification. Secondly, from a regional point of view, the Kurds are 
aware that Turkey, Syria and Iran wish to challenge the KRG and interfere in its 
internal affairs. These countries have manipulated their allies in the new Iraqi 
government in order to create barriers to Kurdish ambitions, particularly in relation to 
the implementation of Article 140. They often express resentment publicly towards a 
more powerful KRG, and claim that the Kurds are blocking peaceful co-existence 
between different ethnic groups by the demarcation of regional boundaries and 
through proceeding with the development of Kurdistan’s oil resources. The Kurds, on 
the other hand, emphasise that these places were subjected to ethnic cleansing and 
Arabization. It follows from the over-emphasis by Turkey, which has drawn several 
red lines for the Kurds, that any political gain by the Iraqi Kurds is likely to create a 
problem for the Kurds in Turkey who may decide to demand similar political gains. 
Thirdly, the international powers, particularly the Unites States, will put pressure on 
the Kurds to be more flexible and to offer concessions on their territorial and 
economic demands. Therefore, the Kurds will find it difficult to protect the relative 
independence they once enjoyed, and will in due course find it virtually impossible to 
seek independence.
However, Kurdistan is taking advantage of a period of stability and has established 
democratic law, which gives a firm basis for undertaking further development, even 
though there is more that needs to be done to enable the Kurdistan region to continue 
on its road to progress. Recent tensions between the Kurdish leaderships and the 
administration of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki have increased. Kurds are being 
accused of crossing the green line, especially with regard to Kurdish claims to Kirkuk 
province (Kurds aspire in particular to return to incorporating Kirkuk as part of the 
4Kurdistan region), and to parts of three other historically Kurdish-populated provinces 
of Diyala, Mosul and Salahaddin, which currently lie outside the present borders of 
the Kurdistan region. In the context of these various areas, the Kurds insist on a 
referendum through implementation of Article 140 which calls for a referendum to 
decide the fate of Kirkuk and other disputed areas, and which takes account of the fact 
that it might be impossible to have a stable Iraq if the border between the two sides 
remains unstable.
The Kurds have endeavoured to reach a compromise with the central government in 
Baghdad over implementing the constitution (including Article 140), integrating the 
Kurdish fighting forces, the Peshmerga, within the Iraqi army, and recognising KRG 
oil contracts. Obviously, there have been disputes between the two parties over the oil 
law, with the Iraqi government claiming that the oil contracts were illegal and 
accusing the Kurds of having negotiated behind the scenes without Baghdad’s 
knowledge. In addition, the Iraqi government blame those countries that have 
approached the Kurds and treated them more or less as an independent nation.  For 
this reason, progress recorded in Kurdistan has not been embraced by Baghdad, even 
though the increased revenue would be beneficial to the country as a whole. 
On the other hand, it is argued that the tensions between the two sides might increase 
and erupt into violence with the withdrawal of US troops. Indeed, the US was 
intending to withdraw all its troops and leave Iraq by 2011; however, they started to 
withdraw from the major cities on 30 June 2009. At the same time, US officials were 
attempting to mediate between the two sides to resolve their disputes and also to make 
sure that fighting would not start in the region as soon as the Americans left Iraq.6 It 
is possible that if these problems remain unresolved, the situation may lead to conflict 
with the Iraqi government and this will threaten stability and peace in Iraq. It is worth 
repeating that the KRG wish to resolve these issues peacefully and in accordance with 
the terms and conditions enshrined in the Iraqi constitution. Despite the circumstances 
and whatever the differences might be, it does not mean that the problems are 
6 During his visit to Baghdad and Erbil at the end of July 2009, and at meetings with both Maliki and 
Masoud Barzani,  US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates argued with reference to tensions between the 
Kurds and the Iraqi government, that the US was ready to help resolve disputes over boundaries and 
hydrocarbons before they left Iraq. See “Ruling bloc wins Iraqi Kurd poll”, Available at:
<URL: http://news.bb.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8175097.stm> Access Date: 29 July 2009.
5insurmountable or cannot be solved; indeed, both sides claim that they depend on the 
constitution and on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
The Kurds have constantly explained that the Iraqi constitution which was endorsed in 
December 2005, has become the foundation of a new democratic and federal Iraq, and 
that this reflects the collective desire of all Iraqi people to prevent a repetition of past 
violence, while providing a new opportunity to improve the lives of all the country’s 
citizens.  In this regard, the KRG has made it clear that the exploration and production 
of oil and gas that has led to the Kurdistan region’s present export trade, is within the 
terms of the constitution of Iraq.  It can be seen that some of the serious problems 
between the two parties is related to the lack of a federal hydrocarbons law or a 
revenue-sharing law.
1. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The main focus of this research is based on the observation that the Kurds are 
supporters of integration with Iraq rather than opponents. They insisted on 
accommodating themselves to the new situation that emerged after 2003, and became 
pro-Iraqi, and since then they have given great support to the Iraqi state. This study 
attempts to analyse facets of changes which have occurred in Kurdistan Region as 
well as in Iraq, in order to provide a clear insight to the study of Kurdish aspiration in 
new Iraqi state post 2003. To achieve this objective, the study observes that the Kurds 
are trying to give a legal and constitutional framework on their gains which have been 
earned since 1991. Further this study attempts to examine the most significant period 
of the Kurds attitude and its interaction with the Iraqi state post 2003. This in turn, 
requires reference to the impact of most important events and the consequences that 
occurred during the years 1991-2003.
After the removal of Saddam’s regime and the adoption of the constitution, the Kurds
became partners in the governing of Iraq and during the rebuilding of the country 
have continued to participate in forming a new political system and creating 
mechanisms to guarantee justice and promote reconciliation with Iraq’s diverse 
6political and social groups.7 The Kurds have seriously attempted in proving their 
attitude to ensure further political progress and produce a unified, democratic Iraq, 
believing that within Iraq they could maintain their power and secure their rights. 
Furthermore, their new discourse since 2003 has been to promote federalism. 
However, while the Kurdish leaders clearly favoured remaining within Iraq, orthodox 
Kurdish opinion, as expressed in both Kurdish and non-Kurdish literature, was not 
satisfied with re-joining Iraq, and was inclined towards independence, being of the 
opinion that the Iraqi government could not be trusted to keep promises in the future, 
and that the dominant Arab view was reminiscent of the previous era which had 
always denied the Kurds their basic human rights.  Overall it would seem that the 
Kurds have been insistent on resolving issues with the Iraqi government, with the aim 
of guaranteeing a future for the Kurdish people and preventing any repetition of their 
tragic history. They have continuously claimed to be seeking a relationship within the 
framework of the constitution of a federal, democratic Iraq.
This thesis is a contemporary historical narrative of changes and developments on the 
positions and strategy of the Kurds to achieve their national demands in a civilised 
and rational form. Given to the impact of the significant events of Iraq’s invasion of 
Iran; also, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait until the attacks on 9/11 and their implications 
to alter International community's attitude toward Iraq, and the light on Kurd's 
suffering for long decades of tyranny by previous Iraqi regimes. In addition, this 
thesis will focus on defining the role and contribution of the KRG in post-Saddam 
state-building efforts in Iraq, whether institutional or constitutional processes, which 
should be considered in the broader context of testing the federal model in post-war 
Iraq. The thesis could argue that it is an attempt to explain the tension between the 
efforts to build a strong Iraqi state to protect its territory and peoples, on the one hand, 
and the power of that state domestically, on the other.
7 The Kurds have participated effectively in the Iraqi government since the liberation of Iraq in 2003. 
Opportunities for Kurds in Iraqi politics have grown dramatically, and they have obtained some of the 
highest positions, especially after the Kurdish coalitions won 75 major seats in the Iraqi parliament; 
this led to the appointment of the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as Iraq’s first Kurdish president after 
the 2005 Iraqi elections. In addition, the deputy prime minister, the deputy leader of the Iraqi 
parliament, the minister of foreign affairs, and the chief of staff are all Kurds; this was because, after 
having done so successfully for 12 years, the Kurds were the only ones in Iraq who knew how to 
govern and lead.
7Further, through this narrative the research attempts to determine whether Iraqi 
Kurd’s aspiration after toppling Saddam regime was in the form of separatists or 
Integrationists. This study focus is an attempt at providing an understanding and 
considering of the core differences and disputes between KRG the Iraqi government 
in the four levels (the Constitution/ federalism, the implementation of Article 140, Oil 
contracts, and case of Peshmerga) and how to resolve through negotiations and 
national reconciliation, which is a shared responsibility shouldered by the political 
forces, opinion leaders, religious scholars, intellectuals, civil society organizations, 
and all active forces in the Iraqi arena.
2. RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION
The significance of this study is reflected in the analysis of the status quo of the 
Kurdistan region, which is going through periods of tensions, harmony and 
negotiations in order to resolve some of the chronic issues that have remained 
unresolved by all the previous governments.  For example, concerning Kirkuk and the 
other disputed areas, the dispute between the Kurds and the Iraqi government over 
Kirkuk has lasted more than 80 years and has often resulted in violence. The crucial 
issue is highly problematical for both sides, and must therefore be resolved, relates to 
the era of Saddam Hussein.  This is the issue of the accelerated practising of ethnic 
cleansing, by expelling or killing Kurds and Turkmen, or by subjecting them to 
nationality ‘corrections’ (whereby non-Arabs are forced to declare themselves Arabs), 
along with the settlement of Arabs into Kurdish areas. These developments have 
created difficulties and problems that determine the administrative demarcation 
between the Kurdistan region and Iraqi government.
The importance of this subject, which will be defined and analysed in the course of 
this discussion, is related to the current and future state of Kurds as a nation in this 
part of Kurdistan. Moreover, Kurds are involved in promoting the culture of 
democracy, not only in Kurdistan but also in Iraq; Kurds have helped Iraq’s evolution 
into what it is today. Furthermore, this extension of the culture of democracy will 
directly or indirectly have an effect on the Kurds in the other parts of Kurdistan (in 
Turkey, Iran and Syria).
8Additionally, this thesis has examined the main controversial issues between the two 
sides and suggests the following solutions: 
1. The constitution is based on the rules of the political balances between Iraqi 
factions, but also takes into account the interests and wishes of each of the three 
components (Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds). Even so there are Constitutional gaps and 
contradictions that should be addressed in the Iraqi Constitution without prejudice to 
the rights of minorities and the federal regions. On the other hand, it seems clear that 
some groups wish to exploit this issue in order to exaggerate the problems between 
the KRG and the Iraqi government. For this reason, the Kurds have consistently 
confirmed their adherence to the constitution, and that maintaining their rights as 
enumerated in the constitution represents a red line that should not be crossed.
2. Appropriate solution could be through the formation of other federal regions. 
One trend in Iraq supports the creation of other federal regions, whereas another trend 
strongly opposes the application of any idea of federalism as a whole.
3. Concerning the type of political morality that should be followed in Iraq, it 
would be necessary to create trust among all Iraqi parties; they should also respect 
their commitment to agreements made between them.  The lack of trust between the 
Iraqi parties neither serves the stability nor ensures the unity of the territory of Iraq, 
since instead of recognising the rights of other parties they resort to conspiracy and 
attempt to evade their responsibilities. The historic responsibility for the political 
parties to decide the fate of Iraq and to face what might happen in the future rests on 
the status quo.
4. The Iraqi Government, the federal region, and civil society organisations need 
to act on all levels across Iraq to promote political awareness of federalism and make 
it understood that the application of federalism will maintain the unity of Iraq and will 
not divide it. Some Iraqi politicians have frequently made confessional statements;8
8 On 16 August 2011 the Iraqi Prime Minister declared in a speech (published in the Iraqi media) that 
the federal system was not favoured by the Iraqi people. This speech was contrary to Iraqi demands,
particularly as the citizens in the provinces of Diyala and Basra had recently demanded federal regions.  
9this is likely to lead to provocation and disorder that in turn will lead to increased 
unrest among the Iraqi factions.
5. Article 140 should be applied at all stages, because of its importance not only 
for the Kurds but also for the whole of Iraq, but with significant difference at its core. 
Disputes between the provinces of Anbar and Karbala, and also between the 
provinces of Baghdad and Salahaddin are due to administrative changes only, while in 
the Kurdish areas, deliberate administrative and demographic manipulation has been 
implemented. Given the nature of religious and ethnic composition of Iraqi society, 
the only path to maintain the unity of Iraq is security, and respect and commitment to 
the constitution to ensure the peaceful coexistence of all its parts. Therefore, the Iraqi 
government must genuinely intend to implement Article 140.  A new Iraqi 
government must also prove in practice that it is working to eliminate the process of 
Arabization that was so widely exercised by the Baath regime. What is currently 
happening in the Iraqi arena seems to confirm the opposite, since evidence indicates 
that the process of Arabization by the new Iraqi government is occurring in another 
form and in new styles in the disputed areas.9
6. While the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the Iraqi 
economy, the KRGs want to push ahead unilaterally with developing oil fields within 
their region. They also want each of the country’s regions to receive a portion of all 
the revenues in Iraq, including oil revenue, according to the size of its population, 
particularly as the new Iraqi constitution allows a federal unit to retain a large 
percentage of revenues collected within its borders, with the rest being collected by 
the central government. The Iraqi government has deliberately neglected the issue of 
an oil revenue-sharing law, and is unwilling to give the regions the broad powers 
9 It is evident that many Arab political parties are trying to follow the same methods used by the 
Baathist regime to change the demographics in the Kurdish areas, known as ‘disputed areas’, and 
currently outside the control of the KRG administration. In an interview with Mahmoud Sangawi (a 
prominent military leader and member of the PUK’s political bureau) via satellite on 15 August 2011, 
he accused the Iraqi forces of collaborating with terrorist groups on a large scale to expel Kurdish 
citizens living in the disputed areas. He said the PUK had many documents to prove this, adding that 
the Wali of Diyala, a prominent al-Qaeda terrorist leader, had been arrested carrying half a ton of TNT, 
but released after six hours. Sangawi had also seen a list of names of terrorists who had blown
themselves up, simultaneously killing large numbers of citizens; however, the Jalawla administration 
considered them martyrs and the Iraqi government gave them salaries. In addition, over 67,000 acres 
of agricultural land owned by Kurdish families in Diyala, but occupied by resettled Arabs (wafideen) 
had not been returned to its owners due to some Arab political parties in the government encouraging 
the wafideen to stay.
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granted by the Iraqi constitution to extract and manage the oil sector by regions. The 
main controversial debate will concern the capability of a federal government and 
attempts to centralise and control all oil contracts that have been held by international 
oil companies. Applying a federal system will provide for a fair distribution of 
revenues according to Iraq’s demographic structure, and will also prevent the federal 
government from controlling oil resources. It must be remembered that the KRG’s
have made serious attempts to avoid the re-centralisation of Iraq, since their people 
have paid a heavy price to obtain the gains mentioned in the Iraqi constitution.
7. It is also quite important to focus on the KRG’s problems inside the Kurdistan 
Region itself. The Kurdistan Regional Government should respond to and deal more 
moderately with the demands of the opposition on the most sensitive issues; these 
include: the elimination of administrative corruption at all levels of government; the 
transparency of oil contracts and how resources are spent and  distributed; and a real 
union between administrative units, particularly the financial and military affairs,  i.e., 
the formation of a united Peshmerga force to protect the region under the KRG’s 
control (not run by the main PUK and KDP parties). This will solve the internal 
problems and disputes between the Kurdish parties and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri 
Al-Maliki have a positive impact on the KRG, giving it a united voice in its dealings 
with the Iraqi government.
3. RESEARCH QUESTION
In this thesis, I wish to analyse and examine the question as to whether or not KRG’s
were driving towards total independence before the 2003 war, and whether they 
transformed into enthusiastic pro-Iraqis from 2003 onwards. In this context, I shall 
endeavour to address the hypothesis that the KRG’s have been effective supportive 
elements for the Iraqi State since 2003, that they do not want to secede from Iraq and 
that they wish to compromise and make serious efforts to achieve their legitimate 
rights and protect their gains via the Iraqi political process. Through a survey, I will 
try to address the following questions: 
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a. How did the KRG’s protect the gains that they had made within the new structure 
of Iraq during a seven year period, and how they achieve the others? In other words, 
how were the KRG’s able to achieve the gains that are mentioned in the Iraqi 
constitution?
b. Why are there fears about the KRG demands? Do the KRG’s constitute a factor 
for stability or fragmentation in Iraq?
c. Does the federalizing for Iraqi State and the implementation of Article 140 only 
guarantee the bringing of KRG rights, or should they be seeking another guarantee?
d. Why did Kurdish aspirations change in post-Saddam Iraq?  What are the ways by 
which the re-organisation of the KRG-Iraqi government relationship has been taking 
place in Post-Saddam Iraq, and what effects has this reorganisation produced?
e. Why are the Kurds interested in annexing the Kirkuk province to the Kurdistan 
region? Do Kurds give up to join Kirkuk within the KRG or should they be resorting 
to military actions?
4. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
The introduction provides the reader a summary of the work reported in this thesis 
and the outline and structure of this research. As the purpose of this thesis is to 
introduce the reader to the complexities of the political situation of the KRG’s within 
Iraq, and the changes that happened in the political arena at the level of regional and 
international towards Iraq and its implications over the Kurds.
Chapter one focuses on theoretical frame work and methodology. The study uses this 
chapter to give details on the theory of integration and non-state actors. Besides, this 
chapter refers to the consociational theory, which whilst is similar to other theories of 
conflict regulation such as integrationist theories, nevertheless it is strongly connected 
with the modes of democracy (which include elections, cabinets, parliament, and civil 
service), Further, this chapter extends through the federalism theory as an 
arrangement for a pluralistic society of diverse peoples aiming at a union of parts. 
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This chapter helps give an understanding of the ideologies and the various 
interpretations of the non state-actors' role on the political stage. It is only through 
tracking these three theories that the necessary grounds attempt to tackle and 
understand the KRG's position during the successive governments up to the creation a 
new Iraqi government post 2003.
Chapter two takes a comprehensive look at the brief history of the Kurds and their 
situation in Iraq during the Ottoman Period and the British Mandate and the Kurdish 
revolutions that followed  up to Iran -Iraq war: 1980-1988.
In chapter three an attempt is made to identify the respective events and the different 
factors that influenced and caused the first Kurdish elections in 1992 and formation of 
Kurdistan Region Government.  It also attempts to observe how Kuwait's invasion 
resulted in radical changes inside Iraq and in the region, including the establishment 
of Safe Havens for the Kurds and UN's reactions to ratify the UN's SCR 688, and the 
SCR 986 (Oil-for-Food programme) and its impact on the Kurdistan Region. This 
chapter helps give an understanding of the factors that had significant impact to the 
outbreak of internal fighting between the two main Kurdish parties, and how it led to 
administrative division between them.
Chapter four tackles the progress of the political situation in the Kurdistan Region 
since 2003 that started as a result of Iraq' liberation. This chapter is an attempt to 
demonstrate the US administration's effort to restructure the Iraqi State through the 
formation of the interim government of Iraq and helps the Iraqi factions to write a 
new constitution for their country.
Chapter five addresses the first major focus and the most original contribution of this 
study which is the repercussion of the new Iraqi constitution on the Kurds, which 
gave the KRG’s a broad power to manage their area. The second section of the 
chapter studies the impacts and objectives of the implementation of the federal system 
within the Kurdistan and Iraq.
Chapter six deals primarily with the intricacies of the case of Kirkuk through the 
examination of the various reasons and objectives that lay behind implementing the 
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process of Arabization by the Iraqi regime in the province of Kirkuk and its environs, 
which is affected seriously to change the demographic ethnic composition in the city 
of Kirkuk. Chapter seven goes on to tackle the phases of Article 140 of the Iraqi 
constitution which is necessary to implement a road map between the KRG and the 
central government in Baghdad in order to settle their disputes and determine the fates 
of the disputed areas. Although it is apparent that the Arabs (whether Sunni or Shiite) 
with Turkmens have united to stand strongly against the notion of Kirkuk’s inclusion 
in the Kurdistan Region and their alliances focused on how to prevent the 
implementation of Article 140.
Chapter eight addresses KRG's policy on oil contracts, which have been conducted 
with international and regional companies. This chapter covers a complicated issue 
which is raised between the KRG and Iraqi government about the legitimacy of those 
contracts. From the KRG's view it is deemed that those contracts are legal and it is 
exercising its legitimate right derived from the constitution.
The final chapter addresses the issue of the Peshmerga (Kurdish forces) in post-
Saddam Iraq and the negotiations between the two sides to recognize the rights and 
duties of the Kurdish forces by the Iraqi government as similar to the Iraqi military 
forces.
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Chapter 1:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Identifying a theoretical model to enable analysis of the contemporary political 
situation in the Kurdistan region is a highly problematic process, especially given the 
speed with which events are changing in the Kurdistan region and Iraq, as well as in 
the wider Middle East. The Kurdistan region has been affected by instability in the 
international situation and more specifically within the Middle East. On the other 
hand, to understand this subject it is necessary to combine reflection on past issues 
with speculation as to future events, particularly with regard to the current US 
withdrawal from Iraqi cities and the challenges that will result from the elections that 
will take place both in the Kurdistan region and Iraq. This thesis will examine current 
and emerging evaluations of the Kurdistan region, thereby, to a certain degree, 
bringing into contention those aspects that can be described as analytical, and those 
that may be determined as prescriptive.
Events during the past two decades and specifically what has been happening to the 
position of the Kurds in Iraq will be subject to evaluation and discussion. The collapse 
of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent participation of Kurds in the Iraqi government 
have given them opportunities to become a major component in the present and future 
government of the whole of Iraq.
In effect, the Kurds have been gaining experience in the administration of their de 
facto government in Iraq since 1991, and the Kurdistan region has been relatively 
peaceful and prosperous since the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, the political 
autonomy of the Kurds, and their territorial and economic demands have caused 
friction with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other Arab leaders of Iraq, and with 
neighbouring Turkey and Iran: nor do the major outstanding issues between the Kurds 
and the Iraqi government seem to be close to resolution. After the Iraqi government 
reduced the role of Kurdish representation in the mixed provinces, tensions increased 
and there were reports that these disputes between Kurdish forces and Iraqi
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government forces had the potential to erupt into violence. In this context, the Kurdish 
leaders confirmed their desire to remain as part of Iraq and showed their support for 
full negotiations, in order to resolve the disputed issues and to prevent the stability 
achieved in the Kurdistan region and also throughout Iraq from being undermined. 
The Kurdistan region does not, however, have its own regional constitution. Currently 
(summer 2010), the KRG has legislative and executive authority in the areas defined 
by the Iraqi constitution, consisting of three provinces (Dohuk, Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah), and its duties include allocating the regional budget, health, education 
and security. The KRG exercises considerable powers of autonomy within a federal 
Iraq, taking into consideration the fact that any new constitution in Kurdistan cannot 
contradict that of Iraq.
While it is true that the political situation in the Kurdistan region is distinctive, the 
region itself is not a State recognized by the international community, or by other 
States in the Middle East, due to its geographical location at the sensitive intersection 
of the boundaries of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Furthermore, Kurds are subjected to 
the effects of relations between the interests of the international political powers and 
the interests of the states that include Kurds in the Middle East; this of course 
influences the interactions that arise from such alignments.  In terms of institutions, 
attributes and characteristics, the internal political system has evolved rapidly with the 
development of administrative systems and a growing civil society in the Kurdistan 
region. 
The impact of changes in the global economy and in regional geopolitics has created 
new opportunities for studying the political system in the Kurdistan region. Kurds 
now occupy a significant position in the foreign policies of various states, which can 
be attributed to several interrelated factors, including in particular the participation of 
international and regional companies for the exploration of oil in this region.  It is 
therefore important to note that the subject of the Kurds has been discussed in terms 
of the impact of Kurdish issues on the relations and interests between and among the 
states in the Middle East that possess significant Kurdish populations. In this respect, 
it may possible to depend on international relations theories to analyse and understand 
the political situation of the Kurdistan region. 
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Regarding the use of international relation theories, Gareth Stansfield notes that, “it is 
an impossible task to provide a truly insightful analysis of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
predicament from the starting point of the domestic political system”, pointing out 
that the de facto Iraqi Kurdistan may be positioned within theoretical interpretations 
of the characteristics of the State. There is an argument to the effect that
...the theories of politics and government which exist under the 
umbrella of comparative politics are founded in the analysis of 
established, and often State, systems, and the discipline of 
comparative politics originates in the study of nation States and 
the liberal democratic politics. Comparative politics has been 
developed and is used to investigate the governance and 
politics of nation states. Nonetheless, this does not prevent it 
from been applied to Kurdistan region. 10
There are, however, aspects of political systems that have been addressed in the 
theoretical literature.  A focus of this survey is to identify the political system that has 
developed in the Kurdistan region since 2003, and to discover aspects of the 
development of the political system in the current political conditions in the Kurdistan 
region as well as in Iraq as a whole.  It is for this reason that the study intends to use 
the theory of a consociational political system as a basis for analysing the challenges 
and factors the Kurds face to maintain political stability in their region, a precedent 
that has been addressed by this method in other literature. Stansfield suggests 
arguments as to why this theory can be employed in the case of Kurdistan, stating that 
the future peaceful development of the political system in Kurdistan region can be 
achieved by the adoption of a consociational model. However, it is argued that the 
splitting up of administration between two major parties as a result of political 
cleavages after 1996 might have destroyed the consociational system, despite the 
cooperation of the elite and the association of administrative activities between the 
areas of the two parties. 11
Nevertheless, we can argue that the consociational system has not lost its importance, 
particularly during the last decade when the two main parties reached a conviction, 
10 Gareth R. V. Stansfield,  Iraqi Kurdistan: Political development and emergent democracy, (New 
York and London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 18
11 Ibid., p. 21.
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this was only through political consensus and that cooperation would maintain the 
security and stability of the status quo of Kurdistan Region. According to these facts, 
an analytical and descriptive route is pursued to achieve the objective of the study. It 
could be argued that the nature and scope of this thesis is of a qualitative nature, 
which deals mostly with accounts of contemporary historical events. Besides, given 
its empirical nature, the study focuses on how and why these policies and decisions 
were made by Kurds. In this chapter we try to tackle the theories of Integration and 
Non-State Actors, consociational theory and federalism theory, in order to understand 
the development and changes in political situations and its repercussions.
1.1 THEORY OF INTEGRATION AND NON-STATE ACTORS
Depending on the international relations theories, which have been illustrated in the 
process of State interaction at the governmental level, I will attempt in this study to 
elucidate the interaction of the non-state relationships. In the study of international 
affairs, actors in the international community must be taken into account. It has been 
argued that in this context, domestic political issues and cross-cultural and social 
relationships, for instance, are important elements. Despite this, the primary actors in 
present world politics are still nation-states or sovereign States, which are the most 
important units of analysis in the study of international relations. Thus, it becomes 
apparent that many political scientists argue that nation-states are the first for 
understanding and explaining world political behaviour. 
This tendency of thought has depended on several postulates to the state-centric 
model; first, global politics are dependent on the interaction of nation-states. 
Secondly; while such states are equal in sovereignty they are, however, considerably 
different in size and power. Thirdly; nation-states are independent and distinguishable 
from one another. Fourthly; the governments of nation-states, especially their 
foreign–policy agents, are only participants in world politics. 
Nevertheless, it can currently be seen that non-state actors, as entities other than 
states, have interacted with the international community, and that, according  to Philip 
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Taylor, most of the incidents of international conflict since the Cold War have largely 
involved non-state actors.12 Taylor also notes that non-State actors include 
multinational corporations, stateless groups (e.g., the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, the Basques, the Kurds), terrorist organizations (the Irish Republic 
Army, Black September, and so on), regional international organizations (the 
Organization of American States), and the United Nations Security Council and 
General Assembly. He is critical of the state-centric model which ignores the 
existence and importance of regional international organizations, 13and has suggested 
that in this context it is necessary to identify the purpose and functions of non-state 
actors, in order to create a framework for analysis of non-state actors. These must 
then be classified to construct a typology of the units (including size, memberships, 
geographical location, function, purpose, longevity, importance, and so on). In 
addition, he argues that to understand the behaviour of any non-state actor it is 
necessary to be clear about their objectives, the nature of their structures and 
processes and how they organise themselves: “the simplest definition of non-states is 
that they are entities other than nation-state actors that interact in the international 
political system”.14
In this regard, some of the more traditionalist scholars maintain that non-state actors 
are unimportant in the study of world politics, whereas others stress the importance of 
such components. Borhanedin Yassin suggests that the traditionalist view is expressed 
in the state-centric model, which is based on several assumptions; thus, states are 
equally sovereign regardless of size and power; world politics are exclusively based 
on the interaction of states; the relationship between domestic and foreign policies is 
not relevant; there is no authority above that of the state; and the world is divided into 
states with governments exercising overall control.15 With regard to international 
integration as an insignificant area within international relations, Taylor indicated that 
according to some international political scholars (such as Altiero Spinelli), theorists 
of international integration  consisted of functionalists, the confederalists, and the 
federalists. Other such scholars (such as Charles Pentland) have indicated four 
12 Phillip Taylor, Non-state Actors in International Politics From Trans-regional to Sub-state
Organization, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1984), pp. 3-5. 
13 Ibid., pp. 3-5
14 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
15 Borhanedin A. Yassin, Vision or Reality? The Kurds in the Policy of the Great Powers 1941-1947, 
(Malmo, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1995), p.21
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schools: the pluralists, the functionalists, the neo-functionalists, and the federalists. 
These schools might represent explanatory capabilities, depending on the aspect or 
stage of the integration process. Additionally, Pentland assigned intellectuals such as 
C. J. Friedrich, W. H. Riker, Peter Hay, George Liska, and Amitai Etzioni to the 
federalist school.16
1.2 CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY 
It has been argued that consociationalism is concerned with “consociational 
democracy” which is defined by the following four conditions: a grand coalition, 
proportionality (which include elections, cabinets, parliament, civil service, etc.), 
mutual vetoes, and segmental authority (depending on whether each social segment 
has its own sphere of authority, either territorially or functionally).
In terms of the evolution of the political situation in Kurdistan region in particular and 
in Iraq in general, it can be useful in this study to depend on explanatory theories 
which are devoted to the analysis of political and ethnic conflicts; therefore I pay 
particular attention to consociational theory as a normative theory that is pertinent to 
the concept of the establishing and progressing of democracy.  An interesting 
interpretation of the concept of consociationalism is provided in the theory developed 
by Arend Lijphart, and its relevance to pluri-national places; thus it can be a state, a 
place within a state, or a place that crosses state borders. Scholars such as John 
McGarry and Brendan O’Leary base this subject on the concept of a pluri-national 
place and its relevance to discrete national identities; thus “the dominant political 
party or parties, or its popular civic associations, are nationalist in character and 
support the classical nationalist goals of self-determination (autonomy or 
independence)” 17 It is reasonable therefore to assume that this theory can be possible 
and to depend on it in the present study. 
16 Taylor (1984), op. cit., p. 31.
17 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Consociational Theory and Peace Agreements in Pluri-
National Places: Northern Ireland and Other Cases’, in The Failure of the Middle East Peace Process? 
A Comparative Analysis of Peace Implementation in Israel/ Palestine, Northern Ireland and South 
Africa, ed. Guy Ben-Porat. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 70
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The theory started as an attempt to explain how democracy remained stable in the 
deeply-divided societies of Switzerland, Austria, and other places. Indeed, it is 
evident that consociational democracy was discovered in several other countries, 
including Colombia, India, Lebanon, etc. Although controversies continue as to 
whether it is contemporary and more relevant to the transitional regime type, it has 
reduced the effects of deep societal divisions.  It is also crucial to note that although 
the consociational theory has been critiqued by integrationists, it is very 
accommodating towards minority groups, whether defined as nations, or as ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious communities, which in turn leads to empowering the ethnic 
elites who have an interest in maintaining division along ethnic lines.
It has also been claimed that consociational institutions have been working to 
entrench divisions. According to McGarry and O’Leary, other commentators object to 
the way consociationalists focus on political elites rather than supporting the 
mobilisation of civil society organizations in order to convert society towards 
progress and development.  Their arguments have shown that they can support 
consociations if it is appropriate to do so, although they argue that consociational 
institutions can be seen by minority nations as too integrationist. It has also been 
asserted that the focus is on integrating diverse groups within States through 
accepting them as groups, rather than pursuing secession or division as a way of 
resolving conflicts.18 It could be argued that during the past two decades, there have 
been settlements, and also efforts to reconcile a number of issues that are pluri-
national in origin, as  happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova 
(Gagauzia), Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), the Philippines (Mindanao), Sudan 
(the South), Northern Ireland, as well as Iraq (Kurdistan region). However, in some of 
these, the issue is not power-sharing but the achievement of territorial autonomy.19
According to Yassin, scholars have used several trends to illustrate the Kurdish 
dilemma, based on a variety of factors within or outside the framework of the Kurdish 
community. Some have focused on the social and economic aspects of the Kurdish 
question, while others have depended on the ethno-political nature of the issue.20
18 Ibid., p.71
19 Ibid., p.85
20 Yassin (1995), op. cit., p.15
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From its establishment up until the present, the Iraqi State has attracted the attention 
of the Great Powers from both strategic and economic perspectives. As a part of this 
context, especially in the post-Saddam era, the Kurds have taken on a new role in its 
development; they offer an interesting field of study, since they reveal a strong 
interactive relationship between a numbers of factors with an emphasis on the 
international dimension. It is a fact that since 1991 the Kurdish dilemma in Iraq has 
attracted increasing attention from the international community as well as regional 
policymakers.
In the case of Iraq and Kurdistan as the pluri-national community and despite the 
considerable instability of the situation, the process of democracy has been promoted. 
I want to refer here to the situation outlined by Yassin who maintains that 
...the Kurds have long been a critical political factor in the 
region in which they are found by residing in a number of 
neighbouring countries, by being consistently involved in
political upheavals against the central powers in those 
countries; though of Kurds and especially Kurdish political 
movements with one another across official State boundaries; 
and being involved in and affected by Great Power policies in 
the area.21
I think that what is even more important in this context is that this theory could be 
applied to resolving intra-state conflicts and promoting consensual democracy, 
especially since Iraq’s new constitution has emphasised autonomy for the regions, 
with immediate recognition for Kurdistan as a region, while provisions for power-
sharing at the central level are relatively weak and informal, since they are based on 
political consensus and this, in turn, is subject to change in political equations within 
Iraq. 
In addition, the Kurds want a weak central state because of bad experiences with all 
the previous Iraqi governments, even though they were permitted some power-sharing 
for autonomy. They have struggled for the insertion of a clause in the “Transitional
Administrative Law” section of Iraq’s interim constitution confirming that Iraq is 
composed of several nations as “a country of multiple nationalities”, and that Arabic 
21 Ibid., p.22.
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and Kurdish are both official languages, with the aim of consolidating these items in 
the permanent constitution. In this regard, some scholars have argued that the aim of 
nationalities is to seek a special form of collective territorial autonomy, in which their 
homeland has a unique autonomy and therefore possesses a distinct status when 
compared with other regions belonging to the State’s dominant national community. 
In this context, one needs to consider that the weakness of this theory is that at times 
it could be difficult to determine whether such matters have been addressed by 
traditional consociational theory.
In fact, for the Kurds the current priority is to unify Iraq and attempt to achieve a real 
sharing of power through a system of federation in Iraq and to expand its current 
borders to incorporate Kirkuk and other disputed areas into the Kurdistan region. It 
should be noted that supporters of such “integrative” federalism include Donald 
Horowitz, Andreas Wimmer, the Dawishas, and Kanan Makiya; the latter three 
writers have explicitly supported such arrangements in Iraq and Kurdistan. In terms of 
evaluating this theory, McGarry and O’Leary have asserted that not all ethnic groups 
are secessionists, and that it is not true that ethnic divisions are necessarily more 
intractable than class or religious disputes. Integrationists believe that, generally 
speaking, minority nationalities try to obtain collective self-government; therefore, 
they suggest dividing nationalities into multiple federal units as a preferred strategy, 
thereby making it more difficult for them to secede. In addition, it can be said that the 
minority divisions into units could lead to facilitating the construction of alliances 
between varieties of groups, as well as to reinforcing central State “nation- building”. 
The counter argument, on the other hand, is that, in particular circumstances stateless 
nations will persistently oppose integrationist partition; hence; such a situation 
promotes conflict rather than reducing it. In any event, it has been stated that the 
consociational theory is similar to other theories of conflict regulation, particularly 
integrationist theories, at least in its early modern forms which focused on 
institutional prescriptions that coincided with a State’s territory.22
22 McGarry, and O’Leary (2008), op. cit., pp. 77-78 
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1.3 FEDERALISM THEORY
As a principle and in practice, federalism has been used increasingly in the 
international arena, particularly during recent decades.  One might describe it as a 
way of protecting a country’s territorial integrity; on the other hand, most recent
ethnic movements are interested in federalization as an important political step 
towards identity recognition, a high degree of autonomy in the international 
community, and political unity.23 Federalism may be considered as an arrangement 
for a pluralistic society of diverse peoples aiming at a union of parts. On the other 
hand, federal polities limit governmental power by dispersing it among administrative 
levels with independent sources of authority that aim to protect the diversity of 
political entities, particularly ethnic minorities. From this point of view, it has been 
argued that federalism aims “to be the toleration of difference rather than the 
overcoming of difference in a wider unity.”24
It seems that a federal solution can be an appropriate method for organizing national 
and ethno-national communities so that they can live with differences. It is widely 
believed that the real spread of federations occurred in the period after the Second 
World War, mostly in former colonies in Asia and Africa, as well as in Europe, which
can be turned to as an appropriate political model for uniting multi-cultural societies. 
Today, federations represent some of the largest nations of the world: the Russian 
Federation (replacing the former USSR), Canada, USA, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Germany, India, Nigeria and Tanzania. In another sense, most of 
the governments of the world are currently under a federal form of government of one 
type or another.
It can be said that the failure of socialism in the socialist bloc, and the involvement of 
globalisation, have current relevance to the federal idea, particularly when a world 
marked by centralised nation-states and national sovereignty is not appropriate for 
federalism. The extent of the impact of globalisation on the nation-state is a subject of 
23 Ann Ward and Lee Ward ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism, (UK: Ashgate, MPG 
Books Group, 2009),  p. 567
24 Ward, Ann and Sara MacDonald , ‘Nascent Federalism and its Limit in Ancient Greece: Herodotus 
and Thucydides’, in The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism, Ann Ward and Lee Ward 
(eds.);( United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books Group, 2009), p. 137
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some debate among scholars,25 and despite some differences, all agree that today’s 
nation-state has not lost its importance, even though it is argued that globalisation has 
undermined the basis of these unitary centralised nation-states to such an extent that 
the sovereignty of the nation-State is much diminished. Thus, federalism can be an 
appropriate way for countries suffering from ethno-national conflicts in many parts of 
the world to avoid the problems that arise in various political circumstances, 
particularly post-colonial, post-communist, and post-conquest, and at different stages 
of incorporation within the international community.26
Our methodology is constructed upon the theory of federalism and focuses on the new 
situation after the political changes in Iraq and in the region after 2003. Due to the 
nature of the complex ethnic composition inside Iraq, it may be concluded that 
expanded opportunities for all Iraqi ethnic groups to participate in the political process 
might be achievable through a federal system, in turn permitting diversity among 
regions, allowing flexibility in problem-solving and providing opportunities for 
experimentation and innovation. From the experiences of countries around the world 
that apply such a system, federalism appears as a successful political principle for find 
solutions to the key problems, particularly linguistic in nature, for minority groups.  
From this perspective, the question is to what extent can federalism solve Iraq’s 
chronic problems of ethnicity? In other words, in what conditions would it be 
appropriate for the Iraqi government to adopt a federal solution, or should it be 
restricted? One might justifiably argue that a new political situation in Iraq requires a 
commitment to a new contractual arrangement between political parties. It must be 
understood that federalism has ability to create varying balances between provincial 
and federal powers. An important dimension supporting this theory is the conviction 
that federalism would provide protection for minorities and enable cultural, linguistic, 
religious, and ideological diversity to flourish. Another consideration is that a federal 
25 Given the nature of developments and political events during the nineteenth century, all trends and 
motives among states were towards nation-building, particularly by nation-uniting. Most nations were 
born by nation-uniting, and adopted ‘unity-in-diversity’ as a new kind of idea. Arguably, in an era of 
the worldwide fragmentation of national identity and the nation-state, the role of federalism becomes 
critical. Certainly many scholars are convinced that the nation-state still remains the principal actor 
within the global political order.  In addition, most countries that enjoy multiculturalism, racial, ethnic, 
and gender consciousness are challengers of national identity, and there is no doubt that federalism was 
a product of America’s experiences in the British Empire and the work of “Revolutionary Assemblies”. 
Harihar Bhattacharyya, Federalism in Asia, India, Pakistan and Malaysia, (London: Routledge, 2010), 
pp. 8-9
26 Ibid., pp. 9-12
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government should try to ensure greater social and economic equity through social 
welfare and civil rights programmes.
1.3.1 THEORISTS OF FEDERALISM AND THEIR ROLE IN THE      
SUCCESS OF THE THEORY OF FEDERALISM
The theory and practice of federalism has evolved over centuries. As most would 
argue, the notion of federation developed and was derived from confederations of 
independent city-states in antiquity, to the secular and religious institutions of 
classical and biblical times, and so into the contemporary world; thus federalism 
remains a permanent political possibility for the arrangement of human society.27
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the fundamental ideas of federalism, 
particularly with regard to the notion of popular sovereignty and the decentralisation 
of power between two levels of government were developed by Hobbes, Locke, 
Harrington, and Montesquieu.28
In paying attention to the theorists and advocates of federalism, Thomas Jefferson’s 
theory, 29 who put the theory of federalism to use, which is regarding the success of 
27 According to political theorists federalism has historical roots, particularly in the republican or 
democratic institutions in Athens as described by Herodotus, when Greek cities formed a federal 
alliance to save Greece from subjugation to the Persian Empire. Alternatively, it has been thought that 
the federal idea originated in the Bible, and that the original use of the idea was theological and 
referred to the partnership between humans and God. Ann Ward and Sara MacDonald ,“Nascent 
Federalism and its Limit in Ancient Greece: Herodotus and Thucydides”; in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Federalism, Ann Ward and Lee Ward (eds.); Ashgate, MPG Books Group, United 
Kingdom, 2009,  p.15; and also Cited Ann Ward and Lee Ward (eds.), The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Federalism, Ashgate UK, MPG Books Group,  2009,  p. 567
28 The theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and eventually Montesquieu and Madison in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a significant impact on the federal notion of transforming 
secular political principles and techniques. From this perspective, Montesquieu explained how “federal 
polity [would] be composed solely of republics rather than monarchies or some combination of the 
two.” Cited in Ann Ward and Sara MacDonald, ibid., p.15
Sharada Rath, Federalism Today: Approaches, Issues, and Trends, Sterling publishers private Limited, 
Printed in India, 1984, p. 182 
29 Thomas Jefferson (who became the third US President in 1801) was both a prominent theorist and a 
practitioner of federalism. Some have argued that Jefferson rarely had an opportunity to put his theories 
into practice, even though he thought that republicanism should consist of the institutions responsive to 
the will of the people and a people actively engaged in political affairs. But he was clearly interested in 
how to organize national and local governments, and was persuaded that popular election and strict 
accountability were the best means of securing the best service for the citizenry. It is generally agreed 
that Jefferson contributed significantly to interpreting the constitution during the 1790s, particularly 
with regarding to the constitutionality of a national bank. Peter McNamara, “Thomas Jefferson’s 
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the American republican experiment emphasized that the advantages of federalism 
were liberty, security, and happiness. For this, Jeffersonian federalism “presupposes a 
considerable homogeneity among citizens and a fundamental agreement on basic 
political principle.”30
Elazar’s political theory of federalism was rooted in the Latin word foedus, which in
Hebrew means the ‘covenant’.31 Daniel J. Elazar remarked that “federalism is more 
than an arrangement of governmental structures; it is a mode of political activity that 
requires the extension of certain kinds of cooperative relationships throughout any 
political system it animates.” 32 Bhattacharyya draws attention to another of Daniel 
Elazar’s beliefs that “the federal idea is resurfacing as a significant political force in 
humanity’s transition from the modern to the post-modern epoch.” According to 
Elazar, federalism as a political principle combines the two principles of self-rule and 
shared rule, and in this context he remarks that shared-rule (common purpose) and
self-rule (specific regional purpose), as it were, entail decentralisation in respect of 
self-rule. Obviously, what this illustrates is that political institutions, such as free 
elections, free criticism, and representative institutions are based on democracy, 
which implies that democracy provides the basis for the legitimacy of such a 
combination, as well as being necessary for federalism, and thus for the sake of 
diversity. Irrespective of the difference, Elazar is convinced that federalism seeks to 
maintain both unity and diversity at the same time, noting that, “it is a mistake to 
present unity and diversity as opposites”. 33
The American political scientist William Riker was another contributor to the theory 
and history of federalism who paid particular attention to the idea of the “bargain of 
Enlightenment Idea of Federalism”, in The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism, ed. Ann Ward 
and Lee Ward (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books Group, 2009), pp. 208-18
30 Ibid., pp. 222
31 Covenants are also distinguished from compacts and contracts by the belief that God is the guarantor, 
even though Daniel Elazar, twentieth century American Jewish intellectual, believed that compacts 
were more similar to covenants than contracts. At the end, covenants, compacts, and contracts all seek 
liberty for their members, but each of them explains the relationship between liberty and morality in a 
different way. See Glenn A. Moots, “The Covenant Tradition of Federalism: the Pioneering Studies of 
Daniel J. Elazar”, in Ann Ward and Lee Ward (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism, 
Ashgate, MPG Books Group, United Kingdom, 2009, pp. 391-97
32 Alain-G. Gagnon, “The Political uses of Federalism”; in Comparative Federalism and Federation: 
Competing traditions and future directions, ed. Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, (Great Britain: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 17
33 Bhattacharyya (2010), op. cit., pp. 12-5, pp. 97-98, p.150
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federalism”. According to Riker, “The politicians who offer the bargain desire to 
expand their territorial control [while] the politicians who accept the bargain are 
willing to do so because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity.” 
In addition, Riker found himself at odds with the way “the administrative theory of 
federalism” concerned “the division and sharing of administrative responsibilities”, 
which were supposed to preserve guarantees to the states, and argued that the central 
government was maintained by “administrative centralization”.34 In another place, 
Riker indicated that federalism was “…a form of government which implies 
arrangement of tiers of government ‘in a permanent agreement’ that ensures that 
governments at the constituent and central tiers always exist and retain their assigned 
duties.” According to this view, federation was a bargain about government which
depended solely on simple trust.35
Harihar Bhattacharyya pays particular attention to the views of the Canadian, Ronald 
Watts concerning how a federal political system could be activated as a political 
organisation mixing shared-rule and self-rule. Watts defines federation as 
…a compound polity combining constituent units and a 
general government each possessing powers delegated to it by 
the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal 
directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant 
portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers 
and each directly elected by its citizens.36
Wessel’s focuses on the views of the Australian scholar K. C. Wheare, who 
considered that particularly with regard to the “federal principle”, the division of 
powers between a state’s national and regional authorities could be performed in a co-
ordinated and independent manner within its own specific sphere.37 In Wheare’s 
34 Benjamin Kleinerman, William Riker’s “Rationalist” Federalism, in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Federalism, ed. Ann Ward and Lee Ward, (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books 
Group, 2009), pp. 414-8
35 Bhattacharyya (2010), op. cit., p. 13
36 Ibid., p. 13
37 According to Wessels, the theory of federalism can be attributed to the classic work of K. C. Wheare 
on federal government (1967). There were other contributions, on origin, operation and significance 
(1964) by W. H. Riker, and on the nature of federalism (1968) by W. S. Livingstone. See D. P. 
Wessels, The Division of Powers in a Federation, in Is Federalism the solution? Principles and 
proposals, D. J. Kriek, et al., (South Africa: HSRC Publisher, 1992), pp. 36-7
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opinion a number of factors had to be present when states or communities wished to 
unite in one or another federal form:
1. a feeling of military uncertainty with a consequent need for common defence;
2. a common need to act independently of foreign powers;
3. the expectation of greater economic advantages from such an association;
4. the existence of one or other joint political association in the past;
5. geographical proximity;
6. the existence of similar political institutions. 38
One should mention here that Riker adopted Wheare’s concept of “division of 
powers” and the belief that in a federal state there would be two levels of ruling 
authorities with each side acting within its own sphere of competence and protected 
by a constitution.39 Riker defiantly stressed that federalism had a functional and 
structural basis, particularly when he observed that “the political process in federalism 
is a relationship of continuous negotiation between the leaders of the central and 
regional governments.” 40
Beyond this, Marchildon believes that the appearance of what is known as 
postmodern federalism “directly relates to the historically and territorially defined 
national minorities seeking a high degree of self-determination.”41 In his view, 
38 Kriek, D. J., (Chief ed.), D. J. Kotze, P.A.H.  Labuschagne, P.F.G. Mtimkulu, P.K.R O’Malley (Co-
ed.), Federalism the solution? Principles and proposals, (South Africa: HSRC Publisher, 1992)., pp. 
16-7
39 It was clear that federation as a political entity was composed of a plurality of sub-units, the aim of 
which was to preserve each member-state. On the internal level, the federal state is directed to establish 
a new and collective political status, along with a federal constitution; therefore, the main duty of the 
federal state as the supreme power should be to protect the existence of each member state under the 
new constitution and also to resolve conflicts among member-states. In turn, each member state that 
becomes a party to a federal state should have to change its condition in order to subordinate itself to 
the new federal state. In other words, it loses its capacity to dictate its own unity. Conversely, each 
member state will cede a portion of its sovereign power to the federal state. Regarding the international 
level, Schmitt pointed out that the federal power had the responsibility and the right to defend the 
territory and existence of the federation. Nicolas Patrici, “Looking into Medusa’s Eyes: Carl Schmitt 
on Federalism”; in Ann Ward and Lee Ward (eds.), op. cit., pp. 306-7; and also cited Wessels, D .P., 
op. cit., p.37
40 D. J. Kriek et al.(1992), op. cit., pp. 16-8
41 For Marchildon, the key features of the postmodern federation are represented by five 
characteristics, including:
1. recent devolution and decentralization;
2. reflecting a high degree of formal and informal asymmetry;
3. protecting and vigorously promoting key minority language rights;
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postmodern federations are required to make major amendments for minority 
nationalists and their languages in sub-state territories. Thus, the concept of 
postmodern federalism is a new form which seeks to alter the differences between 
unity and diversity into peaceful and democratic political association, rather than 
secession and partition. It has also been argued that the decentralising of power and 
responsibility from the central government to sub-state units has occurred rapidly in 
the postmodern federations, whereas there is a comparatively stable relationship 
between centralisation and decentralisation in the classical federations.42
1.3.2 DEFINITIONS OF FEDERALISM
Into the new millennium, the concept of federation has prompted renewed attention 
from scholars, opinion-makers and political elites and rulers. It is reasonable to say 
that the idea and the nature of the federal State can be illustrated through definitions 
and descriptions put forward by theorists and scholars. Some scholars have observed 
that federalism can be considered as a “struggle between centripetal and centrifugal 
forces that result in ‘coordinate, cooperative or coercive’ federalism.” 43 Although the 
political benefits of federalism are currently increasing and developing to include the 
maintenance of the country’s political independence, achievement of economic 
growth and self sufficiency, accommodation of regional diversities and, finally, 
maintenance of a balance between unity and diversity.
4. experiencing the rise of regionally based nationalist political parties and the decline of ideologically 
oriented pan-national political parties;  
5. struggling constantly to construct alternatives to secession, partition and violence.
The central governments in the postmodern federations have made considerable efforts to reach 
democratic solutions as a final alternative to secession and partition. However, the central States are 
having to face the constant threat of secession or partition by their opposition parties as a real 
possibility within the federalist framework, particularly when the demands of the national minorities 
are for greater autonomy, despite central government’s concessions. Similar situations have arisen in 
the cases of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland. Greg Marchildon, “Postmodern Federalism and 
Sub State Nationalism”; in A. and L. Ward (eds.), op. cit., p. 442, pp. 450-51.
42 The term “decentralisation” is generally used in the context of formal federations such as Canada and 
Belgium; the same process is often described as “devolution” in previously unitary states such as Spain 
and the UK. See Greg Marchildon, ibid., pp. 441-7                                  
43 Haig Patapan, Australian Federalism: An Innovation in Constitutionalism, in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Federalism, ed. Ann Ward and Lee Ward, (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books 
Group, 2009) p. 497
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Sharada Rath refers to Robert Garran, who defined federalism as “A form of 
government in which sovereignty or political power is divided between the central 
and local government so that each of them within its own sphere is independent of the 
other.” As Rath sees it, federalism is a dynamic process, not a static institutional 
pattern, noting that the process of federalising a political community occurs
particularly when a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements 
to discover solutions, adopt common policies, and make joint decisions on joint 
problems.44
Meanwhile A. V. Dicey points out in his definition, that “a federal state is a political 
invention which is intended to reconcile national unity and power with the 
maintenance of the rights of the separate member states.”45 It would appear that the 
majority of researchers focus on the basic issue, which concerns the protection of 
individual liberty in a federal system. According to Glenn A. Moots, federalism is a 
form of justice, emphasizing liberty and citizen participation.46 However, others have
argued that federation is possible only where a common law that binds all citizens is 
possible, while Elazar considered that federalism could offer significant assistance 
towards achieving both local and global peace. 47
For opponents of the idea of federalism, the key problem is the demand for regional 
financial equality, and more financial assistance for achieving revenue equalization 
among the autonomous units, when development of all parts of the country, 
particularly in developing nations, is an urgent necessity. According to Sharada Rath,
in determining the failure or success of a federation, the factors to consider are 
external dangers and foreign reactions. In fact, the creation of any new federation will 
have a direct impact, by affecting both the attitude of other countries towards this new 
creation, and the attitude of the new federation towards other countries.48
It is logical to assume that the many fundamental factors involved, such as the 
economy, external dangers, and foreign reactions, emerge as incompatibilities. 
44 Sharada Rath, Federalism Today: Approaches, Issues, and Trends, (India, Sterling publishers private 
Limited, 1984), p. 185
45 D. J. Kriek et al.(1992), op. cit., pp. 14-5
46 Glenn A. Moots, op. cit., p. 402
47 Ibid., pp. 408-10
48 Rath (1984), op. cit., pp. 192-93
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Therefore, the success or failure of any attempt at federalism depends upon the 
formula adopted by a federation to manage the crisis and grow.49 In other respects, 
most scholars consider that a constitution has dual functions, whereby one side serves 
to strengthen the supreme authority of the unified state by carrying out all 
constitutional functions by the various levels of authority, and upholding internal and 
external sovereignty, while the other circumscribes the sphere of competency of the 
two levels of authority. In this context, constitutional federalism, according to 
Wessels, “…means that the national and regional governments are by law equal, 
autonomous and co-ordinate institutions that receive their powers from the 
constitution, and which also enjoy protection through the constitution in terms of their 
status and functions.”50 Thus, it can be concluded from some of the foregoing 
definitions that the units or states of which a federation is composed are looking 
towards unity rather than uniformity and concentrating on the rights of member-states. 
In this context, it may be generally understood of federation that a federal union can
be formed through reconciling various visions, diversities, ideologies and influences.   
It is reasonable to affirm the political uses of federalism in the long term, particularly 
in the area of conflict management, which is strongly linked to the protection of 
minorities. For most ethnic groups and territorially-structured communities,
federalism has become an important contributor to accommodating the problems that 
occur within multicultural and multilingual communities. From this perspective, it is 
possible to understand how federal systems might be able to manage “…significant 
crises, whether economic, political or structural, [that] emphasize most often cross-
cutting cleavages, political elite behaviour, political instrumentalities or, alternatively, 
administrative arrangements.” 51 In short, one can conclude that the main objectives of 
federal union can be put into creating a mechanism of federal governance with a 
strong parliamentary centre, which in turn would guarantee cultural autonomy for
regions with strong linguistic, religious, tribal or territorial identities. The key goal is
49 Ibid., pp. 186-8
50 Wessels, D .P., op. cit., p. 42
51 Alain-G. Gagnon, op. cit., pp. 15-18
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presented as reducing regional and economic disparities through fiscal federalism and 
planning.52
1.3.3 FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE: AS A POLITICAL ENTITY
After the Second World War the idea of federalism was warmly received and gained 
considerable momentum among countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, and 
even in Western Europe. It should be noted here that the pre-1945 federations, such 
as the USA, Canada, Australia and Switzerland53, are commonly known as classical 
federations, while the new federal governments set up in the post-1945 period were
founded as colonial federations, and either imposed by the imperial power or 
developed by a process of negotiation between nationalists and the imperial 
government54. Thus institutional federalism55 began to take shape during the British 
colonial period, in Malaya (1948), Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953), Nigeria (1954), 
the West Indies (1958), and South Africa (1959).56 The French also attempted during 
this period to set up colonial federations in Indo-China, in French West Africa, and in 
French Equatorial Africa, while the Dutch imposed a federal constitution on Indonesia 
in 1949.57
52 Akhtar Majeed, India: A model of Cooperative Federalism, in The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Federalism, ed. Ann Ward and Lee Ward, (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books Group, 2009), p. 
504
53 Switzerland is at the top of the unitary nation-states; having been the first country in Europe in the 
nineteenth century to adopt a federation. The Swiss Confederation (which had lasted from 1291 to 
1848) has remained a paradigm case of the successful accommodation of diversity, particularly with its 
successful transformation into a federal union in 1848. Bhattacharyya (2010), op. cit., p. 97
54 In practice, however, some of these federations collapsed in the post-1945 period, during the critical 
times just before or shortly after withdrawal of the imperial powers; this happened, for example, with 
the British experiments in the West Indies and in Rhodesia and Nyasaland; while others were 
transformed into unitary political unions. Rath (1984), op. cit., p. 183
55 Nicolas Patrici, “Looking into Medusa’s Eyes: Carl Schmitt on Federalism”; in Ann Ward and Lee 
Ward (eds.), op. cit., pp. 306-7
56 For the first time there was a ‘federation’ for India, according to the Government of India Act of 
1935 (passed in the British parliament), which was partially implemented at the provincial level only 
after April 1937.  Cited Bhattacharyya (2010), op. cit., pp. 45-51
57 Sharada Rath looks at how circumstances arise, develop and impact on the political system: e.g., in
Indonesia, the Dutch-imposed federal structure was replaced at independence by a unitary state. The 
collapse of constitutional government in Pakistan and its replacement by military rule in 1958 ended
ten years of troubled federal government; the Libyan federal structure created in 1951 was recast as a 
unitary model in 1963; and Eritrea, federated with Ethiopia in 1952, lost its autonomous status in 1962. 
Cited Rath (1984), op. cit., pp.182-83. 
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It has been argued that the Soviet-model federations in the former USSR and Eastern 
Europe did not contain the true content of federalism and lacked any real motive for 
power-sharing and hence real autonomy, due to their highly centralist, undemocratic, 
and mostly rhetorical approach. Apparently the legitimising of a negative principle of 
nationhood lay behind the failure of the socialist federations, and was the reason why 
the Soviet model ultimately failed to offer any durable space for accommodating 
ethno-national diversity.58 Needless to say, the failure of the so-called ‘socialist’ 
federations did not signify the failure of federalism as such, but did offer a lesson or 
two to the rest of the world for rethinking the modes of accommodation of ethno-
national identities for state unity. 59
The Communist leadership in the former Yugoslavia adopted a federal system in the 
1970s to resolve a number of governance-related challenges. Yugoslavia’s 1974 
constitution allowed decisions to be made by a process of coordination rather than 
majority rule – in other words, each republic possessed a de facto veto over federal 
decisions, and in addition established a collective rotating presidency to ensure the 
participation of each republic in the formation and execution of federal measures.60
However, in October 1990, Slovenia and Croatia jointly declared a “confederal 
arrangement” with a purely consultative parliament and a Council of Ministers. 
Indeed, the dismantling of Yugoslavia caused a horrifying civil war and the tragedy of 
58 Bhattacharyya (2010), op. cit., pp. 8-9
59 From the experiences and policies followed by countries that adopted a federal system it was clearly 
essential for their governmental bodies to have control of the Supreme Court of the Constitution in 
order to prevent any avoidance or misrepresentation. The three essential governmental organs of a 
federation are:
1. A sizeable freely-elected assembly representative of all the units, which needs to stand for a fixed 
term of some years. Relative state membership of the assembly may conveniently be related to the 
population by certain formal rules; but it is essential that it should be adjustable (and adjusted) to 
changing population movements.
2. An elected Upper House or Senate of a fixed and limited number of members, with equal 
representation of all states. Only through this medium can the smaller and weaker states feel that they 
can make a positive contribution to national policy decisions.
3. A central (or general) government of quite a small number of members, capable of taking decisions 
quickly, probably preparing the first draft of the national budget, and probably playing an important 
role in introducing new legislation or suggesting constitutional amendments. See Federalism: Failure 
and Success A comparative Study, (Great Britain: Macmillan press LTD, 1978), pp. 3-7
60 Yugoslavia consisted of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia) and two “autonomous provinces” within Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina), as well as a 
number of national groups with long histories (Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and so on). Cited James Read, 
John C. Calhoun’s Federalism and its Contemporary Echoes, in The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Federalism, ed. Ann Ward and Lee Ward (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books Group, 2009), pp. 
253-54.
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ethnic cleansing, during which more than 100,000 individuals were killed and 
millions were forcibly relocated or turned into refugees.
It seems too that in scholarly research, US federal doctrine has become an interpretive 
guide, in both the judiciary and the legislature. However, most interpreters have 
concluded that federalism initially appeared as a mechanism for sharing power along 
territorial lines in the US and Latin America, and in Canada, while also contributing 
significantly as a state-building technique, and it has been argued that the regional 
governments created during the late colonial period were regarded as the approximate 
equivalent of the founding US colonies. The Latin American federations followed the 
US model of dual federalism relatively closely by reproducing the US bi-cameral 
legislature (Senate), particularly with regard to territorial representation on an equal 
basis. However, there were some important differences between them, related to 
constitutional amendment procedures, and also to the constitutional status of 
municipalities.61 It can be seen from the brief outline above that the countries that
have adopted a federal system have been subjected to enormous economic, social, and 
political pressures for change, and that the main goal underlying this principle aimed 
to protect them from external pressures, provide economic benefits, and preserve 
broadly-shared values concerned with federation and national units.62
In focus on practicing federalism there have been significant debates among scholars 
about a strong connection between democracy and federalism; this in turn has a 
positive correlation with national or cultural pluralism. Certainly federalism has 
become an important institutional instrument for guaranteeing political stability and 
improving democracy. On the other hand, among the political theorists the German 
Carl Schmitt was explicitly against the idea that there was any positive correlation 
61 It should be noted that the Latin American federations granted constitutional recognition to the 
municipalities and assigned jurisdiction as well as fiscal resources to them, while municipalities were 
absent from the US constitutional text.61 From this perspective, Riker argued that, “the federal form 
invented by the US that has been copied by so many governments in the last 200 years [has caused] the 
development of federalism throughout the world.” He also explains that this invention was very 
important, not only for the US but for the rest of the world, “because it allows the expansion of states 
without either conquest or the sacrifice of some amount of local sovereignty. Kleinerman (1994), op. 
cit., p. 416
62 Ralph J. K. Chapman, ‘Structure, Process and the Federal Factor: Complexity and Entanglement in 
Federations’, in Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing traditions and future directions, 
ed. Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, (Great Britain: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p.69
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between federalism and democracy, regarding them as opposing principles.63 He was 
convinced that federalism was a concept associated with relations between States, and 
affirmed that federalism was concerned with pluralism.64 In this context, Elazar noted 
that federalism should be distinguished from democracy or republicanism, but insisted 
that “democracy may be necessary, though not sufficient, to federal integration of 
power.”65 In this context, the limitations of federalism are the limitations of political 
association itself. In the most obvious sense, despite the considerable developments in 
federalism over the centuries, federalism today has the ability to provide security, and 
also to protect civil and religious liberty; this in turn, is reflected in promoting self-
government consistent with cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and regional distinctiveness. 
Consequently, it has led to the federal system achieving wide acceptance as a 
successful political process by the majority of nations and states that make up the 
international community.
CONCLUSION
The applicability of a federal system can take different forms, and in this context 
Ronald Watts is surely right when he argues that federation-building in diverse 
societies requires power-sharing with territorially-based communities, in addition to 
the various consociational arrangements of power-sharing.66 It has been argued that in 
all political systems, stability and legitimacy are both composed of important and 
63 According to Schmitt, any constitutional theory of federalism would be faced with three main 
incompatibilities, as follows: the first concerned the right of self-preservation of each member state. In 
this context, the main aim of the federation was the preservation of each member-state; equally, each 
member-state would have to relinquish its right to self-preservation for the sake of the federal state.
The second contradiction, strongly connected to the first, concerned the right of self-determination. At 
a certain point, each member-state entered the federation in order to protect its political independence; 
at the same time, the federation’s right of self-determination would be achieved through the federal 
capacity for intervention. The third contradiction related to the issue of sovereignty, which had the 
potential to cause significant tension between the unity of the federation and the plurality of the 
member-states. This possible conflict between member-states and the federation could be considered a 
conflict between sovereigns. However, Schmitt identified a remedy for these contradictions, stating that 
they could be resolved through a theory of democracy, especially since the main characteristic of 
democracy was homogeneity. In this context, Schmitt had already elaborated elsewhere that 
sovereignty was an indivisible principle because, in a democratic federation, sovereignty was the 
people. Nicolas Patrici, op. cit, pp. 308-10
64 Schmitt also stressed that federalism, as a political concept, hindered democratic sovereignty, 
particularly in relation to the many contradictions within the Weimar Constitution. He stated that while 
this constitution was incompatible with principles of liberalism and democracy, it contained a liberal 
legal structure and also sought democratic legitimacy. Nicolas Patrici, ibid., p. 298.
65 Glenn A. Moots, op. cit., p. 401.
66 Harihar Bhattacharyya, op. cit., pp. 173-74
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difficult concepts, but in federal systems they are considered problematic because of 
the varying nature of the state.67 One important aspect is that federal states can be 
created on different foundations. They usually have a territorial basis, but can also 
have other bases. In emphasizing “territorial units”, Kriek argued that the territorial 
areas could serve as units of federations, which in turn could be subdivided into city-
states on the one hand and states on the other.68
Indeed, federalism can contribute to the process of nation-building over two levels of 
government, by attempting to have interdependent spheres of jurisdiction, while at the 
same time playing a coordinated and collaborative role in achieving common national 
objectives. It has been said that a federation’s success depends on finding a way that
will bring mutual satisfaction. Thus, it will be secured against internal disruption, 
particularly when citizens feel more proud of their nationality than of any details of 
their state’s rights.69 Federalism has been instrumental in uniting different 
communities, and at the same time it has been cooperative in involving 
decentralisation in the political process. One should mention here that there are phases 
of development in each federation and every federation differs in its goals. The 
purpose of a federation is embedded by the goals it serves. In other words, federations 
were formed mainly to achieve political unity and to maintain a political entity. Here 
one may ask about the role of the federal government in developing national 
compromises on essential issues that concern national unity, and in maintaining 
economic stability.  
As has been discussed, federalism offers an excellent opportunity for minority and 
other ethnic groups to enjoy internal security and stability, while maintaining some 
equilibrium between unity and diversity, and gives various advantages to minority 
groups that enable them to play a significant role in running their own domestic 
affairs. Opponents of this notion, on the other hand, consider that adopting this system 
67 Michael Burgess, “Federalism and Federation: A Reappraisal”; in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. 
Gagnon (eds.), Comparative Federalism and Federation, op. cit., p. 10  
68 From a practical standpoint, Kriek notes that city-states serve as units of federations; thus Hamburg, 
Bremen and West Berlin are units of Germany; Vienna forms a unit of Austria, and Basle and Geneva
are cantons of the Swiss Federation. In general, states comprise the basic units of a federation, such as
Illinois, Michigan and California in the USA; Ontario, Quebec and Alberta in Canada, and Bavaria, 
Baden-Wurttemberg and Lower Saxony in Germany. See D. J. Kriek, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
69 Sharada Rath, op. cit., p. 195
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will encourage cultural or religious minority groups to demand the greatest possible 
measure of decentralization to protect themselves, particularly when they claim
greater dependence on the government’s finance and resources. This dependence can 
lead either to unitary trends or to take steps to secession. Similarly, the majorities can
also be regarded as a great danger to federalism because of their aspirations towards 
centralisation. In this case, the only authentic protection for federalism is through 
strong regional or group parties.70 Here, the key factor behind federal stability lies in 
enabling regional diversities to express themselves adequately. If such opportunities 
are not acceptable, the movement for secession may gain momentum, leading finally 
to disintegration. Another requirement for federal stability is the encouragement of
cohesion among the regional groups on aspects which they have in common. Thus it 
is important that institutions are designed to encourage cohesion rather than 
conflicts.71
Another significant point is that in federations, sovereignty is tied to the existence and 
entrenchment of regional territorial entities. Representation is a crucial issue in 
virtually all federations, and concerns two main principles. Every federation considers 
that in principle each of its citizens has an equal right to vote. On the other hand, the 
federation usually assists with the exercising of that vote in two ways; first, to elect 
members of the regional government, and second, to elect members of the national 
government.72 As many have argued, federalism is not the remedy for all ills. 
However, it is characterised by its capacity to accommodate socio-cultural diversity 
and ethno-regional or national identity, particularly in countries that are marked by 
socio-cultural diversity. Additionally, among the essential features of the federal 
system is its ability to provide a legal means to enable both federal and provincial 
governments to share power, despite the many differences of culture, religion and 
language that prevail within a country. Federalism today is able to achieve different 
goals. It can be used to fight regional disparities, and has also been used to resolve 
deep societal cleavages in plural societies.
70 D.J. Kriek, “The theory and practice of federalism”, op. cit., p. 30
71 P. K. Sharma, op. cit., p. 28
72 Preston King, op. cit., pp. 98 99
38
Iraqi society undoubtedly possesses a difficult and complex structure in terms of its 
composition, being heterogeneous, and having many languages, cultures and religions 
differences. Despite the religious differences between the Sunni and Shiite 
communities, there is no serious problem in the coexistence of these groups with each 
other, more than is used politically to implement the political goals for the benefit of 
specific groups, whether in or outside Iraq. Consequently, the federal system will face 
enormous challenges for stability, promoting a culture of tolerance, and finding 
reconciliation among conflicting views. All Iraqi groups and parties should be aware 
that under the federal structure there is tremendous scope for cooperation, and for
greater participation of the population in the political and economic activities that are 
at the core of successful federalism. Nor would it be wise for the Iraqi federal 
government to neglect the rights and duties of the KRG as a federal unit. The Iraqi 
federal government should be expanding its policies, in order to satisfy every region;
this in turn will lead to a desire on the part of the provinces to take economic 
development policies into their own hands. The KRG also wishes to tackle the 
intentional negligence on the part of the federal government. From this perspective, 
the KRG should sketch out the structure of its economic plans to counter the policies 
that will have had such deleterious effects on their region. 
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Chapter 2: 
THE KURDS IN IRAQ
INTRODUCTION
“The Kurds are an ancient people with a past full of political, 
scientific, literary, artistic and military activities. These people 
resided and are still residing in a land that is considered the 
cradle of human civilisation. Kurdistan has been the Kurdish 
people’s homeland since the dawn of history. Their homeland 
Kurdistan is rich with waters, oil, minerals, agricultural, 
merchandises and animal products……..The history dealt them 
a lousy deal so they were denied not only their national state, 
but the simplest of human rights also. The devious powers 
divided them according, to their greedy materialistic ambitions 
between artificial uncivilised states……..”
(Dr. Jawad Mella, 2005) 73
2.1 A GENERAL OVERVIEW ON KURDS AND KURDISTAN
Some historians argue that the Kurds as an ancient people were often dominated by 
various groups, and as a result of numerous invasions by Hittites, Assyrians, 
Babylonians, Armenians, Persians, Parthians, Mongols and Greeks, they often faced 
migration.74 These areas have been called Kurdistan75 since the 13th century. The 
73 Dr. Jawad Mella, “Kurdistan and The Kurds Divided Homeland and a Nation without State”, 
(London: Western Kurdistan Association (WKA), 2005 ).
74 It is generally acknowledged that the Kurdish land is called the “cradle of Humanity” because of the 
emergence of different civilizations in this land, such as; Elamites, Hitties, Hurrites, Medes, Mittanis, 
Karduchoi, Corduenes, Sassanides, Assyrian, Greeks, as well as other people who either originated in 
this area or invaded it. According to Jemal Nebez the strongest hypothesis for the origins of the Kurds 
is that they are derived from the Medes. Jemal Nebez, The Kurds History and Culture; (London: 
Western Kurdistan Association (WKA), 2004), pp. 9, 15, and also see Mustafa Al-Karadaghi, 
Application of the principle of self determination to the Kurdish Nation, Kurdistan Times,  No. 3 
December 1993, p.43.
75 The name Kurdistan accurately means the land of the Kurds in the Middle East. It is described by 
David McDowell: ‘The heart of this area consists of the extremely rugged mountains of the Zagros 
range, running in ridges north-west to south-east. In the west these mountains are continuing hills 
falling into the Mesopotamian plain. To the north the mountains turn into a plateau which in turn 
transform into the highlands of the Armenian Anatolia’. David McDowell,  The Kurds: a Nation 
Denied, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1992), p.7
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term ‘Kurd’ is perhaps derived from the Latin word ‘Cordueni’.76 There are various 
arguments about the term “Kurdistan”. It emerged for the first time from the Turkish 
Seljuk Prince Saandjar, when he created a district under this name. However, there are 
no fixed maps or boundaries for Kurdistan, which indicates the detrimental political 
situation of Kurds, since they are denied a nation by Turks, Persians and Arabs.77
However there are other opinions. Prince Sharaf Khani Badlisi asserted in his book 
‘Sharafnama’ that the term Kurdistan appeared and was used for the “Darsim” 
province, while Hamadulla Al-Mustawfi in his book Nuzht Al-Qulub fi Al-Masalk wa 
Al-Mamalk, indicated that the city of “Bahar” was the capital of Kurdistan. Another 
belief is that the cities of Kermanshah and Shahrazur were drawn under Kurdistan’s 
map in Buldan Al-Khilafa Al-Sharqiya.78
Further, according to linguistic experts, the modern Kurdish language belongs to the 
western Iranian Branch of the Indo-European family. However, there are various 
linguistic dialects which were and indeed still are used by Kurdish people. The two 
main dialects that are practised today are Kurmanji in the north of Kurdistan 
(Southeast of Turkey) and Sorani which is used by the majority of Kurds in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, in the South-East of Sanandaj and the Mahabad region in Iran.79
76 However, it has been argued that, Zagros was inhabited by a variety of groups and tribes who were 
ethnically and linguistically related, among whom the Kurds and the Elamites were the most famous, 
but we do not possess any written documents about kingdoms in the Zagros highlands “Kingdom of 
Gutium, Kingdom of Lullu, Kingdom of Nairi and The Enlightened Kingdom of Urartu, and two strong 
empires of “Kassite” and “Hurri-Mittani which controlled Mesopotamia and the surrounding lands”.
Thereby, all evidences derived from the writings of the cuneiform of the Sumerians, Akkadians, 
Babylonians and Assyrian. Another view is that Kurds inhabited the surrounding area between the 
“Wan River” and the mountains under the slopes of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, as well as areas of 
the Zagros mountain range up to the border with the tribes of North Lor in Iran.  And while the word 
‘Kurd’ may not derive from a single source, most Kurds believe they originate from the Medes. 
According to some historian's opinion the Xenophon faced a cruel beating by Karduchoi “Kardu or 
Gutu” during his famous withdrawal to the Black Sea in 400 BC.76 In this regard, Kerim Yildiz asserts 
that as a result of immigration, the Kurds were created from Indo-European tribes such as the  “Guti, 
Kurti, Mede Mard, Karduchoi, Gordyene, Adianbene, Zila and Khaldi”, from the Zagros mountain 
region. Walid Hamdi,  Kurds and Kurdistan in the British Documents , in Arabic (Sjel Al Arab Press, 
1991), p.15, and also see Kerim Yildiz,  The Kurds in Iraq: The past, Present and Future, (London: 
Pluto Press, 2004), p.7; and also cited Mustafa Al Karadaghi, “Introduction to the Ancient History of 
the Kurdish Nation”, Kurdistan Times, Vol. 2, No. 6, March 2001, USA (Editor and Publisher Mustafa 
Al Karadaghi ),  pp 3-4
77 Muhammad Amin Zaki, The History Of Kurds and Kurdistan: From the ancient period  till now (In 
Arabic) Second edition, Baghdad, 1961, pp 5-6
78 Ibid., pp 5-6 
79 David McDowell (2000), op. cit., p.9
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2.2 THE KURDS AND POWER POLITICS IN IRAQ
Scholars have agreed that modern Kurdish history began with the appearance of the 
Ottoman Empire. It is known, according to geopolitical terms, that Kurdish areas were 
located under the influence and authority of the Safavi (Persian) and the Ottoman 
Empires. However, the Kurds had also enjoyed semi-independent principalities that 
were strengthened and recognised by the Ottoman Sultans.80 Thus, the Kurds directly 
implicated in the hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire, 
particularly, when the Sultans deliberately to use the principalities as barrier zones 
between the two Empires.81
It is quite evident that the period of the First World War and its aftermath represented 
an important phase in the growth of Kurdish nationalism. However, Kurdish national 
awareness had grown rapidly, especially during the latter part of nineteenth century, a 
period during which the Kurds, like the other national movements of the Ottoman 
Empire, were eager to attain their independence.82
However, there were a number of reasons and circumstances why the Treaty of 
Sevres was stillborn and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne. It is worth noting here 
that the Allies began to renege on their promises to the Kurds at the London 
80 These principalities could assume certain responsibilities, mainly the collection of taxes and the 
defence of their own territories. It should be noted that during the 16th century, three quarters of 
Kurdistan came under the domination of the Ottoman Empire while the rest was occupied by the 
Safavid Empire. Borhanedin A. Yassin, ‘Vision or Reality? The Kurds in the Policy of the Great 
Powers 1941-1947’, (Sweden-Malmo: Lund University Press, 1995). p..42
81 Sa’ad Jawad,  Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958-1970, (London: Ithaca Press,, 1981), p.3
82 It is also interesting to speculate the British and the French government asserted that their aims in 
coming to the region were to liberate peoples under Ottoman rule and to give the native populations 
freedom to establish their own national governments and administrations. The Allies promised self-
determination to the people living under the control of Ottoman Empire in order to maintain their own 
vital interests. They were interested in seeing to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and to 
securing a new balance of power, to ensure that the Ottomans would never return to their previous 
position.  To reach these aims, they needed a non-hostile relationship with the people who had existed 
under Ottoman rule. It should be mentioned, that with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Kurds, like other ethno-national groups within the Empire, found themselves with a historical 
opportunity to achieve independence. The national minorities of the Ottoman Empire, including Kurds, 
welcomed US President Woodrow Wilson’s declaration that nations could have the right freely to 
determine their own destiny. His proposal comprised fourteen points. Points 5 and 12 gained the 
attention of the Kurds as it was specifically tailored to their cause. Point 5 concerned the finding of an 
equitable and sincere settlement for all conflicts while Point 12 claimed the minorities within the 
Ottoman Empire should be assured the opportunity for autonomous development. Borhanedin A. 
Yassin, op. cit. , p. 45
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Conference in 1921.83 In fact, the future of the Kurds in Iraq was profoundly 
influenced by the progress of negotiations and decisions that took place in Lausanne
(which was signed on 24 July 1923). Even though the Treaty of Sever was not 
ratified, it could be considered one of the most important declarations since it 
provided for an autonomous Kurdish State in Eastern Anatolia.84
It is generally acknowledged that the period from 1920 to 1931 embodied the most 
serious challenged posed by the Kurdish leaders.85 They requested the League of
Nations to construct an independent Kurdish State, or to grant the Kurds political and 
national rights within Iraq; however their efforts were unsuccessful.  In addition, this 
period witnessed more political activity and the founding of many parties.86
83 The change in the Allied position was due to various factors involving their specific interest in 
absorbing the Kurdish area of Anatolia into what became known as the Republic of Turkey along with 
the advance of the Turkish nationalist movement, led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. According to Article 
3(2), “The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangements to be 
concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months”.  It is evident that according to 
evolving events at the time of the negotiations, the Kurdish question had not been mentioned at 
Lausanne. Therefore, in addition to the private negotiation that followed the signing of the Treaty of 
Lausanne between Turkey and Great Britain (Sir Percy Cox and Fethi Bey representing Britain and 
Turkey respectively) they decided to take the matter on to the Council of the League of Nations. The 
Council at its thirtieth session, 20 September 1924, started its deliberations on Mosul. Great Britain still 
argued for delimitation of a frontier line and Turkey for the whole province of Mosul. See Henry A. 
Foster;  The Making Of Modern Iraq, (Great Britain,: Williams and Norgate, 1936), pp. 152-53
84 Foster argues that Article 64 obviously indicated the Kurds’ desire to gain independence from 
Turkey, and in this case the Kurds were allowed an independent State; the Kurds in the Mosul vilayet 
would not be prohibited from a voluntary adhesion to such a state.84 In 1920, a referendum was held in 
Iraq to approve the accession of Prince Faisal as King in the new monarchy, but the Kurds of 
Sulaymaniyah refused to participate in the election and the province of Kirkuk voted against the Prince. 
Foster, ibid,, p. 153, and also see Derk Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan, (London and New York: 
Institute of Race Relations Oxford University Press, 1964), p.36
85 It is important here to note that the first half of 1920 witnessed an attempt to establish an independent 
Kurdish State, or at least to settle the Kurdish problem by the formation of several Kurdish autonomies.  
Here, one of the most heated and a controversial discussion is that if the British were willing to solve 
the Kurdish problem, it would have been possible to so during the period 1920-1932 at which time Iraq 
was a British mandate.  Iraq became independent in 1932, and it was quite evident that the British had 
maintained considerable influence on Iraqi governmental policies during and after this period. It would 
seem that political developments in that period ran counter to Kurdish nationalist ambitions. Wadie 
Jwaideh, ‘Kurdistan National Movement: Its origins and Development’, (United Stated of America: 
Syracuse university press, 2006), pp. 128-30
86 e.g., the Hiwa party, the most influential political party, was established in 1930, and Komalay Azadi 
Kurd, (the Kurdish Freedom Association) was also founded in Sulaymaniyah in 1935. Other political 
organisations appeared at this time, including Komalay Zhianaway Kurd (the Association for Revival 
of the Kurds), founded in 1942 in Iranian Kurdistan. Borhanedin A. Yassin, op. cit., p.120, 143    
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2.2.1 THE KURDISH SITUATION DURING 
THE OTTOMAN PERIOD
Throughout their history the Kurds have been subject to the various Empires that have 
dominated the area. The Ottoman sultans were able to expand their own sphere of 
influence over the region known as Mesopotamia or ‘Iraq’ today. During the 16th and 
17th centuries the area was divided into three provinces or Vilayet: Mosul, Baghdad 
and Basra. These three provinces were under the rule of the “mamluk” military caste, 
but were allowed to have military forces that were supported and acknowledged by 
Ottoman sultans for the sake of the survival of their authority in these Vilayets. It also 
enabled them to defend their domains from the Safavid Shah of Persia and others. The 
Ottomans wished to sustain alliance with the powerful Arab tribes in Baghdad and 
Basra and also with a number of semi-independent Kurdish principalities in the Mosul 
vilayet. 87 The Mosul vilayet (current Iraqi Kurdistan) was controlled by three 
Kurdish principalities of Baban, Badinan and the Soran dynasties in the different 
historical periods.
The struggle between the Ottoman Sultan Salim and the Safavid emperor Shah Ismail 
in 1514 at the battle of Chaldiran was produced a very crucial problem for the Kurds 
through divide their country between the two empires, which could be considered as 
the first division of the Kurdistan. However, permit Kurdish tribes and the feudal 
chiefs greater power and more status in their emirates which they duly used against 
each other. McDowall notes that the political structure of Kurdistan was established 
and practised in 15 main emirates until the 19th century.88
It was obvious that direct Ottoman rule was intended to weaken Kurdistan by obliging 
it to confront numerous crises from the late 18th century up till the First World War, 
particularly when the power of some tribal chiefs reached the point where they no 
longer needed further support, as was the case of the Kurdish Prince of Soran, known 
as Muhammad Pasha of Rawanduz, who tried to unify a great part of Kurdistan. A
87 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 8-9.
88 David McDowell (1992), op. cit., pp 26-7
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number of reasons and circumstances lay behind his defeat by the army of the 
Ottoman Sultan in the 1830s. 89
2.2.2 THE SITUATION OF THE KURDS DURING                          
THE BRITISH MANDATE
There was a dispute between some mandatory powers over the ownership of the 
Mosul Vilayet. According to the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916,90 France was given 
possession of Mosul Vilayet, but the discovery of oil in Kirkuk might have been one 
of the reasons which caused a change, in 1918, in the original agreement whereby 
Britain was given control over Mosul. Consequently, the League of Nations granted 
France mandates over Syria and Lebanon and also approved a right to Great Britain 
over Iraq and Palestine. 91
On 30 October 1918 British forces occupied the Mosul Vilayet (current Iraqi 
Kurdistan or Southern Kurdistan) after defeating the Ottoman power.92 On 1 
December 1918, the British chose Sheikh Mahmud Barznji 93 as a suitable person to 
head the Kurdish government, and appointed as Hukumdar (governor).94 For the 
89 Mir Muhammad was able to control one of the strongest emirates in the area bounded between two 
Zabs and Iranian boundary. He expanded his power over the Koi-Sanjaq, Erbil and Altun-Copur and 
Raniya.  See McDowell(2000), op. cit., p 38
90Madhar Ahmad argued that the secret diplomacy of the Sykes-Picot accord was devoted to 
determining how the Arab countries subject to the Ottoman Empire were to be partitioned. According 
to Sykes-Picot, Britain had ceded Mosul province to France because it did not wish to have spheres of 
influence adjacent to Russia. In addition, Kurdistan had an important place in the secret negotiations of 
the Allies, commensurate with their interest in this area. Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan During The 
First World War; trans. Ali Maher Ibrahim, (London: Saqi Books, 1994), p.105.
91 It is also arguable that the right of the creation of a Kurdish state was accepted following First World 
War in the Treaty of Versailles. However, the treaty was denied by force on behalf of the newly created 
Republic of Turkey. In this context we seek to highlight that the two separate Kurdish republics and 
one Kurdish Kingdom declared sovereignty, i.e., the “Republic of Ararat (Northern Kurdistan/Eastern 
Turkey), the Republic of Mahabad (Eastern Kurdistan/Iranian Kurdistan) and the Kingdom of 
Kurdistan (Southern Kurdistan/ Northern Iraq)”; each of these fledgling states was duly crushed by 
military intervention.
92 The armistice signed at Mudros between the Turks and the Allies deeply influenced the destiny of 
the people of the Mosul Vilayet, and it is useful to note that the modern State of Iraq came into being 
with the Mosul Vilayet as one of its essential parts, although the Mosul issue remained contentious.
Kamal Madhar, op. cit., p.105
93 The well-known religious leader Sheikh Mahmud (1882-1956) was officially appointed to Governor 
of Kurdistan, who was later, crowned King of Kurdistan. This Kurdish state existed from 1919-1924. 
Jemal Nebez, op. cit., p. 36  
94 Sheikh Mahmud as the head of the leading Saiyid family in the region he had religious influence and 
a huge number of followers. The Civil Commissioner, Sir Arnold Wilson, who was in Sulaymaniya at 
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British government, the difficult issue, caused by the seriousness of the internal 
situation and the instability prevailing from the end of 1918 until 1921, was the need 
to deal with the Kurdish question in Mesopotamia.95 In this context, there were 
various views; some suggested it as a State, or States, under their “tutelage”; 96others 
suggested including it in the Arab Kingdom of Iraq that was in the process of being 
established.97
According to Major Noel, the British sought to gain Kurdish support with the object 
of opposing the Pan-Islamic propaganda of the Turks and their efforts to turn the 
Kurds against the British. Great Britain supported the proposed Kurdish autonomy or 
independence98 as a means of creating a barrier zone between the Soviet Union and 
the area of British interest, especially between the Soviet Union and Turkey, Turkey 
and Iranian Azerbaijan, and Turkey and Central Asia, as well as to contain any 
possible expansion of Soviet influence into the Middle East following the October 
Revolution. The second group was against the existence of the Kurdish separate 
entity.99
What should be mentioned here that the serious tension had evolved between Sheikh 
Mahmud and the British. The British believed that Sheikh Mahmud had planned to 
expand his powers to include all the Kurdish areas of Iraq, since he had exaggerated 
that period confirmed Sheikh Mahmud as Hukumdar (governor). David McDowell (2000), op. cit., p. 
156
95 In Mesopotamian, British government set up a military administration under Arnold Wilson as acting 
Civil Commissioner during the absence in Persia of Sir Percy Cox, the Civil Commissioner, despite 
there were a disagreement over the future status of Mesopotamia between these two officers.   See D. 
K. Fieldhouse (ed.), ‘Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44’, 
(London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p.7
96 The British view of the Kurdish question seems to have been divided during this period of time; in 
other words, those in Kurdistan supported Kurdish participation in high office while those in Baghdad 
took a dim view of the Kurds.96 The first group, which included several British officials, supported the 
idea of Kurdish independence. Major E. M. Noel, a British Officer who was involved in Kurdish affairs 
at this time, wrote about the suggestions made by Colonel Arnold Wilson for the founding of an 
independent Kurdistan under British rule, to include the areas of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir. See Derk 
Kinnane, op. cit., pp. 36-7
97 The British accepted the demands that were explained in the letter by Sherif Hussein of Mecca to 
establish the new state for Arabs in the area of lower Mesopotamia which is composed of Vilayet Basra 
and Baghdad, as a prize for his uprising against the Turks. See Chaliand, Gerard (ed.), People Without 
The Country: The Kurd and Kurdistan, (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1993), p.144.
98 According to Colonel Arnold Wilson, who visited Sulaymaniyah in December 1918 and met some 
60 leading Kurdish chiefs, there were two aspects that the Kurds of that period needed to consider. The 
first was that it was uncertain if Iraqi Kurdistan would be put under British administration, while the 
second was that Kurdistan must be separated from Iraq and governed directly by British authority 
David McDowell (2000), op. cit., P. 156, and also see: Borhanedin A. Yassin, op. cit., p. 47
99 Borhanedin A. Yassin, ibid., p. 49
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his authority beyond the realms of what he had previously accepted, thinking that he 
was in a position to achieve their interests in the region by turning to the Turks against 
them.100 When the British decided to reduce Sheikh Mahmud’s power and influence, 
he responded by organising a rebellion, and on 22 May 1919 the first recorded 
revolution occurred in the Kurdish cities.101 Sheikh Mahmud’s forces attacked 
Sulaymaniyah, and raised the flag over the British political office; this uprising also 
extended to Erbil and Mosul. However, In November 1922, Sheikh Mahmud
proclaimed himself King of Kurdistan, and agreed to limited self-rule inside the new 
Iraqi state.  In July 1924 the British drove him out of Kurdistan permanently.102
After the invasion, the British forces could impose the integration of the three of 
Mosul, Baghdad and Basra into a new State of Iraq under the League of Nations 
Mandate administered by them.103 The Allies imposed their conditions on the 
Ottoman Turks at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, which obliged the 
Ottomans to sign the Sever Peace Treaty with the Allies, according to which Turkish 
rule was restricted to Western Anatolia. As well as this the British were awarded the 
right to establish a state for the Kurds and Armenians and promised, moreover, 
according to Articles 62, 63 and 64 to give the Kurds independence following a year 
of autonomy.104 Britain was granted the mandate for Iraq under the Treaty of San 
Remo, and established a provisional government in Baghdad, with Prince Faisal as 
100 Wadie Jwaideh, op. cit, pp. 193-94
101 By the spring of 1922, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan had deteriorated to such an extent that the 
British decided to bring Sheikh Mahmud back from exile, In September 1922, Sheikh Mahmud was 
reinstated to his position of authority, only to use the Kurds against the Turks, who had territorial 
ambition over Mosul and Kirkuk. On 12 September 1922 Sheikh Mahmud arrived in Baghdad; on 30 
September 1922 Sheikh Mahmud was arrived Sulaymaniyah accompanied by Major Noel. In the 
course of the negotiation that took place there, Sheikh Mahmud undertook not only to prevent the 
Turks from occupying the town of Sulaymaniyah, but also to expel them from other parts of the 
division. He also agreed not to interfere in the affairs of the Kirkuk and Erbil divisions. Borhanedin A. 
Yassin, op. cit., p. 199
102 It has been argued that the emergence of a Kurdish entity was not acceptable after it had been 
agreed with the League of Nations, who had indicated that Kurdish rights should be protected in a new 
state in Iraq. This statement was made following the announcement of Iraq’s admission into the League 
of Nations in 1932. While this gave Iraq its independence, it remained under British tutelage until 
1958. During this time both British air and ground forces with the new Iraqi governments were 
involved in suppressing the third uprising of the Kurds and destroying their entity. Seen Stephen C. 
Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), 
pp. 62-3, and also see  Helen Cook, The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for 
Iraqi Kurdistan, (London: University of Essex and the Kurdistan and the Kurdistan human Rights 
Project, 1995), p. 10
103 Charles Tripp, ‘A History of Iraq’, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 30
104 Kurdistan Times, No. 4, November 1995, p xi
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King of Iraq. It became clear that according to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty negotiations, 
Britain supported Iraq’s claim to the Mosul vilayet being attached to Iraq. 105
Focusing on the British Mandate period over Iraq indicates that the guarantee of 
autonomy for the Kurds within Iraqi borders had been reinforced and reaffirmed 
during this period. It had become a basic condition to make Iraq a recognised State in 
the international community, but these guarantees were not achieved. On the other 
hand, elections were necessary for ratification of the treaty if Iraq was to become an 
independent state. On 6th September 1930 the Kurds refused to participate in the 
election and demonstrated against it in Sulaymaniyah; this caused the death of 30 
protesters and many others were wounded at the hands of the British and Iraqi 
governments who responded with brute force.106
However, it has been argued that, Britain was only interested in securing oil by 
incorporating Mosul into the newly-formed Iraqi State. 107 Nevertheless Dr. 
Borhanedin Yassin holds a different view; he believes that Britain's goal was to 
contain expansion of Shiite influence into the Middle East, and also to keep balance 
between the two religious entities in the region. Thereby, the establishment of strong 
Sunni's entity in Iraq had not, at the time, been achieved without the integration of 
Mosul into the newly-formed Iraqi State. Thus, the frontier problems between Turkey 
and the Iraq mandate have been frequently discussed during 1923-1926, and the fate 
of the Kurdish issue in the Mosul Vilayet was directly suspended to the outcome of 
these discussions.108
2.2.3 THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
Although the Kurds were widely scattered in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, they have 
always had the universal wish for self determination. The development of ethno-
nationalism is largely correlated to the existence of a common language, race, religion 
105 Sa’ad Jawad, op. cit., pp. 7-8
106Borhanedin A. Yassin, op. cit., p.119
107 Kurdistan Times, No. 4, November 1995, p. 114;  Also see: Stephen C. Pelletiere, op. cit., p. 58.
108 Interview  through Telephone with Dr. Borhanedin Yassin, on 12 August 2009, Sweden
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and historical experience.  The spread of doctrinaire nationalism among the Kurds, as 
a result of active participation by Kurdish intellectuals, was in large measure a 
reaction against Armenian, Turkish, Arab and Persian nationalism. The outbreak of 
movements in that period hastened the emergence and growth of doctrinaire 
nationalism among the Kurds and encouraged them to demand freedom. The 
appearance of a Kurdish nationalist press and the establishment of Kurdish 
associations and societies gave further strong motivation to Kurdish cultural and 
political activity.109
Kurdish identity and the aspirations of Kurdish nationalism increased among Kurds 
soon after the attempts to establish the Republic of Mahabad. Although this failed 
within the year, it was during this period that vast progress took place, and there is 
evidence suggesting that Kurdish nationalism was increasingly under the influence of 
the leader Mustafa Barzani.110 The national parties, especially the Hiwa Party, 
supported Barzani in utilising nationalism, and it is argued that the impact of socio-
economic changes encouraged its rapid growth among the Kurds throughout the 
Second World War and its aftermath, not only in Iraq, but also in Iran, Turkey and 
Syria.111 Madhar Ahmad argues that the slogan of an autonomous Kurdistan, as well 
as idea of the right of self determination became the crucial demand of the people, 
especially among the intelligentsia, who were influential in encouraging the populace 
109 In this context, one should mention the small groups of Kurdish nationalists living in exile that 
continued to work for an independent Kurdistan. Some of them turned to Russia and others to England, 
such as General Muhammad Sharif Pasha who was chosen by the Kurdish nationalist organisation to 
represent the Kurds at the Peace Conference and who sought to promote Anglo-Kurdish cooperation. 
He suggested that the British should guarantee the Southern Kurds autonomy under British protection.
In this context, Jwaideh argued that, in December 1914, General Muhammad Sharif Pasha offered his 
services to the British expeditionary forces in Mesopotamia, evidently with the object of obtaining 
some assurances with regard to the future of Kurdistan, but he failed to reach an understanding with the 
British. On the other hand,  members of the Bedir Khan family, especially ‘Abd Al- Razzaq Beg and 
Kamil Beg Bedir Khan, maintained strong and amiable relations with the Russians; at some point 
before the war Sheikh Sayyid Taha appears to have entered into formal relations with the Russians. 
Wadie Jwaideh, op. cit., pp. 128-30
110 What it should be noted here, that the sequence of events in the Barzan region caused the eruption of 
the First Barzani rebellion in 1931-1932 by Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, who was a leader of the 
Naqshabandi order. However, the uprising (1943-1945) led by Mulla Mustafa was initially quite 
isolated from political Kurdish activities, and its aims were confined to a specific area in Barzan. It is 
important to note that Barzani eventually succeeded in his endeavours to create compatibility between 
different elements. He also contacted various tribes and urban elements, through collaboration with 
Kurdish political organisations, in order to obtain their support. Consequently, in 1945, Barzani 
decided to establish a new political party-in-exile. On 16 August 1946, just after the collapse of the 
third Barzan revolt in 1945, “The Kurdish Democratic Party” was established. See Abdulkader 
Brifcani, Mustafa Barzani: Leader of the Modern Kurdish National Movement, (London New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 2000) , p.59; and also see Borhanedin A. Yassin, op. cit., p.222
111 Borhanedin A. Yassin, ibid., pp. 46-8
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to move towards a new phase of the liberation struggle after the war.112 It is also 
argued, on the other hand, that the First World War influenced the emergence of the 
first Kurdish nationalist movements in Turkey and Iraq. The spread of the idea of self 
determination was supported by the two leaders, Lenin, the Soviet leader, and US 
President Wilson; this encouraged the Kurds to demand an independent state. 113
There are various reasons for the progress and spread of Kurdish nationalism, 
including the imposition of Ottoman rule, and the negative reactions of feudal and 
princely Kurdish families to a central authority which led to a society with the poor 
social and economic conditions that were common in Kurdish areas.114 Borhanedin 
Yassin points out that during the First World War, the Kurdish elite and educated 
urban individuals played a major role in the development of Kurdish nationalism, as 
well as in the politicisation of Kurds. This coincided with the rise of the modern State 
system in the Middle East.  The eventual dismantling of the Ottoman Empire was also 
a significant factor in the progression of ethno-national identities of ethnic minorities 
that had been under its rule. 
It is evident that the nature of the conflicts between the Kurds and the Iraqi 
government has had historical roots in the deliberate neglect by previous governments 
to find a reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem; instead they constantly 
implemented a repressive approach towards the Kurds and their grievances. The 
general view of the Kurdish revolt seems to have been that the Kurds created a real 
danger to Iraq’s territorial aims and were also an obstacle to achieving the notion of 
the dominance of ‘Arabness’ in Iraq. It should be noted that each government that 
came to power during this period presented an armistice that was only for negotiations 
until matters had been arranged for the Kurds to continue as before.115
112 Kamal Madhar Ahmad, op. cit., p.129
113 Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod (ed.), The Kurds; Nationalism and Politics, (London, San 
Francisco Beirut: Saqi Books, 2006), p.15.
114 Shams C. Inati (ed.), Iraq: Its History, People and Politics, (New York: Humanity Books Press, 
2003), p.167
115 Gareth R. V. Stansfield, ‘ Iraq: People, History, Politics’ , (Great Britain: Polity Press, 2007), PP. 
103-04
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In October 1964, Kurdish demands for self-government again included the areas of 
Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Irbil and Mosul, which would be governed by the Kurdish 
people through their own parliament and other significant ministries, such as foreign 
affairs, finance and defence. They agreed to be controlled by the Iraqi government, 
and this time made no mention of oil revenues or the Kurdish army within the Iraqi 
army. These two vital matters had been stumbling blocks in all previous 
negotiations.116
It is significant that when all the Iraqi Arab authorities came to power, they initially 
signalled their intention of respecting the ambitions of the Kurdish people and agreed 
to recognize the political rights of Kurds. Shortly after having achieved power, these 
promises ended and the leaders turned towards defeating the Kurdish revolutions by 
force; for example; Abdul Selam Arif on 18 November 1963,117 Abdul Rehman Arif 
on 14 April 1966; and the Baath Party under President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, with 
his vice-president, Saddam Hussein on 17 July 1968. When the Baath regime returned 
to power in Iraq they dealt with the issue by implementing the same methods; killing 
and oppressing the Kurdish question. However, under international pressure, 
especially from the Soviet Union, the Iraqi government announced the “Statement of 
11 March 1970” which assured autonomy for Kurdistan.118
At the time the “Statement of 11 March 1970” between the KDP and the Iraqi 
government represented a historical achievement. It included a 15-point proposal to 
116 In June 1964, tensions increased between Barzani (President of the KDP), and the KDP politburo 
headed by Ibrahim Ahmad (Secretary of the KDP), which led Barzani to drive the KDP politburo and 
followers out of Iraqi Kurdistan, in order to put an end to the political career of Jelal Telebani. In spite 
of this, Telebani remained active in the Kurdish national movement, appearing again in the political 
arena, especially after Barzani’s revolution had collapsed in 1975. Telebani also benefited from the 
tensions between Baathist parties in Iraq and Syria in establishing the headquarters of a new party 
under the name The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Damascus. The PUK obtained support from 
Syria to participate in the Kurdish resistance taking place in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Stephen C. Pelletiere; op. 
cit. , pp. 135, 139,  185 
117 Barzani was permitted to return from his exile in the Soviet Union after the military coup by Abdul 
Kerim Qasim in 1958. Under the leadership of Abdul Salem Aref (November 1963 to April 1966) a 
war was launched against the Kurds in June 1963. In negotiations between the Kurds and the central 
government in 1963, the Kurds demanded autonomy. After the overthrow of Aref’s government 
Mustafa Barzani agreed to a ceasefire in January 1964. Ibid., PP. 133-34, 152
118 It should be noted that in 1970 Iraq was considered a follower of the Russian camp and that they not 
had any relations with the United States since 1967 because of US support for Israel. For this reason 
the Iraqi government had insisted on abandoning contracts which supplied oil to Western markets and 
instead turned to the Russians in 1972, from whom they obtained and armed themselves with various 
weapons. Ibid., pp. 165-66
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implement an autonomous scheme in Iraqi-Kurdistan within four years, and 
authorised the participation of Kurds in the Iraqi parliament. But until 1974, apart 
from the Revolutionary Command Council, Iraq still had no parliament and had no 
permanent constitution since a military force ruled the country.119 A plebiscite was
planned for October 1970 to determine the area predominantly run by Kurds; but this 
never took place, despite the peace agreement that included the Kurdish demand for 
equality, home rule and participation within Iraq.120 In order to eradicate the Kurdish 
movement and to extend its control over the entire Kurdish region, the Iraqi 
government wished to resolve its boundary differences with Iran at the OPEC 
conference in Algeria. In 1974, on the basis of the “Algiers Pact” between Iraq and 
Iran, and with mediation from the Algerian president Houari Boumedienne, the Iraqi 
119 Nevertheless, these promises too were broken in March 1974 when the Iraqi government decided 
unilaterally to apply limited autonomy, in a move deliberately intended to weaken the accepted version 
of the agreement. The Iraqi government created a legislative assembly in Iraqi Kurdistan with 80 
members under the dissident KDP member Hashem Akrawi. This legislative assembly was not the 
result of free elections, but its members were selected and appointed by the Iraqi government. Without 
this power, the whole process of reconciliation was dangerously undermined by the Iraqi government. 
In addition the Arabisation policy in Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas continued to be assiduously 
applied. Alexis Heraclides, The Self Determination of Minorities in International Politics(Great 
Britain: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1991), pp. 134-34; and also see Edmund Ghareeb, ibid, p. 
172
120 The most significant points in this agreement were:
1. It recognised that the Kurdish language should be considered equal to Arabic, be an official 
language and be the language of instruction in the areas manned by a majority of Kurds. Elsewhere, in 
the rest of Iraq, it should be taught as a second language.
2. The Kurds were to be recognised in the interim constitution, which should be amended to read: 
“The people of Iraq are composed of two principal nationalities; The Arab nationality and The Kurdish 
nationality. This constitution recognizes the national rights of Kurdish and all of nationalities within 
framework of the Iraqi unity.”     
3. To eliminate any discrimination between Arabs and Kurds regarding participation in the 
government and holding any important and sensitive public offices such as ministries or army 
commands, etc.
4. The administration, including government officials such as district officers, directors of police and 
directors of security, etc. were to be elected among the Kurds in the Kurdish province.
5. Women, students, youths, teachers etc.., would have the right to set up their own organisations and 
the government would supply them.
6. Workers, employees, government officials, civilians and the military, who had lost their jobs during 
the hostilities, should return to service. 
7. There were to be economic plans and equal development schemes for the Kurdish Provinces along 
with the rest of Iraq. Also pension salaries were to be paid to the families of members of the Kurdish 
armed movement who had been martyred or who were incapacitated or disfigured.
8. The Governorates Law would be amended to conform to the contents of the 11th March Statement.  
9.  One of the Vice-Presidents of the Republic should be a Kurd. However, some of these terms were 
implemented directly, such as the appointment of five Kurdish ministers to the cabinet, while others 
were discussed but left without any solution. One of the thorny problems concerned the delineation of 
the autonomous region with the Kurds demanding that the province of Kirkuk be included in the 
Kurdish region. They also demanded the authority to preserve their own forces and establish contact 
with foreign powers. See Michael M. Gunter (1992), op. cit., p.14; and see also: Stephen C. Pelletiere; 
op. cit., p. x; pp. 173-74.
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government decided to appease Iran  by transferring some territory in order to be able 
to use the Shatt Al-‘Arab waterway provided that Iran agrees to end its aid to the 
Kurds.121
The collapse of most Kurdish revolutions came about as a result of various factors, 
most of which have been put forward by Kurds themselves in their attempt to draw 
the appropriate lessons from previous disasters. In this context, Alexis Heraclides 
argued that the prime Kurdish mistake was excessive dependence on Iran as it was 
deemed untrustworthy from the beginning; however, it might be reasonable to counter 
this on the grounds that the Kurds at that time did not have an alternative means of 
support. Another error was the naive belief in the existence of a guarantor. Barzani  
miscalculated when he acted on the basis that the aid from Iran and the US would 
never stop, even though the US had been reluctant to support the Kurds and had little 
stake in the conflict. Nevertheless, it may be useful to pay attention to the argument 
that Barzani was not hardly concerned with presenting the Kurdish case in the Third 
World and in Socialist countries; as well as this, his inability to obtain the support and 
sentiments of the Arab Left, who were traditionally sympathetic to the Kurdish cause, 
meant that Barzani did not have the required diplomacy to carry the Kurds through 
this ordeal.122 To conclude, it is noteworthy that the re-establishment of association 
between the Great Powers during the two World Wars effectively removed all 
Kurdish efforts to found their entities and collapse their movements in each State.
121 However, the heavy fighting between the Kurds and the Iraqi government soon led to the 
breakdown of negotiations. On 7 March 1975, according to the agreement Iran closed border traffic to 
Kurds, Iranian aid was abruptly terminated, and all provisions of the Kurdish movement were stopped; 
and the Kurdish resistance was thus brought to an end. Consequently, the Kurdish revolution for which 
Barzani had gone into exile in Iran, collapsed and others surrendered. Michael M. Gunter, ibid, p.18; 
See Gerard Chaliand (ed.), ibid., p.7
122 Within this context, it would be realistic to analyse reasons why the Kurdish rebellion did not have 
the chance to succeed and did not achieve their aims during that period.
1.  The Kurdish movement failed to succeed in mobilising the human potential of the Kurdish people.
2.  Most of the Kurdish rebellions were under religious leaders, Sheikhs, who had a negative influence 
on the whole of the Kurdish movement. 
3. The Kurdish movement was thwarted by its leadership, especially during the Barzani Revolution and 
its aftermath. The Kurdish leadership deliberately rejected attempts to be reconciled with each other, 
sometimes even depending on their enemies to settle their conflicts.  
It is necessary to analyse the events and disputes at this period on two levels, international and internal, 
and how these led to the weakness of the Kurdish movement. The Kurds did not find any long-term 
allies to support them because the interests of international powers were directed towards countries that 
contained a majority of Kurds, rather than towards the violation of human rights of the Kurds as a race.
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2.2.4 THE KURDS’ SITUATION DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ 
WAR 1980-1988
The Iraq-Iran war brought the Kurds new opportunities and new disasters.  During the 
war both sides began to support and arm each other’s Kurdish opponents. However, in 
1983-84 there were unsuccessful attempts at negotiation between the Iraqi 
government and the PUK to settle their differences. The PUK demanded an increase 
in autonomy in the Kurdish region and withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the area under 
PUK control. They also demanded financial support and the dissolution of Kurdish 
tribal forces (Jash).123 In 1985, under the influence of Syria, Libya, and Iran, the two 
main parties, KDP and PUK, initiated contact. Moreover, in 1987 they created the 
“Iraqi Kurdistan Front”, whose goal was to attain wider autonomy and bring down the 
regime.124
The consequences of the Kurds’ activities against the Baath Party and their 
cooperation with Iran led to revenge by the Iraqis and to increased repression of 
Kurdish people. The Iraqi army was involved in widespread and systematic use of 
chemical weapons against both military and civilian goals, especially in 1986 when 
there were strengthened relations between the Kurdish movement and the Iranian 
government, and the promotion of a truce between the PUK and KDP.  In response, 
and following the end of the Iraq-Iran war, Iraqi troops launched severe operations 
against the Kurds, under the name ‘The Anfal campaigns’,125 which took place during 
the period from 29 March 1987 to 23 April 1989.126
123 ‘Jash’, the term meaning Kurdish irregulars who are loyal to the government and were recruited to 
the Kurdish tribal forces; the government pays them for any activity against the Peshmerga. See  
Edmund Ghareeb, op. cit., p.174
124 Saddam Hussein drove Iraq to a destructive war in 1980-1988, However, the United States 
government implicitly supported the Iraqi government because the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
viewed as a major threat. This war cost Iraq nearly $100 billion of debt, which was used mostly in 
military mobilization and equipment. Large army forces reached nearly a million in size and destroyed 
the economic infrastructure. It was estimated that around $200 billion of investment was needed to 
repair the damage that overwhelmed the country as a result of the war. In this context, Dr. Stansfield 
stated that Iraq was granted debts and supports mainly by the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, of between $US 50-55 billion, and from the West and Japan $US 25-35 billion, as well as 
$US 10 billion from the former Soviet Union.  See Liam Anderson and Gareth S. V. Stansfield, ‘The 
Future Of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, Or Division’,( New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.84,
Also see Michael Clarke, ‘The Diplomacy that Led to War in Iraq’, in The Conflict in Iraq 2003, ed. 
Paul Cornish, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2004), p. 28 
125 The term “Anfal” refers to one of the verses of the Qur’an. It was a serious military operation used 
by the Baath Party and was intentionally anti-Kurdish; its goals were to devastate all the villages of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, in order to eliminate support for the Peshmerga forces and to stop their acquisition of 
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The first Anfal campaign was initiated in the Jafayati valley villages of Bergalou and 
Sergalou. The second Anfal campaign began on 22 March 1988 with the chemical 
bombardment of the village of Sawsenan. On 13 March 1988, the Iranian army had 
shelled the town of Halabja in order to control it. In response, the Iraqi army counter-
attacked on 16 March, with heavy air strikes which included attacks of napalm, 
phosphorus and chemical weapons.  Although the Human Rights Watch organisation 
has the name of 3,200 victims, they estimate that between 4,000 and 7,000 people 
were killed.127
In short, during the eight years of war, the Iraqi government was widely supported by 
Arab countries and by Western industries who supplied financial aid and weaponry. 
This motivated the Iraqi government to practice oppression over its citizens. And 
although the United Nations, and the international community in some cases, 
condemned the Iraqi government’s violation of human rights no-one was ever 
seriously punished.
supplies. It is stated that the destruction caused by the Anfal campaigns included the execution of 
50,000 to 100,000 Kurdish civilians. In other words, more than 5,000 villages were completely looted 
and destroyed by troops, and anywhere that was defined as a “prohibited area” was regularly 
bombarded with troops and artillery. It subsequently caused the destruction of the Kurdish rural 
economic infrastructure and displaced around 1.5 million people. Moreover this operation included the 
Arabisation of the city of Kirkuk. It is also worth noting that the first attack in which chemical weapons 
were used against the Kurds by the Iraqi government started in the villages of the Balisan valley and 
Sheikh Wasan. These initial attacks were followed by intense bombing by the Iraqi air force. Helena 
Cook, op. cit., pp. 12-3;  and also see Kerim Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 25-6.
126Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin Ali Hassan Al-Majid as supreme commander of these 
campaigns and gave him unlimited power over the entire Kurdish region. He also directed the Iraqi 
army’s First and Fifth Corps
127 It is worth noting that in the first campaign, disappearances were restricted to men and teenage boys, 
who were never seen again. However, in the second campaign the disappearances also included women 
and children, who were separated from the men and teenage boys into groups according to age and sex. 
The third Anfal campaign was described as a series of severe attacks from both airborne and ground 
troops, which spread in the Germiyan areas, including Leilan, Aliawa, Qader Karam, Chamchamal, 
Tuz- Khurmatu and Qoratu. The campaign included the mass destruction of villages, a rapid increase in 
the eradication of the Kurdish countryside and also the displacement of thousands of Kurds. The final 
campaign started in Badinan, on 25 August 1988. The Iraqi army recorded the arrest of over 13,000 
civilians in this campaign. In addition to this, there were attacks of poisonous gas and the shooting of 
numerous civilians, a pattern that in fact was common to all the Anfal campaigns. Furthermore, 
locations in the central and southern regions of Iraq had been converted by the Iraqi government into 
camps for Kurdish civilians. For example, the camps in Tikrit included Topzawa, and Dibs which were 
set up especially for female prisoners. Another camp was Nugra Salman for elderly male and female 
prisoners. Individuals in these camps suffered from terrible conditions, with a lack of food and water 
and appalling sanitization. Many died on the way to the camps as they were kept inside the vehicles at 
scorching temperatures with very little hydration, which resulted in the deaths of a number of prisoners. 
Most were driven to mass graves and were never to be seen again by their relatives. Kerim Yildiz; 
ibid., pp. 28-9.
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CONCLUSION
During and after the First World War the Great Powers, especially Britain, 
strengthened the formation of several new States in the Middle East, among which 
were Iraq, Turkey and Syria. These new States were internationally recognised 
entities with clearly determined boundaries; this, however, caused the partitioning of 
Kurdish land between these States and created a geopolitical dilemma for the Kurds 
from which they are still suffering. Simultaneously, their language, culture and 
nationalism were severely affected by this partition, and this also represented a 
serious obstacle to Kurdish unity as far as a nationalist programme and strategy was 
concerned. It is obvious that these States did not try to solve the Kurdish problem 
according to democratic principles. Instead, they tried to resolve it by force, thinking 
that they would reach their goals by violence and suppression.128
Indeed, the Kurds have struggled to obtain the right to self determination which 
includes defending, developing and maintaining their culture and identity for many 
decades. The Kurds as a nation are divided among four States: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, which do not recognize the right of self determination, excluding the recent 
situation in Iraq. Additionally, Kurdish ambitions for gaining independence or 
autonomy emerged and were widespread as a result of increased Kurdish nationalistic 
activity within this period. One of the chronic problems for the Kurds in the period 
after the First World War was that new independent States were formed from the 
disintegration of the Ottoman and Persian Empires. There was a determination to 
create and centralise new identities based on central control and loyalties to the largest 
ethnic and religious groups, in order to integrate and forcibly assimilate other 
minorities. 
It is worth reiterating Pelletiere’s view that the Kurdish national movement was not 
separatist; during the time they were asking for autonomous rule for Kurdistan they 
were asking to share power with the Arabs ruling in Iraq; however the Kurds were 
denied any access to the Iraqi government. Mustafa Barzani, in all his rebellions, 
declared the Kurds were fighting for autonomy, not for independence; he believed 
that it was only through negotiations that they could obtain their rights and that this 
128 Wadie Jwaideh, op. cit., pp. 128-30
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was preferable to the continual fighting that had been going on for decades.129 In 
discussing this matter, some Kurdish intellectuals were critical of Barzani when they 
thought that Barzani should not have rejected the 11 March 1970 settlement out of 
hand; his rejection of the project and consequent run-up to the war as a result of his 
confidence in Western powers (especially the US) showed an inaccurate evaluation of 
these powers and an incorrect view that Western interests would take care of the 
Kurds.
During the last century, all previous regimes in Iraq had proposed truces with the 
Kurds, often on conditions that appeared attractive. In all negotiations with all 
previous Iraqi governments, the Kurds demanded democracy for Iraq and autonomy 
for the Kurds. When these negotiations come to play, the Iraqi government, as with all 
the previous governments, failed to keep its word because it truly did not want to 
settle or to reach an actual compromise with the Kurds. However, the situation in Iraqi 
Kurdistan is different from that of other countries in which Kurds are settled. These 
countries believe that Kurds pose a significant threat to their national security and 
territorial integrity. This situation leads to these countries forgetting their disputes and 
unifying to crush any Kurdish rebellion that might evolve into a real war of national 
liberation. In short, the Kurdish question often emerges and disappears on the 
international scene as a result of external, regional, or international strategic interests 
and designs. Moreover, the location of Kurds overlaps State borders, which makes 
them vulnerable to interference and manipulation by regional and international 
powers, so that their national rights are more likely to be exploited.
129 Stephen C. Pelletiere, op. cit., P.28, 131  
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Chapter 3: 
THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT (KRG)
1991-2003
INTRODUCTION
In fact, the Kurds suffered seriously from the Iraqi regime from 1980 into the 1990s, 
especially in 1991 with the mass exodus, but for the first time (since the Sevres 
Treaty), these predicaments put the Kurds on the political map in the accounts of the 
political forces in the international arena. It could be said that Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait and the miscalculations of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait in 1990 gave the Kurds 
an opportunity for the inclusion of Kurdistan in the Iraqi State, since the West and 
neighbouring powers would not allow the Kurdish region an independent existence 
outside Iraq.
By 1992, however, the Kurdistan region was suffering under international and internal 
sanctions The Iraqi government imposed a total ban on all foodstuffs, medicine, and 
petroleum products in the Kurdish region, and isolated the region from the rest of 
Iraq. This was an attempt by Iraq to oblige the Kurds to reach a political settlement. It 
is undeniable that all these circumstances, as well as the internecine fighting that took 
place between the KDP and PUK affected the internal political situation in the 
Kurdistan Region causing instability and uncertainty.
The present chapter examines the international response to the plight of the Kurds in 
Iraq between 1990 and 2003, and explains how far the intervention achieved a 
positive humanitarian outcome to save the Kurds in the immediate aftermath of the 
Gulf War and the establishment of a no fly zone over northern Iraq. Western military 
forces were also claimed the legitimacy of the humanitarian justifications, especially 
after the Security Council had adopted Resolution 688 by providing armed protection 
for the Kurds in northern Iraq. The chapter also investigates the reasons why Saddam 
Hussein decided to withdraw his forces and cut the administration in the three 
Kurdish governorates, consequently the IKF forced to establish a local administration 
in their region and followed by establishment the Kurdistan National Assembly 
(KNA) on 8 April 1992 through holding democratic elections on May 1992, which is 
58
represented one of the most democratic processes that had ever been conducted, not 
only in Iraq but in the wider Middle East as well. Eventually, establishment the first 
cabinet was formed on 4 July 1992. It is important to note that this chapter is 
necessary to understand the changes and developments of events with its implication, 
which happened post 2003, also to challenge all obstacles whether inside or from Iraqi 
neighbouring States to restrict their national rights.
3.1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS AND THE OUTBREAK OF 
THE UPRISING IN KURDISTAN REGION
Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the 
will of the United Nations: Leave Kuwait, or be driven out. 
Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead, he tried 
to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of 
America. 
(President George Bush - January 16, 1991)130
Indeed, the Iran-Iraq war was expensive and eight years of brutal warfare left terrible 
after-effects on the economy of Iraq; this made Saddam Hussein desperate for a 
financial solution to his rapidly failing economic and political situation.131 Beyond 
this, most scholars argue that the 1991 Gulf War is still one of the most interesting 
military campaigns in modern history; it came at a specific time after the lengthy Cold 
War that ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.132
130 The History Place Great Speeches Collection, ‘The President George Bush Accounting War Against 
Iraq’.  Available at:  http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush-war.htm; Access date 19 November 
2011.
131 Saddam Hussein demanded that the Arab countries, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (who do 
not weaken their economies by exceeding their agreed quotas), should reduce their oil production; this 
impacted on oil prices which declined to less than the OPEC-agreed per barrel level. Saddam stated 
that Iraq had made sacrifices against the Persians on behalf of the Arab countries, anticipating that for 
this reason the Arab countries would see their financial aid to Iraq in terms of donations instead of 
loans. Kuwait was constantly accused of aggressive behaviour against Iraq, and of having benefited 
from the Iran-Iraq war by accumulating wealth, while Iraq had made great sacrifices to defend the Arab 
nation’s soil. In this way, Saddam had found his justification for invading Kuwait, especially when the 
Kuwaiti government made it abundantly clear that they were not prepared to reduce the debt or assist in 
lowering oil prices. Gareth Stansfield, Iraq: People, History, Politics, (Great Britain: Policy Press, 
2007), pp. 124-25. Also see Alastair Finlan, Essential History: The Gulf War 1991, (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2003), p. 25; and see also Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: People, 
Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2004), pp. 83-4
132 Alastair Finlan, ibid., pp. 7, 10
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After the Iran-Iraq war, relations between Iraq and Kuwait deteriorated, especially 
when Kuwait insisted that the Iraqi government had to repay its debt to the Kuwaiti 
government. In turn Iraq requested that the debt should be excused because it had 
been incurred during the defence of Arab nationalists and national dignity. The Iraqi 
Government also criticised Kuwait for its aggressive stand against Iraq which 
included stealing from the Rumaila oilfield.133 Consequently, on 2 August 1990,
under the guidance of Ali Hassan Al-Majid the Iraqi troops occupied Kuwait after all 
the Princes and ministers had fled to Saudi Arabia. On 28 August 1990, Saddam 
decided on the full annexation of Kuwait as the 19th province of Iraq.134
The international community came to the conclusion that peace initiatives to end the 
crisis would not work with the Iraqi regime, and they believed that Saddam would not 
withdraw voluntarily without exposing the regime to armed conflict. Consequently, 
the UN Security Council was obliged to pass Resolution 678 on 29 November 1990; 
if a withdrawal was not completed before 15 January 1991, they would permit 
member States to use all necessary measures in order to evict the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait.135
133 The war took most of the world by surprise.  Initially Saddam Hussein announced that there had 
been a coup in Kuwait and that the new government had requested assistance from the Iraqi army to 
protect it, but the weakness of these allegations was not heeded by the international community and did 
not hold up. Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq, (London. 
New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), p. 7
134 Despite mediation attempts by French and Russian officials to end the crisis, Saddam refused to 
comply with or take advantage of the efforts made by Iraq’s regional and western friends to encourage 
withdrawal of the Iraqi troops. They warned him that if he continued to pursue such a policy this would 
increasingly aggravate attitudes and pressure from the international community. The situation led to the 
difficulty of any of Iraq’s closest regional friends being able to offer support. Saddam Hussein also 
appeared to have miscalculated when he tried to manipulate the inclusion of the issue of Palestine with 
the withdrawal from Kuwait. He insisted that the Palestine problem was to be resolved as part of a 
regional settlement before the question of Kuwait was dealt with. However, the international 
community rebuffed this proposal as well, and thus the Western countries had the legitimacy to embark 
on preparations for military action and the chastisement of Saddam. The use of force was viewed as the 
most likely outcome. It was quite evident that since the 1970s the US had given priority to the stability 
of Saudi Arabia (and the other oil rich States in the Gulf), as the largest oil producer and a major 
trading partner of the US and the West. It should be noted that, at the beginning of preparations to 
attack Iraq, main forces which included 265,000 American and 8000 British troops reached the Middle 
East under the justification of defending Saudi Arabia in September 1990. In the same context, Tom 
King, the British Minister of State for Defence explained his views to the House of Representatives on 
7 September 1990 that the troops were there to defend Saudi Arabia, not to attack Kuwait or Iraq, and 
also to emphasize that the embargo imposed by the United Nations needed to be implemented 
effectively. Ibid., pp. 8-9
135 However, Saddam did not wish to comply with a UN-determined deadline. For this reason, the US 
and its coalition, including European forces and the Arab armies of Syria and Egypt, launched 
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3.2 THE KURDISH UPRISING IN THE NORTH
The invasion of Kuwait was seen as bringing new opportunities and much hope for 
the Kurds to restart military activities. However, on 3 August 1990, the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front (IKF) which included the PUK, KDP, the Iraqi Communist party and 
also several smaller Kurdish parties, condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq’s 
withdrawal. The Kurdish leaders also decided to suspend all operations against the 
Iraqi government until the end of the crisis.136
The Kurds notably began their uprising by imagining that members of the coalition 
might be coerced into supporting them against the Iraqi regime;137 from the Kurdish 
perspective the coalition members had betrayed them, when they gave the Iraqi 
regime the green light to crush their uprising. On the other hand, the attitude of the 
coalition leaders (especially those of the US) could be construed as a factor that raised 
concerns among a number of coalition members about Iraq’s territorial integrity if the 
Shiite were to take up the reins of authority in Iraq. In other words, there was also 
concern that weakening the Iraqi State’s hold on the south would allow the Iranians 
more influence. At the same time, this inter-connected strongly with Turkish fears that 
a possible Kurdish State might provoke a wider uprising among Turkey’s Kurds.138
Operation Desert Storm which imposed on Iraq the need for immediate and unconditional withdrawal 
from Kuwait. This was Iraq’s last chance with a deadline of 23 February. It has been argued that 
Operation Desert Storm confirmed the power of the UN Security Council as a New World Order 
policeman, despite the limits of its role. In the name of the liberation of Kuwait, the coalition forces 
attacked Iraq on 17 January 1991 resulting in the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. Fighting was over in 
less than 48 hours and Kuwait was free once more. See David M. Malone, ‘The International Struggle 
Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005’, (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 
2006), p. 84, 101. Also see Stansfield (2007),  op., cit., p. 128
136 Furthermore, the IKF reconfirmed its commitment to the ceasefire against the Iraqi government 
through the statement issued in December 1990. The Kurds also attempted to obtain the support of the 
Kurdish militias that were allied to the regime; their numbers were believed to have risen to around 
200,0000. At the same time the Kurds tried to strengthen their efforts with other Iraqi opposition 
groups, and looked increasingly for support from their regional and international contacts. Edmund 
Ghareeb; ‘The Kurdish Issue’, in Iraq: Its History, People, and Politics, (ed.) Shams C. Inati, (New 
York: Humanity Books, 2003), pp. 175-6
137 It is worth noting that the expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait and resentment and hatred of the 
military regime. With the arrival of some of the army’s advance troops in the city of Basra, there were 
several uprisings with popular backing against anyone related to the regime, which enabled them to 
gain control of the government centres. Other spontaneous uprisings immediately began to occur in the 
southern cities of Amarah, Nasiriyah, Karbala and Najaf. See Toma Tomas, “Al-Tariq” (The Way), 
No. 38, Available at: http://www.iraqcp.org/members4/0070705w2.htm,; Also see Liam Anderson and 
Gareth R. V. Stansfield (2004), op. cit.. PP. 87-8
138 Edmund Ghareeb; op. cit., pp. 176-7
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In Iraqi Kurdistan, the uprising started in the town of Raniyah near Sulaymaniyah on 
4 March 1991, and from there extended to the major Kurdish cities. Under the 
unifying banner of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), the partisans (Peshmerga) of the 
KDP, PUK and other Kurdish political parties were able to control the rebellion and 
organise it as best they could. Consequently, it led to Iraqi Kurdistan being put under 
Kurdish control on 19 March 1991.139 Importantly, both before and during the 
uprising, many mustashars and the pro-government Kurdish militias known as Jash 
forces joined the Kurdish side, and became a part of the parties’ Peshmerga forces, 
especially after they were convinced that Saddam Hussein had been weakened; 
however, some of them retained ties with the Iraqi government.140
Compared with the uprising in the south,141 it is clear that the northern uprising under 
the banner of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) was considerably more organized and 
better formed. Despite that the victory of the rebel movements of the Kurds and 
Shiites continued for a short period only,142 largely because the coalition failed to 
139 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris,  No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, 
(New York & London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1992), p. 14. 
140 Sarah Graham-Brown, op. cit, p. 217
141 Despite wide participation of the soldiers in the south uprising, whose numbers were not 
inconsiderable for military regiments even with their light weapons, various factors meant that they 
failed to topple the regime; first, because of the spontaneous nature of the uprising as noted previously; 
secondly, the absence of opposing political leaders, especially in the south, where the uprising began; 
thirdly, the lack of unity among opposition groups at the country level, and at the level of sectors that 
had incurred an uprising, and the lack of coordination between the disparate and often isolated forces. 
Such factors prevented the uprising from seizing power and deciding the fate of the regime in Baghdad. 
Additionally, the presence of the security forces and a Republican Guard that was well-armed with 
tanks, artillery and aircraft helicopters, land-land rockets and chemical weapons, as well as the 
participation of members of the Iranian Mujahidin and some elements loyal to the Palestinian authority 
was sufficient to suppressing the lightly armed uprising.
142 The heated discussions with respect to the political miscalculation that occurred during the uprising 
and caused its failure, identified some of the following factors:
1. Internal factors included the narrow-minded nature of the factions of the uprising (in the south) while 
their slogans reflected their sectarian character; such trends prevented them from planning to take 
advantage of military units for joining in the uprising,  especially those who did not participate in acts 
of repression against the people. In light of such conditions, talk about the establishment of an “Islamic 
republic” along the lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, contributed to raising fears among domestic 
and public opinion in the Arab and international community. 
2. The effects of regional and international factors of keeping Saddam Hussein in power were 
significant; the predominant trend among the majority of Arab, regional and international powers did 
not want the regime of Saddam Hussein to fall at the hands of a victorious and popular uprising. The 
US administration would have preferred a coup which removed the top few candidates, which meant 
the head of the regime only. Meanwhile, the Gulf countries expressed their concern regarding the 
possibility that regime change might backfire and open the way to the appearance of a Shiite republic 
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offer the necessary assistance.143 However, the regime had been weakened by the 
coalition’s attack and by the spring of 1991 had lost control of 16 out of Iraq’s 18 
provinces. It was obvious the situation was developing badly for the Kurds and Shiites 
when Washington and London made it clear that they had no plans either to change or 
destroy Saddam’s regime.144 In short, as a result of the war that erupted over the 
invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath, in terms of casualties the effects were as 
follows: killing of 100,000-120,000 soldiers and 5,000-15,000 civilians during the 
war, and the deaths of 4,000-6,000 people after this war, while, the victims of the 
uprising at the hands of the Iraqi regime were estimated at between 20,000-50,000 
individuals.145
as an extension of Iran. On the other side both the Iranian and Turkish governments rejected a 
democratic alternative which would give the Kurdish people a chance to enjoy their nation fairly and to 
have the right to self-determination within the framework of a democratic, unified Iraq. Behind the 
political scenes, it was certainly instructive to see how the Iraqi people were coping. They had been left 
without any support and were subjected to the full wrath and coercion of Saddam’s troops. By allowing 
the regime leeway to deal with the popular uprising with such brutal ferocity it was able to re-exert its 
authority over the whole of Iraq. Political and organizational report of the Fifth National Conference 
of the Iraqi Communist Party (in Arabic), Available at:  http://www.iraqcp.org/framse3/moat5w4.htm.
143 Another contentious issue to analyse and interpret was the deal made on 3 March between the 
coalition’s military commanders, led by General Norman Schwarzkopf, and the Iraqi leaders in Safwan
in southern Iraq over signing the cease-fire agreement. Although their discussions focused on Iraqi 
forces and how they were unlikely to pose a threat to the allies, they were granted use of military 
helicopters; however, the civil unrest in southern and northern Iraq was ignored. This could be 
interpreted as giving the green light for the Iraqi regime to go ahead and use helicopters, as well as 
artillery and ground forces, to suppress the uprisings.  Saddam duly gave close family members and 
supporters, especially the Republican Guard, absolute powers to quell the rebellion; to end a very tense 
situation Ali Hassan al-Majid was made Minister of Interior, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri was sent to the 
south and Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, was appointed Minster of defence. The regime was 
able to crush the insurgency with great ferocity in mid-March. The repression of the uprising coincided 
with the Security Council’s decision to impose permanent ceasefire terms on Iraq. Sarah Graham-
Brown, op. cit., pp. 18-9
144 Some opposition groups may have triggered concerns among the allies that parties opposed to 
Saddam’s regime were influenced by neighbouring powers, particularly Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, 
with whom they had stronger links, such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Dawa, 
and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. These groups showed more animosity towards the US which 
they described as the ‘Great Satan’, than they did against the dictatorial system in Baghdad. On the 
other hand, there were other reasons why the allies drew back from removing Saddam at that period. It 
was obvious the US took regional sensitivities into account before involving itself in a military 
campaign the political consequences of which were not known. Gareth Stansfield (2007),op. cit., p. 
133, 138
145 Figures from the Iraqi Red Crescent suggest that 6,000-7,000 civilians were killed during the war, 
and another 6,000 died because of contaminated water. According to a report by the Iranian 
government, the mortality rate among children who were displaced as Kurdish refugees to Iran in 
March 1991 reached 1,300,000, which translates to 1,000 children a day. Eventually, it was estimated 
there were 15,000-30,000 deaths among refugees in Iran and Turkey, but there were never any 
estimates of deaths that might have occurred in other places such as Saudi Arabia, where more than 
30,000 Iraqi refugees reached its border. Reliable health sources predicted the deaths of some 170,000 
children under the age of five in the year following the war. See Political and organizational report of 
the Fifth National Conference, ibid.
63
3.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE HAVENS FOR THE KURD   
AND ITS PROTECTION
After crushing the uprising in the south, Saddam ordered the Republican Guard to 
move into the rebel Kurdish areas.  From 28 March onwards, the Kurds were forced 
out of the major cities and into the mountains bordering Iran and Turkey. Between 1.5 
and 2 million Kurdish civilians began fleeing into the snowy mountains, fearing for 
their lives and remembering the Iraqi terrorist actions against them during the Iraqi 
Anfal operations in 1988 which had involved not only the unrestrained use of 
chemical attacks on Kurdish populations but had also systematically destroyed 
villages, towns, and the agricultural economy of the mountain regions.146
What is noteworthy, when the international news agencies eventually started to report 
to the outside world the plight of Kurdish refugees who were freezing and starving 
following their panic-stricken flight to the mountains, public opinion in the West was 
outraged and aroused. This had a significant impact on their governments and created 
intense pressure to resolve the crisis with military and humanitarian action and to 
impel the international community to take action by establishing a ‘safe haven’ for 
refugees in northern Iraq.147 Help eventually reached approximately one million 
desperate Kurds at the Turkish border on 28 April 1991.148
146 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.159. and also see: David M. Malone; op. cit., p. 85. 
147 Here another important point to be taken into account was that initially the UN had not supported 
the establishment of enclaves, but after the allied forces had initiated OPC, the UN signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Iraqi government to allow for UN humanitarian aid 
inside Iraqi territory. In this regard, it should be pointed out, that differently from OPC, the UN plan 
was to seek Iraqi consent and cooperation; nor did the UN plan provide for any military protection.  In 
this context, Malone notes that President Mitterrand, who was severely criticised the international 
community that should not forget the plight of the Kurds, stating that it would be the imperative duty of 
the Security Council’s “political and moral authority” to protect them. Sophie Thomashausen, 
Humanitarian Intervention In An Evolving World Order: The Case of Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo and East 
Timor, Africa Institute of South Africa, South Africa, 2002, pp. 33, 36; Also see David M. Malone, 
ibid, pp. 74-5, 86
148 The idea of providing a ‘safe haven’ for Kurds was appeared when the Turkish authorities insisted 
to bring the refugees out of the mountains to the plains inside Iraq, instead of into the populated valleys 
on the Turkish side, which in turn made it easier for the Western relief agencies to send them 
humanitarian aid. Some political analysts have interpreted Ozal’s words as being a reminder to the US 
and Britain that the Turkish authorities still dreamt of recovering Turkish domination of northern 
Iraq.148 It should also be noted that both Turkey and Iran had written formally to request the UN 
Security Council to take international action to stop the flow of a million Kurdish refugees from the 
north, and 500,000 Shiites from the south across their territorial boundaries since this would threaten 
their territorial security. This move coincided with the visit of US Secretary of State James Baker to the 
region, and a declaration that they would not leave the Kurds to die in the mountains of northern Iraq. 
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Meanwhile the international aid agencies had launched a massive aid operation to 
help the refugees. The factors and reasons already noted above lay behind the decision 
of the Allies to create a Western umbrella protected by the forces of the US, the UK, 
and France.  In what became known as Operation Provide Comfort,149 a small area 
was identified in northern Iraq around the cities of Imadiya and Zakho and under 
allied pressure; Iraqi forces withdrew from Zakho, which was proclaimed a safe 
haven by the coalition members in April 1991.  It is necessary to reassert that, these 
operations achieved their humanitarian objectives by providing food, clothing and 
shelter to the displaced refugees in the safe haven and guaranteeing safe routes for 
Kurds to their homes in northern Iraq.  At the same time, the Allies activated 
Operation Southern Watch to prevent the Iraqi aircraft bombing of Shiite civilians and
army deserters in the southern marshlands. For this reason, some political analysts 
argue that the actions of the coalition forces cannot be considered a violation of the 
UN Charter. There was also a consensus that the Iraqi government had infringed 
international law. Furthermore, the Allies themselves confirmed that the purpose 
behind the use of force was not meant to galvanise the Kurds or allow the Shiites to 
become independent from Iraq, nor to change Iraq’s government or to violate its 
territorial integrity.
It is quite evident that, this humanitarian catastrophe had led the UN Security Council 
to pass Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991,150 in order to terminate the repression of 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 142, 148, and also see John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends 
But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds , (New York & London: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1992), p. 2
149 The combined US-UK operation known as Operation Provide Comfort II (OPC II) enforced the no-
fly zone above the 36th parallel until the operation was officially ended in late 1996 (to be immediately 
replaced by Operation Northern Watch in January 1997). OPC II, known to the Turkish as Operation 
Poised Hammer, was established by the allied powers, when a group of eight nations set up a Rapid 
Deployment Force (RDF) of 2,500 troops that was to react to any reprisals taken against the Kurds by 
Saddam Hussein’s forces. The initial plan for Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was to build six 
camps that would shelter around 60,000 refugees. Over 20,000 troops from 13 countries participated in 
protecting Kurds in an area of 5,500 square kilometres in the Dohuk governorate.  These relief camps 
would be constructed in Zakho and Dohuk and displaced people would be transporting from mountains 
to the ‘safe havens’ and then to their homes. Planes flew daily observation runs above the 36th parallel 
from Incirlik airbase in south-eastern Turkey; permission for this operation had to be renewed by the 
Turkish government every six months. In this context, Malone suggests that the OPC was not only for 
humanitarian relief, but also laid a foundation for more positive economic and political development of 
the Kurdish region, which in effect was able to experiment with autonomy under international 
protection. Sarah Graham-Brown, op. cit., pp. 107; David M. Malone, op. cit., p. 89, 93
150 What should be mentioned, a key issue here was whether the Security Council should legitimise the 
use of force to save the Kurds, and the legitimising of the safe haven by alliance in the wider 
international community. Clearly the Western States legitimised their intervention as in conformity 
with Resolution 688, as well as being justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In this 
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citizens in Iraq. This resolution represents one of the important events in changing the 
fate of the Kurds in this region. However, while Resolution 688 provided immediate 
humanitarian assistance to the Kurds, there were growing fears that the situation was 
deteriorating; this prompted the US and Britain to impose ‘no-fly zones’ to prevent 
Iraqi aircraft  from flying north of the 36th parallel.151
In this context, one important dimension was that a clear political message had been 
sent by the coalition to Saddam Hussein that the international community would 
continue to provide protection for those who had returned from the mountains, despite 
the withdrawal of the Western forces from Iraq. The no-fly zone in the north would 
also remained in operation and would be watched by Western air forces. Any future 
attacks against the Kurds by the Iraqis would mean harsh reprisals by the allies.152
Simultaneously, at this point Talabani and Barzani were obliged to open negotiations 
regard, the UK foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd commented that the situation “recognizes extreme 
humanitarian need”.  Some member States (such as China) expressed concern that the draft resolution 
should not violate Article 2(7), while the French Foreign Minister, stating that the situation needed 
more serious action, reminded member States that it was their duty to intervene to save the Kurds. 
Thus, while Resolution 688 did not authorise military enforcement action, it could be described as a 
contribution to the promotion of international security. Wheeler points out that the resolution was not 
adopted under Chapter VII, but came under Chapter VI which relates to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes where the Security Council recommends taking action.  This position was also confirmed by 
UN Security General Perez de Cuellar who stated that the UN establishment was not in favour of 
military action under Resolution 688, and this Resolution was not “put in the framework of Chapter 
VII”. In discussing this matter it must be remembered that the enforcement action and the 
consequences of Iraq’s repression as a threat to international security, if adopted under Chapter VII, 
would have opened up various options for military enforcement action. David M. Malone, ibid., p. 91; 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, op. cit., P.146; Sarah Graham-Brown, ibid., p. 106.
151Here another important point to be taken into account was that the allied military presence in 
northern Iraq could be established on the authority of the UN and without Iraqi consent, and Perez de 
Cueller confirmed that the safe havens could be formed without Iraq’s consent but under the care of the 
UN. By focusing on the legitimisation of intervention, Perez de Cueller declared that in the absence of 
Iraqi consent, any deployment would require explicit authorisation by the Security Council.  In 
response to growing pressure from critics in parliament and media calls for action to save the Kurds 
rather than abandoning them, the British Prime Minister John Major sent a letter to the UN Secretary 
General on 2 May, in which he first introduced the idea of a UN police force to protect the Kurds. He 
proposed that allied forces could be replaced by a UN police force, and that Resolution 688 provided 
sufficient authority for this. On April 16, Major had also proposed the creation of ‘safe enclaves’ and 
had confirmed that their composition was legal and provided for in Resolution 688. Meanwhile, he 
asserted that the Plan did not involve interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, but merely granted a 
population safety from persecution. The proposal also received backing from the US and the EC 
(European Community) governments, particularly from President Mitterrand, which prompted the 
British Foreign Secretary to declare that Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Italy had decided not to 
end their operations in northern Iraq whilst the Kurds remained at risk. Nicholas J. Wheeler, ibid., pp. 
153-7; David M. Malone, ibid, p. 88; Gareth Stansfield (2007),op. cit., pp. 134-35
152 When the Iraqi army increased its activities in the southern marshes area, there were reports and 
allegations of shelling and air attacks, as well as the draining of the ancient marshlands. This situation, 
in turn encouraged the coalition members to declare the imposition of a no-fly zone south of latitude 32 
on 26 August 1991, because of concerns over human rights and to provide access for humanitarian aid 
to reach people in need. Nicholas J. Wheeler, ibid, p. 157; Sarah Graham-Brown, op. cit., pp. 107-8.
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with Saddam Hussein on autonomy for Kurdistan. In spite of the continuing 
negotiations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, the Kurdish Peshmerga 
forces had at the same time taken control of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in July 1991.153
3.4 THE UNITED NATION’S RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE KURDS 
Obviously, the first international cooperative action towards Iraq was taken on 20 July 
1987, when the UN ratified UNSCR 598 which aimed to end the Iran-Iraq war. It 
should be noted that the first resolution against Iraq was adopted on 6 August 1991 by 
UNSCR 661 (with Cuba and Yemen abstaining), when the UN imposed a 
comprehensive economic blockade on Iraq by appealing to its members to desist from 
financial activities and economic transactions with Iraq and Kuwait. Despite this, 
provision remained for the import of essential civilian needs, such as foodstuffs and 
medical items, and in fact a Sanctions Committee was established to oversee the 
implementation of this resolution. This was the first time the UN had endorsed and 
implemented such a comprehensive mandatory economic embargo against any of its 
members, since imposing economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1960. It is 
worth noting that Iraqi Kurdistan was included within the terms of the UN sanctions 
against Iraq, despite repeated requests from the Kurdish parliament and its 
administration. 154 This meant that the Kurds were isolated and punished from both 
sides, i.e., by UN sanctions as well as the Iraqi government.
153 Historically, the Kurds had suffered bitter experiences with Saddam’s regime and how it had 
reneged on his promises. Here it should be noted that the coalition and the relevant UN agencies had 
been urging the Kurds to enter negotiations with the Iraqi government. Because of these negotiations, 
which might reflect on their standing, the allies were in a good position to accomplish their tasks, 
which included solving the refugee problem to encourage the mass return of most of the remaining 
refugees in Turkey, along with the need to protect the Kurds and change the view that this was 
‘interfering’ in the internal affairs of Iraq. For the Kurds it was the chance to obtain more gains and 
peace. There were different views towards Baghdad among the Kurdish leadership of the Kurdish
political groups within the IKF, but they were well aware that if they did not cooperate with the Iraqi 
government it would have serious consequences for the returning refugees. In addition the Turks had 
declared that they were not prepared to host a large new Kurdish population, so from that side also 
there was no alternative but to negotiate. Sarah Graham-Brown, ibid., p. 36
154 The situation between the Iraqi government and the UN was severely strained in June 1992, 
especially in relation to UNSCOM’s research team and the access by its inspectors to places suspected 
of concealing weapons of mass destruction (WMD); security problems for UN and NGO aid staff had 
also increased.  In the meantime, the Iraqi government requested changes in the terms of the UN’s 
humanitarian involvement.  It should be remembered that, during the period of siege until his regime 
collapsed in 2003, Saddam Hussein had exploited the rapidly-growing social discontent under UN 
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As was clear from the provisions of Resolution 661, imposing an international 
economic embargo on Iraq was the situation at hand. It should further be noted that 
Resolution 678 retained the same ban on Iraqi oil exports but adjustments were to be 
made that would allow Iraq to import foodstuffs according to the 661 Sanctions 
Committee which referred to “materials and supplies for essential civilian need”.155 In 
the context of the sanctions on Iraq, one of the most important decisions to restrict 
Iraq was Resolution 686, which was adopted by the Security Council on 2 March 
1991; it emphasised an explicit threat to punish through the use of armed force if Iraq 
did not meet all the UN’s demands, especially those related to accepting responsibility 
under international law for war damages and loss during the occupation, to fully 
disarming, and to recognising Kuwaiti sovereignty and releasing all prisoners and 
detainees.156 On 3 April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 687 for the 
cessation of the Gulf War and also for creating the framework within which Iraq had 
to operate. Needless to say, according to Resolution 687, Iraq was considered 
responsible for all damage inflicted on Kuwait, and was obliged to accept this, without 
limitation or condition. Therefore, Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 both 
offered the formal structure of a permanent cease-fire, but also indicated the future 
intricacy of the UN’s role in Iraq.
sanctions as an effective form of propaganda in the Arab World as well as in the war with the 
international community. He blamed the UN, as well as the US and UK governments, for the 
continuing deterioration of the Iraqi economy and the deaths of Iraqi children as a result of the 
sanctions. Sarah Graham-Brown, op. cit.., pp. 7-8, 56, 108
155 In light of such conditions, the basic provisions of this Resolution, including forcing Iraqi 
compliance, contained the demarcation by the UN Commission of the Iraq-Kuwait border; its 
acceptance was mandatory. UN observers would monitor a demilitarised zone that extended six miles 
into Iraq and three miles into Kuwait, and Iraq was also to accept the sovereignty of Kuwait. In 
accordance with the Compensation Commission, 30 percent of all Iraqi oil revenues were to be 
deducted for compensation and return of stolen Kuwaiti property. The most significant issue for the 
western States was how to compel the Iraqi government to allow the unconditional and complete 
identification and destruction of all chemical and biological weapons, and of all ballistic missiles with a 
range of more than 94 miles and related production facilities, or their total removal under international 
supervision. It should be referred here to the legal clauses imposed by the UN concerning reduce or lift 
the prohibitions. This was dependant on the policies and practices of the Iraqi government, and 
included the implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions. Moreover, if the embargo on 
Iraqi exports was to be lifted, Iraq had comply with all the requirements set forth in paragraphs 8 to 13, 
which concerned Iraq’s agreement to destroying, removing or rendering harmless all weapons of mass 
destruction under international supervision. The United Nation, International Law, and the War in Iraq, 
Resolution 687 (1991), op. cit.
156 David M. Malone, op. cit., p. 77
68
As it mentioned above, in the face of mounting pressure, the Security Council passed 
SCR 688 on 5 April 1991;157 this Resolution condemned Iraqi repression, and 
demanded that the Iraqi government respect human rights and cease persecution of the
Iraqi people, particularly of the Kurds, despite objections from some Security Council 
members who regarded it as intervening in Iraq’s internal affairs. For the Kurds, this 
Resolution was a true reflection of their own destiny as they had been given support 
by the international community for the first time in the modern history of Iraq. To 
begin with, Resolution 688 was intended, through diplomatic means,  to reduce the 
suffering of the Kurd and Shiite refugees, and focused on the cross-border situation in 
order to convey humanitarian aid to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq, 
with or without Iraqi consent.158
Since the last century the Kurds, sadly, have always been the victims of prevailing 
geopolitical realities and the interests of regional countries with great power in the 
political arena. Although, the United States and its allies have in general taken a more 
sympathetic line with Kurds, and provided protection for the no-fly zone,  their 
concerns as to whether the Kurds would seek greater independence have remained. 
The events that followed the withdrawal of coalition forces, and unexpected political 
157 It is a reasonable to assume that the Resolution 688 contained several crucial elements. First, it 
looked at how to deal with the threat to international peace and security in the region as a result of the 
crossing of the border by a massive flow of refugees, since, according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, 
the Security Council was the only apparatus authorised to determine what comprised a threat to 
international peace and security. Secondly it considered how to compel Iraq, through diplomatic 
means, to respect the fundamentals of human rights and to put an immediate end to the repression faced 
by all Iraqi civilians, expressing hope for open dialogue that would take place to ensure that the human 
and political rights of all Iraqi citizens were respected. Thirdly it examined how the agencies would be 
enabled to convey all facilities necessary for the work of providing international humanitarian aid and 
organisations to all in need of assistance. Fourth it looked at how the collaboration between the UN 
Secretary General and the Iraqi government would be managed, so that the humanitarian efforts to help 
the refugees in the region could continue. Finally, it required all member States and humanitarian 
organisations to participate in the relief operations in order to gain immediate access to all those in 
need of assistance in all parts of Iraq. Sophie Thomashausen, op. cit,, P. 26, 30
158 The draft of this Resolution, initially proposed by France and Belgium, had the support of the UK 
and the US. However, the formula did not satisfy all the members of the UN; it was endorsed by ten 
members who voted in favour, while the three who voted against it were Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe, 
and China and India abstained.  The Resolution also raised a legal dilemma in the international 
community and for international law, related to whether the Security Council was acting within the 
framework of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter or was in violation of the Charter. Wheeler notes that 
according to paragraph 6 of this resolution, legal authority was granted for the safe havens when there 
were “appeals from all member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these 
humanitarian relief efforts”, while others argued that the resolution would allow the States to depend 
on military action in order to access humanitarian aid in human crises. David M. Malone, op. cit., p. 86; 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, op. cit., P.143, 153; Sophie Thomashausen, ibid., p. 33
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vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, led to the 1992 elections to choose a 
parliament and establish a de facto government in the north of Iraq.
The UN had imposed sanctions against Iraq but the UN, through Security Council, 
issued Resolution 986, from which the Iraq people benefited considerably when the 
UN allowed a significant amount of oil to be sold by Iraq in order to purchase 
humanitarian supplies; with a determined 13 percent of the revenues guaranteed for 
the Kurdish authority in the Kurdistan region.
3.5 THE FORMATION OF THE IRAQI KURDISTAN FRONT                                                                        
(IKF) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Indeed, the IKF was urgently required to play effective and influential role, 159 both 
politically and militarily after the legal vacuum left by Iraq’s withdrawal from Iraqi 
Kurdistan.160 Although the IKF was not capable of forming an effective 
administrative body to manage the government or to provide the appropriate services, 
it resembled an umbrella organisation that included all the differing attitudes and 
parties in the Kurdish arena. In this context, it should be noted that the most important 
aspects of vulnerability in the IKF affected the contraction and reduction of the role of 
159 The devastation of the Kurdish area and the ferocious scale of the genocide of the Kurds during the 
Anfal campaigns led to a convergence among the Kurdish Parties. On the eve of the suspension of the 
war between Iraq and Iran, all the Kurdish parties agreed to sign the Charter of Kurdistan Labour and 
the draft of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF); the signing took place on 12 June 1988 at the headquarters 
of the Iraqi Communist Party in Khoakourk, in the territorial triangle near the Iraqi-Turkey-Iran 
border.159 The Kurdistan Front included eight parties; the KDP,  PUK, Socialist Party of Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan Socialist Party-PASOK, People's Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Organization for 
the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and Front Kurdistani; these were later joined by two more, the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (KTP), and the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), who had obtained 
approval to join the Front. In order to manage IKF work, it was decided that Masoud Barzani and Jalal 
Talabani would both lead by rotating through every six months. Samir Tabla, “Profiles of the date of 
the movement of supporters of the Iraqi Communist Party” Al-hewar Al- Mutemedn,  No. 1954,, 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=100456, accessed on 22 June 2007
160 As many observers have noted, the Iraqi withdrawal from the three provinces in the north of Iraq 
created a new and unusual situation for the Kurds, and may be considered as a basis for two key issues: 
first, it was a unique opportunity to gain democracy and a chance for it to be implemented and 
practised in this part of Iraq for the first time. Second, as the sole chance it also was possible to create a 
base in the Kurdistan Region for the Iraqi opposition, from which to overthrow the regime. The 
common trend over the past century towards the emergence and existence of any Kurdish entity has 
been to assert that it would destabilise the region; it has always been claimed that the Kurds represent a 
constant source of internal instability. Thus it would be difficult to envisage how Iraq’s neighbouring 
countries, who have a large subset of Kurds in their own lands, would accept the emergence of an 
independent Kurdish entity. 
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the Front. These eight parties had separate political structures and their own armed 
Peshmerga, as well as the ability to veto any proposals or actions by the Font.  In 
January 1992 the IKF formally withdrew from autonomy negotiations with the Iraqi 
government,161 after their disappointment at the lack of progress made and because of 
the dire circumstances prevailing at the time. As a political dividend for the Kurds, the 
Front was therefore determined to show great enthusiasm for holding elections for a 
regional parliament and simultaneously to replace the regional assembly that had 
existed under Baathist rule.
During and after the uprising, the IKF emerged to maintain the security of citizens 
and the defence of the Kurdish people by the establishment of IKF committees in 
provinces and districts to replace the previous government departments and policy 
units after the withdrawal of the Iraqis. In addition, the Peshmerga forces from all the 
parties in the Kurdistan Front organised joint teams to maintain security in the cities, 
until the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government and its police units and 
security structures. The monopolization of power by the PUK and KDP had paralysed 
and dismantled all these committees and their activities. Some analysts have argued 
that the situation was a serious mistake by both of the major parties. But in practice 
that monopoly of power led to bloody conflict between them, and left casualties and 
considerable material damage. In addition, that conflict led to paralysis of the work of 
Parliament, and the division of Kurdistan between the two administrations.162
161 Negotiations between the IKF under the premiership of Jalal Talabani and the Iraqi government 
began officially on 18 April 1991, as coalition forces were about to arrive in Zakho. In these 
negotiations the Kurds submitted four papers to the Iraqi government. The first dealt with democracy 
and human rights in Iraq and called for an end to the Baath party’s monopoly of the political system in 
Iraq through the separation between State and party. It also required a free press in Iraq and a freely 
elected convention to draw up a new Iraqi constitution, and called on the government to accept 
international laws and norms set by the world community with regard to human rights. The second 
paper presented by the Kurdish delegation dealt with autonomy and the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. It 
demanded that security in Iraqi Kurdistan should be left to the Kurds, and that all schools and 
universities should be free of government control. It also called on the Iraqi government to recognize 
the areas of Khanaqin, Mandali, and Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish area. The third paper concerned the 
normalization of relations between the Iraqi government and the Kurds, and called for the government 
to end its policies of Arabising Kurdistan and trying to change the region’s demography. The fourth 
paper covered territorial integrity and the strengthening of national unity, which was quickly agreed to 
by both sides. As it was clear that Talabani led the first phase of negotiation with the Iraqi government 
and Barzani led the Second phase. In spite of that, these negotiations failed, however, some analysts 
returned to the US and the British had a role through the pressure has been exerted on the Kurdish 
leaders. Following of these course of events the Iraqi government withdrawal its forces from Kurdistan 
and imposed an economic blockade on the region. Edmund Ghareeb; op. cit. p. 178
162 www.iraqcp.org/members4/0070705w2.htm, op. cit.
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3.6 THE KURDISH ELECTIONS IN 1992 AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KRG
The miscalculations of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and in the wider region created a 
historic opportunity for Kurds to form an administration in their area, especially when 
Saddam Hussein decided to withdraw his forces and cut the administration by 
reducing the wages and emoluments of all public employees who remained in the 
three governorates. At the end 1991, he also cut off funds for investment and the 
running costs of public institutions from the three northern governorates, and shut 
down (at least until 1996) the small number of industries located in the Kurdistan 
region that had been integrated with other parts of Iraq. The Kurdish administration 
depended for its income on customs revenues, most of which came, in difficult 
circumstances, from trade with Turkey and Iran; these internal obstacles created a set 
of political and economic problems for the Kurds. After the failure of the autonomy 
talks, Saddam’s aim in his policies was to put pressure on the Kurds to oblige them to 
return and renegotiate.
On May 1992, for the first time in the history of this region, the Kurds succeeded in 
holding free elections and in the areas under Kurdish control, people participated in
the elections enthusiastically and in large numbers in order to choose the Kurdistan 
National Assembly (KNA);163 they also took part in the presidential elections. In this 
election, Most of the main political groups participated in the elections, with the 
exception of the Conservative Party and the Iraqi National Turcoman Party, and the 
163 The legal principles and procedures of the administrative body of the KRG were detailed in Law 
No. 1, which was proclaimed and collectively accepted by the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) on 
8 April 1992. The structure of the KNA is based on a secret poll in a closed list and consists of 105 
seats. Each seat represents about 30,000 votes, with an exception made only for the Christians 
minorities who are guaranteed five seats within the Assembly; otherwise all the small parties should get 
at least 7 percent of the total votes in elections for seats in the Kurdistan Parliament. Thus, the KNA 
works according to proportional representation, with the vote to the party lists and not the candidate. 
Moreover, the parties are free to combine with each other, which is what happened between the PUK 
and the Workers’ Party (called Parti Zahmat Keshan in Kurdish), and also between the KDP and the 
Kurdistan Socialist Party (PASOK). Regarding participation of other parties in the electoral 
competition there are, in addition to the two major parties, the Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party 
KPDP, Iraqi Communist Party ICP, Islamic Movement of Kurdistan IMK, and Independents. The 
Christian lists include the Assyrian Democratic Movement ADM, Kurdistan Christian Unity KCU 
(which is pro-KDP), Democratic Christians DC (pro-PUK), and the Kaldo-Ashur Democratic Party  
KAD (pro-ICP). David M. Malone, ibid, p. 93; Also see Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: 
Political development and emergent democracy, (New York and London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). 
p.122, pp. 125-6
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two main Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK, obtained the overwhelming majority of the 
votes; the KDP obtained 50.8 percent of the vote, while the PUK took 49.2 percent. 
The two parties agreed to maintain an equal balance in the formation of the new 
Kurdish government. 164
However, one of the main challenges that faced the election, and which remains 
problematic to the present time, was/is the absence of a regional census, not only in 
Kurdistan but also in Iraq, as a result of the demographic changes resulting from the 
Arabisation policy and the brutal suppression by the former Iraqi regime.165 But 
despite all the odds, the Kurdish legislative assembly explained, and confirmed, in 
Law No. 1 that in rearranging their relationship with the Iraqi government, federalism 
would be the best solution.  Although a fragile experiment in self-governance, the 
Kurds survived and prospered and directed their efforts towards guaranteeing the 
political and cultural rights of all groups residing in the Kurdish regions. On the other 
hand, they should perhaps have endeavoured to alleviate the tension and fears of 
neighbouring countries by reassuring them that they did not threaten anyone’s 
territorial integrity, that they were capable of maintaining unity and peace in their 
areas, and that they were not intending to break away from Iraq.166
In an evolving situation, the first cabinet was formed on 4 July 1992, according to 
Law No. 3 of 1992. It was composed of 15 ministers and five ministers of State in 
addition to the prime minister and his deputy.167 Alongside a rivalry between the 
164 The polling process was for election of the KNA as well as for the leader of the Kurdistan 
Liberation Movement and took place on the same day, as noted.  The candidates for the leadership 
position were Masoud Barzani of the KDP, Jalal Talabani of the PUK, Sheikh Othman Abdul-Aziz of 
the IMK, and Dr Mahmud Othman of the KSP. As expected, both Barzani and Talabani seized control 
of the ballot and were able to secure an absolute majority, as their parties had obtained in the KNA 
elections. Brown has argued that, however, the original vote for the KDP was 45.3 percent and the 
PUK 43.8 percent. But the results were changed to 50.8 percent for KDP and 49.2 percent for PUK 
after the re-distribution and the addition to the two main parties of the votes from the smaller parties 
that received less than the 7 percent of the vote required to correct the spelling of obtain a seat. 
Sarah Graham-Brown, op., cit., pp. 219-20
165 Gareth Stansfield (2003); ibid., p.129
166 Most of the debates that concerned the Kurds made remarkable progress towards achieving their 
goal through the holding of elections according to Law No. 1 on 19 May 1992; the elections which 
were under the supervision of international observers, either individuals or human rights organisations. 
Western observers and the Western media expressed their admiration for the large number of people 
who turned out to vote. Edmund Ghareeb, op. cit., p.182
167 The Presidium of the KNA was also divided between the two major parties, with Jawher Namiq 
Salim of the KDP becoming the Speaker, and Muhammad Tawfiq his deputy. The KNA opened the 
first session on the same day in the parliamentary building in Erbil.  Dr Fuad Masum was appointed as 
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parties, the KNA, the PUK and KDP bargained to divide the KNA’s 105 seats equally 
between them, in a system known as ‘50-50’,168 excluding the five seats assigned for 
the Christian minority. This ‘50-50’ eventually led to paralysis of the government in 
much of its work and put many constraints on its progress, as a result of the dominant 
spirit of competition, rivalry and partisanship among party supporters. A difficult 
problem between the two major parties which would become an outstanding issue was 
related to the nominating of one of the two main candidates for the leadership. It has 
been argued that by the non-acceptance of any one of them the concession to the other 
party has led both Barzani and Talabani to stay out of the administrative structure of 
the KRG, which had meant that political competition has continued between them; it 
also meant that the decision-making process was done within the framework of the 
political bureaus of the KDP and PUK, which in turn led to the paralysis of the KRG 
through the politicization of its system at every level.169
Throughout 1993 until 1996, the KRG’s situations was deteriorated seriously, due to 
the neighbouring powers, particularly Iraq and Iran, were seriously affected by the 
worsening situation through tightened internal sanctions on the Kurdistan region. 
Despite the strong rivalry between PUK and KDP, these factors caused a weakening 
of relations between the two parties, and the KNA failed to build on its achievements 
with the first and second cabinets which were under the premiership of Kosrat Rasoul 
in the PUK.170 The Kurdistan Region thus ended up being divided geographically and 
prime minister in the first cabinet, and Dr Roj Nouri Shawais was his deputy prime minister. It was 
clear that the majority of ministries would be divided between the PUK and KDP, with all ministers 
and their deputies having the same political influence. 
168 Certainly, this form of governance (the polarisation of the political system), by which we mean the 
division of power, started from the Council of Ministers and extended to all the administrative sectors 
and the governmental structures, including municipal functions, schools, health facilities and so on. 
Although it appears that in practice the Peshmerga forces were under the control of the Ministry of 
Peshmerga Affairs, in fact both the PUK and the KDP retained full control of their respective forces. 
169 The overall participation rate reached 982,649 votes cast; 12,079 votes deemed void and/or 
unreadable. For Masoud Barzani, votes cast: 466,819 or 47.51 percent; for Jalal Talabani 441,507 votes 
or 44.93 percent; for Sheikh Othman Abdul-Aziz 38,965 votes or 3.97 percent; for Mahmud Othman 
23,309 votes or 2.37 percent. Gareth Stansfield (2003), ibid., pp. 130-1; Also see Sarah Graham-
Brown, op. cit., pp. 219-20.
170 As mentioned, the outcomes of the tension between the PUK and the KDP came to a head in August 
1996, with the result that each party established its own third cabinet (1996-1999), either from among 
its own partisans or among individuals from other allied parties in the areas under its control. For 
example, on 1st September 1996 the KDP decided to dissolve the previous cabinet and established the 
third cabinet under the premiership of Dr Roj Nuri Shawais, with Nechirvan Barzani as his deputy in 
Erbil. At the same time, the PUK claimed that they had a legal right to re-establish the government 
with all the ministries in the second government in Sulaimaniya. Therefore, the PUK proceeded to 
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politically between the KDP, which dominates the two major cities of Erbil and 
Dohuk, while the PUK controls the city of Sulaymaniyah and its environs, as well as 
some parts of Kirkuk such as Darbandikhan.171
It is plausible to think that, the situation of elections and its aftermath also reflected 
the endemic divisions within Kurdish society. Certainly there was a complete division 
in measures that had been practised between the two major parties for all managerial 
positions; thus, if a minister was a PUK member then his deputy would have to be a 
member of the KDP.  It is reasonable to conclude that the level of national affiliation 
was not sufficiently strong when most of the Kurdish population showed loyalty to 
their parties before the supreme national interest. On the other hand, the parties 
worked to enhance their position, and used the authorities and government interests to 
serve and strengthen their status. Consequently, they and their leaders gained 
tremendous personal wealth, most of illegally. Personal rivalry reached a level that 
could split Kurdistan region completely; one can imagine that the effects would be 
felt for decades afterwards. 
3.7 THE OUTBREAK OF INTERNAL FIGHTING BETWEEN  
THE PUK AND KDP
It is undeniable that, the KDP’s refusal to share customs income from the Ibrahim al-
Khalil checkpoint on the border between Turkey and Iraq was one of the reasons that 
led to the emergence of the internal conflict between the PUK and KDP.172
establish the third cabinet in late 1996 under the premiership of Kosrat Rasoul, with a coalition of 
parties that had not participated in the Erbil cabinet. There were heated discussions concerning the 
PUK’s inability to establish the KNA in Sulaimaniya since a legal quorum could not be achieved as 
long as the MPs of the KDP and the Christian remained in Erbil. Given these critical circumstances, 
what happened again was that neither Masoud Barzani nor Jalal Talabani participated in the formation 
of the government. Gareth Stansfield (2003); ibid., pp. 152-5; pp. 161-2
171 A highly problematic issue arose when the two main party leaders decided to stay outside the 
parliamentary and administrative structures in a new Kurdish government, which in turn led to 
paralysis in the administration. In fact, the PUK and the KDP have both focused on enhancing the 
prestige of their parties instead of supporting and strengthening the government. Specifically the KDP 
and PUK deliberately did not submitted a portion of the custom revenues that they had collected for the 
finance ministry of the Kurdish government, which directly undermined the administration’s political 
position in the KRG, and created difficulties with governmental activities; it also reduced progress in 
delivering basic services to the Kurdish people. Edmund Ghareeb, op. cit., p.179
172 What should be pointed out here is that after the imposition of the blockage over Iraq and until the 
collapse of Saddam’s regime, he had established an oil smuggling route to Turkey which passed 
through areas controlled by the KDP so that they would be far away from the eyes of international 
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It was also obvious that the situation between the KDP and the PUK deteriorated in a 
most atrocious manner between 1994 and 1996. The situation was both dangerous and 
unstable, and both sides had prepared their troops and their equipment for battle. 
Talabani claimed that Barzani controlled the most significant strategic points of 
Kurdistan; therefore he wanted to obtain some of this revenue. A combination of the 
factors mentioned above resulted in fierce fighting between the two sides, with the 
final result that the PUK was able to remove the KDP from the major areas in the 
region without them having reached the border crossings with Turkey.173
In the summer of 1996, there was a serious and worsening escalation in the fighting 
between the KDP and PUK. Barzani found himself in a weak position, which in turn 
gave him an incentive to establish strong links with Baghdad (even though it had 
economic and military relations with Turkey). The cooperation between the KDP and 
Saddam Hussein’s forces shocked the Kurds and the world. At the time that 
negotiations were in progress, another round between the PUK and KDP was held in 
London, hosted by the UK and the US. The KDP had justified its request under the 
pretext of foreign threats from the Iranians through Iran’s alliance with the PUK. This 
situation had been requested out of the need to defeat of the PUK and to restore the 
areas that had been taken by the PUK during the period of fighting. Thus, with the 
cooperation of Iraqi government troops, 30,000 Republican Guards and KDP forces 
entered Erbil and were able to take control on 31 August 1996.  By 11 September, the 
KDP appeared to be in control of most of Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition, the KDP 
announced a new government at the parliament building in Erbil in September 
1996.174
observers. Anderson and Stansfield note that these circumstances have assisted the KDP in particular, 
since the senior members of the Barzani family were involved in, and earned an enormous fortune from 
the taxation of this illegal trade, especially during the time when the Iraqi government had imposed its 
internal embargo over the Kurdistan region and the Kurdish fighting was launched. Liam Anderson and 
Gareth R. V. Stansfield (2004), op. cit.. p. 174
173 Intra-Kurdish fighting has as a historical background the bitter relationship between the parties in 
the political arena in Iraqi Kurdistan. From the foundation of the PUK in 1976 there were several 
periods of increased tensions between the PUK and KDP, when they were in the mountains; or between 
the PUK and other Kurdish parties, such as the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) which appeared 
to be making some gains in the areas under PUK control. Edmund Ghareeb, op. cit. p. 180
174 What is interesting here is that, at a time when the Kurds were still under the protection of allies 
within the safe haven, the Iraqi forces had actually pulled out of this area in late October 1991. 
Certainly the Iraqi army’s incursion caused considerable embarrassment to the Kurds themselves and to 
the US in particular, when the Iraqi army’s raid on Erbil had been undertaken on the basis of an 
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When Saddam’s forces withdrew from the region shortly afterwards, it is quite clear 
that in retaliation for this situation, the PUK was able to regroup its forces in Iran and 
begin the counterattack with Iranian weapons and support. By the end of October they 
had been able to retake the majority of the areas that had been previously lost and had 
arrived at the nearest point to the city of Erbil. The PUK then announced a new 
government based in Sulaymaniya, which was managed by Kosrat Rasoul. Since then, 
however, hostility between the PUK and KDP has been reduced, and since 1997 they 
have shown their desire for a peaceful initiative with each other and with other ethnic 
and religious minorities within Iraqi Kurdistan.  
One of the most salient consequences of the intra-fighting between the KDP and 
PUK175 in 1994 resulted in the diminishing of international support for the Kurds. 176
In short, As a result of the erroneous policies and the irresponsible behaviour 
exercised by the PUK and the KDP, which fought for geographic and economic 
dominance and ended up dividing the region between them, their citizens were left 
invitation by one of the two main Kurdish parties, and could not be considered as a hostile act. On the 
other hand there was a further dilemma in that Saddam Hussein was seeking a unique opportunity to 
achieve his target of attacking both the serious threats to the PUK, and also removing all the opposition 
parties with bases in Erbil (including the INC, SCIRI, the Iraqi National Turcoman Party, and the 
Islamic Action Organisation) in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.  The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq 
Aziz, claimed that Masoud Barzani had sent a message to Saddam Hussein on 22 August 1996, in 
which he appealed for assistance, in spite of the fact that Barzani had also appealed to the 
administration of President Bill Clinton for help on 21 August 1996; his request was ignored., but was 
not heeded.  See Sarah Graham-Brown, op. cit., pp. 117, 232. Also see David M. Malone, op. cit., p. 93
175 It is a reasonable to assume that the Kurdish nationalist movement and its conflicts with the regional 
governments often had a regional dimension but did not to come to fruition. The painful truth that had 
been repeated several times throughout the history of the Kurdish movement was that the Kurdish 
parties tried to rely on external forces as allies in their struggles for power. The Iraqi Kurdish political 
forces found themselves locked in conflict with their governments, and this led to alliances with other 
countries – in most cases with Iran, Syria and Turkey, as in the case of the PUK. Finally, the 
emergence of the Kurdish-controlled enclave in northern Iraq in 1991 created a new political situation 
for the neighbouring countries to interfere with, using other methods. Another dilemma was that both 
Turkey and Iran had maintained an intelligence presence in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992; meanwhile, 
since there was a political vacuum and turmoil in northern Iraq, the intra-fighting gave these 
neighbours the necessary justification to intervene militarily and with impunity and to order the closure 
of their border so that Kurdish rebels could not infiltrate. One of the painful truths was that both the 
PUK and KDP were sometimes forced to assist and participate with Turkey and Iran in battles with 
their own Kurdish opponents. Sarah Graham-Brown, ibid., p. 228
176 Given the ongoing unrest in the Iraqi zone of Kurdistan the European governments where there had 
initially been much sympathy towards the Kurds decided to diminish their support, particularly, when 
the PUK and KDP started to devote most of their energies to publicly accusing and denigrating each 
other. On the other side, for example, US aid organisations and other humanitarian organisations had 
been withdrawn from the Kurdistan region, and in December 1996 France proclaimed that it was 
ending its participation in the northern no-fly zone; European governments did not want to offer 
neutrality or support for either of the two parties. The most significant consequence of the fierceness of 
this war, which eventually became apparent and continues to affect Kurds till now, was that huge 
numbers of Kurds had left the country or were trying to leave.
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fearful and despairing for the future.  It should be noted here that during the time that 
the war was in progress between the PUK and the KDP, the regional States, consisting 
of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria, had held a high-level meeting for their 
representatives.  The key point at this meeting concerned the common fear of the 
emergence of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, and how to take necessary measures 
to abort this de facto entity.177 The most significant consequence of the fierceness of 
this war eventually became apparent and continues to affect Kurds, and was behind 
the huge numbers of Kurds trying to leave and leaving Kurdistan.
3.8 RECONCILIATION WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIVISION OF THE KURDISTAN REGION BETWEEN 
THE PUK AND THE KDP
Indeed, both the US and the UK expressed their serious concerns about Iran’s 
apparent influence in northern Iraq, which requested them to step up their attempts to 
find a permanent solution to the problem and arrive at a settlement between the two 
parties.  After significant efforts by Kurds and friends of Kurds inside and outside the 
Kurdistan region, Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani signed a peace agreement in 
Washington in September 1998 aimed at putting an end to the fighting and instability 
in the Kurdistan region.178
177 While the Kurds were preoccupied with their dreadful internal clashes, the Turkish government 
launched an operation into northern Iraq and over 35,000 troops with helicopters and fighter jets 
crossed the border from 20 March until the end of May 1995. The Turks alleged that the threat posed 
by the presence of the PKK bases in northern Iraq had a negative impact on Iraqi Kurdish civilians. The 
Turkish Generals were undoubtedly continuing with the incursions they had been making since the 
mid-1980s against the PKK guerrillas. However, from the autumn of 1992 until 1995 they started in 
earnest to invade the safe haven, in the name of a “final offensive” to liquidate PKK bases in northern 
Iraq. It is important here to recognise that the two main parties, whether on a large scale or in some 
cases at a limited level, were involved or were forced to participate in the joint campaigns against the 
PKK.  This went on into 1994 and caused great embarrassment for the KRG. Related to this was the 
fact that the US had earlier shown its support for these operations. The situation had evolved to one of 
continuing deterioration in the border areas and to the displacement of its population, which in turn led 
to protest and condemnation of this invasion by most of the European Members and NATO allies, 
especially France and Germany. It also put pressure on the Clinton administration to compel the 
Turkish troops to withdraw from the Kurdistan Region at the end of May 1995, even though they 
resumed their attacks in July of the same year. Gerard Chaliand (ed.),  A People Without  A Country 
the Kurds and Kurdistan,( London,: Zed Books Ltd, 1980 and 1993), p.4, 164
178 Eventually, with the backing of the US and UK governments, the KDP and PUK agreed to make the 
ceasefire permanent. Turkish officials and the Turkish army’s General Staff also participated in these 
negotiations sessions. Both sides decided to rectify the bad and dangerous situation that had occurred in 
the past, and for this they intended to stop the media attacks, organise an exchange of prisoners, and 
restore the civil service.
78
The result of internal and international efforts yielded another success between the 
two parties when they reached an agreement to resolve serious disputes. In order to 
prove their good intentions, both sides were allowed to open partisan offices in the 
cities under its control. The results of the settlement had obviously achieved some 
gains, such as the plan to reunite the Kurdish Parliament with a division of 51 seats 
for the KDP, 49 for the PUK, and 5 for the Assyrians. They then held a joint meeting 
of the Kurdish Parliament, at which they called for preparations for new elections in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and also discussed crucial issues that concerned the future of the 
Kurds in light of a possible war in Iraq.179
In fact, a number of reasons and circumstances could be taken into account for 
development and stability in the Kurdistan region; it was related to the revenue 
inflows to the region produced by SCR 986 (the Oil-for-Food programme), on 20 
May 1996, as well as to an improvement in the relationship between the KDP and 
PUK. Under this resolution the Iraqi government was allowed to export $US 2 billion 
of petroleum products for a six-month period that was renewable. Accordingly, and as 
determined by UN agencies, the share of the Kurdistan region was approximately 13 
percent of the proceeds from Iraqi oil exports and was guaranteed for the three 
northern governorates, which are largely under Kurdish control. Consequently, the 
observations and mediation by the United States had a positive and effective role in 
the normalising of political relations between the two parties, culminating in the 
Washington Agreement in September 1998.  This in turn had a significant impact and 
markedly improved the economic developments that took place in the region in the 
period from 1997 to the end of 2003.180
179 Edmund Ghareeb, op. cit., p. 180 
180 Gareth Stansfield (2003), op. cit., P. 149; and also see Liam Anderson and Gareth R. V. Stansfield 
(2007), op. cit., P.177.
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CONCLUSION
The exodus of Kurds from the oppression of Saddam Hussein might be regarded as a 
rare tragedy in modern history, which shook the conscience of the world. It should be 
noted that the international media (mainly in the West) played an important role in 
bringing the plight of the Kurdish refugees along the Turkish and Iranian borders to 
world attention. Thus, under the pressure of international public opinion, actions had 
to be taken; this led to the establishment of safe havens and no-fly zones (north of 
latitude 36, and then south of latitude 32) which impacted on the human rights 
situation in Iraq. This in turn led to protection from Iraqi reprisals for the Kurds in the 
north and the Shiites in the south. However, there were differing views, including the 
scepticism of many non-aligned countries that the Western powers might be using 
human rights issues and their support within the UN for nations or minority groups as 
a stick to beat their enemies. The controversial issue here was that human rights issues 
would contain a challenge for their own domestic policies.
On 5 April 1991 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, the first 
international document to refer to the Kurds since the League of Nations had done so 
in 1925 when deciding on the fate of the Mosul province. For the first time, the 
international community faced a unique humanitarian disaster. As a result of a mass 
exodus, Kurds fled for fear of persecution of the Iraqi government.  Thereby, they 
expressed great concern about the cross-border attacks that were threatening 
‘international peace and security’. However, on the ground the numbers of refugees 
continued to increase enormously. In turn, the evolving situation led to the setting up 
of a safe haven near Dohuk under the protection of the coalition, which contributed to 
providing the Kurds with a unique opportunity to set up a de facto government to 
manage their own affairs and decide the nature of their relations with the Iraqi 
government. The safe haven was a measure of humanitarian action by the 
international community to deflect the imminent threat of death and starvation facing 
the Kurds. In these conditions, it seems sensible to conclude that the Kurdish
leadership had no choice but to seek a reasonable outlet with the regime in order to 
reduce the humanitarian disaster that was taking place in the mountains. Politically, it 
is reasonable to conclude that SCR 688 was used to legitimise a new principle of 
sovereignty as a relative concept. According to this analysis, the United Nations 
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would allow the use of force when a state relied on vicious measures in its treatment 
of its own people; this in turn could be considered a threat to international peace and 
security, but was needed to end persecution by the State and to protect civilians in
Iraq.
In practice the Kurdistan region faced some difficult situations and considerable 
instability during the period from 1991 to 2003. These unstable conditions were 
created by a number of factors: first there was the economic embargo imposed on Iraq 
(including Iraqi Kurdistan) by the United Nations (UN), as well as the embargo that 
was imposed by the Iraqi government itself over the three Kurdish-controlled 
provinces of Sulaymaniya, Erbil, and Dohuk. Second were the several internal clashes 
that erupted between the Kurdish political parties, and particularly the bloody 
hostilities that occurred in 1996 between the major parties, the PUK and the KDP.  
Third were the interventions of regional forces, especially Turkey, Iran and Syria, in 
the internal affairs of the region, including border closures, the constant bombardment 
of the border areas and the incitement of groups loyal to them against the regional 
government. 181
It is a reasonable to conclude that the Gulf crisis and its aftermath led to modifications 
in the political structure in Iraq as well as in the region. It is quite evident that, the 
Kurdistan region underwent a period of transition after 1991. In spite of all the odds, 
the Kurds managed to create a de facto State in the Kurdish area through the holding 
of democratic elections and the formation of the legislative, executive and judicial 
apparatuses, as well as, the fact they already had an independent military force 
(Peshmerga) and parliamentary provisions for managing their own government in 
their area. With regard to their relations with the international community, their 
representatives worked independently, away from Baghdad's control. It has to be 
remembered that from the point of view of the conventional opinion of a number of 
181 The neighbouring powers, especially Turkey, Iran and Syria, have promoted tension and created 
problems for the Kurdish authority for their own domestic reasons. Moreover, they do not accept the 
authority of the Kurds over their regions, and approach the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan as a question of 
an authority vacuum. However, some of these views changed after October 2009, especially when 
economic relations began to be promoted between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region.
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politicians and researchers, this period was a real opportunity for the establishment 
and institution-building of a Kurdish State.
In the political environment of Iraqi Kurdistan, the 50-50 power sharing system 
produced a bureaucratic system for the Kurdish government and its administration 
that paralysed the government so that it became difficult to deal with serious problems 
in the region. There is no doubt that the split that they had caused included aspects of 
geographical and political affiliation and organisation within their respective areas of 
authority and caused enormous problems for the administration of the region. This 
caused an outbreak of fierce fighting between them that fairly rapidly split the 
Kurdistan Region into two administrations and came near enough to eliminating the 
government experience completely. In other words the mechanisms for sharing power 
within the Kurdish administration caused the rivalry between the PUK and the KDP 
to shift from competition to military friction on a ferocious level in 1994. Both sides 
maintained mutual hostility and competition for resources, and influenced and 
controlled most of the administrative positions of the Kurdistan Region. What 
happened at the end of August 1996 reflects the painful fact that the Kurdish leaders, 
in their struggle for power, turned to the regional powers for support. However, 
neither side could win more than a temporary victory.
Although various calamities had occurred as a result of the internal fighting between 
the PUK and KDP, the Iraqi Kurdistan region had witnessed progress and was 
distinctly flourishing when compared with other parts of Iraq.  Despite the fact that 
the Kurds currently have their own governing institutions, control over their territory, 
defined borders, and capable armed forces, their possible impact on other Kurds in 
other parts of Kurdistan in the near future will certainly remain a major concern in the 
region.
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Chapter 4: 
THE KURDISTAN REGION, POST 2003: 
NEGOTIATING THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION
“We have always been ready in the past, and we are ready and 
willing now to negotiate with the federal government to solve 
these issues according to Constitutional principles and within a 
federal, democratic Iraq”
(The KRG’s President Masoud Barzani, 19 July 2009) 182
“The Kurdistan Region has always worked to be a part of the 
solution not the problem in Iraq. We contributed in the political 
process, which culminated in the creation of the Iraqi 
constitution. We want to emphasise our full commitment to 
working with all parties and abiding by the Iraqi constitution to 
support a democratic, federal Iraq”. 
(The KRG’s President Masoud Barzani, 8 April 2009). 183
INTRODUCTION
It is important to note that the changes and events that occurred in the Iraqi political 
arena directly influenced development and progress at all levels in the Kurdistan 
region. This was particularly true after the collapse of the Iraqi regime.  As discussed, 
in the wake of the 2003 war the KRG’s gained an historic opportunity to take their 
rightful share in government, and also acquired the power to expand their autonomous 
territory in the Kurdistan Region, under the protection of the US and Britain and 
within the framework of a federated Iraqi State. They also tried to resolve problems 
with Baghdad through negotiation and consensus. Another crucial point is that the 
182 KRG. org; “Khurmala Dome begins providing fuel to power the Kurdistan Region”, 19 July 2009 ; 
Available at: 
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=223&lngnr=12&smap=02010100&anr=30604>
183 Part of speech given by President Masoud Barzani at his meeting with US President Barack Obama 
during the latter’s first trip to Iraq following his inauguration in January 2009.  See KRG.org, 
“President Barzani meets President Obama in Baghdad”, Erbil, Kurdistan/ Iraq. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&rnr=223&anr=28774> 
Access Date: 8 April 2009.
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changes brought about by the war caused some major concerns for the Kurds, 
particularly after 2003, including the Kurdish leadership’s interest in sustaining their 
autonomy at least at the level previously enjoyed between 1991 and 2003; the control 
and management of oil resources in the Kurdistan Region; and how to maintain
control of the Kurdish military forces as protector forces for their region.184 Indeed, 
within Iraq, the three main groups (Shiite, Sunni and Kurds) have different aims and 
interests. For the Shiite, the crucial goal was to control the State. The main duty of the 
Kurds was to ensure that their national rights existed in the constitution, while the 
Sunni groups wished to retrieve something of their glory years.
It is important to note the significant changes and developments that have occurred in 
the post-2003 period, Regime change and the establishment of the Transitional 
Administration in Iraq, as well as writing the permanent constitution, holding general 
elections for the formation of the national government by all the Iraqi factions and 
restoring full sovereignty for the Iraqi State, could all be regarded as significant 
events in bringing about real change, not only for Iraq but for the region as whole. At 
the same time, during the course of these events it is reasonable to think that these 
changes became a vital part of a new history for the Kurds in Iraq, particularly since 
the KRGs played a major and active role in maintaining the success of all these 
events. Obviously, these changes can be considered the first step in steering Iraq and 
the Kurdish Region towards democratic transformation. From this point of view, all 
these events need to be mentioned in this chapter.
This chapter concentrates first on the Iraq 2003 War, which brought many changes to 
Iraq and specifically to the Kurdistan Region, as well as to the whole Middle East. 
However, there was considerable talk regarding the legitimacy of the war, and the 
political model for a post-Saddam Iraq has also been contested, on the grounds that 
the concept of the extension of democratic politics was intimately intertwined with the 
184 Gareth Stansfield, The Transition to Democracy in Iraq: Historical Legacies, Resurgent Identities 
and Reactionary Tendencies, in (eds.) Danchev A, Macmillan J, The Iraq War and Democratic 
Politics, London: Routledge, 2005, 134-159, P. 144
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war.185 Whereas most analysis of the Iraq War focuses on the US position as an 
occupying power in Iraq and their remarkable concentration on Iraq’s oil reserves in 
starting the liberation of Iraq.186
One important dimension in this context was the liberation of Iraq set a historical 
precedent for the Kurds to achieve their aims, and it is expected that most of the 
debates will revolve around whether this conflict can offer the Kurds an opportunity 
to gain influence, not only in the Iraq but also in the region. It has to be remembered 
that from 2003 the Kurds set out to change direction in order to achieve their demands 
within Iraq. Interestingly, the KRG’s understood that even though their attempts to
gain control of additional territory in Kurdistan, including the large cities of Kirkuk, 
Khanaqin and etc, might be possible through application of the Constitution and not 
by force.
This chapter examines the extent, and the possibilities, of the democratization process 
in Iraq, and also attempts to explain the circumstances and reasons that made the 
Kurdish leaders decide against any endeavour for independence at this stage, in order 
to avoid risking what they had already gained, and also to preserve their status within 
the framework of a federated Iraqi State. One should mention here that, however the 
Kurds in Iraq have obtained constitutional recognition. The first legal step started in 
1958 with a “Provisional Constitution” which acknowledged Kurds as a distinct 
national group, stating that “the Kurds and Arabs were accepted as associates in the 
state of Iraq and their respective national right”. The second constitutional recognition 
came in the “Provisional Constitution” of July 1970 and was adopted after the Baath 
Party had come into power in 1968. Whereas, the challenges post-2003 for the Kurds 
who participated for the first time in the construction of Iraqi constitution.187 For the 
Kurds, considerable challenges have emerged after 2003, which constitute a strategic 
185Alex Danchev and John Macmillan (eds.), The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, (London and New 
York:  Routledge, 2005), pp. 1-4
186 This post-Saddam period was critical for the Sunni groups since, for the first time in the history of 
Iraq, power was no longer retained in their hands only but was transferred to the hands of the majority 
Shiite groups and was also shared with the Kurds.
187 Helen Cook, The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi Kurdistan,
Human Rights Centre, University of Essex and the Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Human Rights Project, 
London, 1st Edition, 1995, p. 23
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shift in changing their political situations, particularly after they have a chance to 
participate for the first time in writing the Iraqi constitution.
The main question here is how the Iraqi factions can share power and manage the 
State in a democratic way or through political consensus. In addition, it is also 
important to discuss how they could establish and consolidate democracy in post-
Saddam Iraq. Obviously, the critical issue for the Kurds is that Iraq must be moving 
towards democracy, which in turn helps them to achieve their demands. Besides, the 
Kurds persisted in their demands which they saw as essential for protecting their 
autonomous status, at least at the level enjoyed during the 1990s.
4.1 PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR
It is clear that the US military could successfully have destroyed the Taliban within 
three months of the events of 9/11, and prepared itself to counter al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
The fact is that the US was the main engine for war against Iraq, having in addition 
managed to obtain support from the majority of public opinion, who believed that 
Saddam Hussein had been directly implicated in the events of 11 September 2001.188
It could be argued that several significant issues have been suggested as the basis for 
the US attack on Iraq. First, disarming Iraq of its `was a serious matter, (a) due to the 
possible use of WMD in terrorist acts inside the US or against US targets abroad; and 
(b) to halt terrorism that might have been sponsored by the Iraqi regime itself. The 
Bush administration claimed there were links between Iraq and international 
terrorism,189 and especially with al-Qaeda organization. Thus, arguments over Iraq’s 
possible use of WMD were directed towards a regional context; i.e., the existence of 
WMD in Iraq threatened not only the US but also neighbouring states in the region. A 
second consideration, which subsequently ignited much controversy in the US and 
internationally, concerned issues of regime change, achieving the democratisation of 
Iraq, and defending the human rights of the Iraqi people.
188 John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan, “The Iraq Body Count Project: Civil society and the democratic 
deficit”, in Alex Danchev and John Macmillan (eds.), The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, ( London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 220
189 Ephraim Kam, “The War in Iraq: Regional Implications”; in Shai Feldman (ed.), ‘After the War in 
Iraq: Defining the New Strategic Balance’ (Eastbourne UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2003), p.102
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Most the members of the Republican Party (in USA) accepted that the risk of WMD 
and the related issue of terrorism posed a strategic threat to them and therefore 
represented a potent justification for paving the way to war.   It is also interesting to 
note the important issue of the “Axis of Evil”, invented in 2002 by the Bush 
administration and associated with international security. The term was applied to 
states that were to be considered as a rogue states, having been identified as 
supporting international terrorism or else involved in the proliferation and transfer to 
terrorist organizations of WMD.  This pre-emptive doctrine was also designed to 
remove major restrictions posed by international law and the UN Charter on the use of 
force. At the same time, the US administration affirmed its commitment to sustaining 
its superiority in the international arena, especially in the military field.
On 29 January 2002, US President George W. Bush declared a new doctrine of pre-
emptive action against America’s enemies190 when he declared in his State of the 
Union speech, “I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as 
peril draws closer and closer.” Analysts took this to mean that the US would not 
allow any dictatorial regimes that possessed the most destructive of weapons to bring 
catastrophe to international society. It has been suggested that the rhetorical 
approaches adopted by the second Bush administration predicted Iraq’s possession of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and its involvement with terrorism groups in 
general and Al Qaeda in particular. Certainly this rhetoric became the slogan for the 
entire anti-Iraq campaign.191
In this context, it should be noted that on 19 September 2001, both David Johnston 
and James Risen have revealed the links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, reporting 
allegations by American intelligence officials that “Mohamed Atta, a suspected 
190 President Bush announced a new US foreign policy which became known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’, 
involving pre-emptive war, in his speech at the graduation ceremonies at the West Point Military 
Academy, New York, in June 2002. According to this policy the US would proactively seek out and 
destroy countries that might pose a future danger. The aim was to protect US security and required the 
military to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary, in order to defend liberty and their lives. 
After three months, this new US National Security Strategy was made public, and declared that since 
the best defence was a good offence, the US would use its military pre-emptively against terrorists. 
Marilyn G. Piety and Brian J. Foley, “Their Morals are Ours: The American Media on the Doctrine of 
“Pre-emptive War”, in  Alexander G. Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen(eds.), ‘Leading to the 2003 Iraq 
War: The Global Media Debate’, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.67
191 Nikolaev and Hakanen (eds.), ‘Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate’, (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.2, p.23 
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hijacker on American Airlines Flight 11, which struck the World Trade Centre North 
Tower, met several months ago with an Iraqi intelligence official in Europe.” At the 
same time, during the period from the Gulf War until the collapse of Saddam’s 
regime, the Iraqi regime was continuing its attempts to obstruct the UN’s relief 
efforts, and planned, in addition, to re-take the no-flight zone by arming and financing 
a branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq calling itself the Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) in the 
northern borders near the Iranian Islamic Republic. Consequently, Assistant Secretary 
of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, speaking on 20 September 2001 on the impact of these 
changes, announced his country’s intention of a tough military response, which would 
have included Afghanistan, and “terrorist bases” in Iraq and Lebanon.192
It is true that these events heightened the focus on Iraq;, however, as has been argued, 
the US, despite immense effort, was unable to find any credible links between 
Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda terrorists, or even WMDs.193 Even so, there were some 
concerns in the US about the possibility that Iraqi chemical and biological weapons 
would be used against US troops and Israel.  In the Arab world there was a clear 
expectation by public opinion that war was inevitable and that the US would take very 
severe action against Iraq; this was described as ‘American imperialism’. In turn, 
following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1368 (2001) which required the international community 
to respond immediately by denouncing these attacks, while calling on all states to 
192 W. Lucas Robinson and Steven Livingston, “Strange Bedfellows: The emergence of the Al Qaeda-
Baathist news frame prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq”, in G. Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen (eds.)
Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 29.
193 According to Geoff Simons, it is misleading to argue that the UN inspectors found no WMD in Iraq, 
since by 1997 they had announced the destruction or removal of large quantities of WMD as follows:
“- an assembled supergun;  
- the components for four other such guns and one tonne of propellant;
- 151 Scud missiles, 19 mobile launchers, 76 chemical and 113 conventional warheads for Scud 
missiles, 9 conventional warheads for Al-Fahd missiles, a substantial amount of rocket fuel and 
component chemicals, decoy missiles and decoy vehicles, guidance and control sets, etc;
- equipment for the production of missiles and components;
- more than 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents, including mustard agent and the nerve agents 
sarin and tabun; 
- more than 28,000 filled and nearly 12,000 empty chemical munitions;
- nearly 1,800, 000 litres, more than 1,040,000 kilograms and 648 barrels of some 45 different 
precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents;
- equipment and facilities for chemical weapons production;
- Biological seed stocks used in biological weapons development”. See Geoff Simons, ‘Targeting Iraq: 
Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy’, (London: Saqi Books, 2002), pp. 13, 59-60.
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work together to bring the perpetrators to justice, and to condemn states and parties 
who provided assistance to, supported, or harboured, the perpetrators of such acts.194
Nevertheless, the most serious trouble faced by the US in preparing for the war 
campaign was related to widespread reservations expressed by the regional states as 
well as internationally, especially as the final outcome might well threaten the 
political system of the countries in the region. 
It could be argued that for the US administration, achievement of its objectives might 
in the long run depend on their achieving success in Iraq. Hence, their first step was to 
try to convince or compel other countries to give up support for terrorists and at the 
same time prevent them from having access to WMD.195 At the same time, these
regional countries were concerned about a hidden agenda on the part of the US to 
redraw the map of the Middle East. However, the US did understand, and 
accommodate, the concerns about granting more hope to the Kurds as well as 
supporting them towards a stronger position in Iraq. 196
To critics of the international policy against the Iraqi regime, the events of early 2003 
confirmed a view that the international community had become convinced that Iraq 
had deliberately been “in material breach” of the ceasefire terms, and had violated 
international law as presented under the terms of SC Resolution 687. On the other 
hand, the international community was divided by concerns about taking action in the 
form of military intervention, and how to gain international legitimacy for the use of 
force.  Supporters of the US, particularly the UK and Spain, urged the US to obtain a 
unanimous consensus for Security Council Resolution 1441 before it went to war.197
Aside from this, it is also plausible that, as well as foreign powers, domestic Iraqi 
interests might also have had a particular concern about the removal of Saddam’s 
regime. 
194 It should be noted that during this period the US administration, through their official missions, had 
clearly proclaimed to both their Arab allies in the Middle East and their European allies that they would 
be taking into account all the preparations to take unilateral action to achieve ‘regime change’ in Iraq if 
necessary. Geoff Simons, ibid., pp. 30-31, 48-50
195 Ephraim Kam, op .cit., p.102
196 Ephraim Kam, ibid., p.102
197 Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, ‘Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determination of Choice’, (Boulder 
CO: First Forum Press, 2010), p.3
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The situation at this time was undoubtedly an historic opportunity for the KRG’s to 
turn the attention of the US towards them, since they now found themselves at the 
forefront of the moves to expel the Iraqi forces from areas south of the Green Line, 
including Kirkuk, particularly when the Turkish parliament refused to allow coalition 
forces to enter Iraq via Turkish territory.198 Regardless of this, there were negotiations 
and a memorandum of understanding between the two sides that would allow the 
establishment of a second front. Although the Turkish government did not allow the 
US to open a northern front, they realised that they would pay the price of their 
policy, and on 20 March 2003, they sought to restore their relations with the US by 
providing minimal logistical support to US Special Forces and by permitting US 
military aircraft to overfly their territory, although use of the Incirlik airbase was 
restricted in order to minimise any increase in US strikes against Iraq. The Turkish 
parliament asserted that Turkey’s role would be of a humanitarian nature and to assist
in the reconstruction of public services. Furthermore, on 8 October 2003 the Turkish 
parliament approved deployment of approximately 15,000 troops in Iraq.199
4.2 IRAQ’S LIBERATION AND REPERCUSSIONS ON THE 
KURDISTAN REGION
The 2003 War200 and its outcome is one of the most important events to have taken 
place in this new century, and had a formidable impact, not only on Iraq but also on 
the other countries in the region, most notably the Arab states. Even so, the war did 
198 One should mention here that the Turkey government as one of the stronger advocates of US policy 
in the Middle East; they now found themselves in a political quandary as to how to maintain the 
balance between external pressures to support the alliance forces in an invasion of Iraq and the intense 
domestic opposition to participation in such a war. In fact, the Turkish government had relied for many 
years on significant support of many types (financial and/or military aid) from the West, and 
particularly the US.  It would therefore have been very difficult for Turkey to waive such foreign aid, 
especially the substantial financial aid from the US to Turkey which reached nearly US $6 billion in 
grants and US $24 billion in loan guarantees. Ephraim Kam, op. cit., p.103
199 The US began to plan in earnest for action against Iraq by seeking allies to support military action 
in the region. For this purpose, Paul Wolfowitz visited Turkey on 14 July 2002 to discuss the US plan 
for the collapse of the Iraqi regime with the Ecevit government. See Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, op. cit., p. 
152-4  
200 The 2003 War (19 March to 1 May 2003), which is known as the Iraq War, or Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, and took 21 days to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime under the leadership of US with
participation three countries (United Kingdom, Australia, Poland) with its troops during the initial 
invasion phase, and 36 other countries were involved in its aftermath. Although, the invasion of Iraq 
was strongly opposed by France, Germany, New Zealand, and Canada due to their allegation that there 
was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Besides, there were worldwide protests 
against the Iraq war.
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not lead to direct change in the political map, but altered political direction and 
planning in the international system as well as in the region. This conflict is also 
considered to have been one of the most controversial wars fought by the US and the 
UK in the post-World War II period, and in terms of technology and intensity as well 
as in terms of alliances and international groupings, was arguably one of the biggest; 
it also created a high level of public protest and caused major public diplomatic and 
political divisions between the Western democratic states.201
The US and UK leadership  justified  the invasion  to achieve three aims were to 
disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's alleged support 
for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people. In this context, Macmillan points out that 
Tony Blair defended the 2003 War in his Chicago speech in March 2004 by indicating 
that, since it was a defensive war of necessity, this war came within the context of the 
wider “War on Terror”. He also reaffirmed that there was a connection between Iraq 
and humanitarianism, asserting especially that their duty was not only regime change 
as a justification for war, but that the main goal of the war was “to enforce UN 
resolutions over Iraq and WMD” in order to prevent the threat from materialising.202
An important issue confronting US planning in the region, which aroused equal 
concern in Iraq and its neighbours, was, as noted, the conflicting interests among the 
three groups (Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds) which might potentially lead to violent power 
struggles, since the possibility of a governmental vacuum could lead to the division of 
Iraq through the secession of the Kurdish area in the north and the Shiites in the south;
this in turn would frustrate US efforts to set up a stable state in Iraq.203
In the context of the Turkish attitude in the Iraqi crisis, the Turks expressed their fears 
that regime change and its repercussions in Iraq could be at the expense of the safety 
of their own territories, they had, of course, experienced the political impasse in 1991 
that had caused an influx of refugees within their borders. Therefore, they found 
201 According to Isaac Ben-Israel, this war took 20 days (until the capture of Baghdad, a total of 30 
days); the US and coalition used 730 warplanes and flew 36,000 sorties; and 29,200 bombs were 
dropped. There were approximately 400,000 troops, including 225,000 Americans and 30,000 British 
(plus an additional one million paramilitaries), along with 2,200- 2,400 tanks (including 750 T-72s). 
Isaac Ben-Israel, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Operation in Iraq”; in Shai Feldman(ed.),
After the War in Iraq: Defining the New Strategic Balance, (Eastbourne UK: Sussex Academic Press, 
2003), p.56-7
202 Alex Danchev and John Macmillan (eds.), ‘The Iraq War and Democratic Politics’, (London and 
New York:  Routledge, 2005), p.7 
203 Ephraim Kam, op. cit., p.103
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themselves in a position which forced them to take precautions against the possibility 
of the recurrence of such experiences. The second threat facing them was that the 
situation might lead to a strengthening of the Kurds and the possibility of Kurdish 
autonomy transforming the Kurds into an independent entity, or else to the possible 
creation of a federal structure in Iraq that would provide greater independence for the 
Kurds. From Turkey’s point of view, such a development could quickly trigger unrest 
among its own large Kurdish minority that would demand similar gains. Turkey’s 
opposition to the Iraqi Kurds’ takeover of Mosul and Kirkuk or the northern oil fields 
stemmed from the fear that their economic independence would enable them to push 
for political independence. 
Ultimately, it is reasonable to remember, the likely evolution of the Kurdish situation 
towards forming a Kurdish State became an issue of major concern to the Turkish 
government. The Turkish state also feared the impact of the war and the prospective 
economic devastation of Iraq on its trade relations. It seems reasonable to assess and 
compared the extent of the devastation that afflicted the Kurds and their cities and 
towns during the Iran-Iraq war and in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, to their 
situation in the war of 2003 when, paradoxically, the Kurdistan Region was safer than 
the rest of Iraq. The only major combat in the Kurdistan-held area was in the 
mountainous area near Khurmal on the Iraqi-Iranian border, where the US aerial 
bombardments prepared the way for a ground attack by the PUK against the positions 
of the local Islamist Ansar al-Islam, who were supported by both the Iraqi regime and 
the Iranian republic.204
4.3 THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) AND 
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ
The result was predictable, given that the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath had 
caused the disintegration of existing State structures and institutions including key 
ministries (e.g. the Information Ministry and Ministry of Defence, etc), and the 
dissolution of the Iraqi army on 23 May 2003. Despite that, the building of a new 
204 Michiel Leezenberg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: contours of a post-civil war society’, in Reconstructing Post-
Saddam Iraq, Sultan Barakat (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 67-8
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liberal and democratic polity was proclaimed under the cover of a variety of Security 
Council resolutions. After the collapse Saddam's regime, a period of rapid change 
occurred through a series of events and their repercussions. The first problem 
concerned the formation of an appointed interim government and the handing over of 
power to this body. It was difficult process, but matters needed to be addressed with 
some urgency; such as the training of Iraqi police, and the augmenting of civic 
defence and paramilitary forces in order to take over dealings with insurgency and the 
application of public order.205
In order to enhance the legitimacy of the interim government, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) appointed an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) four 
months after the collapse of Saddam regime. Its composition was on the basis of 
ethnic quotas and it was intended to represent the various components of the religious, 
sectarian, ethnic and clan aspects of Iraqi society and included 13 Shiite members, five 
Sunnis, five Kurdish members (Jalal Talabani, Masoud Barzani, Salahaddin
Bahaaeddin, Mahmoud Othman, and Dara Nur-Al Din), one Christian (Younadem 
Kana), and a Turkmen (Sondul Chapouk). The IGC acted as the first provisional 
government of Iraq from 13 July 2003 to 1 June 2004. Within two months of its 
establishment the IGC had chosen a cabinet that would represent at least some of the 
significant segments of Iraq’s national political forces.206
In the view of some scholars, regime transition is a dangerous process that does not 
necessarily lead to a democratic government. In the case of Iraq, the results were a 
cause for many debates, and assessment of the situation suggested that Iraq, in the 
long run, could be devoid of the most basic requirements for democracy.  Therefore, 
in order to reach its aim, the US moved ahead to put in place plans for managing Iraq 
after the dismantling of the regime and to assist the population to cope with the 
difficult period before the return of sovereignty to Iraq.
After the collapse of the regime the basic task of US administration was to establish 
the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under 
205 Paul Rogers, ‘Iraq and the war on terror: twelve months of insurgency 2004/2005’, (I. B. Tauris, 
London, 2006), p.30 
206 Adeed Dawisha, “The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: challenges and opportunities”, in Sultan 
Barakat (ed.), Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 163
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administrate retired General Jay Garner. This body would at this stage take an 
advisory role only, in determining its aims and objectives of supporting the Iraqi 
Interim Authority to draft a new constitution and organise elections for a new 
government that would assume sovereign functions. 207 Indeed, Garner and his staff 
were forced to leave Iraq in mid-May 2003, due to the deteriorating situations during 
this period. One of the most intense problems, which could not have been predicted, 
was the emergence of strong Shiite religious groups coinciding with the outbreak of 
fierce violence. 208
Following Garner’s departure, on 12 May 2003 General Jay Garner and the ORHA 
were replaced by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA).209 One should mention here that the Bremer’s policy caused increasing anti-
occupation sentiment, and the resurgence of a wave of violence and militant activity 
against coalition forces. It seemed to some scholars that the policy of de-
Baathification was a serious mistake.210 Besides, Bremer was criticised for focusing 
on the superficial elements of democracy-building instead of probing deeply into the 
effectiveness of civil society and political culture.
207 From the beginning of the liberation of Iraq, there were miscalculations in assessing the 
circumstances overall, and in calculating how the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA) could possibly manage to make speedy provision for the basic needs of the 
population while simultaneously applying concepts of democracy for a democratic transition and 
handover of power. However, once basic services had been restored, their administration would be 
transferred to an Iraqi Interim Authority. Rangwala, Glen, ‘The democratic transition in Iraq and the 
discovery of its limitations’ in (eds.) Danchev A, Macmillan J, The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, 
(London: Routledge, 2005), p.162 
208 Gareth Stansfield, “The transition to democracy in Iraq: Historical legacies, resurgent identities and 
reactionary tendencies”, op. cit., p. 15
209 Bremer was known for being more stringent than Garner with regard to military action. However, it 
has been argued that, among Bremer’s many mistakes, a crucial error was the miscalculation that led to 
his decision to dismantle by decree the entire Iraqi army, numbering nearly 400,000 troops, all at the 
same time, on 23 May 2002. More serious trouble occurred when Bremer disbanded this huge army 
without any oversight (and failed to demand surrender of their weaponry when the war was 
abandoned), or at least ensuring their source of livelihood (particularly as the soldiers’ pay was 
cancelled). Moreover, the majority were forbidden not only to hold any rank, but also from taking up 
any public employment. Consequently, the Iraqi people and their property were left undefended and 
had to rely heavily on private security companies whose major task was to protect foreign officials, 
reconstruction personnel, equipment and major installations.  Since the majority of the Iraqi army were 
likely to have been pro-Saddam, it was plausible to imagine that they might well decide to join the 
Islamist organisations associated with Al-Qaeda.
210 It was clear that, the inspiration for the policy was de-nazifsication in post-war Germany, which was 
applied to rid the State apparatus of supporters of the system without loss of essential personnel. 
However, the opposite happened in Iraq, where the cleansing policy in practice led to stripping the 
public institutions of people with managerial experience along with the staff of the civil service. Sultan 
Barakat, ‘Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq’, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p.16
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Given the deterioration of the security situation, which had worsened and political 
negotiations between ethnic and sectarian groups had halted, on 15 November 2003. 
Further, the number of US casualties had increased, which prompted the US 
administration to change direction from a long-term agenda to the much shorter-term 
task of nation building, acceleration of the establishment of an interim Iraqi 
government, and to the transfer of sovereignty at the earliest possible date. The CPA’s
first task was to restore security to Iraq through building new Iraqi institution that 
could help secure major facilities, so that when the US forces departed, the Iraqis 
would be able to take responsibility themselves for providing security. The CPA 
started a programme to train a 40,000-strong Iraqi army, about 10 percent of the size 
of the pre-war Iraqi force, and began to return around 40,000 Iraqi policemen to their 
former jobs. It also recruited 7,000 individuals into the Iraqi civil defence force to 
protect oil-pumping stations, electricity substations and other facilities.211
Clearly the important task for CPA at this stage was to draft the Basic Law and the 
interim constitution by 28 February 2004, in preparation for moving to a permanent 
constitution and holding general elections before 31 December 2005. Therefore, the 
CPA officials duly selected an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC); however, the 
legitimacy of its formation was challenged by those who opposed the liberation of 
Iraq. The IGC in the meantime gained regional support, particularly from the Arab 
League in September 2003. It should be noted that the fundamental task of the IGC 
was to speed up preparations for drafting the new constitution before seeking to prove 
its legitimacy through a referendum. Likewise, it appears that one of the thorniest 
issues was the difficulty of reaching a collective decision with the sectarian groups. In 
some cases, they were forced to appeal to prominent religious figures, such as Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, for a fatwa to address outstanding issues. 212
Needless to say, the CPA had sought assistance for establishing numerous local 
groups in the Iraqi cities under its supervision. The CPA also announced that its initial
reconstruction plan was based on four main pillars – justice, security, governance, and 
infrastructure. As a first step, the (CPA) granted considerable financial aid to, and 
211 Kenneth Katzman “Political Scenarios in Post-War Iraq”, in Iraq Reconstruction and Future Role,
Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004, pp. 100-1
212 Gareth Stansfield, “The transition to democracy in Iraq: Historical legacies, resurgent identities and 
reactionary tendencies”, op. cit., pp. 151-2. 
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supported thousands of projects for participation in the reviving of infrastructure and 
repair; this in turn was a step towards expanding the infrastructure and would led to 
economic recovery.213 The CPA acted for and provided advice to the Iraqi leadership 
until sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004; this 
body was replaced by the Iraqi Transitional Government May 2005.214 The basic 
point implicit in the Transitional Administrative Law was that it was a temporary 
substitute for the Constitution and the basis for the governments of both Allawi and 
Jaafari, from 30 June 2004 to 31 December 2005 and even to the four months before 
the formation of the Cabinet of Nouri al-Maliki, at which point they were to elect the 
parliament, write the permanent constitution, and apply Article 58 (but the application 
of this Article was deliberately neglected). The Iraqi Governing Council IGC also
issued four resolutions regarding elimination of the consequences of an ethnic 
cleansing policy:215
A- Resolution No. 50 issued on 29 March 2003, was intended to repeal all laws, 
decisions, regulations, and directives and instructions and orders issued by the so-
called Revolutionary Command Council and also by other Iraqi official bodies for the 
purpose of changing demographics and political realities in Iraq.
B- Resolution No. 51 on 29 September 2003, stated that those politicians who had 
been dismissed or forced to leave their jobs due to political reasons, exclusively, for 
the purposes of service and retirement, should be returned to their functions 
immediately.
C- Resolution No. 117 on 29 November 2003, stated that all decisions, instructions, 
data and orders that had led to the withdrawal of citizenship or cancellation and 
forfeiture of Iraqi individuals since 1958 should be cancelled, and Iraqi nationality 
with enjoyment of all their legal rights should be granted to them.
213 Richard H Brown, ‘Reconstruction of Infrastructure in Iraq: end to a means or means to an end’, in 
Sultan Barakat (ed.), ‘Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq’, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 
pp. 197-8 
214 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, ‘The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq’ CRS (Congressional 
Research Service) Report for Congress, on 12 December 2006, p.4, Available at: 
<URL:http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/79340.pdf> , Access Date 20 April 2009
215 “Application of Article 140 to ensure  peaceful coexistence”; publications of the Joint Committee on 
Article 140 by the third branch of the KDP  and the second centres of the PUK, pp .9-11  
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D- Resolution No. 5 on 13 January 2004, indicated ratification of the law 
establishing a High Authority to resolve property disputes.
4.4 THE FORMATION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNING 
COUNCIL OF IRAQ AND TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (TAL)
The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was signed on 8 March 2004 by the 
Interim Governing Council of Iraq as a Supreme Law of Iraq during the transitional 
period. Its main aim was to design a way to establish a representative and sovereign 
Iraqi government that would protect fundamental rights and provide a stable political 
structure, but which would expire once a government had been elected under a 
permanent constitution and taken office; this was expected to be no later than 31 
December 2005. The head of government was appointed on 28 June 2004, with the 
advice of UN envoy to Iraq through Al-Akhdar Brahimi. The first Prime Minister,
Iyad Allawi, often described as a moderate Shiite from the Iraqi National Accord
party was acceptable to the US administration, and was a former member of IGC.216
The deputy for National Security, Barham Salih (PUK) was chosen by the IGC to be 
deputy of the Interim Prime Minister of Iraq. IGC also chose Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-
Yawar as the first President, a ceremonial post;217 he was defined as a Sunni Arab 
tribal leader. Two vice-presidents, Ibrahim Jaafari (Islamic Dawa Party) and Rowsch 
Nouri Shawais (KDP) were also appointed. Despite considerable pressure, Allawi 
took over the reins of power on 1 June 2004; consequently, the Governing Council 
and CPA were dissolved as a first step to transferring sovereignty to the Interim 
Government and in preparation for the general elections that were to be held in 2005.  
Allawi’s cabinet was not immune from criticism by members of his government and 
216 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, ‘The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq’, op. cit., p.4
217 It is clear that the US needed to prove its success in Iraq; it had to present the success of its policies 
in the Middle East, and strengthen its role with its allies and within the international community. 
Therefore, the main issue became how to bring stability, and provide security for Iraq.  Furthermore, 
the US sought to exert control over the transition process by choosing reliable allies to take positions, 
given the sensitivity of the sovereign state. Although, the US’s preferred candidate, Adnan Pachachi, 
who was known to be a moderate liberal democrat, was a highly suitable figure, the IGC instead 
selected the Sunni Arab Ghazi al-Yawer for this post.
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also by opinion in the Arab world generally, particularly over his use of military 
forces and his violent dealings with the rebels.
It became apparent that the political rights of Iraqi’s diverse sectarian and ethnic 
groups needed to be guaranteed. Owing to the immediate effects of granting 
legitimacy to the IGC, the  most prominent political leaders in the Iraqi arena 
participated in the IGC forum: Jalal Talabani (PUK), Masoud Barzani (KDP), Iyad 
Allawi (Iraqi National Accord), Ahmed Chalabi (Iraqi National Congress), Ibrahim 
al-Jaafari (Islamic Dawa Party), Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim (Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq), Adnan Pachachi (Assembly of Independent Democrats), 
Mohsen Abdel Hamid (Iraqi Islamic Party), Ezzedine Salim (Islamic Dawa Party). 
Interestingly the IGC included two women in its structure, Sondul Chapouk, 
representing the Turkmen faction, and Aquila Al-Hashimi, who served in the IGC 
until she was assassinated on 25 September 2003 (and was replaced by Salama al-
Khufaji on 8 December 2003). 218
Article 36 of the TAL stated that the National Assembly would elect the head of state 
and its two deputies to form the Presidency Council (PC), whose main function was to 
represent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The 
Presidency Council would be elected on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the members’ votes. In addition, the National Assembly had the 
power to dismiss any member of the Presidency Council for incompetence or lack of 
integrity by a three-fourths majority vote of its members; in the case of a vacancy in 
the Presidency Council, the National Assembly should, on the basis of a vote of two-
thirds of its members, elect a replacement to fill the vacancy.219
To pre-empt future constitutional deadlocks, negotiations over the distribution of 
powers with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) dealt with the government establishment, 
in effect reflecting the Kurdish position on acquiring certain sovereign rights as an 
entitlement of the Kurdish nation, along with the speedy implementation of Article 
218 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, op. cit, p.3
219 For details see Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, available at
http://www.dostoor.jeeran.com /ﺮﯿﺗﺎﺳد%20ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻋ%2010. htm
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58. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, as Prime Minister, was therefore assigned to form the new 
government on 3 May 2005. The cabinet included nine Kurdish ministers amongst the 
37-member Council of Ministers. Appointed 7 April 2005, Jalal Talabani was the 
first Kurd in Iraq’s history to occupy the position of Head of State.220
The inevitability of conflicts and of different and contradictory views among the
Shiite blocs themselves threatened the stability and formation of the new government. 
For instance, the long-standing hostilities between SCIRI and the Sadrist movement 
were reflected in the win by al-Daawa’s Ibrahim al-Jaafari (supported by the Sadists)
over SCIRI’s Abdul Mehdi in the internal UIA election on 12 February 2006. 
However, the al-Daawa-Iraqi Organization was allocated 12 seats of the UIA’s total 
of 128 seats.221 When al-Jaafari began to form his cabinet, it seemed obvious that he 
was serious about countering Kurdish aspirations, a key point in his government’s
priorities for the transitional period. In fact, Al-Jaafari deliberately not wanted Iraq to 
be “democratic and federal” and he made no mention this phrase when he was sworn
in; he also neglected to mention Kirkuk or the implementation of Article 58 in the
speech he made before the National Assembly (NA).222 It has already been argued 
that his attitude stemmed from his intellectual background and was based on his
aggressive non-acceptance of the rights of the other party. It is crucial to note that 
most of this hostility to Kurdish demands was instigated through external agendas by 
Iraq's neighbouring States which have been passed through their pro- Sunni and Shiite 
parties.223
220 Nawshirwan Mustafa, “the issue of Constitution/ How the Kurds can participate in Writing New 
Iraqi Constitution”, on 20 May 2005, www. Reform-Kurd.com., in Sbeiy. Com. Available at:  
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=737&AuthorID=36&AspxAutoDetectC
ookieSupport=1>, on 3 Sept 2008
221 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2004), ibid., p.144
222 Nawshirwan Mustafa, “the issue of Constitution/ How the Kurds can participate in Writing New 
Iraqi Constitution”, on 20 May 2005,  op.cit.
223 Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary argued that the spark that launched the crisis 
between the Kurdish leadership and Jaafari Government regarding his visit with his delegation secretly 
to Turkey in 2006. Obviously, one could assessment that, their discussion was related how to create 
obstacles to the provisions of Article 58 of TAL, particularly, return back of the property claims, 
resettlement, and boundary adjustment process .  Carole A. O’Leary  and Charles G. MacDonald (eds.), 
‘The Kurdish Identity in a Democratic Iraq and Beyond’, in ‘Kurdish Identity Human Rights and 
Political States’, (eds.) Charles G. MacDonald  and Carole A. O’Leary,  (USA: University Press of 
Florida, 2007),P.159-60
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There is no doubt that this open hostility on al-Jaafari’s part created problems 
constant problems for the Kurds, which made him unacceptable to the Kurdish 
people, ordinary people as well as politicians. The Kurds were certainly not alone in 
opposing Jaafari's nomination, but the position taken by the Kurds against his policies 
was the main reason why he stepped down from his post and was replaced by al-
Daawa’s Nuri al-Maliki, who was more acceptable to other factions and was approved 
by the Council of Representatives on 20 May 2006. In order not to repeat the bitter 
experience of al-Jaafari, the Kurds had confirmed their support for a national unity 
government under Maliki, doing so in the form of a written agreement for the full 
implementation of Article 140. Maliki had already pledged to abide by these changes, 
and explicitly affirmed it in declaring his government’s agenda.224
A notable point in the debate on returning sovereignty to Iraq is that when sovereignty 
was officially returned to the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on 30 June 2004, 
UNSCR 1546 deliberately did not refer to the TAL, or to the Kurdistan Region.225 It 
is plausible to see this as a way of avoiding the issue by failing to give the Kurds any 
kind of international recognition, ignoring their rights as enshrined in Article 58, and 
stopping any international legitimacy being given to the Kurdish veto. However, the 
Kurds managed to obtain several powerful ministerial posts, including deputy prime 
minister for national security (Barham Salih, PUK), one of the two vice-presidencies
(Rowsch Shawais, KDP), and foreign minister (Hoshyar Zebari, KDP). In this regard, 
Borhanedin Yassin paid particular attention to the one of the biggest strategic 
mistakes of the Kurdish leaders, particularly Jalal Talabani and Hoshyar Zebari, when 
they stated that they were working to take Iraq out of Chapter VII of the UN Security 
Council. In turn, that meant the end of the work of SC Resolutions 688 and 986. In 
addition, the exit from Chapter VII meant the return of full sovereignty to Iraq. In 
other hand it also demonstrated the tight grip on Kurdish citizens and the threat to 
their society. In the most obvious sense, however, the Kurds, according to Resolution 
986, were the biggest beneficiaries, having been allocated 13 percent of revenues for a 
Kurdistan Region under direct UN control.226
224 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2004), op. cit , p.174-5  
225Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, ‘Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethonopolitics of Conflicts and 
Compromise’, (United State of America :University Pennsylvania press, 2009), p. 119
226 Interview with Dr. Borhanedin A. Yassin through Telephone, on 12 August 2009, Sweden
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4.5 THE PROCESS OF ELECTIONS (GENERAL AND 
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS) IN THE KURDISTAN REGION AND 
IRAQ 
One of the important developments in the Iraqi arena was the elections, on which 
hung the hopes of all factions of the Iraqi people. It is argued that with this election,
the most important task for the new Iraqi government was to establish a form of 
domestic sovereignty. It is clear that the elections were held in a legitimate manner; 
nevertheless Kurdish and Shiite parties apparently dominated the entire process. The 
electoral turnout in the Kurdistan region, as well as in the main Shiite areas in Iraq’s
central and southern provinces, reached high levels; an energetic rush to participate by 
voters produced a high level of turnout. In contrast, turnout in the main Sunni areas 
was below ten percent of the electorate.227
On the eve of preparations for the first elections in Iraq there was considerable talk 
about withdrawing the Sunni political group from the formation of the government as 
a way of protesting about the siege of Fallujah and deteriorating security. Because of 
escalating violence in the Sunni triangle, the Islamic Party and the Sunni Muslim 
Clerics’ Association used these reasons as a justification to withdraw and urged Iraqis 
to boycott the planned January elections. In addition, in mid-November 2004, 47 
political parties and groups declared their boycott of the election, alleging that it did 
not reflect the will of the Iraqi people or their demand for sovereignty and 
independence. The Sunni groups therefore decided to withdraw 275 candidates from 
the elections. In response, 40 political parties connected to al-Hawza and Ayatollah 
al-Sistani also rejected and delayed the election. In March 2004, the Kurds had 
initially faced the refusal by the Sunni / Shiite blocs and Ayatollah al-Sistani to accept 
that they had the privilege/right of veto on the proposed the interim constitution. In an 
apparent effort to sustain the process, the Kurds preferred to maintain a balance 
between the Sunni demands for postponing the election and the insistence of the 
Shiites, as a means to maintaining on their demands.
227 Paul Rogers, ‘Iraq and the war on terror: twelve months of insurgency (2004/ 2005)’, London: I. B. 
Tauris & Cold Ltd, 2006),  p. 103 
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The Iraqi election took place on 30 January 2005 under exceptional circumstances of 
intensive, uncontrolled insurgency, insecurity, and military force. These elections 
included electing 275 members of the transitional national assembly, electing the 
parliament of the Kurdish region, and governorates councils. According to the 
Supreme Independent Election Commission, 111 lists competed for the 275 seats. The 
lists included 7724 candidates whose names were not known to voters. Further, in the 
January elections voting was for the whole list rather than for its candidates. 13 lists 
competed in the elections of the Kurdish parliament, while tens of lists competed in 
the elections of the 18 provincial councils. The council of every governorate is 
composed of 45 members, except Baghdad's council which has 55 members. In spite 
of, the whole process was criticised by political observers, both internal and 
international due to many breaches occurred. However, 25 Iraqi towns and cities 
(Sunni provinces) boycotted the elections. It has been argued that the participation 
rate in the Sunni provinces ranged from 2% to 25%,228 and insurgents attacked 
election officials, candidates and voters. Given prevailing living conditions and the 
political legacy of dictatorship, the election had taken place quite successfully. 229
It is first necessary to concentrate on a significant issue related to the January 30,
2005 elections; this was an unofficial referendum that had been held in the Kurdistan
region in parallel with the general elections in Iraq. Nearly 99 percent of those polled 
had voted for independence rather than to be part of Iraq.230 This referendum 
movement, apparently founded in mid-July 2003, was an organized movement for a 
specific goal inside Kurdistan. In just one month, staring on 25 January 2004, Kurdish 
NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) collected 1,700,000 signatures on petitions 
demanding a vote on whether Kurdistan should remain part of Iraq. The way it
operated was similar to the formation of a mass opinion-based social movement. 
228 What should be indicated here that major electoral lists were participated are: "The Unified Iraqi 
Coalition" of major Shiite political parties, both religious and secular, which they gained the blessings 
of Ayatollah Sistani. There were “The Iraqi List” headed by ex-prime minister Iyad Allawi, and also 
“The Kurdish Alliance” composed of the PUK and KDP, and other small Kurdish parties. Moreover, 
the Christian parties formed two coalitions, while “The People's Coalition” included the Iraqi 
Communist Party. See IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Volume 17, march 2011. 
Available at:
<URL:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/march/winds-
of-change-in-iraqi-kurdistan/mobile-edition/>
229 Tareq Y Ismael & Jacqueline S Ismael, ‘The Iraqi predicament: People in the Quagmire of the 
Power Politic’, (Pluto Press: 2004), p.60
230 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, op. cit., p.5
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Yassin described how some members of the Independent High Electoral Commission
(IHEC) wondered whether the major parties had been deflected away from the context 
of its goals. For example, Halkawt Abdulla, a member of IHEC announced in a
speech231 in front of the Iraqi Governing Council that their campaign was not about
the independence of Kurdistan but was simply to create an opportunity for the 
Kurdish people to decide their own fate by guaranteeing their national rights in the 
constitution, and because voluntary union between many nationalities was an initial 
condition for the success of stability and democracy in Iraq.232 In this context, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the two main parties were enabled to exploit this 
movement to put them under its control, and consequently to achieve partisan 
advantage.
From a broader perspective, the results of this referendum had practical significance. 
It was also clear to the Kurdish leaders that it was difficult to move towards
independence as they would be facing intensive rejection by regional and 
international states. If they were challenged to move in this direction, though steadfast 
it might be a fragile state that survived. In this context, Dr. Borhanedin Yassin noted
that the referendum committee had started its activity in the transitional period before
ratification of the Iraqi constitution. It would appear that the Kurdish leaders had 
many paradoxes in their attitudes and their work. One critical issue was whether the 
Kurdish leadership were using the results of referendum for their political interests; it
was also said that the representatives of referendum movement were subjected to
political pressure to withdraw from the project.233
The results of the votes counted were announced by the Iraqi Election Commission on 
13 February 2005. Out of the 58 percent voter turnout, the United Iraqi Alliance list 
(supported by Ayatollah al-Sistani) won 51 percent of the votes and obtained 140 
seats, the Kurdish Alliance won 75 seats, the Iraqi list (Allawi’s list) won only about 
14 percent of the votes (40 seats), and Al-Yawer's list won 5 seats. The remaining 20 
seats were distributed among several small lists including 3 seats won by the 
Turkumani list. Moreover, the unified Iraqi coalition list won 11 out of 18 provincial 
231 This speech was published in Khabat Newspaper, on 1st March 2003.
232 Borhanedin A. Yassin, ‘Iraq after Saddam Hussein and the Fate of Southern of Kurdistan’ (in 
Kurdish), (Dohuk: Hawar press, 2008), pp. 61-3
233 Interview with Dr. Borhanedin A. Yassin through Telephone, on 12 August 2009, Sweden.
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councils. The two main Kurdish parties (the Democratic Kurdish Party under the 
leadership of Masoud Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani) 
won 89.5% of the votes in the elections of the 111 members parliament of the 
autonomous Kurdish region.234 Despite the backing of the US Allawi failed to win 
the election. Some observers analysed this loss as a failure of the US policy in Iraq. 
On the other side, other Shiite lists won 11 seats and minor parties took the very few 
seats that were left.235
Given such conditions, the outcome of the 2005 elections236 clearly put the KRG’s in
a powerful position, from which they could make their mark on the permanent 
constitution. In 2005, the PUK and KDP reached a power-sharing agreement to rule 
the Kurdistan Region and act as an influential political bloc within Iraq as a whole.237
As mentioned above, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) obtained the majority of seats in 
the NA, which enabled them to gain a two-thirds majority of NA members, or 183 out 
of 275; essentially this meant that they could form a government without the 
participation of the Kurds. Nevertheless, to form a broad-based government, and in 
order to confirm its legitimacy they needed the participation of all the other factions 
represented in the National Assembly. Based on this, the participation of the Kurds 
was deemed to be necessary for any incoming government to succeed, at the present 
time or in the future, given that the Kurdish Alliance occupied 27 percent of seats.  
The essential logic of political participation in the new Iraq was based on political 
consensus between factions.238 In the December 15, 2005 elections 239 the Kurdistan 
234 IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), op. cit.
235 Tareq Y Ismael & Jacqueline S Ismael, op. cit., p.60-1
236 Proportional representation (PR) was adopted in the January 2005 elections (both federal and local) 
as an appropriate system in the on-going absence of a general census. Furthermore, proportional 
representation would depend on each party’s share of the vote. In the case of Iraq, it could be said that 
all ethno-sectarian groups had a chance to be represented.
237 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘The Kurdish Parties’ on 27November 2009. 
Available at:
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/special/misc/iraqielections2010/inde> Access Date: 
5 December 2009.
238 The Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq, ‘IMIE Final Report of the December 15, 
2005, Iraq council of Representatives Elections’, Available at: <URL: http://www.ihec-
iq.com/ftpar/regulation2005/finalreport2005.pdf> Access Date: 25 May 2009
239 The electoral system pursued in the January elections as follow: “(a) the total number of 
parliamentary seats was calculated on the basis of one seat for every 100,000 citizens; (b) 230 seats 
were allocated for competition in Iraqi provinces according to proportional representation of electoral 
lists in each province; (c) each province was allocated a fixed number of seats according to its 
population size; (d) 45 seats were opened for proportional representation of lists on a national scale, 
these seats were called "compensatory" seats; (e) the quota of women representation was set at 25% of 
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Alliance controlled 53 seats, down from the 75 after the January election, but 
Talabani remained as President and Hoshyar Zebari is also remained Foreign 
Minister.
The Kurdish worries undoubtedly increased with each prospective election since the 
Arab and non-Arab factions increased their participation and strengthened their 
positions by opposing Kurdish demands.240 Thus the two major Sunni blocs, the Iraqi 
Accord Front (IAF) and the Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF) were respectively 
allocated 44 seats and 11 seats in the NA, while the Sadri bloc (known as one of the 
most militant movements and hostile towards Kurds) obtained 29 of the UIA’s total of 
128 seats. Besides, the "Kurdish Islamic Union" won 5 seats. The "Reconciliation and 
Liberation" list led by Misha'n Al-Jibouri won 3 seats. The "Missionaries" list close to 
Shiite leader Muqtada Al-Sadr won 2 seats. One seat was won by each of the 
following groups: the Iraqi Nation Party (liberal), the Turkmen Front, the Yazidis list, 
and "Al-Rafedain National List" (Christian).241 It is argued that their participation had 
the effect of maintaining the balance of political power in the Iraqi NA. Although the 
Iraqi factions had various political and ideological differences with each other, but, 
they emerged as a unified body to oppose the Kurds on a variety of issues, particularly 
regarding the implementation of Article 140, control over the hydrocarbons sector, 
and varying degrees of federalism.
In February 2008, the Iraqi parliament passed a Provincial Powers Act by a 
parliamentary majority, although they had reservations about giving the Prime 
Minister power to dismiss a governor of a province, or enabling the Prime Minister’s 
party to control central government in Baghdad. However, a Provincial Elections Law 
needed to be passed within three months of this Act being passed. It should be noted 
that the Presidency Council (consisting of President Jalal Talabani, who is Kurdish, 
Vice-President Adel Abdul Mehdi, a Shiite Arab, and Vice-President Tariq al-
Hashimi, a Sunni Arab), had the power to veto laws. 
the National Assembly seats, or 69 seats”. See IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 
Volume 17, march 2011. Available at:
<URL:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/march/winds-
of-change-in-iraqi-kurdistan/mobile-edition/>
240 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, op.cit., p.6
241 IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). op. cit.
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According to Article 50 of the draft Elections law, a number of seats in the provincial 
assemblies would be reserved for religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis, 
but in the final draft this clause was removed, with legislators citing a lack of census 
data for determining the appropriate number of seats. Applying human rights 
principles became highly problematic in this case as it was agreed that the rights of 
these minorities had been ignored, which is why removal of the minorities’ clause was 
criticised by the UN Special Envoy. As a result of internal and international pressure 
the minority clause was restored on 3 November 2008: it provided for six special seats 
(three for Christians, one each for Yazidis, Mandeans and Shabaks). The security 
situation and the actual turnout in this election was noticeably better, compared with 
the 2005 elections when many candidates were assassinated and many bombs 
exploded.
The prevailing view among the US administration and all the Iraqi factions was that 
the local elections represented an essential step towards developing democracy and 
promoting national reconciliation, and would be continue to be necessary to stabilise 
the country. As political observers commented, such elections would also help Sunni 
groups to participate in the country’s politics. Governorate or provincial elections 
were held in all parts of Iraq on 31 January 2009, to replace the local councils in 14 of 
the 18 Iraqi governorates (with the exception of the Kurdistan Region).  On 19 
February 2009, the Supreme Elections Commission , announced on the results of the 
elections as follow :that the list of the “State of Law Coalition” backed by Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki won 126 seats out of a total of 440 seats in 14 provinces 
where local elections were held. The “State of Law Coalition” took the lead in 10 
provinces and occupied 28.5% of total seats in the 14 provinces. It should be noted 
the Kurdistani List achieved considerable success in these elections. For example, List 
Brayati (which is mean Brothers) list gained 14 seats in Mosul, while the Kurds 
obtained 89 percent of votes in Sinjar, 87 percent of votes in Makhmur, and 96 
percent of votes in Sheikhan.  For this reason, the elections can be seen as a 
106
referendum for the people in these places, which they wished to see returned to the 
Kurdistan Region. 242
While, in the Kurdistan Region were the Iraqi Kurdistan legislative elections to vote 
for the parliament and the presidential elections;  the ballot for the president that took 
place on 25 July 2009 was the first direct presidential vote in the Kurdistan Region. 
However, people who were living at the time outside Iraqi Kurdistan (in the disputed 
territories) were not allowed to vote. It should be noted that the election of the 
president of Kurdistan was achieved directly through popular votes, with around one 
million citizens of Kurdish population eligible to vote. Furthermore, the elections had 
originally been planned to take place on 19 May, but were delayed until 25 July 2009.
Here one should note that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s parliament, or the 
Kurdistan National Assembly, is composed of representatives from the various parties 
and lists, and elects its 111 members every four years, with 11 seats allocated for 
minorities (five for Assyrians, five for Turkmen, and one for Armenians).243 By law 
the quota for women244 is at least 30 percent of the parliamentary seats. Following the 
first election held in the region in 1992, no further elections were held there until 2005 
when they coincided with the election of the Iraqi Interim Government and elections 
for governorate councils. The most important change in the 2009 elections was that
the open list system adopted for the Iraqi governorate elections, was applied 
elsewhere in Iraq, while, the closed list system had been used for the Kurdistan 
legislative election in 2005. In reality, 19 political entities and five political alliances
participated in the elections and the turnout reached 78.5 percent.245 The most 
242 However, “Al Hadbah List” in Mosul won the majority of seats in Nineveh and was able to secure 
19 seats of the 37 seats in the province. On the other hand, 6 seats were allocated for minorities out of a 
total of 440 seats in all provinces. Two seats were allocated for Christians and Sabi’a in Baghdad, three 
seats in Mosul for Christians, Shabak and Yazidis, and one seat for Christians in Basra province. See 
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). op. cit.
243 Among the others, the Turkmen parties that participated in the Kurdistan Region included the 
Turkmen Democratic Movement, Erbil's Turkmen List, Independent Turkmen List, and Turkmen 
Reform List which also contained the Movement of the Independent Turkmen (an affiliate of the Iraqi 
Turkmen Front). Other minorities also participated, despite being small in number and lacking 
supporters, including for example, Unified Chaldean List, Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Autonomy List 
which comprised Khaldu-Ashur Communist Party, and the Assyrian Patriotic Party, and National 
Rafidain List.
244 Kurdish women  gained 39 of the seats in the Kurdistan parliament  according to IKP Law No. 1, 
Article 22, as amended in Article 10 of Law No. 47 for 2004, the third amendment of Law No. 1 for 
1992.
245 Some statistics on the results of the vote, Awene Newspaper, Available at:
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significant lists were as follows: the PUK and KDP continued their electoral coalition 
in the Kurdistani List. The Kurdistan Islamic Union and Islamic Group in Kurdistan 
formed a coalition with two secular parties (the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, 
and the Future Party) that were called the Service and Reform List. As well as the 
Change list and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, there was a Social Justice and 
Freedom List (that included Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan Toilers Party, and 
Kurdistan Independent Work Party, Kurdistan pro-Democratic Party and Democratic 
Movement of Kurdistan People). 
Despite mutual recriminations among the main parties in power and the opposition 
parties over violations during the electoral campaign, the opposition, particularly the 
Change List, made serious accusations about the two main parties, claiming that they 
had resorted to threats and fraud by using all the opportunities offered by their party, 
and by the government budget for their personal interests. The two parties punished 
the opposition’s supporters by cutting off financial grants to those who had been
taking them, particularly the PUK. In the event, the election resulted in the Kurdistani 
List obtaining 60 seats and the Change List 25 seats, while the coalition of four 
Kurdish parties, the Social Justice and Freedom List, gained 13 seats. In other words, 
the Change List won 112,000 votes, the four coalition parties took 42,000 votes, and 
the Kurdistani List obtained 400,916 votes in Erbil province. In Sulaimaniya 
province, the situation was reversed, with the Change List winning 286,664 votes, 
while the Kurdistani List obtained 253,759 votes and the four coalition parties took 
133,527 votes. In Dohuk province, the Kurdistani List were in the majority with 
333,000 votes, the coalition of four Kurdish parties came second, winning 44,000, 
while the Change List gained 18,000 votes.246
It is a fact that the main parties monopolized power for two decades. The opposition 
parties were involved in the political process after the creation of the KRG, but theirs 
was mostly a supporting role for one or other of the main parties. For this reason one 
<URL: http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=4482>; Access Date: on 26 July 
2009.
246 Some statistics on the results of the vote, Awene Newspaper, Available at:
<URL: http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=4482>; Access Date: on 26 July 
2009.
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can say that the election of 25 July 2009 was the first competitive election to have 
aroused real enthusiasm among the Kurds in the Kurdistan Region.  The emergence of 
a new political group in the election (the Change movement, headed by Nawshirwan
Mustafa)247 as a genuine opposition party to the KDP-PUK alliance affected the 
political process, both directly and indirectly, in Kurdistan Region for the first time. 
The Change movement decided to stay opposition in parliament after they had won 25
seats.
4.6 THE NEW IRAQI CONSTITUTION AND ITS 
REPERCUSSION OVER THE KURDISTAN REGION
It is important to note that the constitution is the only legal basis on which political 
life is organised for the Iraqi people who participated for the first time in the 
construction of their constitution. The constitution issue was among the most 
important issues facing the new Iraq, and was a fundamental task for the Transitional 
Authority, since it had to achieve the requirements of the international resolutions, 
achieve access to freedom and independence, and promote the new era of 
humanitarian law and civil society in Iraq.
It is also quite evident that, since the founding of the Iraqi State, the matter of the 
constitution has been one of the most controversial issues in determining or
denouncing the rights of factions and ethnic groups. The Iraqi State has witnessed 
several constitutions at various stages that reflected both developments and relapses 
as follow: First: the Constitution of the Kingdom of Iraq (The Fundamental Law) in 
June 10, 1924 borrowed heavily from western secular constitutions, issued (with 
British support)248. Secondly, the Interim Constitution was adopted after the Republic 
247 Nawshirwan Mustafa is a prominent Kurdish politician who participated with Jalal Talabani in 
founding the PUK in 1976 in Damascus and became deputy Secretary General of the PUK after the 
Barzani rebellion collapsed. He also founded the Komalai Ranjdaran party and was its Secretary 
General in 1970; the “Komalai Ranjdaran” (a strong wing of the PUK) was dissolved and merged in 
the PUK to increase internal PUK unity. After separating from the PUK, Nawshirwan Mustafa 
established the Movement for Change and became leader of the official opposition in the Kurdistan 
Region.
248 “The Constituent Assembly then considered a draft constitution drawn up by a constitutional 
committee. Discussion on the draft constitution by the Constituent Assembly lasted a month, and, after 
minor modifications, it was adopted in July 1924. The Basic Law, as the constitution was called, went 
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was established on 14 July 1958. Third, the Law of the National Council of 
Revolutionary Command No. 25 of 1963, on 4 April 1963; the Interim Constitution of 
1964. Forth: the Interim Constitution of 1968. Fifthly, the Iraqi State Administration 
Law for the Transitional Period, 2004, which it could be deemed to be the first 
opportunity for the Kurds to participate in writing the draft of Iraqi constitution.249
In same context, some scholars are argued that the Treaty of Sevres, signed 10 August
1920 could be regarded as a first constitution for Iraq until The Fundamental Law was 
passed in 1929. The Interim Constitution was adopted after the Republic was 
established on 14 July 1958. Then followed the Constitution of the Kingdom of Iraq 
on 1925; the Second Amendment Act of the Basic Law for the year 1925; the Interim 
Constitution of 1958; the Law of the National Council of Revolutionary Command 
No. 25 of 1963, on 4 April 1963; the Interim Constitution of 1964; the Interim 
Constitution of 1968; and the Iraqi State Administration Law for the Transitional 
Period, 2004.250
into effect right after it was signed by the king on March 21, 1925”. See “Iraq since 1918 British 
occupation and the mandatory regime”. Available at
<URL:http://www.angelfire.com/nt/Gilgamesh/1918.html>
249 Nawshirwan argued that the Basic Law of 1924 was written by British experts. The Kurds did not 
have any role in this Constitution and they were involved in the bloody conflicts, for example the 
Sheikh Mahmud's Revolutions (1930-1931), Barzan's Revolutions (1943-1945), the uprising 
September 6, 1930, and the demonstrations 1948, 1952, 1956. Besides, the political parties and 
organizations were not allowed to work in public. Moreover, the Interim Constitution 1958 was wrote 
by (National Democratic Party, particularly by the Lawyer Hussein Jemil). However, in this 
constitution, particularly in Article 3, it mentioned that "the Arabs and the Kurds are partners in this 
Country". Despite that, the longest Kurdish Revolutions had started in September 1961 It was made 
clear that, the Kurds did not have any role in the interim constitution in 1964. Indeed, what happened 
was a complete violation of what had been agreed before between the Kurds and Iraqi government . 
Beyond this, the Arabization operations continued against the Kurds in this period. Besides, what was 
very much painful and a disaster for the Kurds, when the internal fighting started between the Kurdish 
parties themselves. Finally, though, the Interim Constitution of 1968 recognized that "the Iraqi state is 
composed of the two main peoples Arabs and Kurds", but in this period, the fiercest processes of 
Arabization, Anfal, deportation and destruction of all Kurdish villages had been exercised against the 
Kurds by the Baathist regime. On the whole, it should be said that all these constitutions did not lead 
the creation of a national sense or national identity of the Iraqi people. In addition, it is important to 
remember here that, these constitutions did not also address the sectarian differences and unable to 
form any political consensus to maintain the internal security of Iraq.
Nawshirwan Mustafa, “the issue of Constitution/ Constitutions and One Result”, on 19 May 2005, 
www. Reform-Kurd.com., in Sbeiy. Com. Available at:  
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=737&AuthorID=36&AspxAutoDetectC
ookieSupport=1>, on 3 Sept 2008; Also see: Iraqi Basic Law of 1925 (in Arabic), By  Investigator 
Foundation for Culture and Guidance,; Available at: 
<URL: http://www.dostoor.jeeran.com/ ﺔﺤﻔﺼﻟا%20ﺔﯿﺴﯿﺋﺮﻟا%20ﺮﯿﺗﺎﺳﺪﻠﻟ%20ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا .htm>; Access Date: 29 
July 2010
250 Iraqi Basic Law of 1925 (in Arabic), By  Investigator Foundation for Culture and Guidance,; 
Available at: <URL: http://www.dostoor.jeeran.com/ ﺔﺤﻔﺼﻟا%20ﺔﯿﺴﯿﺋﺮﻟا%20ﺮﯿﺗﺎﺳﺪﻠﻟ%20ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا .htm>; 
Access Date: 29 July 2010
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This was a very difficult period for the Kurds who had to write the draft constitution 
so that they could preserve what they had achieved. In a personal interview, Frsat 
Ahmad 251 indicated that the Kurds were shocked when the other Arab parties 
displayed the draft constitution for the first time, since they had deliberately violated 
the agreement with regard to the issue of what was published or changed, and it was 
no longer in the form previously agreed between the Iraqi Parties. For this reason the
two main parties, the KDP and the PUK, formed what was known as the Committee 
on Attribution for backing the Kurdistani bloc. This was made up of members of the 
KRG parliament under the chairmanship of Masoud Barzani, President of Kurdistan 
Region, with the addition of Jalal Talabani, President of the Republic of Iraq, who set 
out to create a political meeting point in Baghdad where all the Iraqi leaders would
meet.252 The Committee that supported the Kurdistan Alliance List during the writing 
of the constitution was headed by Kamal Kerkuki and ten members of the Kurdistan 
parliament; they visited Baghdad three times in 2005 to participate in these meetings, 
which were also attended by both Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, several
members of the Politburo, and others such as “Dr. Mahmoud Othman, Dr. Hussein, 
Balisani, Dr. Sadi Barznji, Dr. Munther Al Fadl Karim Bahri, Aref Tayfour, Masrur 
Barzani…etc”253
Dr Nouri Talabani ( who was a member of the Legal Committee) described how, a 
few months before joining the negotiating team to participate in the writing of the 
constitution in Baghdad, the 59 members of the Kurdistan parliament representing all 
the Kurdish political parties requested that the draft constitution prepared in 
December 2003 with the assistance of the Legal Committee should take into account 
all the changes and political developments after the fall of Saddam so that it could be 
used as a basis for negotiations with the Arab and other political groups. This was 
agreed by the presidency of the parliament (which was controlled by the majority of 
251 Frsat Ahmad, who is a Member of Parliament of the Kurdistan Region. He was one of the 
individuals who participated in the writing of the Transitional Administrative Law and also the New 
Iraqi Permanent Constitution.
252 In general the work of this committee (Committee on Attribution) was to support, and also give 
guidance and feedback to the Kurdish members in the committee on writing the constitution, and 
discuss with the Arab parties about having the right to vote. Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 
2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq.
253 Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq.
111
PUK and KDP) and the draft constitution was endorsed before the Kurdish 
negotiating team went to Baghdad.254 They were therefore able to insist on the 
contents which represented the demands of the Kurdish people. Dr Nuri added that the 
deliberate decision not to put this draft in front of the parliament had fallen on the 
presidency of the parliament (Adnan Mufti from PUK headed this specific session for 
Parliament). It is reasonable to believe that it was a political decision of the supreme 
authorities of the two main parties that the constitution of Kurdistan would not 
precede the constitution of Iraq. Tariq Jambaz255 supported this idea and argued that
the Kurds had been preparing the project for the Iraqi Kurdistan Constitution and also 
for Iraq since 17 November 2002. He believed that the second task of the Parliament 
of Kurdistan was the adoption of the Constitution of the Region, because the new 
Iraqi constitution had recognised all laws, decisions and contracts issued in the KRG. 
Thus, if the Kurdistan region had owned their constitution, it would have earned its
legality.
From this point of view, it could be said that the Kurds had made a strategic mistake, 
when they postponed ratification of the constitution of the Kurdistan Region and 
worked to create the Iraqi constitution. Moreover, if the constitution of the Kurdistan 
Region had preceded the Iraqi constitution, there were many things at that time 
(including the rights of the Kurdish people) that they would not have had to prove in 
the Iraqi constitution, since they would have been fixed in the constitution of the 
Kurdistan Region. It should be said that the jurists and the Kurdish people were 
constantly demanding a constitution for the Kurdistan Region: however, the ignition 
of internal conflicts between the main parties (PUK and KDP) was one of the most 
important factors that led to ignore this project and ratification was postponed until 
now (time of writing this theses). 
In fact the presence of a constitution is essential for any civilised society in order to 
determine the political system and define the rights and duties of the citizen. 
Obviously, the absence of a constitution means the absence of the rule of law in 
254 Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq
255 Tariq Muhammad Said Osman (Jambaz) was a member of the Kurdistan Parliament (second session 
of the Parliament of Kurdistan in 2005), and was one of the 15 members nominated to review the draft 
of Kurdistan constitution. The first reading of this project was conducted 2006, after the receipt of 
some 5000  proposals and comments from academics, jurists and politicians and others. Interview with 
Tariq Jambaz, on 4 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq.
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general (except in the case of the UK, which it is not have a written constitution but 
an un-codified one). 256 Dr. Nouri Talabani asserted that he was the first to prepare the 
draft constitution of the Kurdistan Region. Having, as their first step, announced a 
federal system as the base of their relations with the Iraqi government, it was 
supposed that the second step taken by the Kurds would acceptance of the constitution 
for their region. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Kurdish people also 
criticised their political leaders for their interest in Iraqi issues, and the conflicts 
between Shiite and Sunni groups over Kurdish issues.  Some did not deny this fact,
justifying their attitude that the Kurds, like any Iraqi group in the Iraqi parliament,
should have the word on all Iraqi matters. Further, any conflicts between Shiite and 
Sunni would significantly impact on the fate of the Kurds.257
By focusing on the essential issues challenged and discussed during this period, the
question of the right to self-determination gave rise to serious discussion in the 
bargaining committees while the Iraqi constitution was being written. The Kurds 
wished to take this subject as a constitutional article and the strongest guarantees for 
the Kurds. In discussing this matter, Dr Nuri argued that the Preamble did not have 
any legal force compared with the constitutional articles, because if the Arab parties
accepted inclusion of the issue as a separate article in the constitution, indirectly it 
meant recognition of the right of self-determination.258 Frsat Ahmad held a different 
view, justifying the attitudes of the Kurdish leadership and noting that
…during the Transitional Administrative Law, which was set 
only for one year…the Kurds and other Iraqi parties were 
directed towards administrative issues, not to the vital issues 
that were crucial in this period. Indeed, Kurds were not guided 
in the direction of self-determination during this stage [since]
it was the interim constitution. Nevertheless, in the process of 
writing a constitution they insisted on including it as an article 
in the new permanent constitution.259
256 In fact, the constitution of the UK is the set of laws and principles, which much of the British 
constitution is embodied in written documents, within statutes, court judgments and treaties. Besides, 
the constitution has other unwritten sources, including parliamentary constitutional conventions and 
royal prerogatives.
257 Interview with Dr. Nuri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq 
258 Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq
259 Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq.
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The Kurds did not succeed in their attempt and as a result it was agreed that this 
wording would be included in the preamble. Although this issue was a separate article 
in the constitution at the beginning of the constitution-writing process, following 
severe opposition from the Arab parties it was put in the preamble, where it asserted 
that “The adherence to this constitution preserves for Iraq its free union of people, of 
land, and of sovereignty”. In the Kurdish leadership’s view this represented a 
guarantee of self-determination for the Kurds, so that if the other Iraqi factions would 
not adhere to this constitution the Kurds would have the right to take any steps to 
protect both their status and their rights. Kurdish leaders (especially Masoud Barzani) 
constantly repeated that the only guarantee for the unity of Iraq depended respect for 
the constitution by the Iraqi parties.260
It is necessary to point out that the Kurds have obliged a series of compromises to be 
made, as the Shiite groups have also done, although to a lesser extent than the Kurds. 
The main reason was to refute the serious concerns of the Sunni community during 
preparations for drafting the constitution. The SCIRI and Kurdish leaders were 
harshly criticised for overriding the political consensus which was intended to be 
adhered to and approved by all the factions, since their decisions were taken behind 
closed doors. In terms of solving the anticipated problems this could have been
predicted, particularly given the absence of Sunni participation in the drafting of the 
constitution. Thus, increasing the number of Sunni Arab members (15) on the 
constitutional committee made the procedure appear acceptable to all groups. 261
260 There is no doubt that placing this article in the preamble gave rise to different interpretations by the 
jurists, according to whom the preamble is part of the constitution, and therefore has the same legal 
power as the provisions of other articles in the constitution. A second groups of jurists argued that the 
preamble had no legal force, compared with provisions of other constitution articles, while a third 
group stated that the preamble had the same legal force as the provisions of other articles, provided that 
there was an article in the constitution clearly indicating this situation. 
261 As noted, selecting the 55 members for the committee was among the core functions of the NA, and 
the selection was done on 10 May, to leave time to draft the new constitution. The UIA (United Iraqi 
Allaince) had 28 places and the Kurds had 15 places on the committee. However, participation of 
Sunni Arabs on the committee was low, compared with other Iraqi groups; thus, only two Sunni Arabs 
participated, one representing the UIA and the other Allawi’s INL. These situations influenced the role 
of these two lists in controlling the content of the new constitution. Liam Anderson and Gareth 
Stansfield (2009), op. cit., p.134-5
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For the Kurds, the constitution was a significant gain,262 and included positive points 
that should be taken into consideration. In this respect Frsat Ahmad noted that the 
most important issues for the Kurds were that:263
1. Any matters not excluded in Article 110 would be in the hands of the regions;
2. The current reality of the Kurdistan region, including the three powers of 
legislation, execution and judicial powers, would be recognised.
3. Concerning the existence of common issues between the federal government 
and the KRG, if there was a discrepancy in the laws between the two parties,
priority would be given to the laws of Kurdistan Region.
4. Should any laws or any articles in the constitution be modified in order to 
reduce the authority of the Kurdistan Region, such laws would not come into 
effect if the Kurdistan parliament had not accepted them, and only if they had 
been accepted in a referendum. This represented a strong and positive point for 
the Kurds. Amendment of the constitution would not be achieved, if it was 
rejected by two thirds of the votes of three provinces. For Kurds, this point, in 
effect, was a guarantee to protect their rights in the constitution, in the event of
the other Iraqi parties wishing to undermine the gains of the Kurds.
5. Ongoing recognition of all the laws passed in the province of Kurdistan: 
otherwise, as a condition, changes in laws by the relevant authorities in 
Kurdistan Region must not be contrary to the constitution of the federal union.
In this context, Dr Nouri Talabani argued that the Iraqi constitution undoubtedly 
contained positive aspects,264 but at the same time there were negative features.265 He 
262 However the Kurds in Iraq have obtained constitutional recognition. The first legal step started in 
1958 with a “Provisional Constitution” which acknowledged Kurds as a distinct national group, stating 
that “the Kurds and Arabs were accepted as associates in the state of Iraq and their respective national 
right”. The second constitutional recognition came in the “Provisional Constitution” of July 1970 and 
was adopted after the Baath Party had come into power in 1968. See Helen Cook, The Safe Haven in 
Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi Kurdistan, Human Rights Centre, University of 
Essex and the Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Human Rights Project, London, 1st Edition, 1995, p. 23
263 Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq.
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felt that the real fear for the Kurds emanated from committing themselves to the 
constitution in terms that could not be retracted. In the prevailing situation, the
effective participation of the Kurds in the creation of a new Iraqi State after 2003 
means that there is no longer any excuse for the difficulties they experienced or the 
hostile attitudes they faced on the part of Arabs or other Iraqi groups. Dr Nouri 
Talabani has argued that the Kurdish parties themselves were responsible for the 
dilemma that the Kurds had not had a constitution for more a decade before they 
joined Iraq. Even if the Kurds had a constitution of sorts, it was simply an interim 
arrangement that worked as a basis for administering their region, particularly after 
they had adopted federalism. It is logical to suppose that it would have been
recognised by the Iraqi Constitution in the same way that they accepted laws
promulgated by the Iraqi Constitution after 1992.266
According to Nechirvan Barzani, the Iraqi Constitution is a landmark document of 
great importance to all the people of Iraq, Kurds included. Nechirvan Barzani also
264 It is true that, the new Constitution recognises the unique position for the Kurds which includes 
adopting federal State as a political system in Iraq. Moreover, it recognises that Iraq is a country of 
multi nationalities, religions and sects (Article 3), which it affirms that all the nations, sects and groups 
will participate in a form of military and security service (Article 9/1st A). Further, with the federal 
system, the powers are shared between both federal government and regional governments. Besides, 
the Kurdish language is as official a language as the Arabic language of Iraq has mentioned in  (Article 
4/1st). The essential point, the Constitution indicates that “No law that contradicts the principle of 
democracy may be established” as well as “any law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms may 
be established” (Article 2/ 1st b, c). Iraqi Council of Representatives; Iraqi Constitution, Media 
Directorate. www. Parliament. iq.
265 In fact, Kurds have good reason to be worried about their future. There are some of Articles in the 
constitution which are the subject of controversy between the different sects and groups in Iraq that 
threaten the democratic process in Iraq.  In Article 2 of the constitution, it indicates that Islam is the 
basic foundation for the country’s law as a main source of legislation, and no law may contradict the 
fixed provisions of Islam. Although, it states that the full religious rights for all individuals and the 
freedom of creed and religious practices is guaranteed. It is noteworthy that the majority of intellectual 
and secularists have expressed their concern over this Article, which may lead the State to be run under 
Islamic rule or Sharia as a fundamental source of legislation. On the other hand, this article may be 
exploited by Islamic groups or threaten the democratic process. It may even hinder the practice of
human rights in Iraq in the future under the name of hostility for the provisions of Islam. In this point, 
it is argued that there are huge contradictions in the comparatives between religious law and individual 
liberties, which remains vague and can be subject to different, even opposing, interpretations. In this 
Article it declares that no law may contradict Islamic provisions, at the same time it also states no law 
may contradict democratic principles and essential rights and freedoms mentioned in this constitution. 
On the other hand, when it declares that Islamic rule is a “source” for Iraqi law, it means that the 
Islamic provisions should be the main basis for new laws and those that will be created in the future. It 
is obvious that the definition of freedom and that of individual rights differ under both concepts. It is 
significant to realise that fear would pave the way for Iraq towards an Islamic State (much like Iran), 
this leads to concern that Islamic law would undermine the constitution’s individual rights. On the 
other hand, such this illusive language does not only disadvantage Kurds, but it restricts the whole 
democratic process and human rights of the entire Iraqi populations. Article 2, Iraqi Council of 
Representatives; Iraqi Constitution, Media Directorate. www. Parliament. iq.
266 Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region.
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stated that, regardless of the size of the Kurdish political presence in Baghdad, the 
concern for the fate of the Kurds as minorities was perhaps a bit overstated. The 
federal nature of Iraq is enshrined in the Constitution, and the only way Kurdish 
progress could be thwarted would be through unconstitutional actions. Even an Arab 
majority united on all issues in the Council of Representatives, would be unable to 
ratify unconstitutional legislation. And if the Council of Representatives chose to 
ignore the Constitution, the Kurdistan Region would be forced seriously to reconsider 
its position and cooperation with the rest of Iraq. But this is all very speculative, and 
the more likely scenario for the future is continued coalition building and political 
wrangling between parties, which is part of the admittedly messy process of 
democracy.267
Looking at the evolving situation, however, the new Iraqi Constitution was criticised 
for not being sufficiently representative or having a unified vision for ruling the new 
Iraq. After several months of wrangling and with intense pressure from the US, the 
Constitution was signed on 28 August 2005. One notes that, before integrating with 
Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan region had emerged as a de facto semi-autonomous region 
that had chosen a federal system for its inter-dependence with the Iraqi government. 
In drafting the structure of the Constitution this trend was strongly reflected, since the 
provinces were given the right to integrate and establish federal regional autonomous 
zones with limited ties with the central government; this would enable them to 
establish their own courts and local security forces. Thus, as some have argued, in the 
most obvious sense the central government’s powers were limited largely to foreign 
policy and financial issues.268
Given the ongoing unrest between factions to reach a final formulation of the 
constitution, and in order to take into account the interests of other parties, the 
mechanism for amending the constitution had been delineated in Article 126 of the 
constitution. Article 126 (1) stated that “the President of the Republic and the Council 
of the Ministers collectively, or one-fifth of the NA members, may proposed to amend 
the constitution”. Ratification of procedural amendments also required a two-thirds
267 Interview with former Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and received his responses through email, 
on 6 May 2010.
268 Yucel Guclu, “The Turcomans and Kirkuk”, p. 97-8
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vote in the NA and needed popular approval through a general referendum.269
Ironically, in order to balance the different interests between Iraqi factions, the Iraqi 
Constitution was founded on the basis of political consensus. Here the controversial 
debate was concerned with amending the Iraqi constitution, which had been included 
to satisfy the Sunni groups. On the other hand, the only legal guarantee of the rights
of the Kurds in Iraq was that the Kurds were able to reject any amendment regarding
Kurdish gains through two-thirds of the votes in the three provinces. To them the
significant threat concerned the extent of being able to maintain these guarantees in 
the Iraqi Constitution, which depended on the kind of consensus that would be 
practised in the parliament. At this stage, the Sunnis and other Iraqi groups were 
intent on amending and changing Articles in the permanent Constitution, with the 
possibility that these changes might be substantial and include all Articles. In this 
context, regarding the continuing demands to amend the constitution, President Jalal 
Talabani (in his interview with the Arabia satellite) was quoted to say “We agree to 
amend some articles of the Constitution, but we do not allow any touching the rights 
of the Kurdish people which is earned and approved by the Iraqi Constitution for the 
Kurdistan region, who have voted by 12.5 million Iraqis”.270
It is crucial to note that according to Article 61c of the Iraqi State Administration Law 
for the Transitional Period, the permanent constitution would be approved by a simple 
majority in a popular referendum unless vetoed by two-thirds of voters in three or 
more governorates. Seemingly, the Kurds ensured their rights through controlling the 
three overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk, which 
enabled them to use the ‘threat of withdrawal’ to guarantee that their rights would not 
be compromised. It might be argued that the Sunni Arabs could have utilised the same 
Article as a blueprint for political pressure, which might also have created a 
constitutional crisis since they comprised a demographic majority in the three 
provinces of Anbar, Salahaddin and Diyala. In this regard, the Kurds were more 
determined and articulate about a workable and equitable federal system, compared
with the various Shiite and Sunni groups. However, certain compromises had to be 
269 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; and also see: Available 
at: < URL: http://www.parliament.iq/manshurat/dastoreng.pdf>, Access Date: 25 June 2009. 
270 President of the Republic: “Iraq is no longer isolated, and the countries of the world began to 
understand the importance of Iraq and its role in the region”. On 31 March 2009. Available at:
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=7097&type=interviews>
Access Date: 15 June 2009.
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made, such as compelling a Kurdish parliament to work within the general parameters 
of territorial federalism alongside a commitment to the Iraqi constitution.271
CONCLUSION
For more than a decade one of the most heated discussions against the coalition forces 
led by the Bush administration and the UN inspectors in Iraq in the face of enormous 
opposition both within the countries that made up the coalition and outside it,
concerned the fact that they had failed to find WMD. The Iraqi regime was one of the 
fiercest dictatorial regimes in the region; it had exercised terrorism for over thirty 
years and the rational logic for this fact (and also its dire consequences in Iraq as a 
corollary), required that the regime should be removed. It is a fact that the War on 
Iraq caused the biggest shift in the lives of the Iraqi people towards shaping their new 
government and determining their future. It also served as a launching pad for the
spread of democracy in the region, since the failure of this policy would lead to 
further destabilization in the Middle East. It also had the immensely important effect 
of enabling terrorist groups to enter and use Iraq as a battleground. Interestingly, after 
US forces had entered Iraq, the US administration constantly declared that the main 
goal in Iraq was to bring new democracy and a new style of economy for the Iraqi 
people in a unified State. 
The primary goal of this 2003 War or Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the US announced, 
would be to act against global terrorism, and that this aim would be achieved would 
be through Iraq. For this reason the US administration made it clear that it was 
necessary to overthrow the Iraqi regime, and having assured the stability of Iraq, to 
provide international and regional support to a new, broadly-based government that
would include all the various factions and ethnic groups. It is quite evident even now 
that among the hottest topics discussed since the liberation of Iraq concerned Iraq’s 
political transition from a dictatorship that had imposed itself on political and social 
life in Iraq for more than 35 years to the development and success of a culture of 
271 Adeed Dawisha, ‘The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: challenges and opportunities’; in Sultan 
Barakat (ed.), Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq,  (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p.164-5
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democracy and opening up opportunities for popular political participation. Despite 
this, it could be said that the liberation of Iraq also exploded the legacy of sectarian, 
religious and national differences between the various Iraqi groups, and in particular 
widened the gulf between the political forces of both Sunnis and Shiites. In a larger 
sense, the 2003 War and the repercussions that followed had a detrimental effect that 
destroyed the infrastructure of the Iraqi economy. In addition, the legacy of sanctions, 
corruption and rampant nepotism have also taken their toll.272 Despite such facts, what 
has been more interesting is that some analysts of the Iraq war have concentrated on 
the democratic transformation that formed a historic watershed in reshaping the 
political map of the region and redesigning the moral reconstruction of the Middle 
East.
The unique situation for the Kurds in Iraq emerged when the international community 
became aware of their situation, prompting an enhanced international humanitarian 
focus on their plight. The seeds had been sown after the liberation of Kuwait, while 
the second phase of change in favour of the Kurds occurred in the aftermath of the 
liberation of Iraq. This meant the KRG’s became a significant element in 
guaranteeing security and stability, not only inside Iraq but also in the wider region.
For the Kurds, the big challenges during the past twenty years or so were their efforts
to rebuild their infrastructure with outside support, and the development of local 
socio-economic frameworks so as to strengthen Kurdish identity. They succeeded in 
winning international attention which to some degree would help to ensure that they 
would no longer face genocide and that ignorance of their national rights could no 
longer be used as an excuse to marginalise them. 
It is quite clear that the KRG’s participated enthusiastically in the formation of the 
new Iraqi government. In addition, and compared with the rest of Iraq, the US forces 
and their allies were welcomed in the Kurdistan Region. Since the liberation of Iraq, 
272 It should be pointed out that the extent of the tragic destruction and looting of a large part of Iraq’s 
cultural heritage and infrastructure was initiated because of the invasion.  As explained and portrayed 
by the Western media this was not a deliberate consequence of an explosion of freedom by exploited 
people. Ironically, US troops observed the burning and the looting of Baghdad while they were 
guarding the Ministry of Oil, but were unresponsive and indeed even refused to intervene when people 
requested their help. Gareth Stansfield, “The transition to democracy in Iraq: Historical legacies, 
resurgent identities and reactionary tendencies” (2005),op. cit., p 136
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the KRG’s have become a significant element in offering support to US forces and 
have participated actively in liberating some of the big cities and towns. In addition, 
the strongest parties (Kurds, Arabs and other factions) were participants in the IGC, 
and also in the ITG, and more recently in the sovereign government that was 
established after the elections of December 2005. In a sense, the KRG seems to have 
believed that an appropriate method of resolving decades-worth of chronic political 
issues would be through their participation in an Iraqi Government.
Since 2003 the Kurdistan region has, in fact, taken a leading role in the building of the 
new state, along with its modern economy and political structures. In other words, it 
has become a key player in the rehabilitation of the Iraqi state as a federal, 
democratizing, pluralistic state that will have a positive impact upon the whole of 
Iraq, and will ultimately benefit all Iraqis. Nor is it difficult to see that the terms for 
the relationship between the Kurdistan Region and Iraqi government are set by the 
Constitution, which sets out a clear framework for the structure of the state and its key 
institutions. For the first time in Iraq’s history, and despite contradictions and 
differences, the constitution of 2005 was drafted by representatives of every Iraqi 
political faction. In this context, the Kurdistan Region may be regarded as both a 
permanent and legislative fixture in the Iraqi political arena.
One must also take into consideration, however, the relatively large numbers of 
researchers who have argued that the Iraqi constitution could be regarded as a 
sectarian constitution and that the Iraqi parties within the government were often 
acting in their own sectarian interest. Nevertheless, most Iraqi factions resented giving 
the Kurds disproportionate powers through the Constitution, in which Article 61 
became known as the “Kurdish veto”. Significantly, all the political parties were 
involved in a political deal that included national reconciliation, constitutional review, 
de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, and the future of Kirkuk. 
In fact, the principle of power-sharing was initially rejected by the Sunni groups, who 
boycotted the first national election and voted overwhelmingly against the 
Constitution. They were strongly opposed to articles of the Constitution that had been 
developed according to consensual principles such as federalism, Iraq’s identity, the 
allocation of oil income, and the question of Kirkuk. On the other hand, the Shiite 
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groups constitute a majority in Iraq, and they have focused on simple majority rule 
against consociational power-sharing. It is not difficult to envisage, that the principle 
of power-sharing would not have been exercised without the insistence of the US. and 
support by the KRG. It was assumed that power-sharing arrangements might not be 
sustainable after the withdrawal of U.S. troops; however, developments in the Iraqi 
political arena demonstrated the need for the sharing of power to continue, in response 
to the wishes of the Iraqis, rather than being imposed by the US.
Given the current situation and the political composition in Iraq, it would be very 
difficult to allow any appearance of a dictatorship, as a model of the previous regime. 
According to the Iraqi Constitution, the institutions of the Iraqi State were formed in a 
manner that would prevent all powers being gathered in the hands of one individual. 
Nevertheless, there is a real fear of any movement towards centralisation and 
militarism which might in turn lead to the creation of a dictatorship. In spite of this, it 
is difficult to determine just how the emergence of a new democratic system as well 
as the consolidation of democracy can succeed in Iraq. Over time, democratic 
institutions have been neither promoted nor taken root, in Iraq or in the broader 
Middle East. Arguably, this is because neither the political parties nor the majority of 
the Iraqi people have had democratic development in mind; nor have they ever
practised this in Iraq. It is expected that the future will carry great promise and at the 
same time considerable fear for Kurdistan. The positive side represents the 
willingness of the US and EU to protect Kurdistan from unwanted interference,
whether by the Turks or other neighbouring countries. There is a real fear of the 
possibility of the Kurds’ enemies, both past and present, exploiting the unresolved 
competition between the main Kurdish parties. 
Regardless of the facts, it should be indicated here that the KRG has had a significant 
part in enhancing and supporting the decentralized authority given to Regional 
Governments in the new Iraqi Constitution. The KRG has always been interested in 
the consociational principles that form the cornerstone of the success of the federal 
system in Iraq, and that constitute a form of ethnic power-sharing government to 
ensure peaceful coexistence and the rights of the Iraqi components. However, there is 
a lack of consensus among Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis about most issues, including 
principles of power-sharing and what Iraq is and ought to be. Despite that, most Iraqi 
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factions, as well as the international community seem currently to favour a power-
sharing arrangement for the future Iraq.
Overall, the Kurds faced considerable challenges after 2003, as a result of a strategic 
shift in their political situation, including the fact that they were able for the first time 
to participate in writing the Iraqi constitution. The 2005 elections clearly put the KRG 
in a powerful position, from which it was able to make its mark on the permanent 
constitution; in addition the KRG arrived at a power-sharing agreement to govern the 
Kurdistan Region and to act as an influential political bloc within Iraq as a whole.  
Beyond this, the KRG endeavoured to become part of the solution rather than the 
problem in Iraq by attempting to resolve problems with Baghdad through negotiation 
and consensus. The KRG confirmed its full commitment to working with all parties 
and to abiding by the Iraqi constitution to support a democratic, federal Iraq. 
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Chapter 5:
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE FEDERATIVE SYSTEM IN THE 
KURDISTAN REGION AND IRAQ
(We say to our Iraqi brothers: Geography compels us to live 
together and not succumb. We prove to the Iraqis that we want 
a union voluntary, not compulsory, that is our choosing and 
our will, when we have, decided to live with the Iraqis in the 
unified federal democratic Iraq)
(President Jalal Talabani) 273
INTRODUCTION
Kurds have chosen a federal system to shape their relation with the Iraqi government 
since 1991. Nevertheless, the most serious challenges occurred in 2003, when the 
Kurds reaffirmed this federal model as a condition to rejoin the Iraqi government and 
their ability to include it in a new constitution. On the other hand, in a press 
conference on 6 March 2003, US President George W. Bush declared a new system in 
Iraq for the Shiite, the Sunni and the Kurds, so that they could unite Iraq and live 
together in a federation State. What many observers find controversial is what kind of 
federation was meant; i.e., was it “territorial”, “administrative” or “ethnic? 274 In light 
of such conditions, it must be noted that there were several significant challenges for 
the US administration and for the future of Iraq that were related to the ethnic 
composition of the Iraqis. A national unity government was formed in May 2006, but 
the real fear was whether these groups would unite to carry out a sectarian instead of a 
national agenda. 
273 Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in a comprehensive dialogue with (Free Hour), “Some of the 
representatives of the Sunni Arab extremists and their aim to foil the Constitutional process”, on 14 
September 2005. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=2223&type=interviews> 
Access Date 5 March 2009.
274 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, ‘The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq’, (United 
Stated Of America: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p.29
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It should be pointed out that the structure of the federal system in Iraq is described in 
the Article 45 of the new constitution as three executive powers, legislative and 
judicial, as well as numerous independent commissions. Furthermore, it is indicated 
that those three authorities exercise their specialty and tasks on the basis of the 
principle of separation of powers. The administrative relations between the Kurdistan 
region and the Iraqi government are based on a federal system.
In this chapter discussion moves principally between two levels of analysis , as an 
institutional arrangement, federation can, on the one hand, take the form of a 
sovereign state, particularly as it is a specific organisational system that includes 
structures, institutions and techniques. On the other, it is different from other states, 
where the central government incorporates its regional units into its decision-making 
procedures according to some constitutionally-entrenched practices. Regarding the 
fears of those who oppose the federalism idea, it has always been asserted that federal 
institutions involve a division of power, and that through legally applied methods 
obstructions could be created to prevent the state utilising its full resources to increase 
economic productivity. It is a logical assumption that the federal system could be 
applied to communities composed of two or more groups differing in language and 
culture. Thus, given the reality of Iraq and the evidence of increasing tensions 
between two trends, the Shiite and Sunni groups stressed a common interest in acting 
through a central government, while the only federal unit in Kurdistan Region (KRG) 
have tended to try and obtain more self-government.
5.1 FEDERALISM AND ACHIEVING PEACEFUL 
COEXISTENCE AMONG THE IRAQI FACTIONS
At the beginning of the liberation of Iraq, in December 2003 and January 2004, many 
observers, politicians and intellectuals who had presented their proposals before the 
putting together of the Transitional Administrative Law of March 2004, declared that 
the federation should be based on the idea of Iraq’s 18 governorates. It is important to 
note that at its core, this proposal signified the Saddam era, and was put forward for 
purposes of ethnic manipulation, especially in Kirkuk, in order that it could be 
presented as “non-ethnic” or as ethnically neutral. Additionally, some worried 
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opponents alleged that territorial federalism, would lead to the creating of the 
independent entities of Kurdistan, Shiastan and Sunnistan. For this reason there was 
trend that sought to dissolve Kurdistan in order to steer clear of dividing the country. 
These groups justified their arguments on the basis that the experiences of Lebanon 
and the former Yugoslavia had shown how any kind of “territorial” or 
“administrative” federations that depended on national and ethnic divisions had failed 
in practice.275
Kurdish politicians announced on several occasions that their commitment to stay in 
the new post-2003 Iraq would depend on two principles: “power-sharing between the 
Arabs and the Kurds, and treating Kurdistan as one geographic and political entity in 
the proposed federal system.” The Kurdish parties strongly identified their position in 
order to accept reintegration into Iraq after 1992, through a parliamentary bill and a 
draft constitution for a two-unit federation in a future Iraq, one to encompass 
Kurdistan and another to include the rest of Iraq. Subsequently, the federation was 
accepted and recognised by the majority of Iraqi opposition groups at a conference in 
London in December 2002, and it was also suggested that the permanent constitution 
of post-Saddam Iraq should be drafted on the base of “the national composition of 
Iraq”. In this way, the demands by the Kurds (for Federalism) were confirmed and 
imposed through the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). 276
Dr. Borhanedin Yassin claims that although the Kurdish representatives participated 
in the Nasiriyah meeting on 14 April 2003, issues surrounding the Kurds and the 
name of Kurdistan were not mentioned at this conference. Furthermore, the second 
paragraph of the fourteenth items for this meeting insisted that the identity of a new 
State should not be structured on an ethnic or a regional basis, but solely on Iraqi 
identity.277 The Nasiriyah conference was attended by various groups of politicians, 
tribal leaders and exiles supported by international mediators. Its key objectives were
to draw up a new political map of Iraq, and also in the short term to take the first steps 
towards restoring order in Iraq and in the long term, towards building democracy. 
This conference was considered the first meeting of all the Iraqi parties, the US, and 
275 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, ibid., p. 30-3
276 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, ibid., p. 34-5, p.48
277 Borhanedin A. Yassin, ‘Iraq after Saddam Hussein and the Fate of Southern of Kurdistan’ (in 
Kurdish), (Duhok: Hawar press, 2008), pp. 31-2.
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its allies;  its aim was to develop the Transitional Administration Law (TAL), despite 
sharp differences between the Pentagon and the US State Department regarding the 
managing of Iraq until a new constitution could be agreed through democratic 
elections.278
An interesting interpretation of the concept of federalism was provided in Article 4 of 
the TAL; it evoked more contentious concepts, such as federation, democracy, and 
pluralism. An important point to note is that the TAL created a federal democracy as 
well as a necessary base for a flourishing federation, as explicitly stated in Article 4:
The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, 
democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared 
between the federal government and the regional 
governments, governorates, municipalities, and local 
administrations. The federal system shall be based upon 
geographic and historical realities and the separation of 
powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or 
confession.279
As well as recognition of the TAL, the existing territory of Kurdistan and the 
Kurdistan National Assembly with its government were recognised, along with the 
Kurdish language as a second official language for Iraq; the region was also granted 
the right to protect its own internal security. It had triggered a vital issue what kind of 
federation would be appropriate for Kurdistan? and what sort of federation would be 
more effective for Iraq to enable it to move towards becoming a democratic and 
pluralistic country? 
In focusing on the “legitimating of ethnic identity” it has been argued that the nation-
state could be regarded as an out-dated model;280 nevertheless, a federal solution 
278 Leigh Sales, “Nasiriyah hosts meeting of Iraq's political factions”, on 15 April, 2003.  
Available at: <URL: http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s832700.htm>, Access Date: on 
Tuesday  2 may 2009
279 http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html.
280 To protect the interests of their minorities, certain measures have been adopted by several 
countries, including the following:
1. a constitution of administrative units on the basis of homogeneous nationalities, practised to a great 
extent in Switzerland, the USSR and Yugoslavia;
2. recognition of more than one language as official languages, as tried in Switzerland, Canada and 
South Africa;
3. minority representation in the cabinet, as in Switzerland and Canada;
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could offer a way out of crises, particularly when there were any national, ethnic, 
linguistic, or racial claims. On the other hand, arguably, by the possibility that 
‘confederalism’ or the ‘new confederations’, might represent a significant method of 
preserving key issues, being strongly correlated with globalisation, which in turn 
could limit economic excesses, support federal democracy and human rights, and 
balance individuals and groups. With regard to decentralisation, it has been argued 
that certain fundamental provisions should be taken into account, as follows:  first, 
regarding identity it is assumed that an identity based on decentralisation is more 
federal in character than one based on population, which in turn may be 
constitutionally guaranteed by the central government through any method. Secondly, 
the process of devolving power and resources is based on identity, particularly when it 
is strongly connected with the recognition of identity (defined as language, region, 
tribal affiliations, or a combination thereof). Third, the most important issue linked 
with decentralisation is that of democracy, which means that decentralized bodies are 
democratically elected by local citizens.281
Frsat Ahmad took the view that the shape of the federalism applied in the Kurdistan 
region had the features of confederation rather than federalism, and showed that, in 
the case of conflicting laws between a federal government and the Regions in most 
federal systems on the international scene, priority was given to the federal 
government, whereas in the Iraqi experience priority was given to the laws of the 
Kurdistan Region.282 In contrast, Tariq Jambaz maintained that it was difficult to think 
about, or move towards a confederation as a suitable solution for regulating the 
relationship between the KRG and the Iraqi government in the first stage of the 
formation of the KRG from 1991 to 2003. At this stage, the objective and subjective 
conditions for the Kurds meant they were not eligible to obtain this gain.283
4. fundamental rights for protecting minority interests, as in the constitutions of the USSR, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Canada;
5. an assumption of special responsibility by the federal government in respect of minority rights in 
constituent units, as in Canada. See P. K. Sharma, Federalism And Political Development :( Developed 
and Developing Areas), (India: University of Delhi, Pragati Publications, 1979),  p.62   
281 Harihar Bhattacharyya, Federalism in Asia, India, Pakistan and Malaysia, (London: Routledge, 
2010)., p.153
282 Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 2009, Erbil, Kurdistan Region/ Iraq
283 Interview with Tarq Jambaz, on 4 April 2009, Erbil.
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As already discussed, until the fall of the former regime there were quartet or 
tripartite meetings between neighbouring countries that were against the experience of 
the KRG and worked to weaken it, while, Borhanedin Yassin284 had a completely 
different view on this matter, saying that although the mainstream political movement 
in Iraq had adopted a federative system instead of autonomy, the federative system 
that developed later within the context of the Iraq constitution was weaker than 
certain autonomy arrangements found elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, he 
claimed that, after 2003 the Kurds had some significant opportunities for 
independence that were not available in 1991. For this, the main parties (PUK and 
KDP) bear historical responsibility for the fate of the Kurds since 1991, and what the 
future will hold for them. It is widely thought that for long periods the PUK and the 
KDP adopted the principle of autonomy, arguing strongly that they were forced to 
accept this principle because they had no alternative due to the inadequacy of the 
political conditions of the regional and international powers. In this context, Dr. 
Borhanedin Yassin argues that the two main parties lost opportunities for the Kurdish 
people at both the strategic and tactical level. 285
The federation as a normative logic had a corollary to be reflected in the new Iraqi 
constitution, which included the restructuring of state-building through adopting 
economic and political systems different from the previous ones and on the basis of 
solid guarantees for the rights of all factions through adopting the federal system. It 
was evident, as indicated in Article 116, that “the federal system in the Republic of 
Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, as well as local 
administrations.” In a sense, the Iraqi constitution espoused the basis of administrative 
decentralization in the running of administrative units. Furthermore, the federal 
284 On the tactical level, the two main parties succeeded in silencing the voices that called for 
independence, thereby also stopping the Kurds from using their only means of pressure against the 
Arabs in Iraq, so that the only option left to them was to integrate with Iraq. In short, the Kurds 
themselves made a formidable mistake by showing this vision to the Arab parties and other factions in 
Iraq; the Kurds could not secede and had no options other than to join the Iraqi State. Perhaps most 
significantly, the Kurds did not mention independence, even at the tactical level. Instead, it raised three 
hopes, which tied them even more firmly to Iraq, as follows:
1, create hope through the US administration for the New Iraqi State;
2, created hope among the Shiite and Sunni groups of dealing with each other; 
3, create hope by the Kurds for the New Iraqi State. Interview with Dr Borhanedin Yassin, an 
academic and a political activist living in Sweden and lecturing at Lund University. This interview was 
organised through email.
285 Personal Interview with Dr. Borhanedin Yassin through email, on 12 August 2009, Sweden.
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authorities, as identified in Article 109, would work “to preserve the unity, integrity, 
independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system.”286
In light of the fact, the US administration strongly supported the establishment of a 
federal system to guarantee the rights of both the centre and the regions through the 
constitution, and as a path towards deepening the roots of democracy in the country. It 
was reasonable to imagine that the federal system would serve as the cornerstone of 
ensuring the territorial integrity of Iraq as a key issue, something that has continued to 
worry all the parties, whether internal, regional or international. In addition, to ensure 
divisions between the authorities, and responsibilities between the centre and the 
regions, meant limiting the powers of the centre and increasing powers of the 
regions.287 Thus it was necessary to concentrate on the situation following the 
liberation of Iraq, when the Arab parties and the US authorities proposed a very 
strongly majoritarian, centralised and mono-national federation. In addition, Sunni 
Arabs consolidated a centralist political model. For example, Adnan Pachachi’s draft 
suggested a national or a central, but not a federal government, while Shiite Arabs 
tried to form a strong federal government, and sought to ensure resources and power
for the southern governorates. Were there to be a strong federal government in Arab-
dominated Iraq, it would mean the presence of unified armed and security forces, and 
governorates that would be heavily dependent on the federal government.
In the current situation the Kurdistan Region is a sole region with its own police, 
internal security, and judiciary, and from 19 March 2003 its borders were also 
recognised. According to O’Leary, McGarry, and Salih, a federation might be 
decentralised with a strongly empowered federation-wide majority; or a federation 
might be centralised with a consensus in organising the regions’ share in power in the 
federal government. In this context, it was argued that the most successful model of 
federation for Kurds and the one that would be more suitable for Kurdistan depended 
on geographic and historical facts and the separation of powers, rather than on origin, 
race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession. In other words, it could be said that the 
legal status of the political process of the Kurdistan Region was going in two 
286 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; and also see: 
<URL:http://www.parliament.iq/manshurat/dastoreng.pdf>
287Adeed Dawisha, ‘The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: challenges and opportunities’; in Sultan 
Barakat (ed.), ‘Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq’, (London and New York,: Routledge, 2008), p. 163. 
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directions: the first towards a strongly-centralized federation in the management of 
natural resources and fiscal policy; and the second towards a more decentralized 
federation if the benefits of natural resources were equitably distributed.288
In practice, one of the most significant advantages of a federal system is maintaining
the integrity between diverse groups particularly in a state that consists of
heterogeneous ethnic groups. In the case of Iraq, it was felt that the federal system 
was the only way of keeping the territorial integrity of Iraq, because the three major 
ethnic groups had radically different and generally incompatible aims and 
perspectives that would have made it impossible to obtain a consensus on the most 
significant political issues. In this context, Ali Babakhan pointed out that “the 
applying federalism in Iraq could lead to peace and security in Iraq and in the whole 
Middle East”. As Babakhan noted that the federalism as a phenomenon was linked to 
the principles of minority rights (ethnic, religious) and a weakened central state 
during the twentieth century. In this view, it is logically to assume that the federalism 
would form only viable option for the Kurds, which would provide widen 
participation in all political institutions and would balance the role of the individual 
and group.289
Aside from this, there is a different view of federalism by others, who have argued 
that the application of the federal system might lead to civil war if it was based on 
ethnicity and not territoriality. In evaluating and comparing the Iraq case with the 
Lebanese case, it was clear that the confessional system guaranteed the political rights 
of each of Lebanon’s diverse communities, rather than keeping them, as a coherent 
entity, committed to Lebanon, with the result that the country ended up with a 
catastrophic civil war.290 On the contrary, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, draws 
attention to the importance of the federal system, and criticized the central system in 
the following terms: “I think that central system was a cause to all the problems in 
Iraq. Central is led to the sectarian persecution and to the national oppression and to 
dispel the wealth of Iraq alone. Conversely, the federal would lead to satisfy the 
288 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, op. cit., p. 59, p.69
289 Ali Babakhan, ‘Federalism as a Model for Democracy’, in “Kurdish Identity Human Rights and 
Political States”, (eds.) “Charles G Macdonald and Carole a. O’Leary ”(USA: University Press of 
Florida: 2007) pp.166-7
290Adeed Dawisha, op. cit., p.163
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people due to ensure the distribution of power and wealth fairly among them". 
Talabani stated that those who oppose the federal, might be did not understand the 
core of federalism or their mentality is still the country's mentality of totalitarianism. 
Nowadays, there are 76 countries in the world practicing federalism, for example, 
UAE kind of federalism, Pakistan, a kind of federalism. Why federalism in Iraq has 
become a division.291
It has been suggested that in order to achieve voluntary and genuine integration in 
Iraq, “…Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq would best be reconstituted in a bi-national, 
multi-ethnic, and multi-religious federation.” It has also been shown that pluri-
national federations are workable, particularly through territorial autonomy for 
historic national minorities. As some analysts have demonstrated, such bi-national 
federations have succeeded and flourished for a century and a half in Canada, 
Belgium, and Switzerland, and for stabilising Iraq might be regarded as better models 
and road maps than the centralised federation that was proposed by American 
academics and administrators. It has also been argued, 
“…that pluri-national federations or multi-national federations 
had failed to stay as a democratic system throughout the 
communist and post-communist world (Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, and the USSR; Ethiopia). It has been pointed 
out; the secessions from the USSR, of Slovenia and Croatia 
from Yugoslavia, and of Bangladesh from Pakistan conform 
to this pattern. Moreover, the situation in the post-colonial 
world, in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean 
are faced with the same fate.”292
A positive element in the federal system described in the Iraqi Constitution was that it 
did not enable the central government to impose governing institutions and 
mechanisms on the regions. This principle was confirmed in Article 120, which 
allowed each region to adopt a constitution of its own that defined its power structure 
and its authorities, as well as the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided 
that they did not contradict the main Constitution. On the whole, Article 119 (1 and 2) 
291 Jalal Talabani's  interview with Al-Sabah Newspaper, on 16 January 2006. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=2562&type=interviews> 
Access Date: 5 May 2009
292 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, op. cit., p. 36-7, p.70-1
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elaborated the ways in which one or more governorates would be able to organise a 
region. These formations depended on a request being made, and had to be voted on 
in a referendum through one third of the council members of each governorate or by 
one tenth of the voters in each of the governorates that were intending to form a 
region.
One of the main challenges for both the central and the regional governments was
formulated in detail in Article 121 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), which referred to the regional 
powers. Paragraph (1) stated that “the regional powers shall have the right to exercise 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except 
for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government.”
In light of this it was imperative for the authorities in the regions to take account of
cases involving a contradiction between regional and national legislation with regard
to issues outside the exclusive authority of the federal government, namely those 
outlined in Article 121 (2). In this case, priority would be with the regional power, 
which had the right to amend application of national legislation within that region.293
The third paragraph of the same Article addressed the allocation of a fair share of the 
national revenues to regions and governorates for performing their duties and 
responsibilities, and taking into account their resources, needs, and the size of their 
population. Under Paragraph (4), however, offices for the regions and governorates 
would be established in embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to pursue 
cultural, social, and developmental affairs. The final paragraph defined a region’s
responsibilities and requirements, which enabled the regional government to organise 
its internal security, such as police, security, and defence forces. It could be said that, 
on the basis of this Article, the Kurdistan Region was granted significant powers to 
manage the region and to establish new administrative units.294
On the whole, it is a reasonable to assume that “applying federalism in Iraq would 
require the region of democracy and human rights in the popular culture and in the 
political party program.” Among the scholars, Ali Babakhan has convinced that 
“federalism provides a workable solution for Kurds because they can exercise their 
293 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; and also see: Available 
at: < URL: http://www.parliament.iq/manshurat/dastoreng.pdf> Access Date: 10 January 2010 
294 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; ibid.
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rights in a representative democracy.” In addition, Babakhan observes “the Iraqi 
Kurdish experience could promote national unity in a federal context and relive the 
apprehensions of Iran and Turkey”. Most importantly, Babakhan emphasis on the 
possibility strengthens claimants for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish questions in 
Iran and Turkey of applying federalism there too. 295
5.2 RESERVATIONS AND FEAR OF FEDERALISM
It was clear that federation as a political entity was composed of a plurality of sub-
units, the aim of which was to preserve each member-state. On the internal level, the 
federal state is directed to establish a new and collective political status, along with a 
federal constitution; therefore, the main duty of the federal State as the supreme 
power should be to protect the existence of each member state under the new 
constitution and also to resolve conflicts among member-states. In turn, each member 
state that becomes a party to a federal state should have to change its condition in 
order to subordinate itself to the new federal state. In other words, it loses its capacity 
to dictate its own unity. Conversely, each member state will cede a portion of its 
sovereign power to the federal state. Regarding the international level, Schmitt 
pointed out that the federal power had the responsibility and the right to defend the 
territory and existence of the federation.296
Given the nature of functional and structural basis in federalism, it is necessary to 
point factors that work together to form federations, including:
First, there should be a desire on the part of the initiators of an agreement to widen 
their sphere of influence in a peaceful way, usually to overcome an external military 
or diplomatic threat, or otherwise to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression or 
expansion;
295 Ali Babakhan, op. cit., pp.166-7
296 Nicolas Patrici, Looking into Medusa’s Eyes: Carl Schmitt on Federalism, in Ann Ward and Lee 
Ward (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism, (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books 
Group, 2009), pp. 306-7; and also cited Wessels, D .P., “The Division of Powers in a Federation”, in Is 
Federalism the solution? Principles and proposals, D. J. Kriek, et al., (South Africa: HSRC Publisher, 
1992), p.37
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Second, there should be a readiness on the part of those concurring in the agreement 
to give up a measure of their state’s independence for the sake of co-operation 
because they desire protection against a military or diplomatic threat, or because they 
would like to have a part in future aggression or in the expected advantages flowing 
from co-operation. 297
In line with the principles already noted, Preston King has argued that a federation 
may be viewed as a sovereign state because of following facts: 
1. “its representation is preponderantly territorial;
2. this territorial representation is characteristically secured on at least two sub-
national levels (referred to as local government and regional government)
3. the regional units are incorporated electorally, or perhaps otherwise, into the 
decision procedure of the national centre; and
4. the incorporation of the regions into the decision procedure of the centre can only 
be altered by extraordinary constitutional measures, not for example by resorting to a 
simple majority vote of the national legislature, or by autonomous decision of the 
national executive”.298
Denial of the entity to a Kurdish presence, whether in a greater or smaller Kurdistan, 
was clearly rejected not only by Turkish officials, but also among Arab politicians on 
the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), as well as among US intellectuals who jointly 
counselled against an “ethnic federation” in 2002-2004.299 Ironically, some Arab 
politicians, who had previously supported Kurdish demands for their own federal unit 
in Iraq, declared their opposition to the existence of Kurdistan from the new positions 
evolving in Baghdad. The number of voices raised against this type of federal or 
federalist arrangement was expected to increase, whether among opponents of Shiite
and Sunni extremists, Baathists or Arab nationalists, and also with those allies who
had backtracked from their previous positions. Jamal al-Din300 asserted that the Shiite
297 D. J. Kriek et al., The theory and practice of federalism, in Federalism the solution? Principles and 
proposals, (South Africa: HSRC Publisher, 1992), pp. 16-8
298 See Preston King, “Federation and Representation”, in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon 
(eds.), Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing traditions and future directions, (Great 
Britain, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 94.  
299 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, op. cit., p.4
300 The seminar was held in honour of the Iraqi Shiite cleric and Ahrar Party leader, Iyad Jamal al-Din, 
who was a member of the Iraqi parliament in its first term (2005-2009). The seminar was arranged by 
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supported the Iraqi identity of Kirkuk, and the notion that the oil had to be under the 
eye of central government for its revenues to be appropriately distributed; in this 
regard neither the city governor nor any other official should play any part. To defend
his view, stated that should be encouraging the administrative federation and they will 
not support federalism on the basis of ethnic’s federation, which would lead to form 
federation of Kurdistan, the federation of Shiastan and federation of Sunnistan.
It has been claimed that the main cause of the overt hostility of the Sunni Arabs and 
Iraqi nationalists towards the federal project generally,301 was because other regions 
such as the Kurdistan Region were allowed to be autonomous. Indeed, the possibility 
of the formation of a ‘Shiastan’ that would include nine provinces in the south had
strong support from Kurds and Shiite (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-
Hakim). Another reason behind the belief that establishing federations would lead to 
the isolation and marginalisation of the Sunni areas, was that Iraq’s energy resources 
were located in the Kurdish and Shiite areas. It was well known that the Sunni groups 
had made their participation in the government conditional on the Constitution being
amended; the reason they insisted on this requirement was because they did not 
actively participate in the process of drafting the constitution. In due course the Iraqi 
parliament approved the formation of a Constitutional Review Committee, which was 
scheduled to complete its work within one year; however this was delayed because of
postponement caused by Article 140 and the need to find a solution for the future of 
Kirkuk.302
The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) under the title “The New Democracy in Iraq”, in the House of 
Commons, London, on 24 June 2010.
301 Post-war Iraq has suffered from massive bombings that have continued to occur and have in turn led 
to the highly unstable situation. Many observers have interpreted and defined the situation as popular 
resistance by the Sunni groups, especially the remnants of the Baath Party, because of non-participation 
in government and their sense of injustice that they have lost control of the reins in the post-Saddam 
era. Sunni Islamist clerics have been accused of collaborating with, and supporting al-Qaeda operatives 
who have come to Iraq from other countries by providing foreign volunteers with shelter and 
assistance.  Certainly some Shiite factions (Sadrists) have become more active and have clearly 
announced their strategy against the occupation. Here the controversial issue is the significant 
involvement of these groups in the government, despite the massive bombings that still occur almost 
daily in Baghdad and many southern cities. Those in the resistance have claimed to be targeting US 
forces, but they are also assassinating Iraqis who are cooperating with the US, as well as attacking the 
oil-exporting pipelines and water and other infrastructure facilities. It has been argued that the aim 
behind these attacks is to slow down the pace of reconstruction and thereby turn the Iraqi populace 
against the occupation.
302 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report, Printed in the United 
States of America, 2006, p. 18
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In so far as the Sunni groups expressed their worries that federalism is a threat and it 
could break up the Iraqi community. Moreover, they emphasized that the revenue 
from oil-rich areas could be lost under a federal system, as the Shiite would have 
reach over the area of oil in the south and Kurds in north. While, they themselves, live 
largely in central areas that are devoid of oil and leave them powerless. Regarding the 
fears that the federalism in Iraq fuelling sectarianism? Talabani answered that “I 
strongly oppose this, and this charge is not justified. On the contrary I think that the 
federalism and democracy would treat all the Iraqi problems, because democracy and 
federalism those lead to fair distribution of wealth and power between the Iraqis and 
Iraq's various regions”. Besides, the current union in Iraq is optional and a voluntary 
union. He added that, historically, Islam was based on a confederation. Islamic States 
had a kind of confederation. Moreover, the Iraqi state during the Ottoman period is 
divided into three states: state Shahrazur (which is known later Mosul mandate), 
Baghdad mandate and the Basra mandate. This was based on the facts of 
geography.303
In this context, it has to be remembered that the recommendations of James A. Baker, 
and Lee H. Hamilton had shown that if Iraq was divided into three autonomous 
regions with a weak centre, it would cause several problems for Iraq since it would be 
difficult to find the means of solving them, particularly because of the administrative 
difficulties involved in delineating each region’s boundaries. The Kurds were shocked 
and strongly rejected these recommendations, stating that “The United States should 
support as much as possible central control by governmental authorities in Baghdad, 
particularly on the question of oil revenues.” They also suggested that the US should 
stay in Iraq and not abandon Iraq.304
The debate that aroused the most controversy concerned the distribution of powers 
between the federal government and regions as set out in the Iraqi constitution. To 
deal with the changes anticipated in the Iraqi arena, as well as to maintain a balance 
between the various factions, was necessary to determine the strength of each party. 
303 Jalal Talabani’s interview with Al-Hayat Newspaper, on 19 September, 2005. Available at:
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=2240&type=interviews>  
Access Date: 15 March 2009 
304 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, ibid., p.39
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The constitution allocated Articles 109, 110, and 113 to the powers of the federal 
government, while Article 114 concerned competencies to be shared between the 
federal and regional authorities. Articles 116, 117, 118, 119, 120 and 121 specified 
the powers of regions.305
A core issue in these Articles relating to federal authority was detailed in Article 110
and its nine paragraphs: paragraph 1 included formulation of foreign policy and 
diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and 
agreements; ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic and 
trade policy. Paragraph 2 was allocated to the wording and execution of national 
security policy to protect and guarantee the security of Iraq’s borders and to defend 
Iraq. The basic point in this Article was affirmed in paragraph 3, referring to the 
framing of fiscal and customs policy, including, “issuing currency; regulating 
commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq; drawing up the 
national budget of the State; formulating monetary policy; and establishing and 
administering a central bank.” Paragraph 6 dealt with cases regulating “issues of 
citizenship, naturalization, residency, and the right to apply for political asylum”;
while paragraph 8 concerned the organisational and planning policies for water 
resources from outside Iraq, while guaranteeing the rate of water flow to Iraq and its 
equitable distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws and 
conventions. Matters concerning general population statistics and census were 
covered in paragraph 9. Last but not least, Article 113 dealt with issues relating to
archaeological sites, manuscripts and coins that would be under the jurisdiction of the 
federal authorities with the cooperation of the regions and governorates, as regulated 
by law.306
One of the most heated discussions, specific to the federal system, concerned the 
division of power between the federal government and the regions with regard to the 
oil and gas sector. Articles 112 and 115 articulated power-sharing and dealing with 
disputes about the division of powers. Another important consideration in the federal 
system concerned the way powers would be shared between the federal authorities 
305 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; and also see: 
<URL:http://www.parliament.iq/manshurat/dastoreng.pdf>
306 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution, ibid.
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and regional authorities. Article 114 and its seven paragraphs indicated that the 
management of customs duties, regulation of the main sources of electric energy and 
its distribution, formulation of environmental policy and general planning policies, 
public health policy, educational policy, and preparation of an internal water 
resources policy would all be expressed in a way that would guarantee their even-
handed distribution in consultation with the regions; the interests of governorates not 
organized within a region would also be taken into consideration and be regulated by 
a law. Thus, according to Article (115), “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive 
powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and 
governorates that are not organised in a region.” In the case of disputes priority would 
go to the law of the regions and to governorates not organised in a region. In fact,
Article (115) meant that important powers could be granted to the regions. 307
Yassin was strongly critical of the federal system in Iraq as having been constructed 
on contradictory bases, particularly when Kurdish politicians claim fraternity between 
the Kurds and the Arabs. At the same time, Kurds struggling for “their identity” are 
confronting a complicated reality, since the autonomy or federal arrangement is 
providing a rather complicated dual identity, of being a Kurd on the one hand and an 
Iraqi on the other. Being an Iraqi further complicates the identity structure, because 
according to the third paragraph of the Iraqi Constitution, Iraq is either a founding and 
active member of the Arab League or Iraq belongs to and is a part of the Arab nation; 
alternatives that might yet be modified in the event of modification to the 
Constitution.    In any case, either as part of the Arab nation or a member of the Arab 
League, there will be further complications for the identity of the Iraqi state as well as 
for its strategic depth, which in turn implies political and security complications for 
the Kurds in Iraq. In addition, as a member of the Arab League, and according to the 
Arab Joint Defence Agreement within the Arab League, Iraq is obliged to defend any 
Arab country that is facing or potentially will face external aggression. This 
agreement was signed by Nouri al-Saad, representing Iraq, in 1952.308
307 “Iraqi Constitution”, ibid.
308 Interview with Dr. Borhanedin A. Yassin, receiving his response through email, on  12 August 
2009, Sweden
139
In the relevant sense of the term ‘evaluation of the situation’, as Al-Najar 309 states, 
the critical issue between the Iraqi factions related to the exercise of political 
consensus as a strategic policy in Iraq after 2003. This political phenomenon may 
wield some influence with regard to peaceful coexistence in Iraq. In Al-Najar’s
view,310 political consensus is no longer practised as it was in 2004-2005, having 
recently become the sort of political equilibrium that is necessary for establishing
common ground between political factions with different views as to its effects on 
current and future events in Iraq. Some (including Kurds) are convinced that 
equilibrium is needed in ruling Iraq. Among others there is a tendency to reject the 
notion of practising any political consensus in Iraq. In fact, the constitution may be 
amended in a manner consistent with the reality of political change in Iraq, and should 
in any case be part of such political equilibrium. In addition, if the constitution does
not play a strong role, it is to be expected that the features of dictatorship will 
reappear in the Iraqi political arena.
5.3 OBSTACLES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
It may be of interest to note that it had triggered concerns that the rise of regionally 
based nationalist political parties and the decline of ideologically oriented pan-
national political parties; struggling constantly to construct alternatives to secession, 
partition and violence. The central governments have made considerable efforts to 
reach democratic solutions as a final alternative to secession and partition. However, 
the central States have to face the constant threat of secession or partition by their 
opposition parties as a real possibility within the federalist framework, particularly 
when the demands of the national minorities are for greater autonomy, despite central 
government’s concessions.311
309 Professor Sherzad al-Najjar, PhD, University of Vienna, 1986, currently teaches in the Faculty of 
Law and Politics in Erbil and Sulaimaniya,
310 Interview with Dr. Sherzad Al Najar, on 28 March 2009, Erbil.
311 Greg Marchildon, ‘Postmodern Federalism and Sub State Nationalism’, in ‘The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Federalism’, (ed.) Ann Ward and Lee Ward, (United Kingdom: Ashgate, MPG Books 
Group, 2009), p. 442, pp. 450-51.
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From the experiences and policies followed by countries that adopted a federal system 
it was clearly essential for their governmental bodies to have control of the Supreme 
Court of the Constitution in order to prevent any avoidance or misrepresentation. 
Moreover, in order to remove obstacles and also to succeed the experience of 
federalism should create the three essential governmental organs of a federation, 
which are follows:
1. A sizeable freely-elected Assembly representative of all the units, which needs to 
stand for a fixed term of some years. Relative state membership of the Assembly may 
conveniently be related to the population by certain formal rules; but it is essential 
that it should be adjustable (and adjusted) to changing population movements.
2. An elected Upper House or Senate of a fixed and limited number of members, with 
equal representation of all States. Only through this medium can the smaller and 
weaker States feel that they can make a positive contribution to national policy 
decisions.
3. A central (or general) government of quite a small number of members, capable of 
taking decisions quickly, probably preparing the first draft of the national budget, and 
probably playing an important role in introducing new legislation or suggesting 
constitutional amendments. 312
In the same context, D. J. Kriek’s elaborate discussion of the federal parliament 
suggests that it would consist of two houses, the lower house and the upper house. In 
general, the lower house would be constituted through common suffrage, based on 
proportional representation and regular elections, while the upper house would be 
established on a geographic basis. In this case, as Kriek notes, every state or unit 
would possess parliaments and governments constituted in the same way as the 
federal structures. The two houses of parliament would have the same powers, except 
that the lower house would have more power over the budget and finances, while the 
upper house would have the right to ratify treaties as well as senior administrative and 
diplomatic appointments. 313 It is evident that the core of federalism is two-level 
government (national and state), and although the names may differ, the principle is 
312 Ursula K. Hicks, Federalism: Failure and Success A comparative Study, (Great Britain: Macmillan 
press LTD, 1978), pp. 3-7
313 D. J. Kriek, “The Federation Plans of the Democratic Party”, in D. J. Kriek et al. (eds.), Federalism 
the solution? Principles and proposals”, op. cit., pp. 233-34.
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the same. In addition, there are two kinds of federal organisation; one coordinates, the 
other is cooperative. It has been argued that in coordinative federalism both levels of 
government operate independently within the field set for them by the constitution.314
In emphasizing the nature of a federal system, Hicks argues that such a system has the 
dual purpose of creating a nation and preserving the identity of the units or States. For 
this reason, it is important to note that constitution and institutions are positioned
appropriately for both purposes. It is crucial for a federation to possess a constitution, 
particularly as the constitution provides several institutions; in fact national policy 
will not be implemented effectively without all these institutions, which are:
1. a representative assembly of all citizens, chosen from the units (or States), or 
depending, proportionately, on their relative populations; 
2. a House of States (or Senate), also normally providing resolutely equal 
representation of all states;
3. a Council or Cabinet which, however, may vary from one federation to another 
and which gives direction and coordination to the whole (the relative power of (2) and 
(3));
4. a chief Minister or President who may (though not necessarily) exercise total
executive power, although this depends on the will of the Assembly;
5. a Supreme Court, answerable to the government as a whole, as chief interpreter 
of the Constitution. 315
However, these explanations may lead to understanding the comprehensive view of 
the course of events in other federations in the world, if compared with case in Iraq, it 
is fair to say that the federal system in Iraq lacks to a fundamental pillar of a federal 
system which is the upper house to guarantee the rights of federal units. The 
significant challenge for the federal government is how to cope with such imbalances 
and survive. From this perspective, the factors causing these imbalances include 
ethnic differences, particularly language and religion. In fact, the features of today’s 
imbalances have emerged to a greater degree in the new federations of Third World 
countries, where they occur due to relative economic and fiscal incompatibilities 
among the units, particularly with regard to demands for economic planning and 
314 Hicks argues that …the modern world federal systems have largely abandoned the coordinate model 
in favour of cooperative federalism in which the relations of Centre and State are much closer because 
they are essentially dynamic and flexible. But in all forms the central problem is intergovernmental 
relations: economic, political and social. Ursula K. Hicks (1987), op. cit., pp. vii-viii.
315 Ursula K. Hicks (1987),ibid., p. 175
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development, and for regional economic equality and financial autonomy for the 
states.316
It is first necessary to indicate that, the Arab Nationalists had claimed that the new 
Iraqi federation should be built around the 18 governorates of Iraq. Obviously, their
key goal was to prevent any change in the boundaries of the governorates, as 
established by Saddam; they justified their claim on the basis that the current 
governorate boundaries would not prevent either ethnic or religious groups from 
having local territorial majorities. For example, the Kurds were the demographic
majority in the three governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, as well as in 
Kirkuk, while the Shiite Arabs were the majority in the nine governorates of Basra, 
Muthanna, Misan, Dhi-qar, Qadisiyah, Wasit, Babel, Karbala, and Najaf, and 
probably in Baghdad. In the four remaining governorates of Anbar, Diyala, 
Salahaddin, and Nineveh, Sunni Arabs formed the majority.317 In this context, Iyad
Jamal al-Din 318pointed out that, in order to end the matter of disputed areas in Iraq, 
the federal system could apply in Iraq based on the 18 provinces in the currently-
known borders, which would have various authorities and powers. This solution 
would accelerate progress and development in these provinces, but was not meant in 
any way to abolish the rights of the Kurds. In his view, the problem known as ‘the 
disputed areas’ was not confined to the Kurdish areas, but includes the border 
problems between Anbar and Karbala, as well as between Basra and Amara.
However, upon coming into force, Article 117 (1) 319of the Iraqi constitution 
explicitly and clearly recognised the Kurdistan Region as a federal region, while the 
second paragraph of Article 117 320would recognise new regions established in 
accordance with constitutional provisions. From the point of view of the Kurds, the 
316 Sharada Rath, op. cit. pp. 188-91
317 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, op. cit. , p. 66-7
318 The seminar for the Iraqi Shiite cleric and Ahrar Party leader, Iyad Jamal al-Din, in the House of 
Commons- London, on 24 June 2010.
319 Article 117 (1) indicated that: (This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the 
region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.). Iraqi Council of
Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; Available at:
<URL: http://www.parliament.iq/manshurat/dastoreng.pdf>
320 Article 117 (2) indicated that: (This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance 
with its provisions.) Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”,  Media Directorate; 
Available at: <URL: http://www.parliament.iq/manshurat/dastoreng.pdf>
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most dangerous threat to the whole federal process was the amendment procedure of 
the constitution that had been imposed under pressure from neighbouring States. Their 
key concern was when their rights would be subjected to the amendment, whereas the 
Sunni groups were regarded as the sole guarantor for protecting the integrity of Iraq, 
which necessitated inclusion of their rights in the text of the constitution.
In analysing the position of the Kurds in Iraq, it appears that most scholars supported 
the principle that has been called ‘federation of Iraq and federacy of Kurdistan’. They 
considered that the federacy was “a distinctive governmental unit with an entrenched 
federal relationship with the central government [which would simultaneously create] 
a semi-sovereign territory different in its institutions and constitutional competencies 
from the rest of the state.” In a federacy the division of powers between the federacy 
and the federal government is clearly recognised, in a way that cannot be unilaterally 
altered by either side. In spite of this, it is allowed to establish arbitration 
mechanisms, domestic or international, to resolve any difficulties that might arise 
between the federacy and the federal government in the future. The significant 
element here is that the status and powers of federacy can be considered as protected, 
which can prevent any changes in its status or powers.321 Sherzad al-Najar322 noted 
that Federalism could be applied in Iraq, but queried whether it would it lead to 
maintaining political equilibrium or to a failure of the political process in Iraq? On 
balance, it could be said that this dilemma correlates to the activate role of the Kurds 
in Iraq, but will it be continuous, static, or in some way altered? In other words, will
the role of the Kurds in Iraq continue or is their role likely to be a temporary situation.
The other crucial point is the majoritarian system that is not institutionally 
incompatible with power-sharing. This principle is not seen as constituting a threat to 
national unity in countries that are a long way from democracy,323 although, arguably, 
it might be difficult to imagine the success of this system in the Middle East
particularly, where communities are deeply divided along ethnic lines and lack a 
democratic system. At the present time the real fear of the Kurds for the future of Iraq 
is the belief by the majority of Iraq's communities in the mentality of the central 
321 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, op. cit., p. 79-80
322 Interview with Professor Sherzad al-Najar, on 28 March 2009, Erbil,
323 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, op. cit., p..211
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government and the dimensions of the Federal Government. What would be the gains 
for Kurds in the position of a sovereign Iraq under exceptional political circumstances
and on the basis of political consensus. Though this consensus might become 
unworkable or fail to continue in the future, depending on the ratio of votes, it 
remains a fact that in terms of votes the Kurds are a minority when compared with 
Arabs. 
CONCLUSION
By its commitment to a federal status within Iraq, the KRG challenged centralism, 
which initially made it unacceptable to its neighbours and to most of the Iraqi groups 
although it currently enjoys the opportunities, stability, and freedoms that the 
resulting autonomy has brought. Undoubtedly, any return to a centralization of power 
in Baghdad would bring ruin to all Iraqis. In other words, the ongoing violence should 
not be interpreted merely as the state lacking the power to impose order and provide 
physical security; hence, long term stability would not be achieved through a 
centralized power structure. For this reason, the KRG seeks to find a genuine 
partnership with the federal government on the basis of respect and commitment to 
the Constitution. What is noteworthy about this debate is that all the major political 
blocs are aware of the need to adhere to the provisions of federalism as outlined in the 
Constitution. 
One should mention here that, among Iraqi factions the KRG has been a big supporter
of a federal system in Iraq and is very eager to maintain its position. It has been 
interested in increasing the power of its region and to enhance the level of autonomy 
that it had enjoyed during 1991-2003. Significantly the KRG made strenuous efforts 
to guarantee national rights in Iraq. However, the Iraqi Constitution indicated that Iraq 
should consist of the two main nations (Arabs and Kurds) with the other minorities.
Another important point is the fact that there are serious problems with the Shiite and
Sunni groups who are already suspicious of Kurdish requests when the Kurds hold
significant positions and heightened autonomy. If this issue is considered in terms of 
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national merit, and takes into consideration the fact that Iraq consist of two main 
national groups, Arabs and Kurds, it becomes a different case. It is a fact that the 
principle of power sharing has been applied, apparently for the first time in Iraqi 
history. However, for entities that have had a majoritarian system, it may be difficult
to accept, which is why they are attempting to reduce the power of the regions and 
strengthen the centre. For this, the perseverance of the Iraqi people in constructing a
road to democracy may be sufficient to solve this dilemma in the future.
Indeed, the culture of dictatorships and of power, which has been deeply rooted in 
Iraqi society for decades, has had a negative effect on the mentality of the majority of 
Iraqi political figures towards accepting democracy and heading in a beneficial
direction. The Kurds and other Iraqi leaders often claim that they do not want a 
divided country. In practice, not all the Iraqi parties are working toward a united Iraq 
and genuine national reconciliation. In this context, it one wonders why the security 
situation cannot be improved? In simple terms, the best analysis of this situation is 
that all Iraqi parties have acted in support of involving their militias in the Iraqi 
forces. On the other hand there is the possibility of the involvement of Sunni Arab 
tribes in al-Qaeda.
The KRG initially advocated publicly for federalism for Iraq after October 1992, and 
this was recognised by the Iraqi opposition. Simultaneously, the KRG announced that 
they respected the territorial integrity of Iraq and envisaged their future within the 
framework of an Iraqi State. However, alongside substantial involvement in the 
affairs of Iraq, the KRG’s also sought to maintain self-government in their region as 
well as to retain a significant relationship with the international community. As 
already pointed out, there were also efforts made by a majority of Arabs (both Sunni 
and Shiite) to concentrate on a geographic federalism  arrangement based on the 
boundaries of the 18 governorates established under Saddam’s regime, which might 
have weakened the concentration on the historically-partitioned Kurdistan.
The Kurds realised that the basic purpose behind the idea of the federal governorates
would keep the KRG within the current administrative boundaries without annexation 
of any disputed areas. The KRG’s strongly rejected the idea that a federal Iraq should 
be based on the old governorates, which meant the loss or concession of their national 
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rights. Successful federation in Iraq must be a voluntary union with the key aim of 
gathering and keeping peoples together, not separating them. An important point in 
this context is that the Kurds understood they had no right to force the Iraqi 
government to choose any kind of federation of the rest of Iraq, but saw themselves as
having every right to choose the kind of federal arrangements they wanted for 
Kurdistan. In light of such conditions, I have argued that effective application of the 
principles of international human rights can be depended on as a way to exercise 
national self-determination in response to Kurdish ambitions to claim at least a 
federacy for Kurdistan.
Irrespective of the difference between Iraqi factions, the essence of the features of the 
political system, which is currently applied in Iraq, depends on political consensus. In 
this context, we agree with His Excellency President Jalal Talabani when he said that 
“the principle of consensus will remain required to maintain a balance and 
maintenance of the country's stability and unity. But that must be by stages until full 
stability is achieved and disappear all the dangers that threaten it. However, the 
political consensus should not become scattering to the state institutions and 
“divided” loyalties on the basis of national, religious or sectarian or partisan, but 
should be efficiency, fairness and full equality between citizens is the basis adopted 
for building the institutions of the state”.324
Indeed, to form a stable and democratic government in Iraq, it would be necessary to 
promote federalism in Iraq by enabling regional governments to have both political 
and financial power; these are essential elements in ensuing protection for the various 
ethnic and religious groups in Iraq by preventing ethnic conflict and separatism. On 
the other hand, and in order to prevent an emerging government being dominated by 
one ethnic or religious group, the Iraqi people would be able to build democracy only 
through the federal system. Thus, in terms of the principle, federalism would give the 
KRG control over many political and economic issues as well as the ability to protect 
324 Interview conducted by the “Moscow News” newspaper with President Talabani, on 25 April 2010. 
Available at:
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=8997&type=interviews>
Access Date: 5 May 2010
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Kurdish identities against the sort of assaults to which they had been subjected in the 
past. 
Overall, in order to pursue the democratization approach in building the Iraqi state, it 
will be necessary to focus on building local capacity in order to create viable 
institutions through participation in the state-building process. In this context, and 
given the situation in Iraq, the KRG has had a significant role because it has both 
experience and viable institutions for local capacity-building. Furthermore, the new 
federalism allows for such local capacity-building, particularly when the Iraqi 
Constitution grants regions and governorates the authority to move forward with 
economic initiatives. Hence, the Kurdistan Region, as a federal entity of Iraq, 
possesses a great deal of autonomy while the federal government of Iraq deals with 
financial, defence, and foreign affairs policy. The KRG is therefore keen to ensure 
popular participation and to contribute to a collective civic culture beyond securing 
ethnic, religious, and cultural rights through dedicating revenues to education, health, 
infrastructure, and other sustainable development needs. Indeed, the KRG is aware 
that democracy guarantees protection of its autonomy, and also maintains Iraq as a 
united entity in the future.
To conclude, the effect of a federal system upon the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi 
state will be to guarantee rights through the constitution and to act as a roadmap 
towards deepening the roots of democracy in Iraq. It was logical to imagine that the 
federal system would act as the cornerstone in ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity, a 
key issue that has continued to worry all the parties, whether internal, regional or 
international. It was felt that the most significant advantage of a federal system in Iraq 
was that it would maintain the country’s territorial integrity, since the three major 
ethnic groups had radically different and generally incompatible aims and 
perspectives that would have made it impossible to obtain a consensus on the most 
significant political issues. In light of this, I feel that Iraq’s problems can be dealt with 
through federalism and democracy, which will lead to a fair distribution of wealth and 
power among the Iraqis and Iraq’s various regions.
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Chapter 6: 
THE ISSUE OF KIRKUK AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
FOR THE KURDISTAN REGION
(…I do believe, personally, that Kirkuk has a special meaning 
for Kurds and that it should be part of our Region. But that 
decision does not belong to me, in the final analysis, but to 
the citizens of the disputed territories. They must be given the 
right, and that is what is most important.)
(Nechirvan Barzani, on 6 May 2010) 325
INTRODUCTION
It was clear that the successive Iraqi regimes practiced the process of Arabization, in 
particular, after the seizure of power by the Baath Party, the policy of Arabization has 
been exercised on a large scale with more aggressive and effective, which the Kurds 
and Turkmens were expelled from the city and replaced with Arabs from the south 
and centre of Iraq; these incomers were given 10,000 dinars along with houses and 
agricultural lands. Further, most of those citizens, particularly Kurds had been 
expelled from their city after the 1997 census and their refusal to register themselves 
as Arab. In its broadest sense, the Arabization process led to more demographic 
change in Kirkuk than occurred in any other city in the region, particularly from 1960 
onwards. Kirkuk was subjected to all types of unremitting destruction through 
Arabization and Baathification. Further, the administrative boundaries were altered 
only to make the Kurds a minority in this city, which is today, formed the essence of 
the differences between Iraqi government and KRG. In this sense, the Arabization of 
Kirkuk could be identified as a State atrocity against the Kurds.
In post-Saddam Iraq, Kirkuk’s identity became a critical issue. Particularly for the 
Kurds, Kirkuk not only signified the existence of oil wealth and reserves, but had also 
become an important symbol and a catalyst to mobilize the spirit of Kurdish 
nationalism. Kurds intended to unite Kirkuk with the Kurdistan Region, although 
325 Interview with former Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and received his responses through email, 
on 6 May 2010.
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there had been antagonistic reactions from Turkmens, Arabs, and Christians. While
the Christians participated in the KRG and also enjoyed close ties with the Kurdish 
parties in the Kurdistan Region, some Turkmen parties, particularly the Iraqi Turkmen 
Front (ITF)326 were openly hostile to the political hegemony of the Kurdish authority 
and censured the PUK and KDP for having worked on the marginalisation of other 
minorities while gaining managerial positions for themselves. The ITF opposed both a 
referendum on the future status of Kirkuk, and demands for special status for the city. 
Consequently, the Kurds accused the ITF of seeking to involve Turkey directly in the 
dispute; however, other Turkmen groups, such as the Turkmen National Association 
and the Turkmen Reform Movement, supported the integration of Kirkuk into the 
Kurdistan Region.
It is clear that, the struggle to determine the identity of this city has actually altered 
since 2003. The future status of the Kirkuk district was one of the most sensitive and 
longest-standing issues that needed to be resolved between the Iraqi government and 
the Kurdistan Regional Government. In particular, when the “Arab and Turkmen 
resentment toward Kurd actions led Coalition authorities to view Kirkuk as a potential 
‘powder keg of ethnic hatred,’ on the verge of erupting into civil war”.327 Regardless 
of how daunting the challenges are, the Kurds continue to insist on the restoration of 
Kirkuk’s demography to the period before Arabization. Even so, every event aimed at 
resolving the issues around Kirkuk and other contested cities has been deferred and 
justification has always been found to do it. For most of the Kurdish population, the 
most contentious question concerned the likely fate of these disputed areas, 
particularly Kirkuk, if they were left to the mercy of future manipulation and 
machination.
Sorting out all other disputes depended upon its resolution and on establishing real 
stability. The outcome of the 30 January 2005 elections gave Kurdish ambitions a new 
momentum, but the most contentious question was the fear that Kirkuk’s future had 
326 The Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), was established as a political organisation in 1995. It announced 
that it represented the Turkmen people in the whole of Iraq and sought recognition for their national 
minority. The ITF is one of the political parties that has stood against federalism for Iraq, which  would 
give considerable power to the Kurds. In the 2005 elections, the  ITF obtained only one seat in the Iraqi 
National Assembly.
327 Peter W. Connors, ‘The US Army in Kirkuk : governance operations on the fault lines of Iraqi 
society, 2003-2009’, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press publications, November 2011. Available 
at: < URL: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp,>, p.9
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yet to be settled. It was agreed that the period for implementing this would extend 
until the end of 2007 at the latest, although nobody could predict how long it might 
take to patch up the disputes. The Kurds had also demanded a referendum on the 
governance of the city, and this too remained an open and heavily-debated question. 
The question here was how to remedy the serious injustices caused by the practices of 
the previous regime in changing the demographic and ethnic structure of the strategic 
regions in the Kurdish areas, particularly in Kirkuk and Khanaqin.  
However, the Kurdish leadership set out to expand their federal region by re-joining 
areas that had been extracted from the Kurdistan region, and particularly Kirkuk; most 
Kurds demonstrated their strong support for such a move. Nevertheless, their 
demands were countered by the Turkmen and Arab political leaders who accusing the 
Kurds of aggravating the situation and threatening dire consequences in response. To 
cover this subject adequately in the present chapter, it is necessary to indicate the 
process of Arabization and its repercussions, how it was practised and seriously 
impacted on the Kurdish community politically, economically and socially. The 
chapter looks at other ethnic groups who live with the Kurds in Kirkuk and its 
environs, and examine their attitudes to prevent the Kurdish efforts to achieve their 
aim of returning Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Region as a vital part of Kurdistan, 
historically, geographically and demographically. The background of this chronic 
dilemma is examined, including the challenges and obstacles, whether internal, 
regional or party political, that have opened the door for intervention on the regional 
or international level.
6.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ARABIZATION IN KIRKUK
The root of the problem of Kirkuk goes back to the period when the British founded
Iraq. In the context of World War I, there appeared to be a vital interest related to the 
discovery of a large oil reserve in Kirkuk; this essentially altered the impact of British 
policy towards the Kurdish issue in general and the fate of Kirkuk in particular. Given
the differing interests of the Great Powers, the British administration annexed to the 
151
Iraqi Kingdom the Vilayet of Mosul, and dined Kurdish right to establish state.328 In 
December 1924 King Faisal I visited the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, to encourage the 
population of both areas to join the new Iraqi State. There is no doubt that, with the 
emergence of the new Iraqi State, both the British and the new Iraqi government
cooperated seriously to exclude the Kurds from the political arena, in order to control 
the operations and projects of the oil companies. For obvious reasons the British were
solidly behind the creation of the ruling Iraqi monarchy and the mandated Iraq would 
have guaranteed British control over the oil riches. For this reason, the British backed 
down on their promises to implement the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, and Kurdish
aspiration was buried in the post-war arrangements of Sykes-Picot.329
All of the Kurdish efforts failed, particularly when British strategy during that period 
included annexation of the former Ottoman Vilayet of Mosul to the newly-established
Iraqi State under the British Mandate. In this Context, Ali Babakhan’s argument is 
correct: that “the Kurds were the victims of British colonialism and their claims were 
classified as a isolationist and the Sunni elite sat enthroned in the Iraqi government 
with a British Colonial Mandate”.330 In 1921 the British Mandate authorities arranged 
a referendum in the Kurdish areas to oblige the Kurdish population to agree to 
become part of the Iraqi Kingdom. However, some parts of the Kurdish areas, such as 
the Sulaimaniya area, refused to take part in the referendum. Nevertheless, at its 37th 
Assembly in Geneva, on 16 December 1924, the League of Nations decided the fate 
of the Kurdish people in this part: i.e., all the land below the “Brussels Line” (the 
present Iraqi-Turkish border) was to be incorporated into the Iraqi Kingdom, based on 
the recommendations of a fact-finding commission sent to the area by the League of 
Nations.331 The Kurds’ national aspiration and their struggle was for some kind of 
autonomy at that time, but the British supported the new Iraqi government in fighting
the Kurds, justifying this on the grounds that they were a destabilising element against 
328 Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, Playing by the Rules, in “Iraq since the Gulf War Prospects for Democracy” 
Fran Hazelton (ed.), (London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1994)
329 The fate of the Kurds of the Mosul vilayet was suspended between Turkey and the New Iraqi State, 
particularly the British mandatory area, since both sides insisted on possessing these lands. The League 
of Nations therefore decided to hold a plebiscite in Mosul on the issue. See Henry D. Astatjian, The 
Struggle For Kirkuk: The Rise of Hussein, Oil, and the Death of Tolerance in Iraq, (Westport CN and 
London: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 47, 70.
330 Ali Babakhan, Federalism as a model for democracy, in “Kurdish Identity Human Rights and 
Political States ” ,Charles G MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary (eds.), (University press of Florida: 
2007)
331 Nouri Talabani,  Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, Erbil, Aras Press, 3rd ed., 2004, p. 11.
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Iraq's sovereignty and hegemony. Such insights meant there was no Kurdish 
participation in the newly-created power structure in Iraq.
The process of changing the ethnic character of Kirkuk started under the British 
Mandate in Iraq in 1925, when the oil companies brought in a large number of skilled 
Arab, Assyrian and Armenian workers from other parts of Iraq to Kirkuk. The process 
of the Arabization of the Kirkuk region fell into three stages: (a) the monarchy; (b) the 
first republican period (1958-1968); and (c) the second republican period (1968 to the 
Liberation of Iraq). In turn, the third phase can be divided into three sub-stages: (i) 
from 1968-74, representing the Baath consolidation; (ii) from 1974-87, which can be 
described as ‘routing the Kurds’; (iii) from 1987-2003, characterized by the Baathist’ 
‘final solution’. In fact, the Kurds have struggled to maintain their national identity 
from dissolving within the frame of other nationalisms during their long revolts 
against all successive Iraqi governments for changing the ethnic character of 
Kirkuk.332
Essentially, from British mandate times there was a deliberate policy of keeping the 
Kurds away from housing and recruitment, and compared with the other ethnic 
groups, relatively few Kurds were employed in the oil company even though the 
Kurds were a majority of the city’s population. On the other hand, the company 
employed various tactics to settle thousands of Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens and 
Arabs.  Arguably, the process of Arabization began from the time of King Ghazi, 
during the cabinet of Yassin Al-Hashimi, who helped the Arab Ubaid tribe to occupy 
and inhabit the Hawija district of Kirkuk in 1935. In other words, from the era of the 
monarchy there were also carefully planned and executed schemes to settle nomadic 
Arab tribes, such as the Al-Ubaid and Al-Jubur, in the Kirkuk province, which could 
be seen as part of the process of Arabizing Kirkuk.333 In other sense, the core of the 
332 Nouri Talabani, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, ibid., p. 25-6
333 It should be noted that the Britain had a considerable share in the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), 
at the end of 1925; however, the oil began to flow from the Baba-Gurgur field on October 27, 1927. In 
addition, the Iraq was begun exporting crude oil at the end of 1934. Furthermore, the dual pipeline was 
opened to transport crude oil from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Tripoli in 1935. In 
point of fact, it is clear that to date most of Iraq’s oil was extracted from Kirkuk. 
Nouri Talabani; “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”, ibid., p. 27
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royal regime’s policy can be regarded as the initial phase of the Arabization of these 
areas.334
The process of Arabization was continued after the coup on 14 July 1958, by Qasim’s 
regime. Dr Jamal Rashid has argued that the policy began to intensify under various
fanatical Arabs, led by Abdul Salam Arif, Nazim Al-Tabqajaly, Abdul Rahman 
Taher, and Yahiya Bazaz, who exploited the tragedy of 14-15 July 1959. 335 One 
should mention here, that “under General Abdul Salam Arif, the pretence was that the 
Kurds were Arabs of the mountains”.336 During the course of this period, the tensions
rose in Kirkuk, particularly as the Kurds had had an opportunity to exert their 
authority in the city, and to assert the Kurdish identity of Kirkuk and its environs. 
This event was instigated by officials of the Iraqi Petrol Company (IPC) as a means of
expanding the policy of Arabization) through transferring Arab families to Kirkuk 
may have been to provide a supply of workers,  which played an important part in the 
Iraqi government’s Arabizing of the city of Kirkuk. 337 At the same time, however, the 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had a positive part to play in the socio-economic 
development of the society. Nevertheless, the marginalised and shrinking role of both 
Kurds and Turkmen in the management of the city of Kirkuk led to continuing 
tensions among the Iraqi factions.338
It seems apparent that, during and after 1963, all experts and workers were expelled
from the company by the Baathists.339 In this context, it is generally acknowledged 
that Kirkuk was subjected to the worst process of Arabization following the coup of 
February 1963, a phase characterised by the destruction of all 13 of the Kurdish 
villages near the oil fields, and the expulsion of Kurds in Dubz by settler Arab tribes, 
particularly the Awas Sadid from the Delem tribe. Many low-ranking civil servants 
were transferred to southern and central Iraq. Significant numbers of Kurdish workers 
were dismissed from the oil company and replaced by Arabs, and all Kurdish names 
334 Henry D. Astatjian, op. cit., p. 14.
335 Jemal Rashid Ahmad, ‘Kerkuk u Nawcey Germiyan u Mafi Kontrolkirdinyan Le Layen Kurdewe’, 
(Kirkuk , Germiyan’s Region and the right to control by Kurds), (published in Kurdish), Mukiryani 
Establishment For Research and Publication, Dohuk, 2008, p.57 
336 Ali Babakhan, , op. cit., p.162
337 Jemal Rashid Ahmad, op. cit., p.57 
338 Henry D. Astatjian, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
339 Jemal Rashid Ahmad, op. cit., p.57 
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for public places, streets, neighbourhoods and markets were changed to Arabic names
by the various regimes. After the military coup on 17 July 1968, the Iraqi regime used 
different ‘Arabization’ measures in order to change the ethnic character of the Kirkuk 
city. 340
In fact, from 1976, the regime separated the districts of Chamchamal and Kalar and 
attached them to the neighbouring Sulaymaniya governorate, while the Kifri district 
was attached to the Diyala governorate, and the Tuz-Khurmatu district was attached 
to the Salahaddin (Tikrit) governorate, although this district had been Arabized since 
1963, and Arabs had been brought to the Hawija district since the mid-1940s. All the 
administrative boundaries were altered to make the Kurds a minority in the city of 
Kirkuk. In the same way, many villages in the Qara Teppa County in the Kifri district 
were detached, and then attached to the Jalawla County in the Diyala governorate, 
with their Kurdish residents forced to transfer to the Anbar governorate.341
However, after the taking of power by the Baath Party, the policy of Arabization 
escalated. The name of Kirkuk was changed to Taameem; the destruction of hundreds 
of Kurdish villages was synchronous with the expulsion of thousands of Kurdish 
families, and in their place the settling of Arabs who were known as “the ten-
thousand-dinar people”, or “the twenty-thousand-dinar people”, depending on the size 
of their government grants. These Arab newcomers (wafideen Arabs) had been armed 
by the previous regime and awarded houses and agricultural lands that had been 
stolen from Kurds and Turkmens. Meanwhile, most of the Kurdish deportees were put 
into concentration camps such as “Al-Sumud”, “Al-Quds”, and “Al-Qadissiyah”, 
where they suffered the worst living conditions as well as strict surveillance by the 
security services. Further, due to the Baathist regime’s practice of forcible removal, a 
number of Kurds and Turkmen families were even obliged to record themselves as 
Arab, in order not to be expelled from the city and lose their homes and livelihoods in 
Kirkuk.342
340 Nouri Talabani, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, op. cit., p. 25-6
341 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 54-5
342 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 20-21
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In another sense, the process of Arabization was strictly planned and systematically 
carried out to expel non-Arabs, particularly Kurds from the city and environs of 
Kirkuk. As the situation evolved, the Baathist regime resorted to strategies of terror 
and incitement, persecuting the Kurds and forcing them to leave for southern or 
central Iraq while simultaneously resettling waves of tens of thousands of Arab 
families with guaranteed housing that had been built for them in various residential 
sections of the city of Kirkuk. In addition, most of the new settlers were offered jobs, 
and were also appointed to the police and security departments, the intelligence 
agencies, and the government departments. The Iraqi regime confiscated the homes 
and properties of the Kurds on a large scale, while simultaneously forbidding them to 
buy homes or properties in Kirkuk under any circumstances. In addition, they were 
forbidden to sell their properties in Kirkuk except to Arabs. It has been argued that the 
state practised official fraud by adding many names to the 1957 census.343 (See Table 
1)
In this context, Dr Nouri Talabani describes how, from the 1970s until the end of 
1989, the Baath party built residential neighbourhoods for the Arab newcomers inside 
the city of Kirkuk as follows:  
 Following the Agreement between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish movement
on 11 March 1970, the Baath built a new neighbourhood, Al-Karamah, between the 
two Kurdish quarters of Azadi and Iskan, which included 600 housing units for Arab 
new comers.
 A new Arab neighbourhood, Al-Muthanna, consisting of approximately 500 housing 
units was built near Al-Karamah between 1972 and 1973.
 Over 200 building plots were distributed to Saddam’s “Qadissiyah Martyrs” near the 
Kirkuk-Sulaymaniyah road between 1981 and 1982.
 A new neighbourhood, Al-Andalus was constructed near the Kurdish neighbourhood 
of Rahim-Awa, which is near the Kirkuk-Erbil road.
 In 1979, around 2000 housing units (Arrapha) were built under contract by a state 
company. 
343 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 39-44
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 Two hundred Arab newcomers to the Kurdish neighbourhood of Imam-Qasim 
benefited from a distribution of 10,000 dinars, given as a grant, despite having bank 
loans to build their houses.
 A neighbourhood, Al-Wuhda, was built that included 200 residential units; a further 
150 houses were built under the name Al-Hurriyah; another neighbourhood, Dur Al-
Amn, consisting of 220 units was built near the Kurdish quarter of Shorija.344
Following the Kurdish uprising and its collapse, the Kurdish population faced severe 
retaliation from Ali Hessen Al-Majid, who oversaw the destruction of around 200
homes belonging to Kurds and Turkmens in the Almas quarter, near Gawur Baghi.
The deterioration in the living conditions of the Kurds in Kirkuk was drastic. Kurdish 
citizens were forced to choose either to go to southern Iraq, in which case they were 
allowed to take their possessions; otherwise, if they chose to remain within the 
Kurdistan Region, all their possessions were confiscated. It is generally agreed that
the most dangerous stage of the Arabization process was prior to the 1997 Census, 
when non-Arabs in Kirkuk were forced by the Baath regime to complete a special 
form for “Changing National Identity”, thereby registering themselves as Arabs;
otherwise they faced expulsion.345
In the aftermath of the Kurdish uprising in 1991 until its collapse in 2003, the regime 
continually and systematically plotted to expel Kurdish residents once and for all from
Kirkuk and environs as well as from Khanaqin. According to a report by Amnesty 
International in November 1999, an Iraqi government decree imposed by the office of 
the President of Iraq, ordered the deportation of 1,468 families and the confiscation all 
of their properties which were to be offered to pro-government Arabs that had been 
brought in from other regions in Iraq between 15 April and 15 June 1998. In 
September 1999 the US State Department also confirmed the fact that the Iraqi 
government had used forcible methods to deport Kurdish and Turkmen families to 
southern governorates, meaning that approximately 900,000 citizens had been
internally displaced throughout Iraq. 
344 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 44.48
345 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 48
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According to internal and international reports in 2004, there were tens of thousands 
of Kurdish families from Kirkuk living in appalling conditions in tents and camps in 
the Kurdistan Region. Thousands of those families had fled in fear from the 
Republican Guard and Special Forces units, specifically after the Kurdish Peshmerga 
forces had taken control of the city at the end of the Gulf War. However, according to 
the agreement signed between the Kurdish leaders and the Iraqi regime at the end of 
April 1991, it was agreed that they would be allowed to return to their houses and 
jobs. The various UN agencies involved were constantly obliged to intervene with the 
Iraqi government to allow these Kurdish residents to return to their homes under the 
supervision of international observers, in accordance with the 1991 UN Security 
Council Resolution No 688. However, the Iraqi regime refused to permit them to go 
back to their places. 346 Overall it could be concluded that the Arabization of Kirkuk 
until 1991 resulted in the expulsion of more than 61,390 Kurdish residents from 218 
villages. In addition, the Iraqi regime had destroyed nearly 3,840 villages, including 
1,957 schools, 2,457 mosques and 271 small clinics by the end of 1989.  It is assumed 
that the number of people expelled from Kirkuk between 1991 and 2000 was 
approximately 120,000 individuals. 
6.2 THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CITY OF KIRKUK
It has been argued that the ancient name of Kirkuk was Arrapha and was ruled by a 
succession of empires, such as the Babylonian, Median, Persian, Parthians, 
Macedonian, and Ottoman. Subsequently, Kirkuk is slowly evolved into an ethnically 
mixed city inhabited by Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Assyrians.347 Over the long 
term, the Kirkuk region, and Kurdistan in general, were strategically located during 
the periods of conflict between the Shiite Safavid Empire and the Sunni Ottoman 
Empire. During these times, the greed of the rulers and conflicts of interest regarding 
territory resulted in several battles between the occupiers over Kurdish areas. The 
Safavids managed to recover Kirkuk in 1743, but the Ottomans regained it according 
to the Peace Treaty of 1746 and it remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the end 
of World War I when British forces took control in May 1918. These wars were 
346 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 48-50
347 Peter W. Connors, op. cit., p.1
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destructive and extremely damaging for the Kurdish regions, and the Kurdish 
population paid a heavy price.348
Historical documents confirm that the Kurds formed a majority of the inhabitants of
Kirkuk. The Ottoman encyclopaedist Shamsadin Sami stated, in his famous Qamusl 
al-A’ala’m, that the Kurds formed three quarters of the residents, the rest being 
Turkomans, Arabs, and Others. There were 760 Jews and 460 Chaldians also residing
in the city, as confirmed by other historians and encyclopaedists. These regions were 
under the supremacy of the local Kurds, who were lords of the governorate of 
Ardalan; however, Ottoman power was established there through the activity of the 
pashas of the province of Shahrazur. Kirkuk, which was one of the 32 districts in the 
governorate became the residence of the pashas of Shahrazur but later was destroyed 
by the Safavid Shah Abbas I.349
The tremendous importance of Kirkuk was due to its location on the trade routes that 
passed through the entire area between the areas ruled by the Safavid and Ottoman 
Empires; the Ottomans occupied three-quarters of Kurdistan which was returned 
according to the Zahab Treaty with Persia in 1639. The Ottomans were interested in
controlling these trade routes and settled their loyal military personnel in the Mosul 
Vilayet.350 At the end of World War I, the Ottoman administration tried hard to 
persuade the Kurds to opt for inclusion within the Ottoman Empire. They also 
endeavoured to create an association with Kurdish and Turkmen leaders in the region, 
in order to reclaim the Mosul Vilayet and also to restore their influence in the area.
348 Dr Nouri Talabani indicated that the Ottoman rule of the Vilayet of Mosul was divided into three 
governorates (Turkish, sanjak; Arabic, liwa’) of Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. After the collapse 
of the Ottoman Jurisdiction in 1918, three districts (qada’) situated to the north of the Lower Zab River 
were detached from Kirkuk to form the governorate of Erbil. In 1925, under the Iraqi administration, 
Kirkuk became a governorate consisting of the four districts of Kirkuk Central, Kifri, Chamchamal and 
Guil. See Nouri Talabani, op. cit., pp. 8-10, 76.
349 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p.8-10.
350 According to Dr Nouri this route, known as the “Sultans’ Route” by many historians, began at Tel-
Afar and Mosul in the north, passed through Erbil, Perde (A’ltun-Copri), Kirkuk, Daquq and Kifri,
before diverging either to Baghdad or to the cities of Khanaqin and Mandali on the present Iraq-Iran 
border. Historians believe that the Turkmens were brought to these areas by the Ottomans as part of 
the forces of Sultan Murat IV, to protect the routes, particularly when the Sultan recovered Iraq from 
the Safavid Persians in 1638, and many Turkmen military personnel who settled in the region later 
moved into commerce and other professions.  At the same time, the Ottomans offered their generals 
and fiefs vast tracts of prime agricultural land. However, the Turkmens themselves claim that they 
migrated into Iraq during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates to serve in the armies of those 
dynasties. See Nouri Talabani, ibid., p.11-13.
159
It is not hard to understand why the minority group of Turkmens in Kirkuk would 
claim that Kirkuk belonged to the Turkmen in the post-Abbasid period. Yucel Guclu 
notes that, according to the first Ottoman-Iranian truce at Amasya on 29 May 1555, 
Kirkuk belonged to the Ottoman dominions. Furthermore, the Kirkuk region was the 
capital of the Vilayet of Shahrazur until 1879, and an important centre during the 
Ottoman rule, being composed of the districts of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya. 
History states that the name Shahrazur was given to the sanjak of Kirkuk 
(corresponding to the present districts of Kirkuk and Erbil) by Mithat Pasha, governor 
of Baghdad (1869 to 1872), while the historic Shahrazur stayed outside in the new 
sanjak of Sulaimaniya. Certainly the Ottoman Empire had been reluctant to lose areas 
of the Vilayet of Mosul following World War I, even though British troops could 
occupy Kirkuk according to the Mudros Armistice of 31 October 1918. Yucel Guclu 
misleadingly describes how “Kirkuk resembles the Turkish towns of Anatolia rather 
than those of Arabia, and also exaggerates when he says that the majority of Kirkuk’s 
population was Turkish.351 Conversely for these allegations, Iraqi President Jalal 
Talabani replied to say “if we go back to the history of Iraq, we find Kirkuk is a 
Kurdish city and the Talabani’s tribe are of the oldest inhabitants. Further, there is a 
map of the Kurdistan region dating back to the Ottoman Empire shows that the city is 
part of Kurdistan, which bore the stamp of the Ottoman Caliph, and so on for all the 
Encyclopaedias, which confirmed this fact. But, when the Baathist came to rule in 
1963 was the city of Kirkuk residents a mix of Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs at that time 
formed a small percentage, which is estimated 5 percent of the total population”.352
In another sense, however, and whatever the circumstances of their coming to the 
region, the Turkmens of Kirkuk always provided strong support for the Ottoman 
Empire and its culture during its rule in Iraq. A more controversial subject concerns 
the estimated Turkmen population, estimated at 2.1 to 2.4 percent of the total 
population of Iraq during the 1920s and 1930s (See Table 2). It is initially necessary 
to concentrate on the official Iraqi census of 1957, which is generally agreed to be 
dependable in providing accurate data for that period, since it goes back to the time 
351 Yucel Guclu, The Turcomans and Kirkuk’, p. 49-50
352 Jalal Talabani’s interview with Al-Sabah Newspaper, and  asked Talabani about his words earlier 
when he stated that Kirkuk is the Jerusalem of Kurdistan and they wondered if he expected it to 
become the city "Kashmir" Iraq, on 16 January 2006. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=2562&type=interviews> 
Access Date: 5 May 2009
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before the demographics of Kirkuk were destroyed by the Arabization policy. It can
be regarded as an adequate census for all ethnic factions, and certainly confirms the 
same proportion of Turkmens as making up 2.16 percent of the total population. 
However, this percentage was deliberately altered by the Iraqi regime through the 
process of demographic adjustment that obliged many Turkmens to register as Arabs 
(See Table 2). In view of the irreconcilable differences, some Turkmen scholars are 
exaggerating to estimate their figures that they make up ten to fifteen percent of Iraqi 
society. 353
The process of Arabization was reflected in a declining proportion of Turkmen.354
Anderson and Stansfield offer the most adequate analysis of the facts surrounding this 
issue, pointing out that according to the 1957 census, Turkmens compromised 37 
percent of the population of Kirkuk city against 33 percent for the Kurds and 22 
percent for Arabs. However, Turkmens were a plurality but not a majority in the city. 
Within the province as a whole, Kurds made up around 48 percent of the population, 
with Arabs at 28 percent, and Turkmens at 21 percent, meaning that the Turkmens 
comprised the smallest of Kirkuk’s three ethnicities (See Table 3, Table 4, Table 8).355
The Turkmen minority is currently spread across many areas in Iraq, particularly in 
Kirkuk and the surrounding areas; they have also settled in Erbil, Talafar, Kifri, 
Daquq, Altin Kopri, Tuzhurmatu, and Kara-Tepe. They have also lived in Baghdad,
concentrated mostly in the north-eastern neighbourhoods of Adhamiyye, Raghiba 
Khatun, and Waziriyye. 356
353 Gareth Stanfield and Hashem Ahmadzadeh,  ‘Kurdish or Kurdistanis? Conceptualising  
Regionalism in the North of Iraq’, in “An Iraq of Its Regions Cornerstones of a federal Democracy?”, 
(eds.) Reidar Visser and Gareth Stanfield, (London: Hurst Ltd, p.139)
354 Nouri Talabani, “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”; op. cit., p. 14-18
355 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, “Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethonopolitics of Conflicts and 
Compromise”, (USA :University Pennsylvania press, 2009), p. 236-7
356 According to Yucel Guclu, use of the word Turkmen is due to the British from the time they set up 
Iraq in 1920. Yucel Guclu , op. cit., p. 26
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6.3 IMPORTANCE OF THE CENSUS IN 1957 FOR 
THE ISSUE OF KIRKUK
It appears that after the foundation of the modern Iraqi State in 1921, and despite the 
demographic mosaic of Kirkuk, the Arabs remained a fairly insignificant minority in 
the ethnic composition of Kirkuk, which did not help the strategy of consecutive Iraqi 
governments, who insisted that Kirkuk was part of Arab Iraq. The scheme to change 
ethnic compositions was initiated during the period of the royal regime in Iraq, and as 
already discussed; the purpose in beginning the Hawija Project in Kirkuk was to 
change the ethnic balance of the Kirkuk province through settling various nomadic 
Arab tribes.357 Therefore, Kurds assert to have had a plurality in Kirkuk prior to 
Arabization if compared with Turkmen and Arab newcomers, not having arrived until 
the Ottoman Empire. What it should be mentioned here, that Kurds emphasize that, 
the original indigenous Arabs of Kirkuk were simply nomadic tribesmen who settled 
in the region, as opposed to those Arabs who came to Kirkuk under the recent 
Arabization process. Thereby, Kurds deem both Turkmen and early Arabs as 
legitimate residents of Kirkuk and worthy of becoming protected minorities in the 
city. For Kurds, the Turkmen and Arabs who lived in Kirkuk before 1957 they are 
Kirkukis. However, the Arab tribes are not originally from Kirkuk, but they settled a 
long time ago and became Kirkukis (See Chart 2).358
The large numbers of Arabs in Kirkuk led to a real change in the demography of 
Kirkuk. As Dr. Nouri Talabani indicated, the percentage of Arabs in Kirkuk increased 
from 28.2 percent of the total population according to the 1957 census, to 44.41
percent according to the 1977 census. At the same time, the Turkmen population 
decreased from 21.4 percent according to the 1957 census to 16.31 percent according 
to the 1977 census. The population of Kurds decreased during the same period from
48.3 percent to 37.53 percent. After the 1977 census the Iraqi government did not 
produce any official statistics.359
357 Henry D. Astatjian, op. cit, p. 14.
358 Interview with Edalat Saleh, on 15 April 2009, Erbil.
359 Nouri Talabani, op. cit., p. 51-3
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According to the 1977 census, the percentage of Turkmens was nearly 1.15 percent of 
the total state population (See Chart 3). The 1957 census had recorded the Turkmens’ 
share in Kirkuk at 21.4 percent but this had declined to 16.75 percent in the 1977 
census. In Mosul their numbers had decreased from 4.8 percent in 1957 to a mere 0.99
percent in 1977. A small percentage of Turkmens was found in Erbil, at 5.0 percent in 
1965, rising slightly to 6.5 percent in 1977, and there was also a small population in 
the town of Perde/A’ltun-Copri, which fell from 7.7 percent in 1965 to 5.7 percent in 
1977.360 From this it is a reasonable conclusion that Kirkuk was a Kurdish city, 
particularly if Kirkuk’s pre-Baathist boundaries were to be restored, and also because 
their higher birth rate would have put the Kurds in the majority of the population in 
Kirkuk (See Table 5). 
The Baathist regime deliberately expelled nearly 250,000 Kurds and Turkmens from 
their homes, including an estimated 120,000 during the 1990s. Several international 
organisations working in these areas, such as Human Rights Watch, have described 
how some of the internally displaced Kurds had returned to their city and were living 
in dreadful conditions, in temporary tents, abandoned factories, and the city’s football 
stadium, while awaiting the resolution of their property claims and restoration of their 
property that had been occupied by the Arab settlers. These organisations had 
encouraged the Iraqi government to tackle the urgent humanitarian needs of the 
thousands of internally displaced Kurds and other non-Arabs in and around the city of 
Kirkuk; at the same time, over 6,000 land claims descended on officials of the Iraqi 
Property and Claims Commission, which had been established in January 2004 by the
CPA and is currently managed by the Iraqi government. 361
The Turks also accused the Kurds of having conducted demographic changes in 
Kirkuk while ignoring all historical grievances against Kurds as indigenous people
who had been were expelled and robbed of their property by the Baathists. As one 
analyst noted, the US administration was tempted to give financial assistance to 
Turkey by lending it nearly US $8.5 billion in return for keeping calm and not 
intervening unilaterally in Northern Iraq. Despite US promises to support Turkish 
360 Nouri Talabani, “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”; ibid., p. 14-18.
361 Nouri Talabani, ibid., p. 51-3
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troops against the PKK they remained silent about attacks against Kurdish fighters 
and the bombing of the Kurdish-Iraqi border villages.362
It appeared that most of the Turkmens were worried about the strong levels of co-
operation on matters of intelligence, support and manpower between the two main 
Kurdish parties and the US troops, particularly when the US military relied on 
Kurdish forces to fight against insurgents in the region. The elections of 30 January 
2005 had effectively put the Kurds in charge of managing the provincial government 
as well as controlling key positions within Kirkuk’s security forces. Yucel Guclu 
alleges that Turkmen and Arab residents in Kirkuk accused the Kurds of attempting to 
alter the demographic structure of Kirkuk, particularly after the PUK and the KDP 
had begun a process of “Kurdification of Kirkuk” by transporting into Kirkuk 
displaced Kurdish families from the northern governorates who had never lived in 
Kirkuk, or who came from as far afield as Iran and Syria; by January 2005 their 
numbers had risen to around 150,000. These endeavours by the two main parties had 
an impact on changing the ethnic balance of Kirkuk. It was assumed that the number 
of Kurds in any future census would increase and thus affect the results of any future 
referendum on the fate of these areas. Naturally it would also influence the interests of 
the regional state players.363
The historical injustice faced by the Kurds was more painful when they witnessed 
how the aggressor and oppressor had become the owner of their rights, while they 
themselves who had been oppressed and exploited for more than three decades now 
faced assault charges and denial of their rights. For this reason the Kurds strongly 
refuted allegations of the “Kurdification of Kirkuk”. Accusations that they had 
brought huge numbers of Kurds from the three Kurdish governorates aimed at making 
gross changes in the demography of Kirkuk was simply slanderous propaganda. 
Certainly, the status of Kirkuk differed from that of the other districts, such as 
Khanaqin, Aqra and Sheikhan in Nineveh that had been under KRG control since 
1991, and which the Kurds refused to call “disputed territories” (See Table 9, Table 
10, Table 11, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14). Some observers note that these districts 
362 Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, ‘Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determination of Choice’, First Forum 
Press, United State of America, 2010, p.158.
363 Yucel Guclu, op, cit., p. 95
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could be regarded as “disputed in the technical sense”, as they were not seriously 
claimed by any other Iraqi factions. However, a similar situation applied in the 
Makhmur district, which went out of the control of the KRG, but the Kurds insisted 
on their claim as it was a part of Erbil.364
According to the regional assembly elections on 30 January 2005, the Kurds won 59 
percent of the votes. However, the Arab incoming and Turkmens accused the Kurds 
of having rigged the elections by bringing in huge numbers of Kurdish voters from the 
three Kurdish governorates. Given the ongoing unrest in the rest of Iraq, Kirkuk’s 
council could be described as one of the successful multi-ethnic councils in Iraq, since
every faction had been given the chance to participate, but it appeared that the 
Turkmen groups on the council, supported by the Shiite Arabs, consistently pursued a 
policy of creating crises as a way of boycotting council meetings. They also requested 
the removal of any Kurdish symbols, such as Kurdish flags, from various areas in the 
city. 
One should mention here that the Kirkuk Provincial Council had adopted and 
depended on the principle of consensus in forming its committees, one of which was 
the Committee for Article 58 and the Victims of Ethnic Cleansing Policies, which was 
responsible for monitoring procedures for normalising the situation in the Kirkuk 
province according to the new Iraqi Constitution. Several committees political, 
cultural, economic and social were also set up to manage and deal with the council’s 
various responsibilities.365 The Kirkuk Council insisted on promoting a spirit of 
brotherhood and establishing principles of equality and collective effort in order to 
provide services to citizens and prevent sectarianism and sedition among the diverse 
communities in the city. Rizgar Ali Hama Jan from the PUK was appointed by the 
Kurdish parties as Chairman of Kirkuk Provincial Council, and the Kurdish candidate 
Abdel Rahman Mustafa was elected to the post of mayor of Kirkuk with Ismail al-
Hadidi as his deputy. The Kirkuk council consisted of thirty members, with three 
364 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, “Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethonopolitics of Conflicts and 
Compromise”, op. cit, p.182
365 These included, for example, the Agriculture and Irrigation Committee; Hiring and De-
Baathification Committee; Projects, Reconstruction and Public Services Committee; Oil and Mineral 
Resources Committee; Education and Higher Education Committee; Security and Public Safety 
Committee; Legal, Election and Referendum Committee; Social and Religious Affairs Committee;
Economy and Finance Committee; and Legal, Election and Referendum Committee.
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chosen “assistants to the Mayor” a Kurd, Hassib Rozbayani, to head up a committee 
on resettlement and displacement issues; a Turkmen, Irfan Kirkuki, to supervise de-
Baathification; and a Christian, Sargon Lazar, to organize governmental affairs.
By 3 August 2004 several international organisations felt that failure to resolve the
competing property and land claims in the disputed areas might cause the situation to 
explode into an armed confrontation between Kurds and Arab settlers, and that such a 
crisis could overwhelm the region, with potentially serious consequences. It was 
thought that a reasonable solution would be to determine the numerical strength of 
each group in the population by means of a census, not only in Kirkuk but throughout
Iraq, and that a reasonable compromise could be achieved through equal power 
sharing, in turn providing guarantees to protect the rights of other minorities. The 
prevailing status quo was that the Kurdish leaders might be prepared to concede on
the idea of incorporating Kirkuk into the Kurdistan Region and agree to share power 
equally. The most serious problem with equal power sharing was that the Kurds had
no incentive to agree unless offered something in return.
Finally, we can deduce that the suitable solution for Kirkuk and other disputed 
territories through finding permanent and serious solution for correcting ethnic 
cleansing and changing the national reality, only through holding a fair census, after 
removing the effects of deportations, ethnic cleansing and changing demographic 
realities. It is a reasonable track, if based on census 1957 or 1977, to settle the 
political dilemmas with regard to know the indigenous population as well as to refute 
the allegations against the efforts to join these areas to the Kurdistan region forcibly
(See Chart 4, Chart 5). 
It is plausible to suppose that, the Kurds should adhere to the principles announced at 
the London Conference, held in 15 to 16 December 2002 by the Iraqi opposition, and 
which includes:
1. return of the displaced to their homes, restoration of their property and award of
compensation for damage and losses;
2. return of the wafideen Arabs, brought in by the Baathist regime to settle in the 
aforementioned areas, to their places of origin;
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3. return of the Faili Kurds and all expatriate Iraqis under the pretext of Iranian 
assets and guaranteeing their enjoyment of Iraqi nationality and return of their 
property; 
4. abolition of all administrative procedures by the Baathist regime since 1968, 
which targeted demographic facts in Iraqi Kurdistan.366
6.4 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS                                                          
IN THE KIRKUK ISSUE
Fearing that the possible development of an independent entity would negatively 
impact on its own Kurds, the Turkish government announced its opposition to any 
change in the Kurdish situation in northern Iraq and pursued a strategy to confront all 
the post-2003 political implications. They identified the red lines that the Kurds 
would not be permitted to override in case the entire region was threatened with 
disintegration, and consistently pressed the US administration not to allow the Kurds 
to take over Kirkuk and its oil revenues. Turkey, as a significant regional player, was 
extremely annoyed by the results of Iraq’s January 2005 elections, which enabled the 
Kurds to gain ground through holding political positions, particularly in Kirkuk. In the 
Turkish view, the emergence of a Kurdish administration in northern Iraq represented
a serious challenge for their regional policy and also facilitated the establishment of a 
de facto Kurdish state. 367
Turkey wanted the US to keep the Kurds out of both Mosul and Kirkuk, and accused 
the US of failing to fulfil their promises, because the Kurds had violated an agreement 
made at an Iraqi opposition meeting in Ankara on 19 March 2003 that was intended to 
prevent them entering the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. When the war started, 20,000 
Kurds entered these cities, with more than half of them settling there. The KDP sent 
Peshmerga forces to Mosul on 12 April 2003. While the Arabs and Turkmen residents 
expressed opposition to a Kurdish presence in Mosul (as a Baathist stronghold), the 
366 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethonopolitics of Conflicts and 
Compromise , op. cit., p. 108-9
367 Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, op. cit., p.158.
167
Kurdish residents greeted the arrival of the Peshmerga with great enthusiasm.368 The 
first US troops entered Kirkuk on 11 April 2003 and order was gradually restored. 
The US administration relied on the Kurds as a strategic ally and also provided
military and financial support for them to secure the stability of the situation.369 More 
precisely, President Jalal Talabani was remarkably explained the situation, when he 
said “In the eve of the Liberation of Iraq, particularly, after Turkey refused to allow 
the landing of the US aircraft in their territory. For this reason the U.S. forces came 
with their forces to the Sulaymaniyah and the Harir district for preparation of their 
entry to Kirkuk”.  Talabani illustrated how they succeeded to send hundreds of pieces 
of weapons into the city and formed armed cells.  Moreover, some pieces of the Iraqi 
army were also involved in the uprising to liberate the city. Talabani argued that “we 
took the Americans with us to deliver the city of Kirkuk due to sensitive situation, 
which were not assumed to be due the existence of the Peshmerga forces alone”.370
In March 2000, there was tension between the ITF and the KDP, to the extent that 
military skirmishes occurred between them. The most serious tension occurred in 
Kirkuk because of the strong involvement of the Turkish side in internal Kirkuk 
issues. To prevent the escalation of instability and conflict beyond Kirkuk’s borders, 
the KDP formed another political bloc (the Turkmen National Association, consisting 
of five constituent parties mainly from Erbil) that would be more loyal to the KRG 
than to Ankara.371 There are several reasons why the Turkmen-Arab alliance rejected 
Kurdish efforts to dominate the governance of Kirkuk and their mutual aim of
preventing the implementation of Article 140. This also facilitated intervention in the 
Kirkuk issue and the involvement of external forces, particularly the Turkish 
government which justified this on the grounds of protecting their nationals. During 
the Saddam era, the Turkish government effectively ignored violations against the 
Turkmens of Kirkuk, but after 2003 they made constant threats to invade Northern
368 Yucel Guclu , The Turcomans and Kirkuk; p. 45
369 It is necessary to pay particular attention to the loss of Republican People's Party in general 
elections in Turkey in November 2002 was affected directly on the American plan in its war against
Iraq. Despite that, the Turkish government was first beneficiary financially to cooperate with the US. 
Despite that, the AKP rejected to form a consensus to allow the U.S. forces from Turkish territory due 
to their alleged adherence to Islamic principles, besides, at that time public opinion was against the 
Turkish intervention in Iraq. See Baltrusaitis, op. cit., pp. 190, 210-11.
370President Talabani's interview with channel Al-Hurra "Free", on 13 April 2008 Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=5503&type=interviews > 
Access Date: 5 May 2009
371 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2009), pp. 68-96
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Iraq, declaring that to prevent the ethnic domination of Kirkuk by the Kurds, expelled 
Kurds were not to be allowed to return to their homes. Baker and Hamilton in their 
report have shown, one essential dimension of the Turkish goal of strong support for 
the Turkmen minority was to use their influence to obstruct the incorporation of 
Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time Turkish companies were investing
widely in the Kurdistan Region.372 Turkey certainly intervened directly in the affairs 
of Kirkuk on several occasions, and the convening of a special conference on Kirkuk 
in Ankara, noted above, is evidence of blatant intrusion by Turkey and incitement of 
Turkmen groups to counter Kurdish influence in Kirkuk. Thus, Prime Minister 
Erdogan’s warnings in January 2007 suggested there might be repercussions against 
Turkey’s regional objectives, especially when he warned that any violent reaction by 
the Kurdish leadership against conducting a referendum would be unacceptable and 
harshly dealt with.373
The Kurds accused the ITF of being under the influence of Turkey’s plans; this was
why the ITF urged cancellation of the referendum on Article 140 and demanded that
the city was put under federal government control. The ITF had claimed several times 
that it preferred to give special status to Kirkuk; on the other hand, ITF was strongly 
opposed to federalism for Iraq, which would lead to the establishment of a weak Iraq 
and a powerful Kurdistan Region as a strong unit among the constituent federal units. 
Similarly, a coalition between Turkmens and Arabs would have had serious 
repercussion both internally and externally, and would have reflected a particularly 
negative view by most of the Western media that any referendum process would add 
to the increasingly complex situation in the city or even lead to civil war.374 In this 
context, it is not difficult to envisage, why the Iraq Study Group Report, published in 
2006 by the US Government, described ethnic hostilities in Kirkuk as an explosive 
powder keg and made the recommendation that the referendum on the future of 
Kirkuk be delayed to avoid potential violence. According to Peter W. Connors, “the 
annexation of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Regional Government, which recognized 
region within the federal nation of Iraq, might be a realistic scenario. However, a 
constitutionally mandated referendum addressing whether Kirkuk should remain 
372 James Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), p. 
30.
373 Anderson and Stansfield (2009), op. cit., p. 158.
374 Anderson and Stansfield (2009), ibid., p. 158.
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within Iraq or join Iraqi Kurdistan was postponed repeatedly between 2007 and 2010.  
If this referendum occurs and passes, however, non-Kurdish residents of Kirkuk, who 
are opposed to annexation, are likely to revolt, thus adding to the mounting ethnic 
tensions in the city”.375
It should be noted that the UN played a significant role, according to Chapter VII of 
its Charter, since Security Council Resolutions 1483 (2003), 1511 (2003), and also 
1546 (2004) reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. Interestingly, 
a call for the establishment of the UN’s mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 15 August 2003 
demanded the UN should play a major role in assisting the Iraqi people, including
establishment of institutions for representative government; assistance in holding 
elections and drafting the constitution; and contributing to the preservation of security 
and stability in Iraq. The UN was also supporting the Iraqi people to benefit from their 
freedoms and privileges by helping to improve Iraqi oil revenues and development 
funding for Iraq.  Shwani 376 confirms the UN’s leading role in dealing with many of 
the critical issues, including its intervention over the time-frame for writing the new 
constitution; its important role in endorsing key laws, particularly in relation to 
national reconciliation and to electoral law; and its discussion of democratic issues 
such as protection of the rights of journalists and women, etc. At the same time, and
in light of the legal situation in Iraq, the Kurds and other Iraqi groups tended to 
believe that any moderate international forces would have been able to find a solution 
to the problem of the disputed areas, but in the context of Article 140.377
Ironically, the political equations turned against the Kurds, particularly when they felt 
their rights might be sacrificed to protect the interests of others. Notably, only one
week before the Article 140 deadline expired, Stefan De Mistura, the UN special 
envoy to Iraq, proposed a delay of six months for implementation of Article 140; a 
suggestion the Kurds accepted, finding themselves heading towards a deadlock. In
fact, the Kurds were angry with De Mistura’s initial report.  He stated that criticism 
by the Kurds on Aqra, Hamdaniya, Makhmur and Mandali had been taken into 
375 Peter W. Connors, op. cit., pp. 1-2
376 Khalid Salam Said Shwani, member of the Iraqi parliament, a member of the monitoring committee 
on the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi parliament, and also a member of the Commission on 
Article.
377 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2009, Kirkuki.
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account, and agreed to provide his options with regard to his latest report on Kirkuk 
on 22 April 2009. Presumably international forces, in particular the US and UK
ambassadors and officials of the EU mission, were behind the wording of the
recommendations since they had attended some of the meetings. Obviously, if De 
Mistura’s options succeeded, these solutions would have international legitimacy. In 
fact the final decisions on these problems were not taken by the UN, which had more 
of facilitating role in trying to bring together the differing views and opinions of the 
various factions with regard to Kirkuk. In this context, the UN’s options would not be 
binding for any parties, but would remain as a recommendation if the parties were not 
satisfied. 
Regarding Governorate or provincial elections in Iraq, De Mistura proposed holding 
elections in all governorates except Kirkuk, deferring the Kirkuk elections for six 
months in order to find an acceptable compromise. This proposal was debated on 6 
August 2008, the Iraqi Turkmen Front, the Iraqi Accord Front, and the Sadrist 
Movement, all of whom objected to the reference in the draft law to the referendum 
on the status of Kirkuk and insisted on delaying the entire election until a solution had 
been found. In terms of the evolving situation, Shwani asserted that “we asked the UN 
to interfere in order to reach a consensual solution to Article 23.” This Article
mentioned that the higher committee (which contained members from both sides, i.e.,
Kurds and Iraqi federal government officials, under UN supervision) has the right to 
require technical assistance and advice on reaching a final agreement from UN. All 
De Mistura’s experts were foreigners, since the Kurds refused to rely on experts from 
neighbouring countries (Turks, Iranians, Arabs) who, since they were interested in the 
issue of Kirkuk, were certainly not neutral. The other parties also refused to appoint 
any expert of Kurdish origin. 378
Given the precarious situation, Stefan De Mistura proposed four options on Kirkuk. 
The first concerned the implementation of Article 140 in accordance with the political 
agreement. For example, how would the requirements of the Article be carried out?
The administrative boundaries of the city of Kirkuk which would participate in the 
referendum were in question. Who had the right to participate in this referendum? 
378 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk.
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And what kind of questions would be included in the referendum? The second option
suggested that Kirkuk should be made a local administration for a period of three to 
five years, managed by the Federation government and the Kurdistan Region, after 
which the referendum would be carried out. (The same method was applied for the 
agreement between London and Dublin regarding Northern Ireland.) The third option 
proposed that Kirkuk would remain inside Iraq as an Iraqi province like the other Iraqi 
provinces: the UN was aware that this option was very weak, since if the Article was 
subjected to a constitutional amendment, it would be rejected by the three Kurdish 
provinces. The fourth option recommended that Kirkuk was made an independent 
region for a period of three to five years, after which the referendum process would be 
carried out.
In Frsat Ahmad’s view, the UN representative had intervened expecting to increase
the disputes between the two sides, Arabs and Kurds. De Mistura had tried to offer 
assistance in finding a settlement between the two parties, but was unable to impose 
his own views, or any of the proposals, but could only offer recommendations, advice 
or tips, with approval from the parties concerned.379 Nermeen Osman380 took a similar
view on the UN’s involvement in the Kirkuk case, considering it an intervention of 
affirmative action since several proposals had been made and presented at the request 
of the Iraqi side.381 While, Kamal Kirkuki 382 had a different point of view, particularly 
on the role of the UN representative in Iraq who, he felt, complicated the Kirkuk 
issues rather than solving them. Kirkuki believed that De Mistura wished to find a 
solution that would satisfy Iraq’s neighbours and other Iraqi parties by sacrificing the 
interests of the Kurds. 
Additionally, Kamal Kirkuki also mentioned that the US itself had created 
considerable obstacles to the control of Kirkuk and by adding to the Kurdistan 
Region. However, there was a law in Kirkuk that any person in the previous regime 
379 Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 2009, Erbil.
380 Nermeen Osman, was Minister of Environment of the Iraqi federal government, and vice chairman 
of the Article 140 Committee since 2006, and also she is responsible for the financial Committee for 
the same Article. 
381 Interview with Nermeen Osman, on 26 April 2010, Sulaymaniyah
382 Dr Kamal Kerkuki is a member of the KDP politburo and was Deputy Speaker of the IKP in its 
second term in 2005. After the third round of elections was held in July 2009 in the Kurdistan Region 
he became the Speaker of the IKP and is assisted in his duties by the Deputy Speaker, Dr Arselan 
Bayez.
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who had occupied a high position in the Baath Party (e.g., being a Task Force member 
or a member of the Division) would not be allowed to return to their previous 
function. For example, around 555 persons had held high ranking positions in the 
Baath Party in Kirkuk. For six months, the Kurds in the Kirkuk provincial council 
rejected all requests to return them to their positions, until the US exerted pressure on 
the Kurdish leaders and got them to agree to return all of them to their former 
positions, especially in Hawija, believing that this policy might bring security and 
stability in these districts. In fact the opposite happened, and this misconceived policy 
led to an increase in terrorist acts, bombings, and assassinations, as well as 
intimidation of Kurdish families and threats of expulsion. 383
In this context, in order to find a way of the political crisis with Iraqi government,  
Baker and Hamilton suggest in their report that reconciliation would require the re-
integration into the political process of Baathists and Arab nationalists, and the 
exclusion of prominent figures left over from the regime of Saddam Hussein. 384
Clearly, key recommendations have been put into practice; however their implications 
have reflected negatively on the security situation, particularly when the militias of 
the various political parties were dismantled and tribal groups, such as Al-Sahwa (the 
Awakening) were engaged in the Iraqi army, where their affiliation was tribal more 
than national. At the same time, the engagement of many of Baathists in the Iraqi 
forces added to the complexity of the security situation. All these factors have been 
very relevant to the explosions that still occur daily in Baghdad, and to the disputed 
areas, especially Kirkuk and its environs. On the other hand, on a related matter, 
Kirkuki said that before assuming the post of US Vice-President, Joe Biden had 
visited Kirkuk, seeking opinions and with a different perspective on the division of 
power in Iraq and the proposed division of the country into three regions. 
Emphasising his view of this matter, Biden noted that George Bush was wrong not to 
have taken his proposal into consideration. In this context the Turkmen had said that 
they wanted to find a solution for Kirkuk that would satisfy all parties. Biden argued 
that in a system of democracy it was not a requirement to satisfy all parties; some 
might be satisfied and others not. Nevertheless, it was necessary for all parties to 
383 Interview with Kamal Kirkuki, on 20 April 2009, Erbil
384 Baker and Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 63-5
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respect the majority decision.385 In this context, Edalat Omer Saleh 386 pointed out that 
De Mistura had intervened in the issue of Kirkuk at the request of the Iraqi parties and 
particularly the US to find a balanced solution between the differing views of the 
Arabs and the Kurds. In her view, De Mistura’s initial plan caused a serious problem
for the Kurds and left the Kurdish people and politicians in a pessimistic mood.
Although he had received all the documents and reports confirming the changes that 
had been made by the previous government in the Kurdish areas, he nevertheless 
played the role of negotiator between the Iraqi parties, rather than offering logistical
assistance.
6.5 THE CHALLENGES FOR KIRKUK POST 2003
In general, the non-resolving matter of Kirkuk was strongly connected to the 
existence of oil deposits, with this province yielding 40 percent of Iraq’s oil, and 70 
percent of its oil products. Consequently, in the event of Kirkuk returning to the 
Kurdistan Region it would have a potential role in the formation of a Kurdish State. In 
reality it is hard to resolve the issue of Kirkuk because the city holds the richest oil 
well in Iraq, from which the economy developed in a way that put Iraq on the world 
oil map and was a key resource for the Iraqi economy. 
After the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, Kurdish Peshmerga were able to enter 
Kirkuk. Control was imposed over the entire city in order to maintain political balance 
and reduce fears of any outbreak of violence between the ethnic communities, as well 
as to prevent any intervention by Turkish forces in the framework of justifying
protection for the Turkmen. The US administrative structure in Iraq, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) took over management of the city. As mentioned 
previously, the CPA was interested in setting up a successful democratic experiment 
in Iraq, and therefore called for elections for the councils in every Iraqi province with 
their candidates chosen according to demographic weighting. 387 Thus, Kirkuk held 
385 Interview with Kamal Kirkuki, on 20 April 2009, Erbil
386 Interview with Ms Edalat Omer Saleh on 15 April 2009.  She was a consultant at the Ministry of 
Human Rights in the KRG’s fourth cabinet, Advisor on Anfal Issues for the KRG’s Ministry of Extra-
Regional Affairs in the fifth cabinet, as well as director of the Center for the Anfal for five years.
387Adeed Dawisha, “The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: challenges and opportunities”, in Sultan 
Barakat (ed.), Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 163-4.
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elections to determine their council, which was composed of Kurds, Sunni Arabs, 
Sunni Turkmens, and Christian Assyrians. It cannot be denied that complete 
responsibility for the security of the city of Kirkuk remained in the hands of the US 
military, rather than with the Kurdish forces although the US relied on the Kurdish 
troops. Particularly, they relied on the internal security forces of the two Kurdish 
parties and the Emergency Services Unit in controlling counterinsurgency activities. 
The police force naturally remained dependent on ethnic quotas, with Arab police 
protecting Arab areas in and outside the city, such as Hawija, and Turkmens 
performing similar functions in Turkmen neighbourhoods.
It has been argued that, according to the status quo, the US administration was
responsible for managing security in Kirkuk but was unable to prevent the streams of 
internally displaced people, amounting to around 72,000 mainly Kurdish refugees 
who had been arriving in and around the city of Kirkuk since April 2003, 388 while, 
Arab and Turkmen leaders accused the Kurds of illegally relocating non-Kirkuki 
Kurds from the Kurdistan Region to Kirkuk to exaggerate the numbers to an 
estimated 300,000-400,000.389 Given the dangers and the progression of events
during that period, approximately 20,000 internally displaced Kurds were motivated 
and encouraged to return to Kirkuk, particularly during August 2004 when the two 
main parties (PUK and KDP) offered practical support for them to return to their 
places.390 One should note, however, that the deportee Kurds who returned to Kirkuk 
faced several serious problems; most did not have homes to return in the city, while  
properties belonging to resettled Arabs had often changed hands many times since the 
deportation of the original Kurdish owners including most of the returnees. In 
addition, the federal government deliberately allocated inadequate budgets to Kirkuk, 
which was why the KRG and the US Provincial Reconstruction Team programme 
both offered significant financial assistance to rebuild the governorate’s infrastructure.
Both Arab and Turkmen groups were given the right to determine for themselves the 
number of displaced Kurds who had the right to return to Kirkuk. Even though these
groups admitted that Kurds had suffered from the policy of Arabization by the Iraqi 
388 Personal Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil.
389 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2009), Crisis in Kirkuk, op. cit., pp. 137-8
390 Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil.
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regime, they claimed that only around 12,000 Kurdish families expelled from Kirkuk 
had the right to return. Based on an average family size of six, the increase would be 
nearly 70,000, according to ITF and Arab estimates. It is not difficult to see that the 
total number of Kurdish returnees would be between 230,000 and 250,000, based on 
the 75,000 or so Kurds who registered to vote between the January and December 
elections. Furthermore, despite allegations by the ITF and Arabs of dishonesty by
Kurdish returnees, the Iraqi government considered the returnees’ participation in the
elections of January and December 2005 was legitimate. On the other hand, according 
to international sources such as Human Rights Watch, around 120,000 individuals, 
mainly Kurds, were Arabized between 1991 and 2002. The Kurdish parties refused to 
accept the entirely unfair and unreasonable allegation that just 12,000 families had the 
right to return, and strongly defended the right to return of the displaced Kurds and 
their descendants, who had been expelled from Kirkuk after 1968.391 Although there 
were significant administrative problems and difficulties associated with the return of 
displaced Kurds, and it was more helpful to push for action at the normalisation stage 
of Article 140, most of the relevant directorates in the governorate were under
Kurdish management, which helped to facilitate much of the allocation of land to 
returning Kurds who needed it, as well as the transferring of their documentation.
With regard to the US strategy for confronting this complex issue at the beginning of 
the liberating of Kirkuk, Dr Nouri indicated that the Americans did not intend to do 
anything for Kurds in Kirkuk, nor did they have any plans for Kirkuk.392 In fact they 
asserted that they would not allow the Kurds to take any action to change their
circumstances until the political situation had stabilised and security had returned to 
the area of Kirkuk. Dr Nouri linked this to UNSC Resolution 688. When the US and 
their allies had been determining the ‘no-fly’ zone, they had intentionally excluded 
Kirkuk so that, if they wished, they could put these areas under Kurdish authority, 
although in the event this was not done. Dr Nouri had pointed out to them that if 
Saddam Hussein fell, no one would be able to prevent displaced Kurds from returning
to their homeland and to Kirkuk, especially those who living in horrible conditions in 
the camps. For these reasons, the Americans decided to allow the displaced Kurds to 
391 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2009), Crisis in Kirkuk, op. cit., p. 221
392 Dr. Nouri Talabani indicated that he had taken part in a meeting regarding the issue of Kirkuk that 
was held by an American institution that had had strong contacts with the Foreign Minister before the 
fall of the Iraqi regime.
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return to their places on condition that they did not complicate the situation by all 
returning at the same time. Despite this, significant blame lies with the Kurds 
themselves as they had accepted that the fate of these areas would be determined in 
accordance with articles 58 of the TAL and then Article 140 of the Permanent 
Constitution. In Dr Nouri’s view, the matter should have been resolved between the 
two parties, Arabs and Kurds, before they had started to negotiate the permanent 
constitution. Consequently, there would have been no need to include Articles 58 and 
140. As long as Article 140 remained pending and unresolved, the only way was for 
Kurds to insist on its implementation. 393
Yucel Guclu exaggerates in saying that Kirkuk has been subjected to the rush of 
outsider Kurds in large numbers. The incoming Arabs and Turkmens were afraid of 
how events would develop after the War, when the administration in Kirkuk was 
transfer largely into the hands of the Kurds. At the same time, the continuing progress 
in the political situations is clearly encouraging the Kurdish leadership to be prepared 
for Kirkuk, rather than Erbil, to be the capital of the Kurdistan Region.394 It should be 
remembered that when the violence between ethnic groups was increasing at the time 
of the liberation of Iraq, the US depended on the Kurdish security forces which they 
found more trustworthy than other ethnic groups. The US had always exerted real 
influence over the Iraqi factions, and particularly on the Kurds, but at the same time
was keen for all ethnic groups to participate in the multi-ethnic police force and also 
to deal with the city according to their presence in the population. Overall, according 
to a quota system in Kirkuk this was adopted by the US, the Kurds constituted 40 
percent of the police force, Arabs 27 percent, Turkmen 25 percent, and Christians 8 
percent. The security of the KRG included the internal security forces of the KDP and 
PUK that been protecting the city.395
In November 2006, the provincial council, which was effectively controlled by the
Kurds with 26 of the 41 seats, was fiercely boycotted by its Arab and Turkmen 
members who claimed that they were excluded and marginalised in the making of 
political decisions. Importantly, this period witnessed the beginning of a strategic 
393 Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil.
394 Yucel Guclu , op. cit., p. 26
395 Anderson and Stansfield (2009), Crisis in Kirkuk , op. cit., p. 107
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alliance in Kirkuk between the Arab and Turkmen blocs. Interestingly, the Sadrists 
also urged their supporters to show more effective opposition against the Kurds and
the US, claiming that on many occasions they had formed a joint coalition or 
protection force with the Arabs and Turkmens to coordinate political activities against 
the Kurds.
Despite the escalation of such accusations, the Kurds excluded any prospect of relying 
on a violent solution. The Arab newcomers and Turkmens had frequently threatened 
that implementation of Article 140 would inevitably require the application of 
violence. These groups did not accept the notion that Kirkuk was “Kurdish city” or 
that the Kurds had a right to ownership of the city based on justification of their 
suffering at the hands of a previous regime that had largely benefited the incoming 
Arabs (wafideen) or the resident Sunni Arab tribes. As for the attitudes of the Kurdish 
allies, the Shiite SCIRI party was considered a key ally in its support for the return of 
Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region. It could be said that in evaluating these alliances, the
perceptions of the Kurdish leadership were misplaced, particularly on the many 
occasions when Ammar al-Hakim repeated the slogan “The Iraqism of Kirkuk and the 
Unity of Iraq” and declared that they did not agree to incorporating Kirkuk into the 
Kurdistan Region. This was a contentious political issue, and on several occasions the 
majority of Iraqi factions had alleged that Kirkuk was a miniature Iraq. In their own 
defence, the Kurds declared that if similar conditions and allegation applied in 
Kirkuk, then they had in turn to be applied to both Mosul and Bagdad as well.
In order to find a way out of the Kirkuk issue with Iraqi government, Iraqi President 
Jalal Talabani confirmed that “the issue of Kirkuk needs accuracy as well as 
correctness and democracy and to be resolved through the normalization of the 
situation as a first step. The second step would be through the return of families of 
Kurds and Turkmen who were displaced, as well as for the Arabs who flocked to this 
city should go back to where they came. After then develop solutions to satisfying all 
the parties and the city should be administrate by all, and the distribution of wealth 
among all. Talabani affirmed that they cannot accept the change in the demographic 
or forcing people to change their nationality. The spirit of brotherhood must be 
spread gradually in Kirkuk. However, this is not find now because everyone calls for 
Kirkuk and everyone says that they are the majority there, and they should get rid of 
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these terms”. Talabani proudly indicated that “the PUK has hacked this subject and 
the only party now, which has members in its ranks Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds very 
large proportions, and I hope that everyone adopts the same approach”. 396
According to Nermeen Osman, the Kurds needed a large lobby that included the UN, 
to support its demands and its point of view As has been seen, one of the difficult 
issues related to the hostility towards Article 140 by most of the political parties who 
had worked to bring other Arabs into the disputed areas, rather than working for the 
returning Arabs (wafideen Arabs) coming back to their original places. In discussing 
this matter, Nermeen Osman confirmed that they could not use pressure or threats to 
compel any persons, particularly the Arabs who had come from the south and centre 
of Iraq, to go back to their places of origin since return was now optional. On the 
other hand, if anyone took the compensation that was being offered (a sum of 20 
million Iraqi dinars) they would lose their right to vote and participate in a referendum 
to decide the future of these areas. According to the Iraqi constitution, all Iraqi 
citizens have the right to settle and live anywhere in Iraq except in the disputed areas, 
when acceptance by the Article 140 Committee should be obtained.397
Focusing on the evolving political process and its repercussions, Shwani argued that 
in Iraq there was a democratic consensus between political groups which was not only 
necessary at that time but was also necessary for the whole political and democratic 
process in Iraq. It has been argued that democratic consensus for states that include 
only one nation means majority rule, whereas states that are multi-ethnic and multi-
national, such as Iraq, should respect the rights of ethnic groups and minorities, 
something that can only be achieved through democratic consensus. Meanwhile, no 
Iraqi factions could monopolise the Iraqi government absolutely, due to a mechanism 
established in the Constitution for resolving important issues, whereby 138 votes were 
required, a percentage that would not be obtained without consensus among the 
political factions.398
396 Jalal Talabani's interview with Al-Sabah Newspaper, on 16 January 2006. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=2562&type=interviewAc
cess Date: 5 May 2009
397 Interview with Nermeen Osman, on 26 April 2010, Sulaimaniya.
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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the thirty years of Saddam Hussein’s rule destroyed Kirkuk’s 
ethnic balance, with the aim of guaranteeing the dominance of Arabs and to 
consolidate control over the region’s oil fields. The policy of “ethnic identity 
correction” as a basic strategy of the policy of Arabization practised by the Iraqi 
regime against Kurds, Turkmens and Assyrians required them to register themselves 
as Arabs; otherwise, they had to leave the city. The regime successfully used these 
tactics as a justification for expelling the city’s indigenous inhabitants.
After the liberation of Iraq and the fall of the dictator regime, the political parties and 
political organisations, in consultation with the Governing Council and Coalition 
Provisional Authority, promulgated the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) for 
Iraq, which remained in effect until Iraq’s first general election and the choosing of 
the first Iraqi government. Following the selection of the Iraqi National Assembly the 
permanent constitution was formulated, and these two processes represented the basis 
on which the problems of the disputed areas would be resolved. In this context, it is 
not difficult to imagine, given the continued unrest in Iraq, that the US was in a hurry 
to control the situation in Iraq, and undoubtedly this came at the expense of the 
interests of the Kurdish side. In the current situation with Iraq, the issue of Kirkuk has 
been the most hotly contested in the disputed areas, and is not yet resolved, remaining 
open to negotiation between the two sides. Indeed, and in fact, the return of Kirkuk to 
the Kurdistan Region is the ultimate goal of all Kurds, who strongly defend the 
annexation of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Region according to the basic factors of 
geography, history, nationality, demography, and morality.
In fact, the new Iraqi State was born with a kind of demographic diversity, with ethnic 
loyalties, and with diverse interests and divisions, even though the majority of Iraqi 
factions were interested in having Kirkuk as a part of Iraq, and not of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
However, there was no sign of any consensus or vision among the various factions for 
determining the nature of Kirkuk’s future. The rather different aims and tensions 
between the ethnic groups also created conditions that could have made it difficult to 
resolve the complex and on-going problem of Kirkuk’s status. According to Article 
140 of the constitution of 2005, when a decision had finally been reached a 
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referendum on Kirkuk’s future status would be held by the end of 2007, but this was 
postponed for as long as possible. Eventually the implementation time for Article 140 
was extended for six months, to expire in June 2008, an example of the Iraqi 
government apparently playing for time. On the other hand, some Kurdish politicians 
themselves believed that the reasonable way to settle the issue of Kirkuk and the 
implementation of Article 140 might be through the adoption of legal techniques and 
relying on a referendum. In turn, other ethnic groups did not force the issue of
determining the fate of Kirkuk. Certainly, reliance on the legal method based on the 
Constitution would not permit interference from the neighbouring countries. It is true 
that, the effects of these events have deepened in the composition of the Kirkuk's 
community, which is led to continuing the ethnic tensions in Kirkuk and most ethnic 
grievances remained unresolved. All ethnic groups, whether Kurds Arabs, and 
Turkmen were more concerned with pursuing their ethnic interests than they were 
with accepting compromise or understanding the democratic procedures.
It is also worth noting that terrorists continue to target Kirkuk because of its diversity. 
In addition, the former regime had a strong foundation in Kirkuk and some of its 
members still exist. One important dimension in this context is that the nature of the 
Sunni-Shiite confrontation is quite different from Kurdish claims to control Kirkuk 
and other disputed areas. However, both the Iraqi government and the KRG have 
similar interests in protecting their popular interests in Kirkuk, and preserving gains 
made since 2003. The basic point implicit in this argument is strongly connected with 
economics, which plays a critical role in both exacerbating and easing friction 
between the Arab-Kurdish minority, as it does in every aspect of Iraqi tension and 
efforts to reach political accommodation.  Meanwhile, the KRG is increasingly at 
odds with Prime Minister Al-Maliki over the lack of progress in resolving the status 
of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Even so it is almost impossible to conceive 
that there would be a political group that would apparently support ceding any part of 
the disputed territories to the Kurds, least of all Kirkuk and its surrounding areas.
Iraq’s neighbours (Turkey, Iran and Syria) are undoubtedly anxious about the 
situation in Iraq, and obviously the policies and actions of its neighbours will greatly 
affect Iraq’s own stability and prosperity. However, because these states were more 
interested in their own affairs than in helping Iraq achieve stability, they were better 
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able to influence events, which in turn often led to Iraq being undermined, even 
though they agreed that they would prefer a unified Iraq. There are several reasons for
the deteriorating situation in Iraq caused by the policies and actions of Iraq’s 
neighbours. Many Arab states were deeply concerned about changing events in Iraq 
that might threaten their own internal stability, and also resented two specific issues;
the shift towards democracy in Iraq, and growing Iranian influence in the region. 
Ultimately, they believe that the impact of developments in Iraq is crossing shared 
borders and could lead them to intervene to protect their own interests. While, Turkey 
and Iran are seriously worried about the transfer of these changes to its borders, in 
particular, the new situation of the Kurds could encourage Kurdish minorities in their 
countries that they have the same demands.
In this context, it is important to note that external interventions and the efforts of 
Iraq’s neighbours to exert influence within Iraq, particularly on the sensitive issue of 
Kirkuk, are unresolved.  The US as well as Iraq’s neighbours have the greatest interest 
and influence in Iraq, with the Turkish government continually warning the KRG that 
incorporating Kirkuk into the Kurdish region constitutes a red line. This stems from 
the fact that Turkey’s priority in Iraq was its territorial integrity, followed by the 
acquisition of oil and gas. Interestingly, in the current Iraqi situation it is not in 
Turkey’s interest to have political tensions between the KRG and Iraqi government.
The UN proposed their strategy in June 2008 as part of its attempt to resolve the 
disputed areas between the KRG and the Iraqi government, while the Iraqi factions,
Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens rejected the UN’s proposal. If De Mistura’s ‘options’ are 
examined carefully, each option has clearly been expressed in a manner consistent 
with the interests of any of the Iraqi factions whether Kurds, Arabs or Turkmen. As 
noted, Article 140 as a constitutional article had the legal commitment of the Iraqi 
parties, but it would be more significant for its international legitimacy if the UN’s 
proposed solutions were accepted.
Overall, it would appear that the Kurds were well positioned to gain recognition for 
the Kurdistan Region in the international and regional arena, and for its powers to be 
formalised within an Iraq federation, but to determine Kirkuk’s status would require 
negotiation with Iraq’s Arab majority, particularly with the Shiite parties, because 
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many of the Arabs who had moved to Kirkuk were Shiite – with whom the Turkmen 
Shiite were all too pleased to ally themselves. In addition, the Sunni groups had taken 
up a challenging position and stood against any attempt to incorporate Kirkuk into the 
Kurdistan Region.
The challenges facing Kurdish leaders are daunting. For decades the Kurds faced 
accusations of “separatism” because they demanded their national rights. There is also 
a suspicion that the Kurdish leadership is secretly planning to divide Iraq and separate 
from it through the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which is why they 
have been attempting to add the Kirkuk region to the existing area. They understand 
that, with hostile neighbours, it would be very difficult to take steps towards an 
independent Kurdistan; therefore they have constantly repeated that they would prefer 
to be within a democratic, federal Iraqi state, despite the majority of Kurds favouring 
independence. As has constantly been discussed, the last word on this sensitive issue 
is that the political process in Iraq cannot be completed or succeed if there is no real 
participation by political and ethnic groups. Indeed, a fundamental issue for the Kurds 
is how they can effectively retain Article 140 and prepare for a free referendum on the 
status of Kirkuk. At the same time, the Kurds have shown their political willingness to 
achieve national reconciliation and security.
The prevailing status quo is that the uncertainty over Kirkuk's status has impeded 
local development. For this, the KRG is constantly striving to improve Kirkuk’s 
situation, whether constitutionally or institutionally. Admittedly, the KRG has 
participated unilaterally and decisively in the rebuilding of the infrastructure the city 
of Kirkuk through reconstructing the institutional organs of the state and to some 
extent by activating and reviving both government institutions and service.  Indeed, 
the KRG has offered significant support to the Council of Kirkuk by providing 
electricity and water supplies, restoring roads and streets, rehabilitating schools and 
hospitals, and establishing Kirkuk University. Additionally, the KRG has organised 
facilities to enable internally displaced people to return to their homes and to recover 
their confiscated property and has provided them with at least the basic services.  
After 2003, Kurdish Peshmerga were able to enter Kirkuk to maintain the political 
balance, ease concerns about any outbreaks of violence between the ethnic 
communities, and combat terrorism to sustain the security of the Kurdish people in 
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those areas, thereby contributing greatly to improving the security situation in Kirkuk 
province. It is worth noting that the costs of all these projects and security measures 
were paid by the KRG out of the annual budget of the Kurdistan Region.
Finally, one of the most sensitive issues that needed to be resolved between the Iraqi 
government and the KRG was the future status of the Kirkuk district. This required a 
serious attempt to find a permanent and serious solution for correcting ethnic 
cleansing and changing the national reality. This had to be done on one hand by 
holding a fair census, after having removed the effects of deportations, ethnic 
cleansing and changing demographic realities. On the other hand, a reasonable 
compromise could be achieved through equal power sharing that would in turn 
provide guarantees to protect the rights of other minorities. As a result all the parties 
would be satisfied that Kirkuk could be administered collectively and wealth 
distribution equably.
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Chapter 7: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 140 AND THE CASE OF
KIRKUK
(We are committed to the application of Article 140 of the 
Iraqi constitution and we promise that we will absolutely not 
compromise on this issue or on the rights of the people of 
Kurdistan. On the contrary, what is extremist and racist is the 
denial of agreements and articles of the constitution..... )
(Masoud Mustafa Barzani, on 21 July 2009) 399
INTRODUCTION
The city of Kirkuk had a multi-ethnic population that includes Kurds, Turkmens, and 
Arabs (and a smaller Christian community), with each ethnic group aiming to win 
local power and control in Kirkuk. The historical problem of Kirkuk’s status had also 
become a strategic problem, being part of a core of dilemmas over the “disputed 
internal boundary” between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq. Indeed, in the 
prevailing situation in Iraq, with fears that tensions might reach breaking point, it was 
obvious that the status of Kirkuk was one of unparalleled prominence in Iraq’s 
politics. Arguably, the future of Iraq could depend on finding a resolution of the status 
of Kirkuk, provided that it would be acceptable to all Iraqi parties. 
Indeed, there were intense political disputes among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens 
regarding the Kirkuk region, even though the Kurds were the majority in the city that 
they regarded as Kurdish. Further, the disputes were also related to gaining the 
national rights for which the Kurds had sacrificed and struggled for many decades.  
Further, various problems with carrying out Article 140 on the domestic level needed 
to be addressed. Historical differences between Sunni and Shiite due to hatred and 
religious divergence were evident, but there was also a principle of coherence through 
399 Iraq Kurd leader vows 'no compromise' over oil city”, 21 July 2009 Available at: 
<URL:http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=Mjc1NTEzMjA=> Access Date: 5 August 
2009
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the Iraqism of Kirkuk and the Unity of Iraq that drew them to the issue of Kirkuk.
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that those who had benefited as a result of the 
policy of Arabization and had occupied the property of Kurds and Turkmens, were the 
ones who now stood firmly against implementing Article 140, alleging that it would 
be a process of ethnic cleansing by Kurdish political parties in the Kirkuk 
Governorate. 
Indeed, a serious obstacle and fundamental disagreement in the talks between the 
Kurds and the Iraqi government, which has been ongoing since 1970 and continues to 
the present day, concerns the future status of Kirkuk and its environs. From this point, 
much of the criticism for this was directed at the Kurdish leadership, who agreed to 
postpone a solution (by implementing Article 58, which was subsequently converted 
to Article 140) until after the census and the installing of a permanent constitution.
Internally, the Arab political factions, whether Sunni or Shiite, have in all 
circumstances and conditions rejected the idea of annexing Kirkuk to the Kurdistan 
Region and have condemned any concept of federalism out of hand. In fact, political 
reality in Iraq would not accept the exclusion of any political factions, particularly 
Kurds, from a government of national unity.
In this chapter we are trying to illustrate one of the most pressing problems, as an 
important post-2003 issue concerned the sluggish mechanism of the commission set 
up to resolve property disputes in Iraq; this in turn, was a crucial step for the 
implementation of Article 140. However, from a humanitarian perspective, it would 
be only right to work to return property to its original owners and encourage the 
Kurds to return to Kirkuk. On the other hand, the fundamental problem was that all 
Iraqi political parties were trying to gain influence in the city of Kirkuk. In view of 
the irreconcilable differences over Kirkuk, the attitudes of the Iraqi factions did not 
change with regard to the future of Kirkuk. Besides, the Iraqi government was 
responsible for implementing Article 140, and that it had provided the Committee 
with a budget for doing so, even though, directly or indirectly it had produced 
obstacles to delay the process.
This chapter seeks to analyze the effects of Article 140 and its content of the entire 
political process in Kurdistan and Iraq, then the interpretation of the major constraints 
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on the part of other groups (Arabs and Turkmen) to prevent Kirkuk to join Kurdistan. 
However, there have been attempts towards compromise and consensus in reaching a 
resolution through Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution, which has become a 
constitutional mechanism for approaching notions of equal power sharing and 
maintaining stability and security, not only in the specific region but for the whole of 
Iraq. Determining the future of the city and identifying the nature of relations between 
the two sides, i.e., the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi federal government, is seen as 
one of the outstanding problems to be addressed. The Kurds took the view that all 
moral, historical, geographical, demographic and constitutional arguments would 
support their belief that Kirkuk was part of Kurdistan, and stated that they insisted on, 
and would never relinquish the implementation of Article 140 as a constitutional 
document, which had been endorsed through a democratic process by an 
overwhelming majority of the Iraqi population in a free and fair vote. Groups opposed 
to implementation of Article 140 maintained that the entire process was outside the 
framework of the Constitution.
Finally, it could be argued, despite continuing unrest over the situation of Kirkuk, the 
Kurds eventually achieved numerical superiority, enabling them to control Kirkuk. A 
problematic issue that had to be dealt with was whether the Kurds would agree to 
compromise or resort to military action. It is worth reiterating, Kurdish leaders had 
frequently declared their belief that Iraq would fall apart if the Iraqi Constitution was 
violated. In spite of that, The Kurds had grasped that the only way to solve this had to 
be from within a new Iraq, and by consensus and agreement among all Iraqi parties 
and ethnic factions. However, if it was perceived from a broader perspective that 
Kurdish politicians had made a fatal error, the new generations would pay a high
price. Incorporating the issue of Kirkuk with the problems of the disputed territories 
in the whole of Iraq meant that any dispute over territory in any part of Iraq was 
covered by Article 58, and then Article 140. In other words, the Kurds have insisted 
that the future status of Kirkuk must be resolved peacefully, through norms of 
compromise and consensus; therefore they refuse any attempt to force an 
unacceptable solution on them. The most contentious political debates among some 
Western observers, as well as international trends, would prefer compromise on this 
complicated issue, but the Kurds fear any settlement imposed at the expense of their 
interests.
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7.1 ARTICLE 140 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
OF KIRKUK 
The post-2003 political climate offered a unique and historic opportunity for Kurds to 
participate genuinely in writing the permanent constitution and to flag up sensitive 
issues. The situation during their long struggle to achieve autonomy meant that 
Kirkuk was included, particularly as the Kurds were regarded as the perennial victims 
of the instabilities in Iraq. It was assumed that had the Kurds wavered on the issue of 
Kirkuk, all the previous governments, as a consequence, might conceivably have been 
willing to give decentralization to the Kurds. In this context, Dr. Jamal Rashid looked 
closely at the issue of decentralisation put forward by the previous Iraqi governments, 
particularly after the coup on 8 February 1963 when they were prepared to recognise a 
decentralisation for Kurds that might include Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk, 
Chamchamal, provided that not include the city of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Duz, Kifri, 
Sinjar and Zumar. Thus the Baathist regime’s Agreement on 11 March 1970 resulted 
in adoption of the same 1963 proposal, the only difference between the two proposals 
being that the later Agreement put Erbil at the centre of their area of autonomy.400
The London conference that was held on 15-16 December 2002 by the Iraqi 
opposition offered a strong statement about the ambitions of the Iraqi people inside 
Iraq and also the world for a new future. It discussed various decisions and 
recommendations on some of the most complex and serious subjects, including the 
issue of disputed territory, deportations, ethnic cleansing and changing the national 
reality. Proposed solutions included holding a fair census, after removing the effects 
of deportations, ethnic cleansing and changing demographic realities, in Kirkuk, 
Makhmur, Khanaqin, Sinjar, Shekhan, Zumar, Mandali and others, as well as in the 
rest of Iraq, under international supervision, before holding any elections. The 
participants unanimously agreed on a set of principles and the conference called for 
implementation in this respect through:401
It is imperative to take into consideration that, the Article 58, section (A-C) was 
suspended resolutions of disputed areas territories, particularly Kirkuk until a general 
400 Jemal Rashid Ahmad, ‘ibid, p.54
401 “Application of Article 140 to ensure the peaceful coexistence”; the Publications of the Joint 
Committee on Article 140 by the third branch of the KDP  and the second centres of the PUK, pp. 7-9
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census has been conducted, in order to enable displaced people who have been 
compulsorily deported and expelled from their home and region are compensated or 
returned home.402 Article 58, section B of the TAL clearly indicated the demographic 
manipulations and changes made to the administrative boundaries by the previous 
regime through expulsions, expropriations, and the process of Arabization, and called 
for these injustices to be remedies, stating that, 
The previous regime also manipulated and changed 
administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency 
Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make 
recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these 
unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the 
Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of 
recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral 
arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In 
the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an 
arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United 
Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the 
arbitrator.403
It is quite evident that the Kurdish negotiators during the drafting of the permanent 
constitution were able to insure the inclusion of Article 140 which was an amended 
version of the TAL’s Article 58. According to Article 140, a census and a referendum 
were to be held before completion of the first stage in the implementation of Article 
140, which was the normalisation stage. This was regarded as the more complex part 
of the process, since it required the resolution of property disputes and was likely to 
take some years to resolve. Although the Kurds insisted on a referendum, there was 
no guarantee that they would have the necessary numbers to win a referendum, and 
that they would therefore have to depend on the restoration of the districts that had 
been separated from Kirkuk by the Baath regime, which would greatly escalate the 
proportion of Kurds in Kirkuk compared with other ethnic groups.
402 Carole A. O’Leary and Charles G. MacDonald, ‘The Kurdish Identity Kurds in a Democratic Iraq 
and Beyond’, in “Kurdish Identity Human Rights and Political Status”, (eds.) Charles G. MacDonald 
and Carole A. O’Leary, (University Press of Florida, 2007), p. 258
403 The Transitional Administrative Law, Available at: 
<URL:http://www.dostoor.jeeran.com/ ﺮﯿﺗﺎﺳد%20ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻋ%2010 .htm>, Access Date: 25 August 2009
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In order to strengthen the Kurds claim to implementing this Article, Shwani noted that 
on this issue the political parties were split into two groups. The first group had faith 
in the implementation of Article 140, including the Kurds who believed fully in its 
implementation, while others, such as some of the Shiite groups had faith in its 
implementation according to their specific interests. For example, Article 140 
indicated a return to the administrative units formed when Saddam Hussein, by 
presidential decree, had cut off some districts from their provinces and added them to 
other provinces as part of a politically-motivated attempt at demographic change. In 
this situation, the Kurds were interested in returning the districts of Chamchamal, 
Kifri, Kalar, and Duz to Kirkuk. In contrast, the district of Zab, which had been 
annexed to Kirkuk since 1984, was to be returned to Mosul province. Some Shiite
groups were encouraged to find appropriate solutions to the problems of the 
administrative borders between the Shiite and Sunni provinces, particularly with 
regard to the provinces of Anbar, Ramadi and Karbala, where the Nukhaib, Aeen-
Zala, and Rahala districts had been separated from Karbala and annexed to Ramadi. 
In this context, when the Kurds discussed the annexation of Kirkuk’s administrative 
borders, some of the Shiite groups opposed the proposition on the grounds that all the 
problems relating to administrative boundaries should be resolved in one deal.404
The second group did not have faith either in Article 140 or in the Constitution; nor 
did they believe that there were places or problems that were known as disputed areas. 
Within this group was the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue led by Saleh Mutlaq, and 
a number of Independent Arabs who had defected from Mutlaq’s group. There was 
also the National Dialogue Council, led by Khalaf al-Olayan; this was composed of 
dissidents from the Accord Front (which itself consisted of three wings: the Islamic 
Party led by Tariq al-Hashimi, the National Dialogue Council, and the Conference of 
People of Iraq led by Adnan al-Dulaimi). In speeches in the media and in some of its 
positions, the Islamic Party declared its adherence to Article 140, wishing to preserve 
the alliance with the Kurds. The Islamic Party, in fact, had faith in the implementation 
of Article 140, but only in terms of solutions to their own problems, while 
concurrently working for non-implementation of the Article, while Tariq al-Hashemi 
was regarded throughout as one of the obstructionists against returning administrative 
404 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
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units to Kirkuk. The Turkmen Front in general held the same opinions as the other 
Arab parties, and took a strong stand against the implementation of Article 140. 405
In fact, the Kurds had long been plagued by the Baath regime, which had made 
significant changes in Iraq’s administrative map since their coup and taking over 
power in Iraq. Therefore, the historical mistake by the Kurdish leaders of accepting 
solutions for Kirkuk’s boundaries that also involved solutions for other governorates 
meant that the resolution of Kirkuk’s boundary issue then became dependent on the 
settlement of other boundary disputes among the southern governorates. However, as 
Kaka Rash 406 has pointed out, the significant lesson to be learnt is that the Kurds 
were supposed to insist on Kirkuk as a Kurdish city and not accept that the fate of the 
Kurdish city was subject to a referendum. At the time the two main parties were in a 
stronger position than other Iraqi parties in terms of political balance. A continuing 
problem was Kurdish suspicion about the Iraqi government, since Article 140 did not 
apply only to Kirkuk but to all factions and ethnic groups affected by the policy of 
racial discrimination in the 28 disputed areas throughout Iraq. The main office in 
Kirkuk worked for Kirkuk and the surrounding area, the sub-office in Sinjar was 
interested in Sinjar, Mosul and Sheikhan, and the Khanaqin office was established for 
Khanaqin and the surrounding areas, including Jalawla, Maidan, and Kalar. Thus the 
mechanisms put in place for Kirkuk would be similarly implemented in each of the 
other areas.407
After the collapse of Saddam Hussein, the Kurdish people had hoped to merge most 
of the liberated Kurdish areas to the Kurdistan Region, but these hopes have never 
been achieved. As Nawshirwan Mustafa noted that, this was due to two main reasons:
the US’s authority did not allow the Kurds to take such a step; on the other hand, 
according to the Article 53 of the TAL, which is recognized the KRG's administration 
borders which are limited to (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk, and some towns of 
Kirkuk, Nineveh and Khanaqin) and it was signed by both President Jalal Talabani 
and Masoud Barzani on 19 May 2003. Therefore, all these areas were under the 
405 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk.
406 The famous Kaka Rash, otherwise Babakr Sediq Ahmad, was a member of the Council of Kirkuk 
province, and also a member of the Higher Committee for the Implementation of Article 140, and head 
of the office of Kirkuk.
407 Personal interview with Kaka Rash, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
191
control Saddam's regime is remained outside of the KRG’s authority. Most 
importantly, among significant mistakes that have passed on the Kurdish leaderships, 
when they accepted that both (Kirkuk and Baghdad) do not allow them to unite with 
any provinces in order to establish any federal region. In other words, this means that 
the Kurdish leaders agreed secretly, that Kirkuk may be constructed a federal unit 
alone in the future.408 In this context, Nawshirwan Mustafa also alludes that another 
strategic mistake of the Kurdish leadership during their opposition to Saddam 
Hussein's regime (1991-2003), they were not insisted on finding solutions to the 
dilemma of the Kurdistan's borders with the coalitions forces (particularly USA) and 
the Iraqi opposition which has postponed to this day.409
American attitudes to the future status of the Kirkuk district and the sensitive nature 
of Article 140 were unambiguous: the solution depended on the Iraqi constitution and 
should be implemented in full, while the future of Kirkuk had to be determined by 
Iraqis themselves without outside interference. However, the Kurds were shocked and 
upset by the Baker-Hamilton Report in December 2006, it suggested delaying a 
referendum on Kirkuk in order to avoid communal violence, and based on 
Recommendation 30, also called for international arbitration.410 In this context, 
Khalid Shwani indicated that paragraph 22 in Prime Minister Maliki’s programme 
mentioned his road map for the implementation of Article 140, which would start with 
a normalization phase, expected to end on 31 March 2007; followed by a second 
phase in which a general census throughout Iraq would be concluded by 30 July 2007; 
while the final stage would be a referendum which would take place on 15 November 
2007. With the establishment of his government, Maliki decided to form a committee 
to monitor the implementation of Article 140, but after a vote by his cabinet on 20 
May 2007 he decided to postpone the setting up of this committee. This delay 
408 Nawshirwan Mustafa, (the issue of Constitution/  Where is the border of the Iraqi Kurdistan), on 5 
June 2005, www. Reform-Kurd.com in (Sbeiy. Com). Available at: 
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=737&AuthorID=36&AspxAutoDetectC
ookieSupport=1>, on 3 Sept 2008 
409 Nawshirwan Mustafa, (the issue of Constitution/ The demands of the Kurds in Iraq's new 
constitution), on 27 May 2005, www. Reform-Kurd.com; in (Sbeiy. Com). Available at: 
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=737&AuthorID=36&AspxAutoDetectC
ookieSupport=1>, on 3 Sept 2008 .
410 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2006), p.65-6
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certainly had a negative impact on the work of the three stages, which had identified 
periods of four months for the implementation of each phase.411
Edalat Omer Saleh noted that the absence of political courage within Iraqi politics in 
general caused disruption and time-wasting in implementing Article 140. Certainly all 
the politicians who have been in power (e.g., Allawi, Jaafari and Maliki) have 
believed that the implementation of this Article under their leadership represented an 
historical error on their part. In this sense, they lacked the courage to carry this 
historical burden, and therefore avoided putting it into practice. Ms Saleh also referred 
to a personal interview in 2008 in which Ibrahim al-Jaafari announced that “one of the 
actions that he had undertaken during his time as a cabinet member, and which made 
him very proud of himself, was his refusal to allow Article 140 to be implemented.”
Ms. Saleh believed that the political daring of the Kurds was successful to some 
extent in some difficult situations. Kurdish politicians were also able to show political 
courage when faced with extreme pressure from internal groups, as well as from 
external, particularly regional, parties, and were not slow to take up positions, 
particularly when they felt that their rights were being violated or were at risk.  At the 
time, the Middle East was enjoying a period of non-political stability which, in the 
absence of international recognition of their rights, put the Kurds in a position that 
made it difficult for them to be able clearly to announce their rights and their claims. 
They could not behave threateningly or risk the use of troops because any negative 
response from neighbouring countries would be a difficult challenge for them.412
7.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 
140
In practice, the implementation of Article 140 was strongly opposed by many Iraqi 
factions (Arab and Turkmen), meaning that it was in serious danger of being 
considered null and void. Arab and Turkmen leaders have been prepared to adopt any 
means and use whatever powers they can to prevent the implementation of Article 
411 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
412 Interview with Edalat Omer Saleh, on 15 April 2009, Erbil
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140. Despite that, On 29 May 2007 all decisions were issued by Commission 140 
(which we are mentioned below), and ratified by the Council of the Iraqi Prime 
Minister, based on the official order No. 6756 of 19 April 2007 which had been 
released for all relevant ministries in order to facilitate transactions for the people 
covered by these decisions. 
Edalat Omer Saleh indicated that the question of disputed areas was a significant 
subject between the KRG and Iraqi government, and during the Fifth Cabinet of the 
KRG (May 2006 to October 2009), a special Ministry for Extra-Regional Affairs was 
created to deal with this issue, and Dr Muhammad Ihsan was appointed as Minister. 
The work of this ministry was based on the constitutional Articles, in particular 
Articles 58 of (TAL) which then amended to Article 140 of Iraqi Constitution, and the 
areas withheld from the Kurdistan Region were Sinjar, Khanaqin and Kirkuk. Edalat 
Abdullah indicated that the Ministry’s actions were carried out both in theory and in 
practice. Practically, visits were made to these areas to study their cases and 
determine the types of problems and demands.413
Given to the ethnic composition of the city the Kirkuk office of the Committee to 
Implement Article 140 of the Constitution consisted of three Arabs, three Kurds, two 
Turkmens, and a Christian. This Committee was established on 28 March 2006, and 
was headed by Hashim al-Shibli, but following his resignation, Rayed Fahmi was 
appointed as Chairman. Although al-Maliki had explicitly declared his commitment to 
implementing Article 140, his hidden aim was apparently to try not to carry it out, as 
was made more obvious when he deliberately decided to add two members to the 
committee: Ahmad al-Baraq, a secular Shiite Arab, and Anwar Beyreqdar, a Sunni 
Turkmen. The Kurds objected to the addition of any members of the ITF’s parties, but 
although the ITF publicly declared their opposition to Article 140, they lacked the 
political power to block its implementation.414 In this context, Kaka Rash explained 
that this Committee was the Executive Committee, with headquarters in Baghdad. 
One of the branch offices was in Kirkuk and Kaka Rash was its director; under him, 
413 Interview with Edalat Omer Saleh, on 15 April 2009, Erbil
414 Anwar Beyreqdar was a member of the ITF’s executive committee and leader of the Turkmen 
Justice Party, which is one of the ITF’s component parties.
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two other committees were formed, a fact-finding committee headed by Tahseen 
Kahiah, and a technical committee led by Mohamed Khalil.415
In their defence, Kaka Rash pointed out that the work of this Committee depended on 
the 1957 census. For this purpose a special form was prepared (issued in a manner 
designed to combat fraud). Any person belonging to Kirkuk who had been recorded 
by the census in 1957 would be entitled to compensation if they had been affected by, 
or had left the city or been expelled from it because of the policy of racial 
discrimination. The forms were to ensure the accuracy of information that was to be 
sent to the Nationality Department They were first checked by the two committees 
and after giving Kaka Rash the figures, would be sent on to Finance Committee416 in 
Baghdad (which has a branch in Baghdad and Erbil) where compensation cheques 
would duly be issued.417
According to Khalid Shwani, despite the many difficulties it faced in its work, the 
Higher Committee of Article 140 was quickly able to issue four decisions intended 
normalize the situation of Kirkuk.
1. The return of all staff members who had moved away because of the policy of 
racial discrimination in their jobs.
2. The return of Kurds and Turkmen refugees who had been displaced from Kirkuk, 
who were given a piece of land (200 square meters) with 10 million Iraqi dinar, 
and were also able to return to their jobs.
3. the return of Arabs coming from the centre and south of Iraq to their original 
places, giving them a piece of land (200 square meters) and 20 million Iraqi 
dinar, as well as letting them have their administrative positions back.
4. Between 1963 and 2003 the Iraqi government confiscated most of the agricultural 
land owned by the Kurds and Turkmen. Based on the reality of the situation, the 
higher committee now decided to cancel all agricultural contracts through which 
415interview with Kaka Rash, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
416 Regarding the Higher Committee for the Implementation of Article 140, Nermeen Osman headed 
the finance committee as a senior official; Dr. Muhammad Ihsan was Secretary of the Committee; and 
Kaka Rash was administrator of the Kirkuk office. The fact-finding committee was headed by Tahseen 
Kahiah; the Technical committee was led by Mohamed Khalil; and Ashur was responsible for the legal 
side.
417 Interview with Kaka Rash, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
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land had been taken from Kurds and Turkmens and given to Arabs for the 
purpose of Arabizing Kirkuk.418
Shwani indicated that although these decisions were made at the beginning of 
December 2006 and were supposed to be ratified by the Prime Minister, they 
remained in the cabinet until 29 March 2007, since Maliki deliberately delayed acting 
to ratify them, and transferred the matter to the Council of Ministers to avoid the issue 
or at least make some major changes. Although aware of these obstacles, the 
Kurdistani List was able to exert pressure for these decisions to be passed without any 
change on 29 March 2007, which meant that according to al-Maliki’s roadmap, any 
ratification was delayed until two days before the end of the normalization phase. 
Thus, there were some 90,000 lawsuits and claims submitted by Kurds and Turkmen 
demanding to return to Kirkuk, of which only 50,000 transactions have been 
completed to this day. At the same time, administrative procedures within the court’s 
working systems began with checking the papers of individual returnees, submitting 
them to the competent authorities, and then paying the appropriate compensation to 
the claimants, all of which was done slowly and took a long time, thereby contributing 
automatically to further delays in the process.419
In discussing the actions of the Implementation of Article 140 committees, Nermeen 
Osman noted that their work was mostly limited to preparing reports for Parliament. 
One such report included all changes in the administrative boundaries that the 
previous Iraqi regime had made since 1975. Another provided information regarding 
numbers and locations of individual families and houses, and identified the reasons 
for their departures. In this context, the information in this report had inspired 
sufficient confidence at the UN for it to be adopted and used as a source for the UN’s 
work in this field. The report’s credibility was due to the accuracy of its information, 
being based on a wide range of material recorded in published information bulletins 
on Iraq as well as unpublished documents, along with decrees issued by northern 
organisations of the Baath regime and decisions issued to the provinces. For example, 
information regarding administrative changes that had happened in districts such as 
418 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
419 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
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Shwan and Qara-Henjir were not mentioned in the Bulletin of the facts of Iraq 
because it was removed from Kirkuk by the decision of the province.420
Regarding the budget for this Committee, Nermeen Osman has asserted that the 
budget for the Committee of Article 140 was paid annually and not in one stage, and 
that since the establishment of their committee until the end of 2009 they had received 
and spent US $720 million, and had allocated an amount of 172 million Iraqi dinars 
for 2010. As noted, the Iraqi government had created two financial committees: the 
first, chaired by Nermeen Othman, dealt with changes to the administrative borders in 
the Kurdish areas, while the second dealt with central and southern Iraq and was 
initially headed by Hanan al-Fatlawi who resigned and was replaced by Dr 
Muhammad Ihsan. It is clear that to date the Iraqi government has spent a total sum of 
around US $900 million on paying compensation to all the Kurdish areas. In short, it 
seems that the Article 140 committees had decided to pay twice as much for the 
wafideen Arabs as for Kurds, which meant that they were effectively rewarding the 
rapist instead of the victim. The policy succeeded in some respects in that it led to the 
return of many Arabs in Khanaqin and the Sinjar and some others in the Kirkuk 
area.421
One should mention here that, the existence of the Committee for Article 140 was one 
of the reasons that kept the article alive as a significant political issue. However, there 
are different trends towards the non-application of Article 140, and arguably, its 
implementation depended on creating the political groundwork in Iraq for acceptance 
of the Kurdish conditions. So far this political climate had not existed in Iraq, despite 
interventions by international and regional countries, i.e., Turkey, Iran, and the Arab 
States. It became clear that the Iraqi groups believed that implementation of all phases 
of this Article would not be in their interests, since if these significant areas were 
added to the Kurdistan Region, it could lead to the Region’s economic independence 
from Iraq. Such thinking obviously created major political obstacles to 
implementation of the Article, meaning that its implementation would require 
political will on the part of Iraqi political groups, rather than a simple focus on the 
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financial aspect and the preparations for the Commission’s work.422 It seemed likely 
that Iraqi political will and the Kurds’ insistence on their national rights represented 
the only guarantee that Article 140 would be implemented. On the other hand, the 
Kurds needed to work at all levels to find support, among the major Iraqi political 
parties as well as from the UN and the international community.
7.3 THE OBSTACLES AGAINST IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 140
Regardless of the obstacles to implementing Article 140, whether related to the Iraqi 
government or neglect by Kurdish politicians, after having passed the deadline for 
implementation by some three years, the normalisation stage remained uncompleted. 
The Kurds’ main concern was that the referendum had not taken place in the areas 
indicated in this Article. However, it could not be conducted until the administrative 
boundary changes had been concluded, and the general census that was to be carried 
out in those areas had been undertaken.
According to Falah Mustafa Bakir,423 the Kurds expected that after the collapse of the 
Iraqi regime the political parties in the new Iraq would have different visions. It was 
supposed that they would be more understanding, so that all parties would be able to 
rebuild a new Iraqi State under the umbrella of the Constitution, and the Kurdish 
leadership showed considerable flexibility for other Iraqi parties to open the way for 
peaceful solutions to all outstanding problems. In his view, by agreeing to put Kirkuk 
at the forefront of the referendum to obtain a Kurdish identity for Kirkuk and other 
Kurdish areas, the Kurdish leaders were proving their good intentions and reassuring 
the Iraqi parties that they supported all peaceful solutions. It was assumed that the 
Iraqi factions respected the Kurdish approach to putting Article 140 in the 
referendum.  Therefore, the Kurds did not anticipate the obstacles created by these 
parties over the implementation of Article 140. There is no doubt that all the 
geographical, historic and demographic documents asserted that these areas were an 
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in the fifth Cabinet; he held the same position in the sixth Cabinet. From 2003 to 2006, he served as 
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integral part of the Kurdish areas, and for this reason, the Kurds had relied on the 
legal and constitutional way as a road map and as the only guarantee for the return of 
these areas to the Kurdistan Region.424
In addition certain technical factors contributed to delays in implementing Article 
140, for example, choosing the chairmanship of the Committee and simultaneously 
ascertaining the neutrality of the committee members. Another important cause was 
the allocation of the budget for the Commission on Article 140, which was delayed 
for two months and also affected the formation of committees and sub-offices. In this
context, Nermeen Osman explained that this committee initially faced considerable 
difficulties regarding the way it set to work, since information and data on the citizens 
was either random or was largely absent. However, the phase of work on the forms 
for collecting information and data ended in 2007. The same process was started in 
central and southern Iraq in May 2010, and the period for this phase was strictly 
limited. At this stage other sources of assistance were utilised to accelerate 
implementation of this constitutional Article, such as The Department of Nationality, 
ration cards, and records of the displaced who had moved with their jobs to their 
areas.425
Similarly, Khalid Shwani confirmed that the Committee for 140 faced many obstacles 
created by the general secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the purpose of which 
appeared to have been to waste time by cataloguing the Kurdistani List within this 
time frame, along with other obstacles related to the Committee on Property Disputes 
that was part of the process of normalizing the situation in Kirkuk. Ironically, the 
Chairman of this Committee was an individual who had no faith in Article 140. He 
created many difficulties, and was behind the lack of progress in the Committee’s 
work, proof being that there were 43,000 cases before the Committee, but fewer than 
7 percent of owners had succeeded in having property returned to them. After 
completion in the Committee for Article 140 the cases would be sent to the Appeals 
Chamber of the State Property Committee. One of the significant factors causing the 
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postponement of the implementation of Article 140 was that returning answers to this 
Committee could take up to two years, whether ratified or not.426
The Chairman of the Committee, Hashem Shibli, eventually resigned under pressure 
from the Arab groups. Moreover, in order to create obstacles to the work of the 
Commission some names were added by Nuri Al-Maliki on one side without 
reference to the other political blocs. On 31 March 2007, their members were 
withdrawn from the Committee on the basis of flimsy arguments that also had a 
negative impact by delaying implementation of Article 140. On the other side the 
Iraqi government itself was impeding its operation. 427
Additionally, the majority of wafideen Arabs who had resettled in Kirkuk and were 
supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr threatened the implementation of Article 140 and 
would provoke armed resistance. For this reason they encouraged their loyal followers 
to remain in Kirkuk and not to leave Kirkuk by force or without force. The objective 
behind the alliance of the Iraqi Turkmen Front with the Arab bloc was to obtain 
regional and international support against moving forward on implementing Article 
140. While the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which had previously been 
chaired by ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, and was now chaired by his son, Ammar al-
Hakim, argued that they were more moderate than the rest of the other parties since 
they were ready to discuss Kirkuk’s future with the Kurds in order to find a way out 
of this thorny issue. The most critical groups in the various Sunni parties refused to be 
involved in any discussions and regarded the Kurds’ political views as unrealistic.
What became a common phenomenon in the status of Kirkuk was that from time to 
time the Arab and Turkmen blocs called for suspension of the Article 140 process, 
and in protest against Kurdish control over the council threatened to boycott it. 
However, the Kurds accused the government of procrastination in implementing 
Article 140. Rather disastrously, every time enactment of Article 140 was postponed, 
with the excuse of Iraqi national interest and for technical rather than political 
reasons, the Kurdish politicians accepted the delay. It is also important to remember 
that the wafideen had not been forced to leave. In fact, the process of normalisation 
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included a policy whereby their departure was voluntary and those opting to leave 
were compensated.428 Regarding the types of problems, whether legal or political, that 
impeded the implementation of Article 140; Khalid Shwani argued that most 
obstacles were political and sometimes administrative, with political purposes 
underlying them. He explained that the 140 Committee had revealed many obstacles 
and many violations, and that most of the complaints that had reached them from the 
people of these areas had been included in the official report to the Iraqi parliament.429
The taking of a general census had not been carried out in Iraq for over 23 years. As 
Iyad Jamal al-Din has illustrated, political factors were behind the failure to carry out
any general statistical surveys. Saddam Hussein was alleged to have inflated earlier 
figures for fear of other neighbours; for instance, following the invasion of Kuwait, 
when the UN agreed to the oil-for-food programme, Saddam began to increase the 
population numbers, announcing that, based on the ration cards, the population of Iraq 
had swollen to 25 million people. After the fall of Saddam Hussein the new Iraqi 
government, particularly the Ministry of Trade, adopted the same approach which was 
dependent on the ration card. Obviously administrative corruption had become 
generalized all over Iraq, but the Ministry of Trade was one of the largest sectors in 
which corruption prevailed. It is not reasonable that in four years (2005-2009) the 
population of Iraq could have shot up to 32 million people. It is clear that the essence 
of corruption in Iraq is due to the lack of accurate census data.430 On the other hand, 
the main Arab parties and some other factions had refused for political purposes, to 
hold a census, particularly in Kirkuk. Another justification for these groups was that 
the disputed areas were not limited on Kirkuk, but also included areas in central and 
southern Iraq such as the disputes between Karbala and Rumadi. A critical point 
facing Kurdish politicians was why they agreed or were forced to link these different 
issues to the issue of Kirkuk, since the types of disputes between Kurds and Arabs 
over Kirkuk were completely different from the sorts of disagreements in other areas 
of Iraq.431
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What was very much more surprising for Kurds, when the Arab and Turkmen blocs in 
the Iraqi parliament deliberately linked the issue of Kirkuk to the provincial elections 
law and proposed to delay the election in the Kirkuk Governorate until after the 
referendum had been held to decide its status. It was first necessary to concentrate on 
the Kurdish position, involving protests on a secret ballot for setting up a power-
sharing arrangement with Kurds in the Kirkuk region, like that which enabled both 
Turkmens and Arabs to get the same amount of power. On the other hand, the Arabs 
and Turkmen blocs wanted to adopt a version that would postpone a decision on 
Kirkuk while authorising the election in other provinces.
In this charged political atmosphere, this had notable effects on the specific proposal 
regarding Kirkuk. As the situation evolved, these groups (Arabs and Turkmens) were 
able to pass Article 24 of the bill by 127 out of 142 members of parliament (MPs) 
without any Kurdish representation. This Article required power in Kirkuk to be 
shared equally among the major ethnic communities. The Arab and Turkmen blocs 
were supported by parliamentary Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani, who succeeded in 
organising a secret ballot to ensure Article 24’s passage. In turn, the Kurdistani 
Alliance boycotted this meeting of Parliament when, as expected, President Jalal 
Talabani used his veto power to reject a previous version of the bill; the Presidency 
Council of Iraq also decided unanimously to reject the bill because of the Kirkuk 
clause, and sent it back to the parliament to review. Because ratifying the law for 
provincial elections had stalled, these events contributed to delaying the October 2008 
election. Thereby, negotiations continued on 10 September 2008, the law was finally 
passed on 24 September 2008, and elections were expected to be held by 31 January 
2009. The compromise reached was that Kirkuk would be dealt with separately, and 
elections in Kirkuk and the three Kurdish autonomous provinces would be held at a 
later time. In short, For the Kurds, the effects of these events and actions among the 
parliamentarians created an atmosphere of mistrust of the previous coalitions and their 
political agreements with the main Iraqi parties.432
On 22 July, the Kurds were faced with two choices:  first, whether the vote on Article 
24 of the Provincial Elections Law No. 36 of 2008, should be in public or secret; but 
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the Kurds did not altogether trust their allies to vote for their side. The second option 
was that originally this Article was not intended to be voted on. There is no doubt that 
these groups had plotted and planned to vote by secret ballot, and the Kurdish list was 
aware that the option for a public vote on the Article would fail. Therefore they 
refused to agree to the Article being subjected to a vote, and decided to boycott the 
meeting. However, some Kurdish politicians were shocked to see that all the Iraqi 
groups, including Shiite, Sunni and Turkmens, whether allies or opponents of the 
Article, had united against the interests of the Kurds and also voted for Article 24. As 
a result of these conspiracies, the veto was use against the Article in the Council 
presidency and it was re-sent to the Iraqi Parliament. Thus, Article 23 was born as an 
alternative to Article 24 and was accepted by the Kurds. Clearly, all attempts to link 
the matter of Kirkuk to the election law were simply political manoeuvrings by Sunni 
groups in order to delay the elections in Kirkuk, as well as to disrupt the political 
process, even though they knew that they could not obtain the necessary votes to win 
in the Provincial Council. This secret planning by Arab and Turkmens to pass a draft 
election law for the provincial councils represented something of a political disaster or 
a political conspiracy in the history of the new Iraqi parliament.433
In domestic terms, the events of 22 July 2008 represented a coup as far as Article 140 
was concerned. In focusing on these events, Shwani has noted that what happened on 
22 July was programmed and planned by chauvinistic Arab parties supported by other 
parties within the government, and with the assistance of the embassies of several 
countries that were able to write an alternative Article. The Kurdistani List or 
Kurdistani Alliance asserted that the election should be held in Kirkuk in the same 
way as in the rest of the provinces in Iraq, and the Kurds took a firm stand against any 
postponement of elections ostensibly justified by non-implementation of Article 140 
because not all Kurds and Turkmens had gone back to Kirkuk. In the Iraqi parliament, 
prejudiced Arabs in Mosul, Tikrit and Diyala had collected signatures with the aim of 
postponing the Kirkuk election, which was supposed to be held based on the division 
of power among the four ethnic factions (Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs and Christians) in 
Kirkuk with a ratio of 32 : 32 : 32 : 4. However, the Kurdistani List rejected attempts 
to delay the election process, and used their allies in the Iraqi parliament, particularly 
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the Supreme Islamic Council, Islamic Daawa Party and National Coalition List, in 
order to resolve this problem, against the other groups including Sadrists, Virtue 
Party, Islamic Party, and Iraqi List.434 According to Edalat Omer Saleh the numerous 
technical and political obstacles in the disputed areas meant that large numbers of
people were deprived of the right to vote, while terrorist acts caused delays in the 
transfer of ration cards for the evacuees returning to their original places as well as 
failure to register them on the voter lists. These difficulties created problems for the 
256,000 families in the disputed areas who were unable to vote; nevertheless, the 
Kurds managed to gain a considerable number of votes in these areas.435
7.4 SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO CHRONIC DILEMMAS OF THE 
ISSUE OF KIRKUK
Given such conditions concerning Article 140 and addressing the case of Kirkuk two 
directions became apparent between Kurdish intellectuals and their politicians. First, 
they believed that the annexation of Kirkuk was a legitimate right of the Kurdish 
people, and that it was therefore incumbent upon Kurdish politicians to prove this 
right and impose it on other Iraqi parties before entering into any negotiations with 
them, in which case it would not be necessary to put this issue as an article in the 
Constitution. A second and alternative belief was that the presence of this Article in 
the constitution gave more guarantees for the Kurds. In this respect, Masoud Barzani 
asserted on many occasions that putting Article 140 into the Constitution meant 
granting it legal legitimacy. In this way, obstacles could be put in the way of any Iraqi 
factions trying to change or deny this right; meaning that the three provinces would be 
able to reject any attempt to change or abort this Article. In fact, the Arab parties 
aimed to procrastinate over implementation of Article 140 on the grounds that, due to 
“terrorist operations”, it was impossible to put into practice the general statistical 
processes which represented the second step after “normalization” and which would 
be followed by a referendum on Article 140.
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One of the most heated discussions about the situation in Kirkuk was that, without 
any serious intention to implement Article 140, the challenges would be more 
complex and the consequences more severe. In order to reach a real solution it would 
have to be through compromise, with each party making concessions to the other. At 
first sight it seemed that equal power sharing or agreeing to put Kirkuk under 
administrative control of the Kurdistan Region would be difficult to concede, and it is 
tempting to suggest that there was a tendency to compromise, either to equal power 
sharing inside the Kurdistan Region or no power sharing outside the Kurdistan 
Region. In any event, if Kirkuk was incorporated into the Kurdistan Region, the 
Kurds would have to reassure all the other ethnic groups that their rights and power-
sharing would also be guaranteed.436 As we have seen, the Kurds realised the 
seriousness of the political positions of those who sought either to derail the 
implementation of Article 140 or else to abolish it completely. From this standpoint, 
the most powerful political weapon available to the Kurds derived from the Iraqi 
constitution, which gave them the ability and the power to block any amendment 
procedure by exercising their right of veto. 
It was suggested that the long-demanded reconciliation by the Arab-Turkmen blocs 
should be implemented on the basis of equality through a new power-sharing deal, 
whereby each of the three main ethnic groups would receive 32 percent of the 
administrative positions in Kirkuk, with a four percent share reserved for Christians. 
Interestingly, the Arab bloc claimed it would appoint Arabs to the posts of deputy 
governor and deputy head of the Judiciary council, while the Kurds insisted that the 
agreement should cover appointments at all levels, from the directors of the various 
directorates down to low-level workers. As a result, after nearly a year of negotiations 
over seats, five members of the Arab bloc had their positions restored and ended their 
boycott of the Kirkuk council on 4 December.437
In terms of power-sharing, and unhappily for many Kurds, Jalal Talabani had referred 
on numerous occasions to the “Brussels model” for Kirkuk within the framework of 
consociational democracy. Further, to response about the possibility applicability the 
model of Iraq in Kirkuk, Iraq, as if the Arab or Turkmen be a governor in Kirkuk? 
436 Interview with Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil
437 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
205
President Talabani replied: “Yes, we said when the normalization of the situation in 
Kirkuk be achieved, and when the people of Kirkuk decide their fate. At that time, we 
will support that the Turkmen or the Arab native take a position of the governor or 
mayor. Additionally, even at this time, I personally called for model Brussels in 
Kirkuk, demanded the distribution of positions as follows” (32: 32: 32:4).438
In simple terms, some Kurdish analysts and intellectuals announced that this 
statement meant giving up of the Kirkuk as a Kurdish land (Kurdistanibuny Kirkuk), 
which completely contradicted earlier statements that not an inch of land of Kirkuk 
would be relinquished. It should be noted that the Kurds had insisted on power-
sharing based on a numerical proportion of the population for each of the groups in 
Kirkuk. For the ITF and Arab groups, equal power sharing among Kirkuk’s ethnic 
groups (except Christians) in this context, according to the formula of 32:32:32:4, was 
seen as a rare opportunity for managerial positions and for preventing the Kurds from 
monopolising power in Kirkuk. In terms of these strongly divergent positions, Iraqi 
President Jalal Talabani has clarified and said “We said that in Kirkuk, Kurds, Arabs 
and Turkmen must distribute the jobs equally (32%) for the Arabs and (32%) for the 
Kurds and (32%) for the Turkmen and (4%) for the Christians, but it should be 
reflected in every levels and functions. Whereas in the oil company of Kirkuk from 
within 15 thousand workers and staff, there is (450) Kurdish workers exists in the 
company. Indeed, this distribution of functions which came at the time of Saddam 
Hussein aimed at Arabization and the expulsion of Kurds, Turkmen workers and 
bringing Arabs from the south of Iraq”. 439
The facts were clear and unambiguous; however, the Kurds were highly sensitive to 
the notion of the division of power in Kirkuk. As shown by Kaka Rash, since the 
more experienced Kurds had obtained 26 seats in the Kirkuk province it was natural 
to take the post of Governor and other senior positions. However the Kurds were 
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wrong to neglect the participation of other ethnic groups in the higher administrative 
positions in the city, and their mistake led to objections and criticism of their policy 
both within and outside Iraq, based on the need for power to be divided according to 
consensus politics. It was apparent that, as noted above, Kurds were not against the 
division of authority (i.e., 32:32:32:4) according to Article 23. It was clearly a lack of 
confidence between these factions in implementing Article 23 in a single phase.  As it 
mentioned above, the Kurds themselves demanded that any division should include all 
levels, from governor to the lowest-ranking civil servants.440
The Kurds were concerned about non-application by the Turkmens and Arabs in 
Kirkuk of other paragraphs of this Article, particularly in instances where those who 
had demanded, and benefited from, higher positions would break their word about 
implementing other paragraphs of Article 23. As noted, these groups were applying 
the political agendas of neighbouring states. The Kurds therefore insisted on the 
application of this article as a whole and not in stages. Politically it would have been 
in the interests of the Kurds if they could succeed in recovering the districts that had 
been taken away and re-joining them into Kirkuk, given that they formed a majority 
in numerical terms compared with Arabs and Turkmens. Thus, holding referendum in 
these districts might make it possible for these areas to be restored to the Kurdistan 
region.441
Several outstanding problems regarding the various possible futures for Kirkuk that 
need to be addressed have been outlined here. Thus there has been the debate as to 
whether Kirkuk should become part of the Kurdistan Region or remain outside 
Kurdish boundaries or be given a special status. Acceptance of such an outcome 
might, in the long run, provoke serious repercussion and pose a significant challenge 
to regional security. However, it should be noted that the various possibilities 
suggested for Kirkuk’s special status, whether inside or outside the Kurdistan Region, 
represented a compromise solution: (1) Kirkuk would gain a special autonomous 
status inside the Kurdistan Region, with power-sharing arrangements for its 
governance; (2) Kirkuk would be inside the Kurdistan Region with autonomous status 
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but without any mechanism for power sharing; (3) Kirkuk would be outside the 
Kurdistan Region with special autonomous status; (4) Kirkuk would be outside the 
Kurdistan Region with an autonomous status and under majority (presumably 
Kurdish) control. According to Article 119, governorates were allowed “…to form 
regions that have powers in excess of governorates”. Therefore, based on this Article 
the possibilities for creating a special status for Kirkuk outside the Kurdistan Region 
would be achieved, in the event of the Kurds in Kirkuk being accepted. 442
Various ideas about resolving the Kirkuk issue were put forward as recommendations. 
From Dr Nouri Talabani’s perspective,443 Kirkuk could be returned to the Kurdistan 
Region as an autonomous Region, which would give its citizens the right to run their 
oil and gas resources while taking account of what was stated about exclusive powers 
according to the Iraqi Constitution.  If this suggestion was accepted, it would establish 
two councils, one ‘legislative’ and the other ‘administrative. The Legislative Council 
would be selected by the citizens of Kirkuk, while the president and the members of 
the Administrative Council would be appointed by the first council. Thus, the two 
councils would have responsibility and authority for managing political affairs, the 
economy, reconstruction and development, and education so that, for example, they 
would decide about keeping the Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk city, and whether to 
invite in the Iraqi forces. If this proposal succeeded, it would in effect be regarded as 
the guarantee for protecting Kirkuk’s autonomy. Perhaps most significant, it could be 
arranged through an international conference under UN supervision as a way to find 
common ground, and to prevent any parties (whether the Kurdistan Region or the 
Iraqi government) from changing Kirkuk’s new status in the future. This reality would 
be recognised by the constitutions of both the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi State, 
and at the same time would inhibit any outside interference by the regional states. 444
One of the scenarios suggested by researchers to resolve the issue of Kirkuk has 
supported an autonomous region of the city of Kirkuk, with its pre-1968 borders, to be 
officially part of the Kurdistan Region through a free referendum. Kirkuk would have 
its own constitution and budget, as well as its own security forces. The distribution of 
442 Anderson and Stansfield, ‘Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethonopolitics of Conflicts and Compromise’, 
(United State of America :University Pennsylvania press, 2009), pp. 204-6. 
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posts and administrative positions and resources at all levels would be made equally 
between ethnic groups and with a full guarantee of cultural and religious rights, which 
should be protected and must not be exceeded by either Iraqi government or the KRG. 
It was also argued that this compromise represented a reasonable resolution that 
granted the Kurds “ownership” over Kirkuk, but without real control or powers. In 
that case, it could be deemed that Kirkuk did not belong to any group.445 In this 
context, some Western scholars suggested to giving Kirkuk special status within the 
Kurdistan Region, handing over its control to the central government, and delaying 
any solution for ten years. Depending on consociational politics and the compromises 
offered by each of the Kurdish and Arab parties, an understanding could be reached 
whereby control over the management of Kirkuk’s oil would remain in the hands of 
the federal government, while creating a special status for Kirkuk within the 
boundaries of the Kurdistan Region.446
Additionally, Dr Nouri Talabani proposed that, in a situation where Article 140 was 
not implemented and the Iraqi government did not seriously find a resolution, the 
district from Prde to Sirwan Lake in the Kirkuk area could be made into an 
autonomous region, provided that it was to be part of the Kurdistan Region. Citizens 
in these areas would be able to have representatives in the parliament of Kurdistan, 
from among whom the Deputy Prime Minister could be selected.447 Dr Nouri 
Talabani also suggested to the Kurdish authority that the Kurds might agree to waive 
the district of Hawija, and merge it with the Salahaddin province. Historically this 
district had been part of Kurdistan, but now had a majority population of Sunni Arabs 
and had become the centre of the Baath Party, meaning that it would be difficult to 
control its re-entry into the Kurdistan region. Also other areas could be integrated into 
the Kurdistan region more easily. The Sunni groups at this time were in a weak 
position, and had the Kurds suggested such a proposal to them, they might well have 
agreed to return areas withheld from the Kurdish provinces by the Iraqi regime to the 
445 Anderson and Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk, op. cit., pp. 231-2
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Kurdistan Region. However, the situation changed, and they became strongly 
opposing to giving back Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region.448
In response to the stinging criticisms made by the majority of Kurds and the 
intellectual elite against their Kurdish politicians in Baghdad, was that the Kurdish 
negotiators did not use the ‘the veto power’ that gave them political power to defend 
the gains, including Kirkuk, that they had already made in the TAL. The Kurdish 
politicians were accused of having given up this right and bargained with the Sunni 
and Shiite parties over political posts and party interests, and some critics even 
reached the point of arguing that the politicians should bear the historical 
responsibility. In focusing on this issue, Nechirvan Barzani has asserted that the 
Kurdish leaders (Talabani and Masoud Barzani) had not made concessions over 
Kirkuk:
Our demands are the same, and our concerns are the same. We 
simply heeded the advice of the Americans and the United 
Nations to utilize their technical expertise. It was a bitter reality, 
for all Kurds, that Article 140 was not implemented by 2007, as 
was assured in the Constitution. However, we must be pragmatic 
and reasonable. Thousands of claims on property, housing, the 
right of return, and other important issues take time to resolve. 
The relevant authorities simply have not had the capacity to 
move forward. At the same time, the strategy to delay 
consideration by leaders in Baghdad has been absolutely 
unacceptable, and this is why you have heard all of our leaders, 
myself included, urge the federal government to adhere to its 
constitutional responsibilities. And we will demand due 
attention to these issues from the coming government before we 
join any coalition. The US does, indeed, fully understand our 
position and supports the implementation of Article 140, 
particularly the peaceful resolution of any disputes. We are for 
peaceful resolution as well, of course. The US support for 
Article 142 is not a problem. Barzani confirmed that he has no 
objection to Article 142; every constitution must have 
stipulations for amendments. It is essential to recall, as I 
mentioned earlier, that Article 142 cannot take any action if 2/3 
448 Dr Nouri mentioned to another political meeting concerning Kirkuk issue in the office of
Nechirevan Barzan in 2004, which attended also Peter Gilbert as a consultant who was former 
ambassador to the U.S. in Bosnia. He also endorsed the view of Dr. Nouri and even suggested to them
that it is better not to request Tal Afar that has the same problem as Hawijah.  Personal interview with 
Dr. Nouri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil 
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of three governorates (for example our three governorates) reject 
it. I do not worry at all about Article 142. 449
Perhaps the most significant item in this analysis, with its focus on the obstacles to 
implementing Article 140 as discussed above, was the situation from Nechirevan 
Barzani’s perspective, and his argument that it was important to pay close attention to 
the wording of Article 140, when one takes into consideration the progress achieved 
on Article 140 over the last few years and how the Kurds can ‘annex’ Kirkuk to the 
Kurdistan Region. Barzani also insisted that the issue of the disputed territories was 
about justice, not about land. The primary objective was to ensure that all those 
forcibly displaced by the previous regime, not only the Kurds but also all the Arabs, 
Turkmens, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and other ethnic and religious groups, had the right 
to determine their fate, as stipulated in Article 140.  Furthermore, Nechirvan Barzani 
also mentioned his firm belief in the importance of power sharing and minority 
protection in diverse cities and governorates such as Kirkuk; “The Kurdistan 
Parliament has such provisions for minorities in our Region, and this has helped 
ensure a sense of security and shared responsibility.” If it was decided that Kirkuk 
should join the Kurdistan Region, he considered it of the utmost importance that all 
citizens and all ethnicities should be included in the government; “Kurds are tolerant 
people and this is and should remain a source of pride.” 450 In this matter, Dr Nouri
Talabani expressed the same idea, noting that the Kurds were always being accused of 
seeking to control Kirkuk to gain possession of its rich oil and gas fields. The Kurds 
had therefore to prove through their actions that this was not the case and was not a 
reason for returning Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Region; they must seek, on the contrary, 
to exploit these resources for the reconstruction of Kirkuk itself, and to use the 
benefits to assist all the residents.451
449 Interview with former Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and received his responses through email, 
on 6 May 2010.
450 Interview with former Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and received his responses through email, 
on 6 May 2010.
451 Interview with Dr. Nuri Talabani, on 12 April 2009, Erbil
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CONCLUSION
In the current situation, the Kurdistan Region is a vital part of Iraq and all the changes 
and challenges in the political arena in Iraq will directly affect the political process in 
Kurdistan. At the same time the future of Iraq has occupied a significant place in US 
strategy, consequently, could say the Kurdistan Region also occupies the same 
attention. Particularly, when Iraq’s stability would reflect the success of US policy 
and will enhance American credibility as well as US interests in Iraq and in the 
region, as it has been deemed that, “Iraq is a centrepiece of American foreign policy”.
452 In this context, it could be concluded that achieving stability and opportunities for 
a better future for Iraq is of vital interest for all sides, and all Iraqi parties are strongly 
recommended to move forward on national reconciliation. One of the most difficult 
and significant international challenges in decades for US interests is how to put Iraq 
together so it can play its part in regional and even global stability. Meanwhile, the 
US administration wants to avert anarchy in Iraq; it wishes the ethnic balance between 
Arabs and Kurds in Kirkuk to prevail.
Article 58 of the TAL was clearly intended to resolve the problem of the disputed 
territories but has also provided the broad outlines of a possible solution to the issue 
of Kirkuk and the disputed territories. The article did not come into effect during Iyad 
Allawi’s transitional government or the interim successor government of al-Jaafari, 
but after a permanent constitution had been approved. These circumstances affected 
the Kurds, and they were deeply angry about the issue of Kirkuk. They then found
Article 140 in the Iraqi Constitution: it had been drafted to resolve the complex 
problem of the future status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and was included 
in the new Iraqi constitution to legitimize rectification of the policies of the former 
regime, including the crimes carried out among Kirkuk’s various ethnic groups. In 
effect it was a witness to the emergence of an alliance of Sunni and Shiite political 
blocs towards Kurdish demands on oil, the budget, and Kirkuk. Clearly there was a 
paradox, with all the Iraqi opponents in the three cabinets’ government deliberately 
delaying the implementation of Article 140 until 31 December 2007. They then 
claimed, under the pretext of a legal limitations order having expired, that the Article 
452 Baker and Hamilton , The Iraq Study Group Report, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006) p.2 
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had lost its legitimacy, could no longer be implemented, and therefore was to be 
regarded as dead and buried.
However, tensions escalated between the KRG and the Iraqi government over Kurdish 
demands for control of disputed areas, as the KRG, historically fearful of persecution 
by the Arab majority, struggled to incorporate all the disputed areas. In view of these 
chronic differences between the two sides, it was necessary to concentrate first on the 
implementation of Article 140 which would involve accelerating the approach to Iraqi 
state-building. In addition, Article 140 required a census and a referendum in Kirkuk 
and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens. Obviously, the 
delays in holding a census not only made it difficult to assess the merits of competing 
ethnic and sectarian claims, but also created ambiguity in defining the territorial 
borders of regions and oil fields belonging to one or another neighbouring region.
The Turkmen perspective focused on support given by the two main Kurdish parties 
to the displaced persons returning after 2003. The Turkmens believed that the Kurds’ 
actions were intended to strengthen their position in Kirkuk, and did not hide their 
worries about the numerical superiority of the Kurds in Kirkuk, accusing them of 
pursuing a Kurdification policy. On the contrary, by focusing on the Kurds’ attitudes 
they established that the rights of Turkmen and other ethnic minorities would be 
protected constitutionally. Indeed, there was also a cooperative strategy uniting the 
Arab community, whether Sunni or Shiite, with the Turkmens, in which they stood 
strongly against the notion of Kirkuk’s inclusion in the Kurdistan Region, proposing 
instead that it retained its current relationship with the Iraqi government or was kept 
of the Kurdistan Region by being made a region in itself. Nevertheless, the Arab and 
Turkmen alliances resented Kurdish control of positions of power in the Kirkuk 
governorate, and were strongly opposed to the implementation of Article 140.
However, the real debate concerned the attitudes of some Turkmen groups, their 
hostility to the KRG, and their opposition to the application of Article 140. Although 
they had been subjected to ethnic cleansing by the Iraqi government in Kirkuk, it was 
not to the same degree that the Kurds had experienced. Some have argued that this 
was due to some trend associated with Turkish doctrine that denied the existence of 
the Kurds or the formation of any Kurdish entity in any part of divided Kurdistan.
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Nevertheless, the Kurds had understood the concerns of the Arab and Turkmen 
factions to divide the higher authorities in the province and their participation in the 
management of Kirkuk. The Kurds announced that they were not against the division 
of powers between these components provided that this division included all the 
administrative functions of the highest positions until it reached the service functions. 
Shwani argued that among the 65,000 employees in Kirkuk, 32,300 were Arabs and 
only 15,000 were Kurds. It was for this reason, and because the Kurds had insisted 
that the division should be equal in all positions, that the Kurds were pushed into
accepting Article 24.453
The Kurdish goal to control Kirkuk was quite different from the Sunni and Shiite 
approach to gaining control of the Iraqi government and other mixed cities. In turn, 
the Kurds favoured reliance on the Constitution to gain control of Kirkuk, whereas the 
other groups played for time through evasive tactics, and frequently resorted to 
violence. In fact, the absence of political courage within Iraqi politics in general 
caused disruption and time-wasting in implementing Article 140. However, as long as 
the policy of Arabization was recognized by the new Iraqi Constitution, all the Iraqi 
factions needed to find a peaceful way of solving the dispute since it had been 
constitutionalized. Furthermore, the new Iraqi government should be committed to 
implementing Article 140 as a road map for finding a way out of the prevailing 
political crisis for the Iraqi government and the Kurds. Otherwise these disputed areas 
would be left unresolved, meaning these cities and Iraq would be left to a dark future 
of instability that would weaken the capacity of the state and inflame ethnic and 
sectarian conflict.
Regarding the possibility of the Kirkuk governorate returning to the Kurdistan Region 
with a special autonomous status, the draft of the Kurdish constitution would need to 
be amended, although approval had not yet been given for it to expand its powers and 
prerogatives.  It has been argued that “Kirkuk would become a federacy within the 
Kurdistan Region” 454 However, all the parties found the status quo unsatisfactory and 
Article 140’s fate remained unclear after each postponement over spurious 
technicalities. The question is raised here, if Article 140 was not fully implemented, 
453 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
454 Anderson and Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk, ibid, pp. 191-2, 231
214
whether the Kurds adopt other methods for joining up the disputed Kurdish territories, 
and declare the boundaries unilaterally, particularly as they had the capability and 
resources to return those areas. The Kurds might have found this a difficult step to 
take, since the KRG at that time lacked both central government funding and a strong 
infrastructure to support them. It was arguably, a matter as to whether the Kurds 
would be obliged to accept a significantly amended version of Article 140, or whether 
there should be a new, legally sound procedure to determine the boundary of the 
Kurdistan Region. In any event, if the issue of Kirkuk was not resolved, the real fear 
for the Kurds was that it might become a chronic problem like Darfur and Kashmir, 
for which the United Nations had been unable to find a solution. Resolving Kirkuk 
was linked firmly to the political stances of the other Iraqi factions as well as to the 
changes taking place the Iraqi political arena.
For the KRG’s, the basic mechanism for implementing Article 140 could be applied 
in two phases. First, demographically, it represented the return of displaced Kurds 
who had been Arabized to Kirkuk, and the return of Arab newcomers to their 
governorates of origin. Second, geographically, it needed the restoration of Kirkuk’s 
administrative boundaries, which had been changed by the previous Baathist regime 
during its long rule. In other respects, the aims and objectives of Article 140 were not 
only to resolve the status of the Kirkuk territory but also to find appropriate 
settlements for other disputed territories in the rest of Iraq. In doing this, dealing with 
some complex and difficult cases would remove a serious obstacle to a just solution. 
Regarding the implementation of Article 140, the Kurdish strategy focused on 
restoring the status of the former administrative boundaries of the governorate that 
had been deliberately changed in 1976 to make the Kurds a minority in those areas.
The motive for not implementing Article 140 by the Arabs and Turkmens was to 
avoid giving any legal legitimacy to the Article 140, thereby making it invalid, as well 
as adversely affecting the Kurdish people. In general, extending the time for its 
implementation was not in the interests of the Kurds, and led to a lack of credibility 
among politicians. The Kurdish public felt that they were always paying the price for 
the errors of the political positions of their leaders, which was counterproductive to 
general Kurdish goals, and also opened the way to those seeking to obstruct the 
implementation of Article 140. Thus, despite the obstacles and the Iraqi government’s
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deliberate stalling over Article 140, the contradictory positions of the two main 
Kurdish parties could well have been the reason why its aims failed to be
implemented.
What could not be hidden were the controversies and distrust among the ethnic 
groups. Related to this, no accurate census had so far been undertaken, while the 
country’s growth and development depended on the census. Further, the lack of 
general statistical was a strong factor in the perpetuation of corruption which was also 
a serious problem for Iraq’s entire economy. In this context, it was surprising that the 
political parties had themselves created obstacles to holding a census.  Some ethnic 
groups appeared unwilling to reveal their true numerical size, particularly in Kirkuk 
and its environs but also in other disputed areas. If all these considerations are taken 
into account, what became collective thinking on how to tackle Article 140 and its 
implementation would rely ultimately on political consensus and political equilibrium. 
It is logical to say that the creation of Article 140 needed consensus among the Iraqi 
parties, and therefore, any amendments to the Article would also require consensus, 
since the only guarantee for its implementation was consensus and equilibrium in 
attitudes, principles and powers.  
The KRG was aware of the fact that Kirkuk faced threats from three different groups; 
al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, and remnants of the Ba’ath Party. Indeed, this political 
atmosphere had a noticeable effect on the increase of terrorist attacks that were an 
attempt to wreck any improvements in the political environment. Certainly the Kurds 
have made strenuous efforts to guarantee the political and cultural rights of all groups 
living in Kirkuk and its environs since the KRG recognizes that Kirkuk has different 
needs from other parts of the region and that the rights of Arabs and Turkmen must be 
guaranteed. However, in the current situation, all ethnic components within Kirkuk 
agree that they need to loosen Baghdad’s grip on the governorate. They have 
struggled to gain financial independence from Baghdad with an enhanced power-
sharing agreement that has split the top government positions among the three major 
ethnic groups and that also delivers basic services to its citizens. In this context, it can 
be assumed that the broader problem with Kirkuk has never been ethnic tensions, but 
rather state repression of Kurds and other ethnic groups. It is also worth noting that 
the Kurds in Kirkuk enthusiastically seek a negotiated, peaceful and consensual 
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solution. Furthermore, all ethnic groups share common interests in providing better 
services and more security, since improving services for all ethnic components will 
enhance the possibility of bringing people together politically. 
One of the most heated discussions about the situation in Kirkuk was that, without 
any serious intention to implement Article 140, the challenges would be more 
complex and the consequences more severe. The major obstacles impeding the 
implementation of Article 140 were political and sometimes administrative.  In order 
to reach a real solution it would have to be through compromise, with each party 
making concessions to the other. In other words, the only guarantee of the future of 
Kirkuk was implementation of this article, which was reliant on the will of the Iraqi 
government. At the same time, the Kurds needed to work at all levels to find support, 
among the major Iraqi political parties as well as from the UN and the international 
community. What could be concluded was that the future of Iraq depended on finding 
a resolution of the status of Kirkuk that it would be acceptable to all Iraqi parties.
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Chapter 8:  
CONSIDERING OIL CONTRACTS BETWEEN FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND KRG
“The KRG's oil contracts are legal, constitutional and 
legitimate and they are in the interests of Iraqi people”
(President Jalal Talabani) 455
INTRODUCTION
After the discovery of oil in Iraq the Kurds suffered various kinds of exploitation and 
repression. Regrettably, all Iraqi governments have always resorted to violence in 
order to keep oil out of Kurdish hands, and indeed went further when they deliberated 
over blocking exploration and development of fields in Kurdistan. Saddam Hussein 
was determined to use Iraqi oil revenues to finance the military campaigns that 
destroyed nearly 5000 Kurdish villages, and he spent huge sums on a chemical and 
biological programme that was used to manufacture the poison gas which killed
thousands of Kurdish civilians.
In terms of evaluating the situation post-2003, the Kurdish leadership have declared 
several times that they have not forgotten what happened in the past, but that they are
focusing these days on peace, prosperity and wellbeing for Kurdish citizens, both now 
and in the future. Thus, they defend the Kurdistani Parliament’s act as a legal right 
when they passed the Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law in August 2007, which authorised
the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources to negotiate and agree to long-term oil 
contracts. A positive point for Kurds is that an abundance of natural resources has 
meant relying on themselves to secure the supply of oil products in creating a refining 
industry, and also to use these resources effectively for the benefit of their own 
population and for all the Iraqi people. Beyond that, the Kurds are aware that ensuring
455 Iraqi Kurdistan begins oil exports, on June 1, 2009, Available at:
<URL:http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2009/6/investkurdistan456.htm>
Access Date:  22 August .2009
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security, stability and prosperity for the Kurdistan Region will require a peaceful and 
cooperative relationship and coordination with all Iraqi factions. 
The equitable distribution of this revenue became a contentious issue in Iraq. One of 
the significant disputes between the KRG and the Iraqi Government concerned the oil
fields within the disputed territories and whether they would be run by the KRG or the 
Iraqi government, and also the signing of contracts with foreign companies for the 
exploration, development and production of oil in the Kurdistan Region. Meanwhile, 
the KRG has defended its attitude that crucial steps have been taken towards reviving 
this sector and its development because the economy of Iraq and the development of 
the Kurdistan region and the lives of all citizens in Iraq depend upon it. That is to say, 
the export of Kurdistan oil is for the benefit of all Iraqi people.
In this chapter we try to find the answer to the dilemma that every adversity, 
oppression and self-denial the Kurdish people have suffered through the past centuries 
due to the discovery of sources of oil wealth in theirs region. The question that would 
arise here, after all changes have occurred in Iraq and the region, are the Kurds able to 
alter this political equation in their favour, that will not allow oil to be used again only 
for the prosperity and development of their region and ensure the well being of its 
people. In addition, the focus of this chapter would be construed in the discussing of 
different viewpoints of the parties for the management of this sector, in terms of 
defending of their own oil policy and even to the extent of their mutual accusations. 
This chapter reveals a level of deep disagreements over oil rights between Baghdad 
and Erbil, due to long-delayed hydrocarbons law, prompting fierce criticism by the 
Kurds. In the meantime, there are seriousness efforts to reach a settlement between 
the Iraqi federal government and the KRG. However, for the Arab parties, it became 
apparent that the real fear of the Kurds had obtained significant gains in the 
Constitution. Significantly, the current problems represent how to diminish these 
powers through amending the Constitution in order to limit and restrict the KRG's 
powers and its role to manage the oil and gas sector in the future.
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8.1 GREAT POWERS AND THE COMPETITION OVER 
KIRKUK’S OIL FIELDS
Historical competition over oil fields in Kirkuk by the European powers, particularly 
Britain goes back to the nineteenth century. The Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), 
with a significant British shareholding, was the first company to exploit Kirkuk’s oil 
resources in 1912 and continued its work after the end of the First World War. Britain 
more or less monopolised the oil resources and other companies, such as the 
Americans, were not allowed to play a role in the region.456 Thus, it is not difficult to 
imagine the circumstances after the discovery of oil after World War I in Kirkuk, 
which led to increase ethnic tensions in Kirkuk. It is necessary to point out that, the 
British had supported  strongly the new Iraqi government to draw the official 
boundaries of the new Iraqi state in 1925, which in turn opened the way for the British 
to control Turkish Petroleum Company drilled Iraq’s first oil well in Kirkuk in 
1927.457
Perhaps the core issue is that Iraq enjoys the second largest oil reserves in the world, 
second only to Saudi Arabia. It is stated that Iraq’s supplies will enable it to produce 
112 billion barrels (13.7 percent of total OPEC reserves). According to Vera de 
Ladoucette, out of 37 oil fields already discovered, only 15 have been put into 
production, while Iraq has the potential to produce 4.7 mbd. In addition, there is also 
the possibility of extending the production of existing fields by about 900,000 bd of
oil from fields not yet exploited but ready to be developed.458 One critical issue is that 
concerning its natural resources, the Kurdistan Region is also one of the richest parts
of Iraq in terms of metal and water wealth. According to Kaiwan Siwaily, around 40
percent of Iraq’s natural resources, including oil reserves and natural gas, are located 
in the Kurdistan Region. 459 Policy resource management is an important dimension 
in the context of government planning. Dr. Siwaily mentioned that the previous Iraqi 
456 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethonopolitics of Conflicts and 
Compromise, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2009, p.19-20.
457 Peter W. Connors, ‘The US Army in Kirkuk : governance operations on the fault lines of Iraqi 
society, 2003-2009’, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press publications, November 2011. Available at: 
< URL: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp,>
458 Vera de Ladoucette, “Iraq in a New Map of Oil Supplies: Implications for Other Gulf Oil 
Producers”, in Iraq Reconstruction and Future Role,  Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and 
Research, 2004, pp. 135-8
459 Interview with Dr. Kaiwan Siwaily, an oil and geology expert who worked with the KRG’s Ministry 
of Natural Resources, on 2May 2009. Erbil
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government had issued a Law of Nationalisation of Oil in 1972 and that all the foreign 
companies were expelled in 1973. However, in simple terms, the policy of the 
Kurdistan Region towards management of this sector was not clear.
It should be noted that, from the 1960s Iraq had moved towards the nationalisation of
all companies in the sector, but the Kurdistan Region continued with its own policy 
against all the rules for the nationalisation of oil, and the KRG declared an open door 
policy for natural resource investment, a policy in which the Western world was 
already proficient. Because of their technological development, industrialised 
countries were able to manage oil and gas sectors by themselves; therefore their
investments were run by their own companies in their own countries. In contrast,
Third World countries (such as Iraq) needed to invite in the foreign companies to 
revive these sectors, particularly if they themselves lacked the capacity to develop 
their oil and gas sectors. The question of how these companies held the contracts is a 
controversial one. It is worth noting that, in the case of acceptance to participate in 
these contracts, it is necessary to determine the kind of contract, i.e., whether it is a 
“service” contract or a “production sharing” contract. In production sharing, as the 
name suggests, production will be shared between the companies and the second 
parties (whether the KRG or the Iraqi government); whereas in a service contract the
companies will take wages for their work.460
As Khalid Shwani indicates, not only does the Kirkuk case have internal dimensions 
on the level of those of Iraq and Kurdistan, but it also has regional and even 
international dimensions. Certainly, the regional countries have a political agenda and 
have also had a significant impact on delaying the implementation of Article 140. It is 
worth reiterating all these concerns because of the oil fields in Kirkuk. In fact, all 
previous Iraqi governments were deliberately draining the oil wealth in the Kurdish 
areas, especially in Kirkuk, which is considered to include one fifth of Iraq’s oil 
reserves, and also contains around a third of Iraq’s production, if compared with the 
giant oil fields in southern Iraq where there was an elaborate scheme to conserve and 
not deplete them.461 In light of such conditions, Talabani has raised inquires as to 
what the Kurds have gained from Iraq as it was scheduled to set up oil refinery in 
460 Interview with Dr Kaiwan Siwaily, on 2May 2009, Erbil
461 Interview with Khalid Shwani, on 22 April 2010, Kirkuk
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Koi-Sanjaq and Dr. Ibrahim Bahr al-Alum laid the foundation stone for the 
construction however he has not yet placed a stone on a stone. So now the Kurdish 
areas are deprived of a railway as there are none available. However, the strategic 
projects in Iraq have dedicated billions of dollars but so far there is no strategic 
project in the Kurdish areas. 462
8.2 THE DILEMMA OF LEGITIMATE OIL CONTRACTS AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND THE KRG
In fact, the new Iraqi constitution is ambiguous, particularly with regard to the 
jurisdiction of the authorities over the mineral rights of the KRG and the Iraqi federal 
government. However, both sides have the right for making oil deals with private 
companies provided that the distribution of revenues is taken into account and 
taxation is applied fairly. The KRG also insists on benefiting financially from the oil 
within its region as it is not receiving its share of revenues from Iraq’s southern 
oilfields. 
In this context, Yucel Guclu notes that any possibility of controlling Kirkuk, which 
would mean controlling 40 percent of Iraq’s proven oil reserves, would encourage 
Kurds to an independent Kurdish State and consequently would lead to outbreaks of
violence, not only in Iraq but also in the wider Middle East.463 Interestingly, regarding 
the possibility and fears of secession of the Kurdish region in Iraq, President Talabani 
stated that: “this is an illusion and imagination are not unfounded, the Kurdish people 
voted for the Iraqi Constitution by 95%, more than any other region in Iraq and the 
first article of the constitution stipulates that Iraq is a democracy, an independent 
federal standard, and this means that 95 % of the Kurdish people voted for the unity 
462 Interview with President Jalal Talabani in the Al- Iraqiya satellite, on 25 February 2008. Available 
at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=5290&type=interviews>  
Access Date: 5 April 2009
463 Yucel Guclu, The Turcomans and Kirkuk, p. 96
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of Iraqi democracy based on the Federal and equality,  Iraq is a number and 
unacceptable to be divided”.464
It is clear that the Kurdish leaders insisted on running their own natural resources and 
developing new oil resources in the Kurdistan region. According to Yucel Guclu, the 
Kurds’ demands were exaggerated when developing the northern reserves, which was 
inconsistent with the policy and authority of the central government. Also, the vision 
of a centralised oil industry created by the coalition authorities clearly indicated in 
clause E of Article 25 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of 8 March
2004, that …management of Iraq’s natural resources, which are owned by the people 
of Iraq, will be conducted in consultation with regions and governorates, with the 
distribution of revenue though the public budget made in an equitable manner in 
accordance with demographic distribution in various areas of the country taking into 
account those areas that were unfairly denied access to revenue by the previous 
regime, as well as the need and level of development in various regions of the 
country.465
One can conceivably indicate that in the first instance, the TAL gave the Iraqi 
government exclusive power over the management of natural resources. Moreover, 
the Iraqi government had full and direct control over appointments and dismissals at 
the Northern Oil Company (NOC), which was entirely dominated by Arabs (See 
Table 7, Chart 1, Graph 1). In fact, it is currently quite difficult to envisage the link 
between Kirkuk’s oil and Kurdish independence, since at the time that, the KRG itself
did not have a strong infrastructure to rely on when managing an independent entity, 
particularly as the KRG’s budget for the payment of the salaries of public sector 
workers, political party employees, and Peshmerga forces, was almost entirely 
dependent on the federal budget.466
464 President Jalal Talabani: “Iraq is now on the road chosen by the Iraqi people, and is the path of 
prosperity and development”, Interview with President Talabani with radio Korea, on 3 March 2009. 
Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=6984&type=interview>
Access Date: 5 April 2009.
465 Yucel Guclu, ibid., p .66
466 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2009), Crisis in Kirkuk, op. cit., p. 132.
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It is worth while mentioning that, the Kurdish leaders expressed their resentment to 
the US administration, and Baker and Hamilton report on Recommendation 28, which
clearly called on the US administration to put oil revenues under the care of the 
central government to be shared among the population. They also recommended that
the federal regions should not be allowed to have control over revenues from future 
fields, as giving control of oil fields to the regions was incompatible with national 
reconciliation.467 On the other side, the KRG insisting on having direct access and 
control over the oil revenues, as well as the signing and implementing of investment 
deals with foreign oil companies.
In Article 109, the Iraqi Constitution indicates the duty of the federal government to 
“…preserve the unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal 
democratic system.” It was believed that Kurdish rights had been challenged in the 
Iraqi Constitution, even though that constitution had taken numerous positive steps to 
structure a strategy for its oil policy for both sides of central government and the 
regional governments; the main principle specified in Article 111 states that “Oil and 
gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”468 Indeed,
it became apparent that the problem lay in the interpretation of the meaning of these 
constitutional articles, which in turn had profound implications for the control of oil 
revenues and for their future use. Thus, According to Article 111 of the Iraqi 
constitution, the oil and gas belong to all committed Iraqis, which mean that oil
revenues must be shared. What was notable about this debate, as has been argued, was 
that the Kurds had obtained significant gains in the Constitution.469 What should be 
noted here that, the Kurds expected to be able to maintain these gains provided the 
other Iraqi groups respected the constitution and intended to implement it. 
Obviously, the KRG was interested in searching for natural resources and developing
independently from Baghdad, at the time the Iraqi constitution was promulgated, there 
was no mention as to how to distribute oil revenues. Article 112 stipulated that a share 
of the proceeds should be allocated to regions that were unjustly deprived by 
Saddam’s regime. In this context, Frsat Ahmad thinks that the strategy for the oil 
467James A. Baker III, and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report, New York, 2006, p.65 
468 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”, Media Directorate, www.partiament.iq
469 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”, ibid.
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sector should be based on a cooperating method with the Iraqi federal government. 
Moreover, these policies have to be practised through coordination, cooperation or 
participation with the central government, as indicated clearly in Article 112 (1) of the 
constitution.470 In other words, the Kurds are always alleging their adherence to the 
Iraqi constitution, particularly Article 112 which granted control over everything 
other than “present fields” to the regions rather than to the federal government: it is 
clearly stated that:
the federal government, with the producing governorates and 
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil 
and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it 
distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the 
population distribution in all parts of the country.
The lack of a federal hydrocarbons law, which clarifying the definition and identity of 
“present fields” meant that it would be necessary to await a legal decision to resolve 
this outstanding problem. On the other hand, the Kurds have benefited from Article 
115, which offered a special grant suggesting that:
…all powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the 
federal government belong to the authorities of the regions 
and governorates that are not organized in a region. With 
regard to other powers shared between the federal 
government and the regional government, priority shall be 
given to the law of the regions and governorates not 
organized in a region in case of dispute.471
It should be pointed out that one of the serious problems between the KRG and Iraqi 
government regarding the oil policy concerned the subject of returns and allocated 
rewarding of investors. In this context, Dr. Ashti Hawrami, the KRG’s Minister for 
Natural Resources stated that investors in the Kurdistan Region were spending less 
and achieving more, compared with the Ministry of Oil’s contracts in Baghdad. The 
Taq-Taq oilfield had been discovered and developed at a cost of less than US $500 
million, and would produce at least 180,000 barrels per day, while Ahdab, an existing
470 Interview with Frsat Ahmad, on 2 April 2009, Erbil
471 Iraqi Council of Representatives, “Iraqi Constitution”, op. cit.
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low-risk discovered field, was expected to produce 100,000 bpd. However, the 
contractor was allowed a massive US $3 billion in cost allowances, ten times higher 
per barrel of production when compared to Taq-Taq, which meant in effect that
investors under the Oil Ministry’s contracts were being rewarded for having higher 
costs. In addition Hawrami explained that:
…in the KRG contracts, investors have strong incentives to 
invest quickly, leading to much earlier revenue returns to the 
people of Iraq. Thereby, the investor gets a gross profit share 
after cost recovery of around 10 to 12 percent. After allowing 
for exploration risk factors, the risked profit for the investor is 
less than five percent. All the costs of not finding oil are born 
by the investor.472
Further, Dr. Ashti Hawrami declared that with the exporting of oil from the Kurdistan 
region, Iraq’s monthly oil exports would increase by 100,000 bd. This would come 
from the Tawke and the Taq-Taq oilfields. Within a year, oil exports from these two 
fields alone will probably increase to 250,000 bd. and by the end of the following 
year, oil exports would have increased to 450,000 bd. Within four years, 1,000,000 
bd. could be anticipated. This would increase Iraq’s overall oil exports by 50 percent
from the present (2009) level.473 He also stated that more than 35 companies from 15 
different countries, including Turkey, had entered into contracts. Further, he claimed 
that the KRG’s efforts would generate US $2 billion in revenue within one year, US 
$5 billion within another year and a staggering US $20 Billion in just four years. He 
added that the contractors had strong incentives to invest quickly, thereby leading to 
much earlier revenue returns to the people of Iraq. The investors would receive a 
gross profit share of around 10 to 12 percent; consequently everyone would share that 
benefit.474 It had been confirmed that the Kurdistan Region had the largest inventory 
472 Dr. Ashti Hawrami, Minister of Natural Resources; Commencement of Oil Export Ceremony,
Erbil, Kurdistan Region - Iraq, 1st June 2009, Available at 
<URL:http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/Ashti_Hawrami_Speech_Oil_Exports_1June09__2009_
06_02_h16m12s39.pdf
473 Dr Ashti Hawrami, Minister of Natural Resources; Commencement of Oil Export Ceremony,
ibid.
474 KRG.org, Kurdistan Region celebrates historic achievement with first crude oil export, 02 Jun. 
2009. Available at:
<URL: http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&rnr=223&anr=29807>
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and oil reserves, including 45 million barrels of oil, 20 trillion cubic metres of natural 
gas, and expected oil reserves in this region for more than 50 years. In the Kurdistan 
Region there were currently three large oil refineries, 22 small refineries in 
Sulaymaniyah, 16 refineries in Erbil and 15 in Dohuk. Currently there were 40 
international companies from 17 countries working in the oil field, some of which 
would work in the Region for 20 years, take 60 percent of the production, with 40
percent for the Kurdistan Region.475
In defiance, the KRG strongly asserts on legitimacy their contract with regional and 
international companies. In focusing on its contracts, the KRG announced that their 
contracts with Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) were based on a production-
sharing contract and commercial terms and conditions. According to this contract 
model, KNOC would take a 60 percent interest in the Sangaw South Block, with the 
remaining 40 percent participation interest held by the KRG. KNOC would also take 
an 80 percent participation interest in the Qush-Tappa Block (published in some KRG 
block maps as “Block K26”), with the remaining 20 percent participation interest held 
by the KRG.476 One should mention here that on 19 June 2008, the KRG signed two 
petroleum contracts with wholly-owned subsidiaries of Talisman Energy Inc, with
headquarters in Calgary, Canada. One of the Talisman Company’s fields in the Kalar-
Bawanoor Block was published on KRG maps as “Block K44”. According to the 
deal between the two sides, Talisman Block K44 would take a 40 percent interest, and 
the remaining 20 percent participation interest would be held by the KRG, carried by 
Western Zagros Limited. Another of Talisman’s field was Talisman Block K39, 
which they planned to exploit under a service agreement for a two-year exploration 
programme in the K39 Block.477 In order to reach these outcomes the KRG 
emphasized that their framework for oil investment in Iraq followed the democratic, 
federal, and free market principles mandated by the Iraq constitution. Therefore, their 
ambition was for the adoption of a similar constitutional framework in the rest of Iraq 
475 The issue of oil was discussed in the Kurdistan Parliament, in the presence of the Minister of Oil 
and Natural Resources, on 22 August 2010,
<URL:http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal& jimare=8329> 
476 Khaled Salih at KRG.org, Industry and media inquiries, “KRG and Korea National Oil 
Corporation sign new petroleum contracts”, on 25 Jun. 2008
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&asnr=&anr=24663&rnr=223
477 Khaled Salih at KRG.org, Industry and media inquiries, “KRG signs petroleum contracts with 
Talisman Energy”, 23 June 2008. See
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&asnr=&anr=24638&rnr=223
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to attract investments that would be specifically designed for Iraq-wide revenue 
sharing, as an essential element for future stability in Iraq.
Given the nature of the terms involved, it was very interesting to note that several 
Western companies had taken up licences to explore in Kurdistan, including DNO, a 
Norwegian firm that had already begun to lay an export pipeline to Turkey. 
Furthermore, there was a service contract with the UAE’s Dana Gas. The DNO’s (Det 
Norske Oljeselskap) discovery significantly enhanced the economic prospects of the 
Kurdistan Region, but at the same time it also raised the political stakes over who 
controlled these natural resources.478
Regarding possible oil development in the Kurdistan Region, more serious trouble
occurred after 2004, when the KRG signed contracts for Tawke and Taq-Taq. On 1 
June 2009, the KRG began oil exports with the Norwegian oil company DNO, having 
completed preparations to export an average of 60,000 bpd from the Tawke oil field 
to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, via a new 45 km pipeline. In another way the Kurdistan 
experience could be seen as the first oil pumped from fields in the KRG to be 
exported from Iraq, thus forming a new strategic position for the Kurdistan Region. 
However, the problem lay with the Oil Ministry in Baghdad which denounced the two 
dozen oil deals that had been signed by the KRG because it considered them as 
illegitimate. Concerning other key obstacles between the two sides, there was still no 
agreement as to how the foreign firms would be compensated and how the contractors 
would be paid for their work.479
In light of the oil licensing activity, the Oil Minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, accused 
the KRG of exceeding the powers that had been granted to them, particularly when 
the DNO480 announced on 30 June 2004, that it had entered into an agreement with 
the KRG to explore for and develop oil and gas in the region. After testing a well 
drilled at Tawke, a village near the Turkish border, 100 million barrels of oil were 
478 Ben Lando and Alaa Majeed “Load ‘em up: fields in Iraqi Kurdistan begin”, Iraq Oil Report, on 1 
June 2009. Available at: <URL: http://www.iraqoilreport.com/the-biz/load-em-up-fields-in-iraqi-
kurdistan-begin-1556/>
479 Ben Lando and Alaa Majeed, ibid.
480 Norwegian oil firm DNO was among the first foreign firms authorised to operate an oil-drilling 
licence in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein. It also has interests in oilfields in the North Sea, 
Yemen, and East and West Africa.
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found in its licence area. In light of such situations, the Oil Ministry in Baghdad 
argued that any of the KRG’s oil deals and all oil exploration had to be approved by 
the Federal Government. The Kurdish Oil Minister rejected these allegations, insisting 
that the Iraqi Constitution was clear in giving an administrative role only to the 
federal Government in the exporting and marketing of oil from existing fields, while 
the regional governments had exclusive power over undeveloped oilfields and new 
exploration activity.481 In this context, Falah Mustafa has noted how, in response to 
the federal government’s criticisms in Baghdad of the KRG’s actions as non-
transparent and non-constitutional, the Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani faced 
formidable censure and was eventually charged because of his failed policies in the 
management of this sector. Al-Shahristani had spent nearly US $8 billion to repair 
Iraq's oil industry, but instead of production levels increasing, overall production 
actually decreased.482
The KRG blamed Oil Minister al-Shahristani, who opposed KRG’s oil moves, and 
insisted that paying the contractors was up to the KRG. Since the KRG received only 
17 percent of state income, this made it impossible for them to cover the contractors’ 
production sharing costs and still afford to run their regional government. In this 
context, the KRG claimed that, according to the Tawke contract, it was the Iraqi 
government that should compensate the contractors, but Baghdad refused this claim. 
It should be noted here that the DNO had a 55 percent stake in the Tawke project,483
481 The DNO was granted a licence over 250 square miles of Kurdish territory in 2004 and tested their
first exploration well, which flowed at 5,000 barrels per day. In fact, the DNO succeeded in finding oil 
in previously unexplored areas in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which aroused considerable interest at a 
time when Iraq’s oil industry was struggling to produce even half of its pre-war output. See Carl 
Mortished, “Kurdish minister defies Baghdad over oil licenses”, International Business Editor, on June 
15, 2006. 
<URLhttp://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article674871.e
ce>
482 Personal interview with Falah Mustafa, on 1st May 2009, Erbil
483 The KRG decided to suspend DNO’s activities in their region for six weeks and threatened to expel 
it permanently after the Oslo Stock Exchange had published details of a $30 million share deal between 
the KRG and DNO in 2008. DNO’s share price fell by 50 per cent the day after the announcement, and 
the KRG's reputation was also negatively affected by this event due to wide publicity in newspapers 
and other local and international media. The stake was subsequently bought by Genel Energy, a 
Turkish company, listed in London as an oil business active in the KRG. It was reported that the
KRG’s Minister of Natural Resources had played the role of mediator in this deal, and it is reasonable 
to conclude that his involvement meant that he personally or other prominent individuals in the KRG 
may have benefited from it financially. It has been estimated that Hawrami benefited from this deal by
an amount of up to ten million pounds. The DNO and the KRG alleged that the Oslo Stock Exchange 
had acted unlawfully by publishing confidential information. In contrast, the Exchange argued that 
their action in releasing the details came under Norwegian law and was legal. The KRG also defended 
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and was the operator. Genel was farmed in for 25 percent, and DNO was also the 
operator of the Dohuk project, in which both DNO and Genel held 40 percent stake. 
Moreover, DNO had a 40 percent stake in the Erbil project, which was also still in the 
exploration phase.484 It was reported around this time that one of the most influential 
figures who had recently joined the DNO’s board of directors was Zalmay 
Khalilzad,485 a former US ambassador to Iraq; another important figure was Peter 
Galbraith.486 It has been said that the KRG was very interested in the appointment of 
these personalities who might influence Baghdad into supporting KRG over the
disputed oil contracts with companies like DNO.487
Another issue that provoked the KRG was that any decision related to contracting for 
development of the Kirkuk and Bai-Hassan fields in the disputed Kurdish territories, 
which contained eight billion barrels of crude and a huge volume of gas and had yet to 
be exploited, required the direct involvement of the KRG as a party to the dispute. In 
reality, the Kurds were excluded from participation. The largest international 
companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil, as well as other companies 
including Lukoil of Russia, Total of France, and Statoil Hydro of Norway, were 
competing to obtain contracts to develop Kirkuk's oil fields.488 Besides these 
differences, there was another serious disagreement between the two sides (Iraqi 
themselves on the basis that they had bought the DNO shares on behalf of Genel Energy (this Turkish 
oil firm also invested in KRG oil deals and now owns nearly 5 percent of DNO) to support both 
companies at a time when financing was difficult and they were not allowed to export oil from Iraq. 
Furthermore, Hawrami indicated that they take would legal action against the Oslo Stock Exchange for 
allegedly violating laws of confidentiality. See Robin Pagnamenta, “DNO could be London-bound 
after Kurdish oil row”, The Times-UK, 30 September 2009. Available at: 
<URL: http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2009/9/investkurdistan506.htm> Access Date 12 
December 2009.
484 Ben Lando, “DNO’s Iraq operations suspended” on 30 April 2011, Access Date:
<URL:http://vancongrp.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37:dnos-iraq-
operations-suspended&catid=4:articles&Itemid=11> Access Date: 1st May 2011
485 As it was clear, that the Khalilzad was U.S. ambassador to Iraq from June 2005 to March 2007, and 
then went on to serve as ambassador to the UN for the remainder of the Bush administration. He was 
also ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005
486 Peter Galbraith, who was a former U.S. ambassador to Croatia and adviser to Iraq's Kurds on 
constitutional issues, was deemed as one of the main supporter of the KRG on his battle with the 
central government to defend on Kurdish national rights. Moreover, it has been reported lately that he 
was an early investor in DNO's Kurdish contracts.
487 Khalilzad nominated to DNO board, the Norwegian firm that produces oil in Iraq's Kurdistan 
region, on June 16, 2010. Available at:
<URL: http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2010/6/invest595.htm> Access Date: 5 August 2010
488 Alice Fordham and Robin Pagnamenta, “Political disputes threaten sale of rights to exploit Iraqi 
oilfields”, The Times-UK, on June 29, 2009. Available at:
<URL:http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article6597797
.ece> Access Date: 14 August 2009 
230
government and KRG), related to the role of a new Iraq national oil company (INOC), 
since annexes to the draft law would allocate 93 per cent of Iraq’s petroleum reserves 
to INOC, leaving only seven per cent for the regions, including Kurdistan. For this
reason, the KRG alleged that the measure was unconstitutional and threatened to 
oppose it in the federal parliament.489 This protest reflected the conflict between the 
KRG and Baghdad over who exercised control over oil reserves in the region. The 
KRG was critical of the proposals for a new INOC, saying that they would reject any 
concentration of power in the hands of INOC because it would represent a return to 
the methods of petroleum management of previous Iraqi regimes which had
centralised oil power.
In other respects, the federal government in Baghdad was suspicious of Kurdish 
initiatives to issue licences independently to foreign oil explorers, which could be 
seen as a stepping stone to Kurdish independence. On the other hand, Baghdad 
maintained it had sole rights to strike oil deals, which was why the Iraqi Oil Minister 
warned foreign companies not to sign contracts without the knowledge of the federal 
Government as they would be illegal. He also blacklisted any companies who signed 
with the KRG for purchasing Iraqi crude or participating in federal oil deals, and
threatened Western companies, such as Western Oil Sands, a Canadian explorer 
which had signed a production-sharing agreement with the KRG in an area southeast 
of the giant Kirkuk oilfield, with an expected investment of US $45 million over four 
years.490 In the meantime, the optimism of the Kurdistan authorities seemed to be 
bringing investment by oil companies into their region, with Heritage Oil from 
Canada signing two memorandums of understanding with KRG for an area 
comprising some 1,300 square kilometres. Sterling Energy, the first company from 
Britain in the area, also contracted with the KRG for oil exploration in the north. 491
What is noteworthy about this debate, despite the external accusations against the 
KRG’s oil policy, there has also been harsh criticism by the opposition blocs in the 
489 Carl Mortished, “Kurdish protest puts Iraqi oil law at risk”, The Times, May 1, 2007, Available at: 
<URL:http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/utilities/article1728869.ece> 
Access Date: 3 February 2009 
490 Carl Mortished, “Oil find in Kurdish Iraq fuels tensions”, The Times-UK, 13 June 2006. Available 
at: <URL: http://admin.iraqupdates.net/scr/preview.php?article=8640> Access Date: 3 February 2009
491 Jan Jun, Iraq: Oil Prospecting In Kurdish-Administered North Intensifies, Radio Free Europe, on 12 
May 2006. Available at: <URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1068359.html>
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Kurdistan parliament against Dr. Ashti Hawrami, the Minister of Natural 
Resources,492 and of the ministry’s policy inside the Kurdistan Region. Accusations 
were levelled, particularly by the Change movement (Goran), the Kurdistan Islamic 
Union (Yakgrtui Islami), and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan (Komali Islami), that 
there was illegal and clandestine smuggling of crude oil in the Region by local 
companies and influential individuals in the two main parties, with the knowledge of 
the Ministry of Oil and Natural Resources. Hawrami responded by saying that the
allegations were false and incorrect. The opposition blocs also maintained that there 
were more than 80 illegal refineries distributed across the three provinces that did not
have legal licenses from the KRG and that should be closed, and accused the Minister 
of not giving Parliament sufficient information about how oil revenues should be sold
and distributed. In this context, it should be mentioned that accurate information was
published through local media about officials and politicians and their family
members who had set up small companies to smuggle crude oil to Iran and Turkey.493
The KRG itself began exporting oil for the first time in June 2009, pumping crude 
through a pipeline to Turkey for sale to foreign markets.
Another significant event in the Middle East concerned an agreement to build a new, 
3,300-kilometre gas pipeline called Nabucco, to run between eastern Turkey and 
Vienna in Austria; it is estimated to be running by 2015. It can be concluded that the 
KRG has the ability to achieve this US $8 billion plan to supply natural gas from the 
Kurdistan Region to Europe via the Nabucco pipeline; at the same time one may
reasonably regard the scheme as an important element in the attempt by the European 
Union to rely less heavily in the future on Russian gas. Disputes over the rights to 
sign contracts and how to manage disputed territories were undoubtedly exacerbated 
492 The Heritage Oil Company put Kurdistan on the world’s energy map. It has been rumoured that
Hawrami bought a stake in the Heritage Company in the autumn of 2008 for 12,095,850 at the time 
the company was looking for oil in the Kurdistan Region. After the discovery of oil by Heritage, 
Hawrami sold the same shares for 25,070,709. See: Jon Tomas, “The secret profits of Ashti Hawrami”
trans.bySbiey.com,,on22 February, 2010, Available at: 
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaiArticleDetail.aspx?id=516 > Access Date 25 February 2010
493 See the report published in Rozhnama newspaper (No. 591, on 10 July 2010), which is funded by, 
and reflects the views of Goran (the Change movement). It directly accuses the PUK and KDP of 
having taken US$250 million monthly from the smuggling of crude oil. As a result of this accusation, 
the KDP’s Political Bureau lodged a complaint against the newspaper, requesting one billion dollars in 
damages and closing of the newspaper.  Rozhnama newspaper responded that the purpose of the 
lawsuit was political. See Awene Newspaper, ‘Azad Chalak said: The KDP's Complaint for a political 
purpose. Available at: <URL: http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=8090>. 
Access Date: 4 August 2010
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by the announcement of this gas export deal in the Kurdistan Region. In this regard, 
Hawrami stated that:
…we are planning a strategic pipeline to link up with the 
Nabucco pipeline. This will generate even more revenues for 
Iraq… Iraq needs to boost exports to at least 5,000,000 barrels 
per day by the time KRG’s production target reaches 
1,000,000 barrels per day. 
Thus Iraq could be one of the nations to reap large profits by feeding gas into the new 
pipeline. Hawrami’s prediction is based on the fact that the Kurdistan region has a 
high percentage of natural gas, and now that the region is located on the world map by 
having become part of the Nabucco project, such projects are likely to have a 
dramatically positive impact on the prosperity of the Kurdistan Region in the near 
future; this should be regarded as a great asset for the KRG and must be skilfully 
nurtured.494
8.3 MOVING TOWARDS A SOLUTION FOR THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF OIL REVENUES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND THE KRG
It is undeniable that Kurds proceeded to Baghdad to issue a hydrocarbons law in 
August 2007, which led to the KRG increasing progress in this sector. Disputes 
between the two sides arose around the time of the establishment of the Iraqi 
Government’s first cabinet, and tensions appeared to have reached the level of verbal 
exchanges between Baghdad and the KRG regarding the draft oil law. The Oil 
Minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, angrily accused the KRG and clearly announced his 
opposition to contracts that were made illegally and were intentionally imprecise. 
Shahristani also threatened that all the companies who dealt with the KRG would be 
deprived of any future oil contracts with the federal government and would not be 
permitted use of Iraqi pipelines to transport the oil produced. However the Kurds felt 
that they had the right to sign Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements 
494 KRG.org: ‘Hawrami said: ‘he constitution gives us the right to sell oil’, 19 August 2010. Available 
at:
< URL: http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=13&smap=01010200&rnr=26&anr=36473> 
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themselves and this would be done separately from the Iraqi government. 
Consequently, the KRG was obliged to move forward unilaterally to develop of oil 
fields within its region, and despite all the obstacles it had succeeded in dealing with a 
large number of international oil companies by the end of 2007. Baghdad’s reaction in 
this regard was expected by the Kurds; the Ministry of Oil duly issued a statement 
indicating clearly that:
Ownership of Iraq’s natural resources, including oil and 
natural gas, rest with the entire Iraqi people. The authority to 
exploit or take new decisions relating to the exploration, 
development, production and handling of oil and natural gas 
has been and will remain a sovereign right of the central 
government of Iraq, and such decisions will be made on the 
basis of Iraqi national laws… As part of this policy 
companies that wish to be welcomed here in the future should 
not enter into or try to pursue the implementation of 
agreements with persons who are not empowered to represent 
the sovereign government of Iraq.495
Falah Mustafa claims that the KRG had approached the Iraqi government with the 
intention of arriving at a draft agreement with them. It was supposed that this draft,
signed by both sides, was attached with the “side letter” that was to be sent to the 
Council of Ministers and from there to the Iraqi Parliament. However, this procedure
appears not to have taken place. Likewise, both sides had accepted the conditions 
which were mentioned in this letter, and if the Iraqi government did not issue the Oil 
Law and its accessories until the end of May 2007, the KRG would have had a right to 
sign its own contracts during this time. At this point it is difficult, if not impossible; 
to envisage how the KRG’s oil contracts were carried out within the legal framework 
of the Constitution and according to international standards. As well as the existence 
of contradictions, the KRG set out to carry on signing its oil contracts with some of 
the international companies. However, the KRG waited until the end of August 2007, 
when the parliament of the Kurdistan Region had ratified the Oil and Gas Law.496
495 Yucel Guclu, op. cit., p .67-8 
496 Interview with Falah Mustafa, on 1st May 2009, Erbil
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In order to find a way out of the political crisis with the Iraqi government, the oil 
contracts in particular needed to be addressed. Falah Mustafa asserted that, among the
more difficult of the outstanding problems, the best thing to do would be to draw up
structure for the Law of Oil and Gas in a form that would serve all the Iraqi people. In 
his view, “this direction of thinking should be changed so that every decision should 
be issued from the centre, under the control of the Iraqi National Oil Company 
[INOC].” In this context, he later referred to a speech by the Prime Minister which 
claimed that:
The days have passed when everything would go back to the 
centre, and we do not want to be at the mercy of Baghdad for 
the use of and investment in natural resources. According to 
the Constitution this wealth belongs to all Iraqi people. So 
Kurds, as a part of Iraq, have the right to invest in its natural 
resources, and to use its wealth in the development of the 
lives of Iraqi citizens and also to revive of those Regions.  
In this respect Dr. Ashti Hawrami, illustrated the importance of the KRG’s 
contribution to Iraq’s oil exports and showed how decentralization and competition 
could increase oil revenues for Iraq. The KRG could own and develop new reservoirs, 
and does have fields with potential oil and gas resources in significant volumes in 
Taq-Taq, Chamchamal, and Zakho. Beyond this, fair distribution of the revenues 
between the KRG and the federal government could be the key to resolving the 
chronic disputes between the Kurds and Arabs in Iraq. Hawrami also emphasised the 
need for a modern federal oil law that would establish a clear and transparent 
framework for managing the oil sector and distributing revenue.
The KRG announced that all contracts issued by the KRG were in the form of the 
production sharing contracts model (PSC), and that if commercial discoveries were 
made, these five PSCs would provide an estimated aggregate profit of over 85 percent
to Iraq and around 15 percent to the contractors. Under the five PSCs made with the 
TNK-BP affiliate Norbest Limited, with a Korean consortium headed by Korean 
state-owned oil company KNOC, with the Hillwood International Energy company 
HKN Energy, and with subsidiaries of the UK-listed Sterling Energy LLC and 
Denver-based Aspect Energy LLC , the KRG had the right to a participation interest 
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to further increase Iraq’s profit share and had retained the right to assign third party 
participation interests to qualified Iraqi and international companies to further
stimulate the local economy.497 In light of such conditions, the Kurdistan Region 
would continue to try to attract oil investment. 
At the present time, dramatic political and economic changes, internationally and in 
particular at the regional level, are to some extent prompting formerly hostile views 
towards the Kurds to change. The Turkish government was confronted by a choice of 
two possible paths. First, Turkey has seen how the economic development of the 
KRG, and the establishment their infrastructure through oil wealth and minerals, can 
lead to a strengthening of the Kurdish state; this in turn may generate a secessionist 
spirit among its own Kurds. For this reason there has been a tendency to stand up to 
these changes and prevent them from continuing, which has so far been a Turkish 
strategy against any Kurdish entity since the creation of the Turkish State. Second, if 
looked at from the viewpoint of Turkish interests, there are enormous profits to be 
made by Turkish companies in the region, which is amounted to approximately 6 
billion dollar in a year. 498 In this case it would be in the interests of the Turkish State 
497 Based on KG block maps, these deals with the foreign companies for oil and gas were explained as 
follows:
•  Award of one PSC for four blocks comprising the Hawler Contract Area (of 1,532 square kilometres) 
in Erbil Governorate, to Norbest Limited, an affiliate of TNK-BP. The Hawler Area comprises blocks 
advertised in June as K11, K12, K14, K15, and is considered to be a low to medium exploration risk 
area. 
•  Award of the Bazian Block (473 square kilometres) in Sulaimaniya Governorate to KNOC Bazian 
Limited, owned by the Korea National Oil Corporation, and Korean private sector oil exploration and 
development companies SK Energy Co Ltd, Daesung Industrial Co, Ltd, Samchully Co Ltd, Bum-Ah 
Resource Development Corp, UI Energy Corporation, GS Holdings Corp, and Majuko Corporation. 
The Bazian Block is a relatively low exploration risk area. 
•  Award of the Sarsang Block (1,226 square kilometres) in Dohuk Governorate to HKN Energy Ltd, a 
Hillwood International Energy company. The Sarsang Block is considered to be a medium exploration 
risk area. 
•  Award of the Sangaw North Block (492 square kilometres) in Sulaimaniya Governorate to Sterling 
Energy (International) Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sterling Energy LLC. The Sangaw North 
Block is considered to be a low exploration risk area. 
• Award of the Atrush Block (269 square kilometres) in Dohuk Governorate to General Exploration 
Partners Inc, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Aspect Energy LLC. The Atrush Block is considered to be 
a low exploration risk area.
See Khaled Salih at KRG.org, Industry and media inquiries, “KRG signs five more petroleum
contracts”, on 12 November 2007, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq. Available at:
< URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=21329> 
Access Date 5 April 2009.
498 Based on the formal reports by KRG and Turkish governments, see “Kurdistan Invest In Democracy 
2011”, Newsdesk Communication Ltd,   
http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/Kurdistan_Investment_Guide_2011.pdf.
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to deal with a wealthy and stable province, rather than oversee its lack of stability and 
destruction.
Therefore, even though Turkey remains extremely reluctant to open up the road to the 
Kurdish entity in the region, ironically, the Kurdistan Region offers Turkey the only
road to realising its potential as a key entity and a strategic partner of the West.  From
this perspective, senior officials in the KRG have consistently emphasised that they 
are interested in working with Turkey as a means of increasing peace and prosperity 
in their Region, and that there should be further direct contacts between the KRG and 
Turkey, both economically and politically, to ensure stability for both sides. In fact, 
economic ties between Turkey and the KRG have strengthened noticeably in recent 
years, and continue to grow (by 76 percent). Recently (at the end of 2010), Turkey’s
Genel Energy has been developing the Taq-Taq oilfield jointly with Canada’s Addax 
Petroleum, an oil and gas company based in Calgary, Canada. 
Given such conditions, the Kurds believed that if the Iraqi government did not 
cooperate with the KRG, it would lead to delayed oil exports from the Region; 
therefore this policy would cause serious damage for the Kurdistan region and for the 
Iraqi government (it is reckoned so far to have cost Iraq over US $10 billion). The 
Kurds have refuted all accusations that their oil contracts were illegal and opaque, and
the KRG claims that they have consistently been transparent in their hydrocarbons 
policy. In fact, all Iraqi factions have become convinced that the only true path to 
achieving peace and stability, to ensuring political progress in Iraq, and to avoiding
territorial disputes, is by passing a modern federal hydrocarbons law for sharing oil 
revenue in a fair and transparent manner between the federal and regional 
governments, otherwise the unity and future of the country will be at risk. In fact, the 
Kurds have relied on Baghdad in ways that make it difficult for them to contemplate 
substantive changes to the status quo. They have obviously moved to secure their 
autonomy, but have also become active participants in attempts to forge a new 
democracy at the centre; albeit one that protects their interests. Regarding this issue, 
Prime Minister Nechirevan Barzani has stated that:
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If there had been a federal oil and gas law, we would have been 
able to achieve everything much more quickly, and this would 
have been to everyone’s benefit, and would have attracted 
more foreign investment. In terms of revenue sharing, I believe 
this will bring the government in Baghdad and the KRG closer 
to resolving outstanding issues in the oil and gas area.499
Furthermore, the Kurdish leadership wishes to prove to the Iraqi government that as 
far as Iraqi cooperation with the KRG is concerned, the oil and gas belong to all the 
people of Iraq. They have repeated their confirmation of increased production and 
have provided substantial revenues to Iraqi funds from which they will receive 17
percent. Regarding these allegations that the KRG's contracts had been signed is a 
constitutional violation and contrary to the policy of the central government of Iraqi. 
In this context, President Jalal Talabani pointed out to the possibility of resolving this 
issue, through the display in front of the Constitutional Court to decide the correct 
interpretation of the Constitution. The President of the Iraqi Republic also said that 
the resolving issue of Kirkuk lies in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, referring to 
steps that must be taken such as Normalization, Statistics and the Census, then can be 
applied of this constitutional Article.500
On the whole, one notes that besides progress and increasing prosperity in the 
Kurdistan Region, there have been significant improvements in Kurdistan’s 
infrastructure and the well-being of most Kurds since 2003. But the two main parties,
PUK and KDP, also face strong opposition from within their ranks, as well as from 
among Kurdish intellectuals and the society at large, because of the real feeling 
among many Kurds that most of the benefits from the huge development projects 
have been swallowed up by the interests of party leaders and other high-ranking 
officials. There are obvious manifestations of corruption, nepotism, tribalism, 
mismanagement, monopolization of power and marginalization of the parliament, and 
499 KRG.org, “Launch of Kurdistan Region Oil & Gas Yearbook 2009”, 20 July 2009;
Available at 
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&rnr=223&anr=30619>
500 “President of the Republic: the differences between the KRG and the central government is fleeting 
disagreements can be solved”, on 15 April 2009
Available at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=7169&type=interviews > 
Access date 25 December 2009.
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complaints made against the two ruling parties about these aspects have become 
standard and cannot be denied. Such complaints are now being openly voiced and 
discussed, currently by local newspapers such as Awena and Livin and, more
importantly by Hawlati and others. Indeed these severe criticisms are now turning 
from a notional phenomenon to tragic reality, so that the two main authorities (KDP 
and PUK) cannot be left to their own devices and must take decisive steps to solve
these problems.
CONCLUSION
It is true that the natural resources that flow from Kurdistan were fully controlled by 
Iraqi regimes for a century, and that the benefits of the oil were never permitted to 
build, unite, and promote a country. Instead, oil was used to finance repression and 
destruction for the Kurds, especially when the Baath regime invested the country’s 
tremendous oil revenues in chemical weapons and used them against the people of the 
Kurdistan region. Ironically, Kurdistan today is a place of opportunity in the oil and 
gas sector since the Kurdistan Region, as authorized by the Iraqi Constitution, is 
exercising federal control over its oil and gas sector. Indeed, the KRG’s policies and 
efforts are directed towards using the same resources to provide welfare and 
prosperity for the Kurdish people and guarantee their future. However, these 
developments have been viewed with concern and even hostility by the Iraqi 
government, among whose members there are some who believe strongly that such 
rights should be overseen from Baghdad.
The KRG is clearly keen to accelerate its plans to encourage inward investment in the 
Kurdistan region, for building infrastructure, improving the delivery of essential 
services, strengthening the emerging democratic institutions, enacting regional laws 
and investing in human resources through capacity building programmes in a variety 
of fields. Since 2004 the KRG has had dealings with Norway’s DNO Company to 
prospect for oil near Zakho and in the Taq-Taq fields. In 2007, the KRG opened the 
Dana Gas project to make gas available to electricity power stations; it also enacted 
the federal oil and gas law. In June 2009, and for the first time under the auspices of 
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the KRG, oil from the Khurmala fields was shipped to international markets through 
the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The Iraqi President Jalal Talabani described this as “an 
historic event, not only for the Kurdish people but for all Iraqis”, and President 
Barzani confirmed, “We have proven in a clear, proper way that we are committed to 
the constitution of Iraq.” Ashti Hawrami, the KRG Minister for Natural Resources, 
detailed the value and importance of the KRG’s contribution to Iraq’s oil exports, 
explaining how decentralisation and competition could increase oil revenues for Iraq 
and that the Iraqi constitution required that oil resources should be administrated in a 
way that would maximise revenues for all the people of Iraq.501 Nechirvan Barzani, 
KRG Prime Minister, also asserted that “...in the best interests of Iraq. We are 
contributing to a better and more stable future for Iraq. Today we want to take a step 
forward for the Kurdistan Region and for all of Iraq”.502
The non-Kurds, whether Arabs or Turkmen, believe that the Kurdish struggle to join 
Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Region is primarily a struggle over oil, and that it may 
represent a strong motivation towards the establishment of a future Kurdish State. On
the other hand, for the Kurds, the Kurdistan Region without Kirkuk does not have the 
means to survive economically, particularly as Kirkuk includes such a high volume 
(40 percent) of Iraq’s current petroleum production. In fact, it is currently quite 
difficult to envisage the link between Kirkuk’s oil and Kurdish independence, since at 
the time that, the KRG itself did not have a strong infrastructure to rely on when
managing an independent entity, particularly as the KRG’s budget for the payment of
the salaries of public sector workers, political party employees, and Peshmerga forces,
was almost entirely dependent on the federal budget.503
The Kurdish leaders constantly insisted that the Constitution had backed the KRG’s 
oil deals and laws, and that if the revenues from oil sales were deposited directly into 
the federal government account, the Kurds would therefore receive only a 17 percent 
benefit from this, while the rest of Iraq, which ironically had been highly resistant to
501KRG.org, “Kurdistan Region celebrates historic achievement with first crude oil export”, 2 June 
2009. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&rnr=223&anr=29807> 
502KRG.org, “PM's speech at start of oil exports”, Erbil, 1 June 2009. Available at:  
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02040100&rnr=268&anr=29800> 
503 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2009), op. cit., 2009, p. 132.
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the idea, would receive the other much-needed 83 percent of these revenues; thus, the 
revenues had to be handled fairly and transparently.504 It is evident that the main point 
of troubles between the Iraqi government and KRG focused on seeing that power over 
oil productions should be concentrated at the centre or in the Regions. However, 
according to the Constitution the KRG’s had the right to manage the fields in their 
areas in cooperation with the Iraqi government. Another point of misunderstanding 
between them related to the kinds of contracts to be arranged with the international oil 
companies. Interestingly, despite efforts to reach a settlement, al-Shahristani insisted
on applying the service contract, a kind of contract that the major oil companies might 
have had difficulty in accepting. The KRG preferred the production sharing type of 
contract that was a formidable motivating factor in getting the private sector involved
in production.505
In focusing on the Iraqi constitution the Kurdistan Region maintains defined rights in 
the Constitution to formulate and implements its oil and gas model, all the while 
recognizing that the resources belong to and should be shared with all the citizens of 
Iraq. What should be pointed out is that the KRG is seeking to retain as much control 
as possible over development deals in the Kurdistan Region. The KRG has also 
succeeded in developing its own fields and has actively created economic 
diversification through encouraging an investment law. Moreover, it vigorously 
promotes foreign direct investment, private enterprise in most fields, and government 
support for the private sector. Meanwhile, the federal government has not been 
operating at a level required to increase production, rehabilitate the oil fields, and 
provide basic services. In turn, it should be pointed out that prompt enactment of the 
federal oil and gas law and a federal revenue-sharing law will be of mutual benefit for 
the KRG and the Iraqi government; in addition these laws are essential for Iraq’s 
future stability and prosperity. In this regard, and in order to resolve these issues and 
move towards developing the oil and gas strategy, the federal government’s oil 
ministry should put an end to the policy of blacklisting companies that work in 
Kurdistan by preventing them from operating in the rest of Iraq.
504 Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, “Kurdistan manoeuvres to become a major feeder to Europe”, 31 May 
2009. Available at:  
<URL:http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.jsp?id=638CFD4670B766EDF93B19D7BF81DC6
2>
505 Interview with Falah Mustafa, on 1st May 2009, Erbil
241
It seems apparent that, one of the serious problems between the KRG and Iraqi 
government regarding the oil policy which pursued with investors. In spite of that, the 
KRG continued negotiations for further contracts with oil companies and political 
tension over oil rights mounted between both sides. The Iraqi government also 
criticised the KRG on the grounds that their proposed contracts had no legal cover. By 
contrast, the KRG argued strongly against the Iraqi government that they should not 
resist Kurdish efforts to revive the sector at a time when the Iraqi government was 
suffering from $10 billion deficit due to the incompetence of Iraq’s Oil Ministry. In 
looking the differences between the two sides, it is clear that what added to the 
political confusion, particularly after the failure of the Iraqi parliament to approve a 
legal regime to deal with foreign oil investment, was the KRG’s decision to move 
forward to seek partners and give oil licences to foreign companies without central 
government approval if the Iraqi government persisted in being non-cooperative by
putting obstacles everywhere. 
It is clear that Iraq needs help to reorganise its infrastructure. The current problems in 
the oil sector should be addressed because the success of the oil sector is critical to the 
success of the Iraqi economy; therefore, Iraq must maximize its capability in this 
sector. In addition, the Iraqi government needs help with all aspects of its operations, 
including expanding oil production, which requires the setting-up of corporate 
structures and improving oil-sector performance. The main tasks for the Iraqi 
government include ratifying a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and 
local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Both the 
Iraqi government and the KRG constantly claim that legal clarity is essential in order 
to attract investment. In this context, former Prime Minister Nechirevan Barzani 
stated that:
In order to develop, the economy of Iraq must be able to 
compete internationally and face contemporary challenges. We 
have moved swiftly from exploration to production and export. 
We are proud to contribute to Iraq’s increased production and 
revenues. In reality, revenue sharing will bind us together more 
than any political slogan.506
506 KRG.org; PM's speech at start of oil exports, Erbil, 1 June 2009. Available at:
<URL:http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02040100&rnr=268&anr=29800>
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It is true that, the discovery of oil in Kurdish territory, as well as Kurdish oil 
ambitions could easily ignite political conflict between the Iraqi government and the 
KRG. On the other hand, it represented a valuable accomplishment for the Kurdistan 
Region. It was a historic event for the KRG’s when Iraq’s Kurdish President, Jalal 
Talabani, and Masoud Barzani, President of the KRG, ceremonially opened a pipeline 
valve in Erbil, asserting that it would bring in much needed revenues not only for the 
Kurdish people but for all Iraqis.507 It is reasonable to state that the KRG’s will not 
allow any return to what happened to them in the past, which is why they insist that 
the oil should now be used in an entirely different way. Perhaps the focus has now 
shifted from ways to recover from a disastrous past, characterised by the needs of 
diverse political groups, towards mutual respect, dialogue and a desire to implement 
the constitution.
In practice, logic and justice through sharing oil wealth and distributing revenues 
across all of Iraq will ensure the unification of Iraq and coherence between the 
different national and other factions. The political system is still adapted to a system
of budget allocation, rather than to a constitutionally-required revenue-sharing 
mechanism. The lack of political will, in addition to direct political interference 
effectively stopped both the federal draft hydrocarbons law of February 2007 and the 
draft revenue-sharing law of May 2007 from being completed and reaching
Parliament.
What it becomes clear that the Iraqi government will inherit a difficult task. A number 
of unsolved issues remain, many of which will have a great impact on the Kurdistan 
Region. Even so there can be great improvements in hydrocarbons and revenue-
sharing legislation, to the benefit of all Iraqis. The Kurdish leaders have tried to agree 
upon and establish a genuine road map for the disputed territories, and the KRG is 
proud of being able to provide essential fuels to Iraqi domestic and international 
markets through the three refineries in the Region, whose licenses have been issued in 
507 KRG.org, “Kurdistan Region celebrates historic achievement with first crude oil export”, 2 June
2009. Available at:
<URL: http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&rnr=223&anr=29807>
243
accordance with the Iraq Constitution and the Kurdistan Region’s Oil and Gas Law of 
2007, which granted the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources the authority to 
negotiate and agree to long-term oil contracts. Meanwhile, the KRG is satisfied with 
its growing oil and gas sector, and the Region’s free trade policies. On the other hand, 
despite all these realities mentioned above, it is undeniable that, the political and 
economic situations in the Kurdistan region have undoubtedly improved sharply. 
Finally, it is necessary to concentrate on the enactment of the revenue sharing law, 
since this will be the core that holds the various Iraqi factions together by pushing the 
supply of investment and essential services to the level of most efficient management 
the local level. Given to the KRG’s ownership of huge reserves of oil, and coupled 
with its stable security and investment policies, the Kurdistan Region has attracted 
significant interest from foreign energy companies. Another important consideration 
is related the development of the gas sector in this region, taking into account the 
importance of gas for regional states such as Turkey, as well as European usage. In 
this respect Kurdistan will certainly have a prominent role to play as a gas supplier 
over the coming years. Consequently, the Kurdistan Region is currently going through 
rapid economic development, spurred by petroleum revenues. In this context, it could 
be said that the KRG’s policy in the hydrocarbons sector has been successful, and that 
this represents a shining example of economic success that will go from strength to 
strength in the future. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the interests of Iraq 
and Kurdistan are mutual and not antipathetic.  From this vantage point, in order to 
ensure that Iraq will remain united, the best mechanism will be a federal hydrocarbons 
law that would draw the Kurds closely into the state structure on terms acceptable to 
both the Iraqi government and the KRG.
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Chapter 9:
CONSIDERING THE MILITARY AND THE CASE OF THE 
PESHMERGA
“Upon the liberation of Iraq, we voluntarily cooperated in the 
reconstruction of the Iraqi government and state. We were the 
first among Iraqis to provide regular military forces during that 
difficult period of transition. Because we believe in the future 
of Iraq, we actively participated in the political negotiations
that led to the endorsement of our Constitution. We will all feel 
more secure in a federal, democratic Iraq that promotes peace, 
stability and prosperity for its people”.
(The former Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, 1st June 2009). 508
INTRODUCTION
A significant issue between the KRG and the Iraqi federal government concerned
retention of the existing Kurdish armed forces and reorganization of the Iraqi army in 
a way that would enable them to participate effectively at all levels and ranks. In this 
respect the Kurds made momentous progress towards achieving their goal, having
held high positions in the Iraqi Armies, particularly since 2003; For example, Brusk 
Shawais of the KDP was appointed secretary general of the Defence Ministry, while
General Babakr Shawkat Zebari was top commander of the Iraqi military and others. 
After 1991, the KRG established its local policing and intelligence services, whose 
existence was recognized by TAL and subsequently in the Iraqi permanent 
constitution; in addition, the KRG set up the professional police academies in Erbil 
and Sulaimaniya. Having thus played a major part in defeating the former Iraqi 
508 Part of speech given by the Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani during celebrations at the start of 
crude oil exports from the Kurdistan Region. See KRG.org, “PM's speech at start of oil exports”,
Erbil,  Available at:
<URL: http:// www.krg.org/articls/detail.asp?=12&smap=02040100&rnr=2687anr=29800> Access 
Date: 1st June 2009.
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government, the Peshmerga then took a significant role in protecting the new Iraqi 
government after 2003.
One of the critical issues faced by the Kurds was resolving the border problems 
between the KRG and the Iraqi government, including reinstatement of the areas 
withheld from Kurdistan. The fact that the Kurds postponed any attempts to find 
solutions for these areas until after the Iraqi elections and the creation of a new 
constitution for Iraq can be regarded as a serious error. As suggested by General Ray 
Odierno, the disputes between the Kurds and the Arabs resulted from the tensions 
between the two cultures over the oil-rich areas that each claimed as its own 
territory.509 The core of the issue concerned which of the parties would be able to 
control the Peshmerga forces, and was an administrative matter that had to be 
resolved.  In other words, were the Peshmerga forces to be placed under the control of 
the Kurdistan region or the Iraqi government?
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore how most of Arabs and Turkmens had 
wanted to exploit the situation by raising the controversial issue of the withdrawal of 
the Peshmerga from Kirkuk and other disputed areas. While, the Kurds assert the need 
to defend the Kurdish component of terror and intimidation that they are exposed 
daily in the disputed areas by the Wafideen Arabs, who attempt in vain to spoil the 
democratic change process in building the state of law and civil society, who try to 
provoke the sectarianism and to create sedition among diverse communities in 
Kirkuk, despite that the Iraqi Army did not take any measures to protect them. The 
focus of this chapter about the escalating tension eventually became a direct threat 
and a confrontation between the Iraqi regular army and the Peshmerga forces, 
particularly, when Baghdad sent troops from time to time into three areas (Kirkuk, 
Khanaqin and Diyala) that had up till then been under informal Kurdish control. 
509 Lara Jakes, “U.S. considers UN peacekeepers for Iraq after 2011; tensions remain between Kurds, 
Arabs”, on 06, July 2010. Available at: 
<URL:http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/07/us_considers_un_peacekeepers_f.html>
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9.1 THE STATUS OF THE KURDS IN THE NEW IRAQI ARMY
What should be remembered here that, Iraq’s armed forces have a track record of 
crimes of oppression and mistreatment committed by the troops against the Kurds. To 
overcome these obstacles and problems during negotiations at the TAL, all factions, 
and particularly the Kurds, agreed on the need for civilian control over the military 
and for the tasks of the Federal Army to be confined to external defence, with the 
police being given responsibility for internal security.510 Unlike the former Iraqi army, 
Kurdish Peshmerga had not been subjected to Baathification and had not been 
involved in genocide or expulsion operations against minority nationalities. Indeed, 
the Peshmerga had always found themselves defending human rights and the Kurdish 
national identity, as well as standing against the plots and strategies of the previous 
regimes to eliminate the presence of any Kurdish entity in the region. In this context, 
Nawshirwan Mustafa pays particular attention to the Peshmerga's role in the history 
of the Kurdish national movements, as well as to protect the Kurdish people. 
Interestingly, the main duty of the Peshmerga during (1961-1991) represented in 
facing the Iraqi troops. While, their duty changed to protect the KRG during (1991-
2003).  Obviously, since 2003 the Peshmerga is responsible for maintaining security 
of the Kurdistan Region and face the threat of terrorism. In addition, Newshirwan
Mustafa asserted that the Peshmerga currently does not represent the KRG’s forces, 
but rather they represent the PUK and the KDP’s forces. Indeed, the Peshmerga forces 
have been controlled by the two main parties and taken their orders from their leaders. 
Obviously, it is highly problematic, if any disputes were happened between these two 
parties, they will implicate the Peshmerga in their conflicts.511
According to the analysts, a combination of the factors mentioned above meant that 
the political prospects of the Kurds and Kurdistan had risen, internationally and 
internally. The Kurds had participated actively in the liberation of Iraq, particularly 
after the US, disappointed with the Turkish stance, had looked elsewhere for support; 
510 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds.), ‘The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq’, (USA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p.131.   
511 Newshirwan Mustafa, (the issue of Constitution/ who is protecting the Kurdistan Region?), on 1st
June 2005, www. Reform-Kurd.com; in (Sbeiy. Com). Available at: 
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/article_detail.aspx?ArticleID=737&AuthorID=36&AspxAutoDetectC
ookieSupport=1>, on 3 Sept 2008 .
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the Pentagon came to depend on the Kurds as a important alternative in their 
operations, and in this context, it has been argued that the Kurds had become 
America’s most numerous allies to achieve their goals. Certainly, around 100,000 
Peshmerga participated with members of the US Special Forces in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. Heated discussions arose regarding the Kurdish military forces, particularly 
when the two major parties and their Peshmerga seized the artillery and other heavy 
weapons of the northern Iraqi armies.512
In this context, Jabar Yawar 513 has argued for the separation of two cases, one related
to the Kurds’ role in the Iraqi Army and the other concerning relations between the 
Kurdish forces and the Iraqi Army, which became known as the Peshmerga case. The 
latter is a highly complicated issue between the both sides and remains unresolved. In 
the Kurdistan Region there are two kinds of forces, one connected to the Iraqi Army
while the second is controlled by the KRG. The Ministry of Peshmerga and Ministry 
of the Interior were established after 1992 and the establishment of the first KRG 
cabinet. On the basis of a decision by Bremer the Iraqi Army was dissolved in 2003, 
and both a Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior were re-established in 2004.
The spokesman for the Ministry of Peshmerga stated that they continued their 
attempts to solve the Peshmerga issue with the Iraqi government, and that in order to 
find a way out of the political crisis with the Iraqi government the political process in 
Iraq had been pursued on the principle of political consensus after 2003 and the 
formation of the new Iraqi government. This consensus had to include all aspects, 
including the formation of the Iraqi army, which meant that theoretically the Shiite, 
Sunni, and Kurdish groupings would each constitute 30 percent of the Iraqi army, 
while the other factions would account for the remaining 10 percent.514
Given such requirements, Sirwan Zahawi who has indicated to determining Kurdish 
rights in the Iraqi Army, there were two trends: first, if based on parliamentary seats, 
the Kurds by right would have over 21 percent of the Iraqi army; secondly, based on 
512 Peter W. Galbraith, “Kurdistan in a Federal Iraq”, in Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled 
Salih (eds.), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, p.270-1
513 Interview with Brigadier General Jabar Yawar, deputy minister of the KRG Peshmerga forces, and 
also spokesman of the KRG's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Sulaimaniya, 15 April 2010.
514 Karzan Hawrami, “According to the constitution the Kurds should represent one third of the Iraqi 
army”, Erbil, December 2009, 
http://www.kurdistanreport.com/Detail.aspx?page=articles&c=news&id=2933
248
political consensus, the Kurds would have the right to nearly 30 percent of the Iraqi 
army. Nevertheless, the actual percentage of Kurds in the Iraqi army was small there
were fewer than 5000 individuals. In addition, he added that the presence of Kurds in 
the administrative units of Iraq are very few or may be non-existent. It is noteworthy 
that the Kurds have so far neither on the basis of consensus and nor on the basis of 
their percentage in the Iraqi Parliament did not determine its stake in the Iraqi army. 
Therefore the Kurds insist on their participation in the Iraqi army, which should be 
raised their percentage nearly 15% on the base of the consensus. 515 Additionally, 
President of Iraq Jalal Talabani has underlined these facts , Particularly, when he 
expressed on his view with the Al- Iraqiya satellite, and said: “There is a rumour that 
the Sunni Arabs oppressed in the Ministry of Defence, but if we look closely we find 
that (44%) of Iraqi army officers are Shiites and (42%) of Iraqi army officers were 
Sunni Arabs and (8%) of the officers Iraqi Army are the Kurds, this is in the 
republican era, which the President of the Federal republic, Kurd. In this regard, we 
wonder is this override or it is diminution of the Kurds rights? 516
It is not difficult to envisage, why the Kurds sought for Peshmerga forces to be 
included as part of the Iraqi Army, even though they had struggled in the past and 
raised different slogans. Their thinking has often been cited as evidence of changing 
attitudes and opinions. Jabar Yawar suggested that there was possibly a 
misconception by most people, because Kurds did not wish to be part of the Iraqi 
army, which had its own functions. As the sovereign army for all of Iraq, the main 
duties of the Iraqi army were to maintain the integrity of Iraq’s land, air space, and 
territorial waters, whereas the specific duties of the Peshmerga forces involved the 
protection of the Kurdistan region that was under KRG control. The draft law of the
KRG’s Peshmerga Ministry defined the duties of the Peshmerga (and the Ministry
itself) in the first paragraph of Article 2; these involved guarding and defending the 
Kurdistan Region, and guaranteeing its national and patriotic interests. Article 2, 
para.3 stated that, according to the security memorandum, they would be ready to
defend the sovereignty and security of the federal government of Iraq; and that they 
515 Karzan Hawrami, “According to the constitution …”, ibid.
516 Interview with President Jalal Talabani in the Al- Iraqiya satellite, on 25 February 2008. Available 
at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=5290&type=interviews>  
Access Date: 5 April 2009
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would coordinate and cooperate with the federal government in resolving and 
surmounting security crises (para.4). With the Iraqi federal government they would 
fight and resist all varieties of terrorism, particularly in Kurdistan (para.5); and in 
addition would contribute to relief efforts in natural catastrophes and offer necessary 
humanitarian aid (Para. 6).517
The KRG as a local government had regional police and security forces, along the 
Peshmerga forces which were not part of the Iraqi Army but were included in the 
defence and security system, along with the army, the security forces, the Iraqi police
and the regional police. In addition to the Regional Guards, the KRG also sought to 
increase the proportion of Kurds in the Iraqi army, but it seemed unlikely that the 
Kurds would play any part in the Iraqi army, either as an independent element in the 
KRG forces (including security, regional police and Peshmerga) that participated in
Iraq’s security and defence system, or as individuals within the Iraqi army, the Iraqi 
police and/or the Iraqi security services.
Regarding the harsh criticisms of the Kurdish leadership over the delay in uniting 
their respective Peshmerga forces, the two main parties (the PUK and KDP) declared 
that their real intentions were to unite their forces, that they were working towards
that goal, and that both parties possessed heavy weapons. According to Mahmud 
Sangawi, a member of the PUK’s Political Bureau and commander of the Peshmerga 
forces, these forces consisted of 18 Brigades, numbering between 150,000 and 
200,000 troops. Sangawi also noted in mid-2010 that only six Brigades had so far 
been unified.518 Given this situation it could be predicted that the spectre of civil war 
had not entirely vanished, particularly if the PUK and the KDP had both worked to 
affiliate these forces to their respective parties instead of enabling them to be a driving 
force for the Kurdish national territory. In turn, the continued lack of integration 
among the Peshmerga forces of both parties was likely to weaken the Kurds’ position 
in Baghdad.
517 Draft law of Peshmerga Ministry of Iraqi -Kurdistan Region
518 Awene Newspaper, “Mahmud Sangawi said that they have secret plan for Baghdad”, on 29 July 
2010, Available at: 
<URL:http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Babet&Cor=Chawpekewtin&jimare=1497>
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9.2 THE EXACERBATING CRISIS BETWEEN THE IRAQI
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE KRG
Most of these chronic problems had historical roots dating back to the first quarter of 
the twentieth century and the establishment of the first Iraqi State, and throughout 
earlier periods of Iraqi rule were certainly linked, directly or indirectly, to the Kirkuk 
issue which formed the basis for all Kurdish revolts; the lack of success of any 
previous negotiations during the Kurdish struggle was due to failure to resolve this 
issue. 
The Arab and Turkmen parties were concerned that if the Kurds retained a separate 
military capability it would be easy for them to secede from a federal command 
structure in the future; therefore they tried to persuade the US administration, through 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), to dismantle the Peshmerga forces. The 
Kurds resisted this demand, regarding these forces as a symbol of Kurdish national 
dignity, pride, and also survival, with the latter being proof of their long and bitter 
struggle against all previous regimes. They insisted on maintaining control over the 
Peshmerga, while the Arab parties preferred a wholly integrated military structure. 
The Kurds were also unwilling to call the Peshmerga a “militia”, and due to the level 
of training and experience among the Peshmerga, avoided comparing them with al-
Sadr’s “Mahdi Army” or the Badr Brigades.
The key problem for Iraqi reconstruction was the on-going question of security; thus, 
the deterioration of Iraq’s security was another key factor behind the CPA’s decision 
the return of their highly-trained Peshmerga forces. To clarify the issue of Peshmerga, 
Yawar has discussed the important aspects that led this problem to emerge. As far as 
the Kurds were concerned, it was probably during Bremer’s period as a civil governor 
of Iraq, when law No. 90 for dissolving the militia was initiated in 2003. According to 
this law all forces and militias throughout Iraq were to be dissolved. Given prevailing 
conditions, the Kurds were asked to redeploy their forces, particularly the Peshmerga, 
by transferring them to police the environment or police electricity supplies or even 
retire altogether if they wished to do so.519
519 Interview with Jabar Yawar, on 15 April 2010, Sulaymaniyah
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Jabar Yawar pointed out that by the forcible imposition of law No. 90, the US failed 
badly, since this contributed to the deteriorating situation in Iraq and to ever-
increasing acts of terrorism, particularly in 2004. Eventually the US Administration 
was obliged to abolish this law, and in order to control the internal situation, had to 
speed up the rebuilding of the Iraqi army from among the same former serving 
officers. Some parts of the Peshmerga forces were transferred under the name of 
border guards and environmental police. Ironically, various reasons and 
circumstances meant that many Peshmerga kept their positions, and were given US 
support to protect the security of the Kurdistan Region and to assist the Iraqi army, 
particularly in the Sunni zones, to fight against Al-Qaida, as well as helping to return
security and stability to these areas. As noted, these situations continued until the 
ratification of the New Iraqi Constitution in 2005, which clearly recognised all forces 
in the Kurdistan Region (police, security, Regional Guards).520
In July 2008 there was a tense situation in Kirkuk following a suicide bombing that 
occurred during a Kurdish demonstration. In response to the attack a group of 
demonstrators, chanting the national anthem and condemning the massacre, marched 
in front of the Turkmen party headquarters, whereupon the Turkmen guards fired into 
the crowd, killing at least 25 Kurdish demonstrators and injuring over 200 people.521
It was not difficult to see that political parties lay behind the tensions, particularly as
those responsible for the shootings found support from, and hides behind, the Arab 
and Turkmen parties. However, it should also be noted that most of the time Nouri al-
Maliki's government had wanted to exploit the situation by raising the controversial
issue of the withdrawal of the Peshmerga from Kirkuk and other disputed areas. 
Tensions were exacerbated when Maliki sent troops into three areas that had up till 
then been under informal Kurdish control. The escalating tension eventually became a 
direct threat and a confrontation between the Iraqi regular army and the Peshmerga 
forces.  
It is quite evident that the issue of conspiracies had been raised, whether at the 
regional or internal level, and after Kurdish and Iraqi troops had clashed in the eastern 
520 Interview with Jabar Yawar, on 15 April 2010, Sulaymaniyah
521 Julian Borger, “Kirkuk dispute threatens to plunge Iraq into Kurdish-Arab war”, Available at: 
<URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/27/iraq> Access Date: on 28 October 2008.
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province of Diyala in 2008, there were real worries that ethnic tensions could lead to 
war. The Turkmen and Arab political leaders had long accused the Kurdish 
Peshmerga of existing illegally in the disputed areas. This reality posed a deeper 
challenge because of the absence of any actual intent on the part of the Iraqi 
government to resolve the problems. Indeed, The Kurds suffered at the hands of the 
Wafideen Arabs who served in the security apparatus, but on the other hand did not 
follow a policy of revenge after they had returned in April 2003 to Kirkuk and the 
other areas to which they laid claim.522 What remained controversial was the fact that 
the security situation in Kirkuk was likely to exacerbate the challenges. Additionally, 
Kirkuk lay outside the areas run by the KRG; however, in practice the Peshmerga 
fighters and a Kurdish intelligence service (Asaish) took a prominent role in ensuring 
the city’s security. They also collaborated well with US intelligence. As many
researchers indicated, they might have benefited from lessons drawn from the 
experiences of other federations; it was therefore suggested some regional armed 
forces should be retained as they would play a crucial role in maintaining security 
through the effectiveness of their participation.523
As a result of the political complications in these areas, particularly in Khanaqin, the 
KRG and the Iraqi government established a system in the city for the joint 
management of the entire province. Khanaqin had actually been under KRG control 
since 2003, but because of being located within the disputed areas, was dealt with
equally by institutions of both the Iraqi government and the KRG. Both sides, for 
example, administered police and security forces as well as colleges and schools. The 
problem was that both sides considered they had the right to manage these areas, 
which included also Sinjar, Makhmur, Sheikhan, Zumar, Alton Kopri, Laylan, Duz 
and Qara Hanjir, and so on.
On the issue of Mosul and the demand to withdraw the Peshmerga forces in the areas 
that were administratively subordinate to the province of Mosul, Jabar Yawar pointed 
522 Whatever their methods, the Kurdish leaders were aware that they might not be able to push out all 
the Wafideen. This implies the possibility of turning to the alternative solution; i.e., depriving those 
who remained of the right to vote in Kirkuk.
Anthony H. Cordesman; Success or Failure? Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence and US Strategy: 
Developments through June 2007, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arleigh A. Burke 
Chair in Strategy, Washington, DC, on September 2007, p.93-4
523 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds.), op.cit., p.130
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out that this represented a political dilemma between the Hadba List (which included
most of the advocates and supporters of the former regime) and the List of Brothers 
(representing the main Kurdish parties and certain groups of Christians, Turkmens, 
Yazidi and Arabs). In fact, there was a serious dispute between the two Lists, due to
the presence of Peshmerga in Shekhan, Zumar, Sinjar, Diyala, etc., areas that were
administratively subordinate to the province of Mosul. Obviously the KRG insisted 
on protecting these Kurdish areas from terrorist attacks, especially as local Kurdish
populations had been targeted by terrorist groups in these districts. The inhabitants of 
this area, which was known as the Sunni Triangle, supported the terrorist acts of al-
Qaeda, and aimed to intimidate the population and to expel local Kurds from their
places of origin.
Whether or not the Iraqi government dealt with the Peshmerga forces as a militia is 
debatable, although various reasons and different views have been put forward. The 
Kurds considered the Peshmerga to have been the liberating power of the Kurdish 
people during their long political struggle, and a symbol of steadfastness and fortitude 
in the face of injustice and tyranny imposed by the fascist regimes. On the other hand, 
some of the Iraqi factions and some of the Sunni and Shiite extremist parties have 
seen the Peshmerga simply as a militia. However, Jabar Yawar states that the Iraqi 
government never dealt with the Peshmerga as a militia. Certainly personal statements 
made by people such as Osama al-Nujaifi or Atheel al-Nujaifi or sometimes 
representatives of some political blocs would seem to support this view.
It should be noted that the US military had acknowledged disputes between the Kurds 
and Arabs in the contested territories, particularly in Kirkuk. In fact the Kurds 
(particularly the Shabak, Yazidi, and other Christian minorities) had frequently been 
targeted by terrorists groups. A series of bombings in July and August 2009 in a 
Kurdish village in Mosul provided some of the clearest evidence of attempts to expel 
other minorities from the city, having caused at least 143 deaths, scores of wounded,  
and the destruction of an entire village. General Ray Odierno, the American military 
commander in Iraq, planned to deploy US troops, along with members of the Kurdish
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Peshmerga force and the Iraqi Army, throughout the disputed areas so as to prevent 
groups linked to al-Qaeda from exploiting the tensions between Arabs and Kurds.524
In this context, Mahmud Sangawi commented that those areas (disputed areas) were 
part of the Kurdistan. As Sangawi noted, the key problems occurred when the Iraqi 
army included all the groups who exhibited racist, chauvinistic and terrorist 
behaviours that in turn were responsible for creating political unrest and insecurity in 
those areas. He also added that broader problems would arise when the withdrawal of 
US troops got under way, since those groups would simply increase their attempts to 
expel the Kurdish population in Jalawla and Diyala and in the city and outskirts of 
Mosul.525
Efforts by Baghdad to form tribal support councils in the disputed areas, under the 
pretext that a security vacuum existed there, were strongly resisted by the Kurds for 
whom these areas, particularly Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Jalawla, were an integral part of 
Kurdistan, even though the Iraqi government described them as “part of the rest of 
Iraq”. The US army was interested in the formation and in the arming of the 
Awakening groups for protection of local areas, particularly in the Sunni localities. 
The Kurds probably had good reason to fear that the councils were created to restrict 
Kurdish influence in those areas.  The Kurdish Peshmerga were able preserve security 
in the disputed areas, while also helping to secure threatened oil pipelines and even 
protecting certain neighbourhoods in Baghdad.526
The major problem for the inhabitants in the disputed areas concerned the probability 
of a security vacuum being created after the withdrawal of US troops from their areas, 
although it seemed reasonable to assume that the US administration, having spent
more than $18 billion on restructuring and equipping Iraqi security forces, had
reviewed its decision on withdrawal, since it seemed that nearly 50,000 soldiers were
524 Sam Dagher, “Minorities in Iraq’s North Seen as Threatened”, 10 November 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/world/middleeast/11erbil.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=minorities%20t
hreatened&st=cse
525 Awene Newspaper, “Mahmud Sangawi said that they have secret plan for Baghdad”, 29 July 2010, 
Available at 
<URL:http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Babet&Cor=Chawpekewtin&jimare=1497>
526 Alissa J. Rubin, “Rejection of Oil Law and Move to Create Tribal Councils add to tensions with 
Kurds”, New York Times, 27 October 2008; Available at:
<URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html> Access Date: 20 
December 2008 
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intended to remain in Iraq to offer logistical assistance and training to Iraq’s army. In 
this regard, Christopher Hill, US Ambassador to Iraq, asserted although US troops 
would withdraw, American interests in Iraq would remain constant and unchanged.527
Anthony Blinken (National Security Adviser to Vice-President Biden) seems to have 
pointed out that the Office of Security Cooperation inside the US Embassy would be 
under the ambassador’s supervision, and while its function would be to liaise between 
the US troops and Iraqi forces, only a few hundred troops, rather than thousands
would be required for this. It should be noted here that in 2007 US troop numbers had
reached 170,000 soldiers, after which the number had dropped to 50,000 troops, and 
was expected by the end of 2010 to be few hundred only. On the whole, despite the 
challenges facing Iraq, including the disagreements between the Iraqi government and 
the KRG, the US was prepared to assist the Iraqi people to come together to find new 
political solutions and build a future together as a united country.
What should be indicated here that, the US played an enormous role in calming down 
the situation in general, and particularly in the disputed areas where it assumed the 
role of a broker between the Arabs and Kurds to resolve outstanding issues, to control 
the worsening situations between them, and to prevent possible military attacks by 
each side.  It was felt that if the US troops were to withdraw from Iraq before
resolving the outstanding problems and without having settled the major disputes 
between both sides, this would be the biggest threat to stability in Iraq, since it would 
lead to a deepening dispute between the Kurds and other Iraqi factions.528 In fact, the 
Kurds more than any other factions were watching anxiously to see what might 
happen in the near future in Iraq, and because they would be particularly affected and 
therefore more vulnerable, they were more interested in the possible redeployment of 
US troops in the Kurdistan Region. Believing that the US departure might increase 
their potential exposure to attack by Iraqi forces and also by neighbouring countries, 
especially Turkey and Iran, Kurdish officials tried to persuade the US administration 
to keep some of its troops in the Kurdistan Region in the event of the US withdrawal
from Iraq. At the World Affairs Council in Denver, Qubad Talabani, the KRG
527 Awene newspaper, on 22 August 2010, Available at:
<URL:http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hemereng&jimare=1232> Access Date 23 August 
2010.
528 “Iraq's Kurds, Arabs face choice: settle or fight”, 4 June 2009; article available at
<URL:http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2009/6/kurdsiniraq45.htm>
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representative to the US, pointed out that the US had strategic relations with the 
Kurdistan Region, and stressed the need for American forces to be permanently
present in the Kurdistan Region to protect its security. Talabani also made the 
significant point that no US soldiers had been killed in the Kurdistan Region.529
9.3 FINDING SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES
Most of the major problems that emerged between the Iraqi government and the KRG 
concerned the constitution, whether related to Article 140, to the Peshmerga issue, to 
determining the Kurdistan Region’s budget, or else to the production and export of
oil. Having agreed on the need to pull the country out of the political crisis it was 
experiencing, along with constant Kurdish claims to be resolving the problems, the 
two sides formed a higher committee in November 2006, headed by Masoud Barzani, 
accompanied by the previous Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and all the relevant 
Kurdish ministers, including Natural Resources, Peshmerga Affaires, Finance, and 
Extra-Regional Affairs, while the Iraqi side was represented by the Prime Minister 
Nuri Al-Maliki, along with the relevant ministers including Interior, Defence, 
Finance, and Oil. 
The Higher Committee’s negotiations led to the creation of a Presidential 
Commission, composed of; Masoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, Tariq al-Hashimi, and 
Nuri al-Maliki.  In 2007 five supreme committees were established to resolve the 
outstanding issues; each dealt with a specific case. The committees continued their 
work until December 2008, when political problems between Nuri Al-Maliki and 
Masoud Barzani led to the suspension of all meetings and negotiations between them. 
There was a perception that the Iraqi government might be moving towards a 
dictatorship and the monopoly of power by one of the Iraqi factions, moreover it is 
reasonable to assume that rejection of the federal system by the majority of Iraqi 
factions (except the Kurds) in Iraq, offered reasonable evidence to support this view. 
Particularly, when the Kurds believe that achieving their gains depend on the 
529 Article from World Tribune, “Kurds have demanded for staying U.S. troops in Kurdistan Region”, 
Available at: <URL: http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/ByaniArticleDetail.aspx?id=787> Access Date: 24 
August 2010.
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application of the federal system, while other factions have a contradictory opinion 
that these changes may affect their interests adversely. 530
Jabar Yawar has indicated that each of the five committees arrived at convincing 
agreements during their negotiations. However, the Presidential Commission created 
various problems which in turn led to the final solutions being held back. For 
example, the committee on the Peshmerga was very specific about the issues 
involved; on 23 June 2007, agreement was reached over eight particular points related 
to the function and duties of Peshmerga, the type of clothing to be worn, types of
weapons, training, how its budget would be expended, and inclusion of a law on
retirement. Both parties signed the convention, but when it was offered to Nuri al-
Maliki he kept the case file and did not sign. Thus, each committee approached the 
others over the agreements, but their efforts were undermined in the Supreme 
Committee. According to Yawar, the Dawa party, and particularly al-Maliki himself 
were the major factors behind the opposition to, and non-implementation of these 
agreements, which in turn led to negotiations being suspended and never concluded.
Despite the creation of coordination centres Jabar Yawar also referred to joint
checkpoints for controlling the disputed areas. There were joint forces for the military 
operations in Kirkuk, Diyala and Mosul, in addition to the convention with the Iraqi 
Minister of Defence with regard to the processing of Peshmerga forces, including the 
necessary technical and communications equipment training to prepare and support 
them as part of Iraq’s security system. As noted, the coordination committee was 
created in 2009, particularly after disputes had arisen in 2008 between the Iraqi army 
and the Peshmerga forces regarding the movement of Iraqi forces towards Khanaqin. 
This problem emerged more or less during the period of the provincial elections and 
therefore affected Kirkuk and Mosul as well. Yawar noted that the Peshmerga forces 
had the right to remain in these disputes areas; however, the Iraqi army claimed the 
same right, because the fate of these areas had not yet resolved. 
To reduce the numbers of Peshmerga, the KRG put a new plan into practice by 
changing many soldiers into police officers, or transforming them into civil defence
530 Interview with Jabar Yawar, on 15 April 2010, Sulaymaniyah
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units, Environmental and Forest Police, some were even allowed to be recruited into 
an Iraqi border patrol. After the TAL negotiations, the Kurds insisted on having their 
National Guard as a regional guard to protect the borders of the KRG; naturally these 
forces were working under regional control, but in certain conditions would operate 
within a federal government.  In this context, Yawar noted that the KRG tried to rely 
on the Iraqi constitution to settle cases with the federal government that involved 
transferring Peshmerga forces to the Regional Guards, and from 2006 negotiated 
continuously with the Federal government. The KRG also created various high level 
committees, and participated in several meetings in Baghdad, some of which were 
attended by the President of the Kurdistan Region and also the President of the Iraqi 
Federal Republic. 531
According to Rashid Azzawi, a member of the Iraqi parliament (from the Accordance 
Front), Maliki's visit to the Kurdistan region as well as the creation of two Divisional 
Forces by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence for the Peshmerga forces did not solve the 
Peshmerga issue.  Kurdish officials in the Region insisted that the Peshmerga budget 
should be paid by the Iraq Ministry of Defence, but at the same time wanted to keep 
the Peshmerga under their administration. Azzawi felt that al-Maliki was guilty of a 
glaring omission, as it was clear that the Iraqi Prime Minister had failed to deal with 
the Peshmerga as he had dealt with the Awakening Councils.532
One should mention here that the Provincial elections were held in Mosul in 2009, in 
which the Kurdish Nineveh Brotherly List obtained the highest number of votes; 
however they boycotted any participation in local government affairs. Ostensibly, this 
disagreement was due to the distribution of Provincial Council posts between the two 
sides; thus, the al-Hadba List managed to monopolise all of the Council seats and 
managerial positions in the city, which led to the withdrawal of the Kurdish Nineveh
Brotherly List. Following meetings held in Baghdad and Ankara, the situation 
subsequently developed further with convergence between the Arab nationalist al-
Hadbah List and the Kurdish Nineveh Brotherly List under a UN initiative to resolve 
the political crisis in Mosul. It has been argued that the two Lists might have found 
531 Interview with Jabar Yawar, on 15 April 2010, Sulaymaniyah
532 Sbeiy.com, “Rashid Azzawi: Al-Maliki visit to Kurdistan Region has not resolved the Peshmerga 
issue”. Available at : < URL: http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=19452&cat=1&title=> 
Access Date: 12 August 2009>.
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their own way to settle the disputes. In the most obvious sense, the resolution of these 
disputes accelerated the implementation of Article 140.
According to Sheikh Jaffar Sheik Mustafa, the KRG’s Minister of Peshmerga, the 
KRG had agreed to deploy the combined forces in the disputed area and to protect oil 
pipe lines and checkpoints that would be based throughout the north. However, the
Iraqi government and the Arab-led provincial government in Mosul were opposed to 
the idea, regarding the arrangement as an infringement of their sovereignty, and called 
for Kurdish troops to retreat from the areas they had occupied outside their region’s 
1991 borders. Sheikh Mustafa pointed out that the US troops should participate with
the joint forces in securing the area and carrying out Article 140 of the Iraqi 
Constitution. From the official US viewpoint, they were keen to resolve a political 
standoff between Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Mosul that had simply exacerbated the 
situation, and were, moreover, optimistic that the joint force would eventually become 
functional in Kirkuk and other disputed areas.533
As was to be expected, the Arabs and Turkmen blocs stood strongly against the idea 
of the spreading of the joint forces, including US troops, Kurds and Iraqis in the 
disputed (Kurdish) areas. By contrast, the Kurdish politicians in Kirkuk and Mosul 
expressed their support for this proposal. Najat Hassan, a KDP official in Kirkuk,
stated that the Division 12 forces in the Iraqi army, which included all Iraqi factions, 
the Peshmerga, and the Regional Guards, were to be found along the border areas 
between the territories and Kirkuk, while the US troops were stationed in their camps, 
either in Kirkuk or Mosul, even though no actual clashes or problems had occurred 
between them. From the other side, Abdul Rahim al-Shmiri 534 felt that such proposals 
would increase political tensions and security problems in Mosul, particularly as most 
of Mosul’s population were Arabs, who did not want the presence of Peshmerga and 
demanded their expulsion.535
533 Sam Dagher, “Minorities in Iraq’s North Seen as Threatened”, on November 10, 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/world/middleeast/11erbil.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=minorities%20t
hreatened&st=cse 
534 Abdul Rahim al-Shamiri, which is known as one of the Arab nationalists and served as the mayor of 
al- Biaaj district in Nineveh province,
535 “The Arabs rejected the proposals of the spread of the joint forces in the disputed areas”, on 19 
August 2009; Available at:<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=19593&cat=1>
Access Date 20 August 2009. 
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Despite the outstanding problems, many meetings were held at the end of 2009.  In 
order to liaise with the regions, the Iraqi government established five coordination 
centres in the cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Diyala and Kirkuk, consisting of an American 
officer,  an officer from the Iraqi government, and an officer of the Peshmerga, whose 
task was to reorganise administrative coordination and exchange of security 
information. Amongst other difficult issues between both sides, this concerned the 
rights or dues of the Kurdistan forces (Peshmerga). According to Yawar there was a 
special budget earmarked for the highest offices in the Iraqi State (e.g., President of 
the Council of Ministers, President of the Republic, president of the Parliament, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the supreme commander of the Iraqi Army). Known 
as the budget of sovereignty, this special funding was ring-fenced and was not 
included in the general Iraqi budget. The view was that since the Peshmerga, in 
providing security for that part of Iraq, undertook the same duties as the Iraqi Army, 
they should also have an equal share of the sovereignty budget.
Signing an agreement regarding the Peshmerga budget and then releasing the 
appropriate resources appeared to be an unresolved problem, or at least a disputed 
item between the KRG and the Iraqi government. Although a clause in the budgetary
law scrutinised in the Iraqi Parliament in 2007 had indicated that the financial plan for 
the Regional Guard was included in the sovereign budget, so far the KRG had not 
received any of these funds. In the current period, the Iraqi government’s failure over 
four years to pay these dues, which included salaries, military vehicles, food supplies,
uniforms etc., caused considerable difficulties for the Kurdish forces and put 
tremendous pressure over the KRG, which was obliged to deduct from 17 percent of
the Territory’s overall budget to pay for the Kurdish forces and Ministry of 
Peshmerga, so that paying for the Ministry of Peshmerga meant eating into the
resources allocated to civilian Ministries. In this context, the KRG did their best to 
implement Clause 5 of Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution by converting the 
Peshmerga forces to the Regional Guards in order to resolve this legal problem. In 
this regard, the KRG’s Finance Minister, Bayz Talabani explained that:
The Iraqi government should have provided the four-year 
budget for Peshmerga forces with the two-year allocations 
according to the national law. But the Iraqi government still 
remains silent regarding to such issue, which makes national 
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allocations short in Kurdistan; because the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) must provide it. Although, the Iraqi 
government allocated the financial allocations of the 
Peshmerga forces from the national budget annually, but has 
not been cashed in which the allocations must be released by 
the Iraqi government.536
Regrettably, one continuing problem was Iraqi suspicion toward the Kurds and the 
fact that Arab-Kurdish tension had so far not diminished in the Mosul and Kirkuk 
areas. National reconciliation would be impossible to achieve if Kirkuk’s status
remained unresolved. The Kurds recognised that they needed to be patient and not 
retaliate against acts of aggression suffered in the past, particularly with regard to
Kirkuk, for if they did they would lose support and international sympathy for their 
case, but despite this understanding, tensions continued to rise over whether a 
referendum should be held on the future of Kirkuk, as well as over the future control 
of oil resources in the Kurdistan Region; its export income also remained subject to 
bargaining. There were other troubling signs, such as when the Iraqi factions and 
blocs of political parties sought to discuss the formation of the government or whether 
to debate any issues vital to Iraq; they even considered resolving their political 
differences by resorting to the neighbouring countries for advice; this was reflected in 
the actual role of these countries and their impact on the political process in Iraq. 
Even so, beyond the competitiveness and differences among all Iraqi factions, it 
remains the case that, in order to form a true national partnership that will represent 
all components of Iraqi society and achieve the aspirations of all the people, the 
political situation and the constraints faced by the democratic process in the country 
do require the Iraqi factions to reach a peaceful and consensual solution. Ultimately, 
they will realise that it is necessary to work together in Iraq against the common 
enemy of al-Qaeda and its supporters who exploit tensions instead of fighting each 
other.
536 PUK media, “Iraqi government still freezes budget of Peshmerga forces”, 28 July 2010, at 
http://www.pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4036:iraqi-
government-still-freezes-budget-of-peshmerga-forces-&catid=29:kurdistan-region&Itemid=385
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CONCLUSION
The Peshmerga forces emerged at the beginning of the Kurdish independence 
movement in early 1919, while the Iraqi Army was formed with the establishment of 
its first battalion early in 1921. The Peshmerga had always set out to defend the 
human rights and national identity of the Kurds, as well as standing against the plots 
and strategies of the previous regime to eliminate the presence of any Kurdish entity 
in the region. Between 1961 and 1991 the main task of the Peshmerga involved facing 
Iraqi troops, but from 1991 to 2003 this duty changed to protecting the KRG.  After 
2003 the Peshmerga became responsible for maintaining the security of the Kurdistan 
Region, confronting the threat of terrorism, and protecting people in disputed areas.
It is worth mentioning that, according to the New Iraqi Constitution, all Iraqi factions 
(Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Yazidi and Shabak) had the right to participate in 
the Iraqi Army according to their population share. The first problem was that if the 
Kurdish population was compared with its participation in the Iraqi Army it would be 
at a minimal figure of around 8.2 percent, whereas when accurate numbers were 
revealed during the Iraqi elections in 2005 the Kurdish population accounted for more 
than 17 percent. This matter was obviously regarded as one of the more contentious 
issues needing to be resolved by the Iraqi government and the KRG. The second 
problem was the case of the Peshmerga; which was that according Article 121, clause 
5 in the New Iraqi Constitution; all Regions could have Regional Guards in addition 
to police and security forces. In the Kurdistan Region these Guards were/are the 
Peshmerga. 537
In fact, the Kurds are now participating in Iraqi politics and institutions. The Kurdish 
forces have gained unprecedented constitutional status, and in the Iraqi constitution, 
the Peshmerga is described as the “guardian of the Kurdistan Region”. Here it is noted 
that the KRG has more than 100,000 Peshmerga, most of whom provide security in 
the KRG region and in other cities in the disputed areas where Kurds live. The 
constitution also considers the Peshmerga as part of the Iraqi defence system, and 
therefore its budget must be provided by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. Thus, the 
537 Interview with Jabar Yawar, on 15 April 2010, Sulaymaniyah
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KRG had the constitutional right to transform Peshmerga forces into Kurdish National 
Guards and effective police forces, with others serving throughout Iraq in the Iraqi 
Security Forces. With its security managed by its own defence forces that are also 
integrated with wider Iraqi power structures, it is the case that the Kurdistan Region 
remains the country’s safest and most stable region. 
It is logical to assume that the core of the Kurdish problem in Iraq has always returned 
to the issue of rule in Iraq. Many scholars have asserted that from the emergence of 
the first State in Iraq, apart from those who were loyal to the regimes the Kurds 
always saw themselves excluded from power and their role in the state and its 
administration marginalised. This probably represents a substantial factor in the
Kurds’ insistence that Federalism would give them a chance to participate as a main 
partner in running Iraq, whereas most of the Arab parties, whether Shiite or Sunni, 
announcing that they would stand firmly against federalism since it would lead to a 
divided country.
In fact, the Kurdish populations in the disputes areas were subjected to an even more 
violent campaign of terror and a great many people were uprooted from their homes 
under the eyes of the Iraqi government; indeed, the government seemed noticeably 
disinclined to take the necessary measures to protect them. The Kurds therefore 
focused primarily on taking measures to protect citizens in these districts who were 
ethnically Kurdish and whose inclusion was favoured by the Kurds; however, the 
minorities were strictly opposed and also expressed their continued concerns about 
the existence of Kurdish security services.
The basic dilemma in this regard was whether Iraq would be stable by the end of 
2011, at which time all US troops were required to leave the country, according to a 
security agreement between Washington and Baghdad. Another problem was how to 
ensure integration between different factions in Iraq. According to General Ray 
Odierno, the top American military commander in Iraq, in the event of US troops 
being withdrawn at the end of September 2011, it might be necessary to deploy UN 
peacekeeping forces to protect the disputed territories if tensions between Kurds and 
Arabs had not been resolved, and if the Kurdish soldiers had not by that time 
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integrated into the Arab-dominated Iraqi army.538 Given the likelihood of ongoing 
unrest in the Iraqi cities, it was expected that the Iraqi leaders might ask the US to 
review its agreement with the Iraqi government in order that at least some troops 
might be left behind after 2011 to assist the Iraqi army and police forces to train more 
personnel and to offer them additional technical support.
What remains controversial is whether the Iraqi forces would have the capacity to 
protect Iraq’s security. Any plans that might have been drawn up to deal with this 
contingency were not considered crucial by the Iraqi government. According to 
Babakr Zebari, Army Chief of Staff, the Iraqi forces would not be able to maintain the 
country’s security and defend its sovereignty before 2020. Furthermore, the departure
of the US troops would not be in Iraq’s interests, and would cause significant harm to
the political process in Iraq, and that the Iraqi politicians needed to find other means 
of dealing with this political vacuum following the withdrawal of the US.539 This
statement provoked uproar in the Iraqi political arena, and Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi 
government spokesman, stated that Zebari’s personal opinions did not reflect the 
Government’s policy, which supported a complete withdrawal of US troops by the 
end of 2011.540
As to what such a withdrawal mechanism should look like, the most important issue 
was that Iraq’s future was now to become the responsibility of the Iraqis. According 
to a report by the Crisis Group, sectarian violence had the potential to draw fighters 
from the Kurdish Peshmerga, Shiite militias, and Sunni insurgents, and potentially 
from Turkey.541 A report in the Washington Times drew attention to the possibility of 
internal conflicts erupting between Iraqi factions because of the influence of political 
parties on the Iraqi army, quoting an Iraqi official who stated that the US
administration had not succeeded in dismantling the military units affiliated to the 
538 The possibility of depending on the UN peacekeepers, according to Chapter 6 of the UN charter,
referred to peacekeeping duties such as investigating and mediating disputes. See Lara Jakes, 6 July 
2010, Available at
<URL:http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/07/us_considers_un_peacekeepers_f.html>
539 Miran Osman, “The US's withdrawal from Iraq would harm Iraq significantly”,  12 August 2010, 
http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=8213
540 Awene Newspaper, “Ali Dabbagh has answered Babakr Zebari”, 14 August 2010,
http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hewal&Jimare=8226.
541 Anthony H. Cordesman, Success or Failure? Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence and US Strategy: 
Developments through June (2007), op. cit., p.94
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Shiite parties, the Sunnis and the Kurds in the Iraqi army, and that these units would
remaining under the influence of their parties. For example, the Eighth Division of the 
Iraqi Army, affiliated to the Dawa party, was located in Al-Kut and in Diwaniya, the 
Fifth Division in Diyala province was controlled by the Supreme Islamic Council, the 
Seventh Division was commanded by the Awakening groups, and the PUK’s forces 
were incorporated in the fourth Division.542
What seems clear from our analysis that the security, unity and future of Iraq will 
remain at risk if these problems are not resolved. Indeed, the unique window of 
opportunity for a unified Iraq depends on the will of the political parties to settle their 
differences and bring the country out of crisis. Simultaneously, it should be clear to all 
Iraqi factions that Arab Iraqis are incapable of forcing their plans onto the Kurdistan 
Region, and that the Kurds remain very conscious of the sensitive positioning of their 
region on the northern border, adjacent to the countries that express feelings of 
hostility towards them and that continue to take aggressive actions against their 
region, even though the Kurdistan region has become a market for their neighbours’ 
goods and a source for investment in their companies. Thus, it can be predicted that
the future for the Kurds will hold considerable risks but also great political prospects.
In other respects, what is noteworthy about this debate, the Kurdistan Region has two 
armies (Peshmerga), two security apparatuses and two so far unconnected financial 
systems. All these factors have resulted in the spread of corruption in all sectors, 
which in turn controls the Region’s political structure. This is creating an atmosphere 
of dissatisfaction among most of the Kurdish population who call for the situation to 
be addressed immediately. Unfortunately, the Kurdish administration has no serious 
intention of resolving this serious issue since it concerns the interests of the main 
parties, and eminent persons in both parties have been involved.
Despite such facts, the Peshmerga forces played an integral role in enforcing peace 
between the warring Iraqi Arab factions and were successful in reducing sectarian 
violence. In addition, the Peshmerga forces cooperated with the US-led Coalition 
542 Sbeiy. com , “Washington Times: Probability of occur of a civil war due to the Iraqi parties 
intervene in the Iraqi Army”, 12 August 2009. Available at::
<URL:http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/newsdetail.aspx?id=19447&cat=2> Access Date 14 August 2009.
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Forces in building peace in Iraq, working as a critical part of peace enforcement. Due 
to escalating sectarian violence in central Iraq throughout 2006 and the first half of 
2007, and because of their fighting prowess and neutrality, the Peshmerga agreed, at 
the request of the US, to be deployed temporarily in the provinces of Baghdad, 
Diyala, Salahaddin, Mosul, and the environs of Kirkuk, to keep the peace and to 
participate in civil and military affairs.  As already noted, the Iraqi Army has had to 
face threats as serious as civil war, terrorism, and regional intervention. 
Notwithstanding, the policy of the new Iraqi government, and of Prime Minister 
Nouri Al-Maliki in particular, was to work actively to purge Kurdish officers as well 
as Sunni Arabs from sensitive intelligence and command positions, as part of a 
broader effort to exercise control over promotions and to appoint commanders who 
would act to create forces that were more loyal to his groups.  
Ultimately, it can be assumed that, in order to reduce tensions between the Iraqi Army 
and Kurdish forces, both sides should act seriously to develop a joint security 
agreement that will protect people in disputed areas. In this context, the federal 
government must commit itself to its previous agreement regarding troop deployment 
– i.e., to conduct joint patrols along the disputed KRG-Iraq border areas. The priority 
issues for the Iraqi government and its people are personal security and economic 
security, alongside the need to fight terrorism. Even so, the most important step in 
achieving long term security and stability is the need to build national unity and 
strengthen political reconciliation between Iraq’s ethno-sectarian groups in order to 
eliminate the risk of violent civil war.  In turn, the integration of the Kurdish forces 
into the Iraqi Army will lead to focusing on state building and ensuring unity. 
Meanwhile, all Iraqis factions should seriously cooperate towards putting their ethnic 
and sectarian differences behind them.
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FINAL CONCLUSION
The tragic history of the Kurds in this part of Iraq emerged from the era of King 
Faisal, who was appointed by the British as King of Iraq, until the collapse of the
Monarchy and the declaration of a republic in Iraq in 1958. During this time the 
dominant influence of the Sunnis gradually increased, and decades of injustice and 
persecution followed, resulting from their pursuit of a policy of discrimination based 
on ethnicity, particularly among groups that refused to merge into the Arab nation, as 
well as exclusion from power based on ethno-religious prejudice. In fact, all Iraqi 
governments attempted consistently to exclude the Kurds, not only from positions of 
influence but from any attempts at assimilation in the country. Indeed, the Baath Party 
successfully followed a policy of marginalizing most religious factions of Shiite and 
other national groups such as Kurds, and also succeeded in enforcing its own concepts 
on society. By strengthening the idea of Pan-Arabism, the Sunni Arabs were able to 
dominate the State administration and the army, thereby considerably reducing the 
participation of other factions in ruling the country from 1963 to the collapse of 2003.
Politically the Kurdistan region emerged out of the difficult circumstances that had 
been caused by the horrific events experienced by the Kurdish people in the 20th 
century. In 1992, the Kurds formed their government and announced its adoption of a 
federal system in its relations with Iraq under the protection of no-fly zone established 
by the United States, Britain and France, which it could be regarded as the first 
historical opportunity for the Kurds to govern their region by themselves. Although, 
the Kurdish political elites were not qualified to take over administrative 
responsibility for the State or to establish a civil society, since they were implicated in 
internal conflicts and power struggle which led to rampant corruption and divided the 
KRG administratively between the two major parties from 1997 until 2002. However, 
despite the difficulties, the Kurds have progressed (significantly, from 1997 onward, 
the ‘Oil for Food’ programme had the effect of leading to relative prosperity in the 
Kurdistan region, especially when the United Nations decided that 13 percent of Iraqi 
oil sales were designated for Iraqi Kurdistan) to reach a level of development and 
stability that enables them to have a foothold in Iraq and firmly claim their legal 
rights.
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In focusing on the primary goal of this 2003 war, as the US announced, would be to 
act against global terrorism, and that this aim would be achieved would be through 
Iraq due to its military and economic potential weight in the Middle East. For this 
reason the US administration made it clear that it was necessary to overthrow the Iraqi 
regime, and having assured the stability of Iraq, to provide international and regional 
support to a new, broadly-based government that would include all the various 
factions and ethnic groups. It is reasonable to assume that the Bush administration’s 
efforts to set up a stable Iraq and its overall approach to Iraq’s future was a 
combination of the coalition’s role in the country and political changes, such as 
prohibiting the rule of the old political elite while introducing economic reforms and 
freeing individuals from the oppression that had existed in the past.
Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, a new era began for all 
Iraqi people, and particularly for the Kurdish people. During its war with Iraq, the US
administration had turned its attention to the Kurds, thereby giving them a unique 
opportunity to participate in the liberation of Kurdish territory, particularly after
Turkey had refused to allow US forces to operate from Turkish territory in order to 
open a northern front against Iraq. In a larger sense, the Kurds were considered as 
having a strong position within the overall Iraqi opposition movement by siding with 
the US military and alliance. In any event, all these factors, including political 
stability, economic development and growing international recognition, have brought 
prosperity to the Kurdistan region. 
After the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, some Kurds believed that Iraqi 
Kurdistan would be the place for another attempt at achieving an independent 
Kurdistan. However, during the period from 1991 to 2003 the dream of an 
independent Kurdistan remained deeply controversial. Whereas, since 2003 the 
KRG’s asserted that they desired to govern themselves within Iraq, and proclaimed 
repeatedly that they supported a unified Iraq while simultaneously insisting on the 
application of a constitution that would accommodate their claims. To support these 
allegations, President Jalal Talabani asserted that the Kurds are not separatists, he 
announced that, “if we were separatists, or want evil to Iraq, we allowed  the Shiites 
and Sunnis to quarrel and kill each other,  but the contrary we have made every effort 
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to reconcile between them”.543 Beyond this, the Kurds were never prepared to accept 
any neglect of the rights that had been included in the new Iraqi constitution, 
particularly the implementation of Article 140, and in fact nearly all the Iraqi factions, 
despite the existence of differences and a lack of confidence, participated in a new 
framework organized for administering Iraq through the establishment of an interim 
government in late 2005.
It should be said the KRG played a major and active role in maintaining the success of 
all significant events occurring after 2003, including regime change and the 
establishment of the Transitional Administration in Iraq, as well as writing the 
permanent constitution, holding general elections for the formation of the national 
government, and restoring full sovereignty for the Iraqi State. These changes can be 
considered as the obvious first step in steering Iraq and the Kurdish Region towards 
democratic transformation. In this context, these events have signalled the emergence 
of the KRG as a key player in the political and security equations in Iraq. In 
particular, the Kurdish leadership has played significant role in Baghdad as part of 
government, as well as in mediating intra-Arab conflicts and gathering the various 
political groups together. Consequently the Kurds, as the second-largest ethnic group 
in Iraq and a main partner for making decisions that would determine the fate of Iraq, 
supported the drawing of Iraq’s regional borders in a way that would guarantee and 
maintain a unified Iraq.  
During the research for this study, it was concluded that federalism would be a 
suitable form of government for establishing democracy and peace within the 
presence of ethnic and religious cleavages.  The idea was in fact suggested by the US 
Senator Joseph R. Biden, who called for the establishment of three semi-autonomous 
ethnic regions linked by a power-sharing agreement in Baghdad: 544
543 Interview with President Jalal Talabani in the Al- Iraqiya satellite, on 25 February 2008. Available 
at: 
<URL:http://www.iraqipresidency.net/news_detial.php?language=arabic&id=5290&type=interviews>  
Access Date: 5 April 2009
544 Senators Joseph R. Biden and Sam Brownback, in September 2007 reignited debate over Iraq’s 
political future, and called for giving Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis control over their own regions.  
Further, this proposal was condemned and rejected furiously by many Iraqi political parties and Iraqi 
government that it adopting a clear partition of Iraq into three separate states. Besides, the US’s 
experts, who argue that such a soft partition “would produce extraordinary suffering and bloodshed”
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The idea is to maintain a unified Iraq by decentralized Iraqi 
government based upon the principles of federalism and 
advocates for a relatively weak central government with 
strong Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish regional administrations,” 
and also he added “The central government would maintain 
control over “truly common interests” such as border defence, 
foreign policy, and oil production and revenue sharing. 
In the view of Peter W. Galbraith, the emergence of a strongly decentralised Iraqi 
state to protect the interests of Iraq against Iran and Turkey was to be encouraged. 
Particularly, Iran has a considerable influence upon whole of the Iraqi political 
process. Despite that, the US paved the way for Iranian's allies to control Iraqi state. It 
is necessary to point, that Galbraith had advocated of partition of Iraq into three parts 
(Kurd, Shiite, and Sunni) depending on their geographic regions and due to each 
factions possess their own forces.545 However, Biden’s idea was rejected by both the 
international and regional communities, and particularly by Iraq’s neighbours as well 
as the Iraqi people (except the Kurds), who sought to establish and support a strong 
central government in Baghdad with a proportional legislative body formed in a way 
that would ensure participation of district representatives. In this context, the 
considerable fears of the Sunni groups were justified, since the natural resources were 
not equally distributed throughout the country (most of the oil being located in the 
Kurdish region, and southern Iraq).
In light of the Iraqi status quo and due to ethnic tensions threaten Iraq’s long-term 
stability. In this thesis, we are supporting Biden’s proposal for the establishment of 
three semi-autonomous ethnic regions that it would be a reasonable and a fair solution 
for saving Iraq from a quagmire of corruption and terrorism. More importantly, we 
have become convinced that through the federalizing Iraq will not be allowed to 
Greg Bruno, “Plans for Iraq’s Future: Federalism, Separatism, and Partition”, Available at: < URL: 
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/plans-iraqs-future-federalism-separatism-partition/p14547> Access Date: 22 
October 2007.
545 Peter Woodard Galbraith, who was the first US’s Ambassador to Croatia in 1993, and acted an 
advisor to the KRG in the beginning of 2003. See Kawa Amin,  “Peter Galbraith called for the division 
of Iraq, and the new administration of Obama and Joseph Biden, would be a strong motivation to work 
in this direction”, Jamawar News, on 17 November 2008, Available at:
<URL:http://www.jamawarnews.com/direje.aspx?babet=kurdistani&jimare=1921&derkewtin=2> 
Access Date:  12 April 2009.
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arrogance of power by any party or ethnic component alone (whether they are 
forming the majority or the minority) to take the reins in Iraq, and also will prevent 
violating the constitution that was voted for by the majority of the Iraqi people. 
Besides, it could be said that such a "soft division" will achieve justice to all 
components of the Iraqi people, which in turn would achieve a balance of political 
participation by all ethnic components and minorities to develop their areas in a 
suitable way and more quickly.
However, the key problem in the prevailing status quo is that there are serious 
disagreements on the formation of the federations and regions. In Iraq’s current 
situation, which is characterised by a charged atmosphere of mistrust and a lack of 
willingness to take responsibility among the political parties and factions, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the formation of federations will sooner or later become a 
truth and a reality in Iraq, and a response to the Arab side, some of whose political 
parties have accused the Kurds of making impossible demands. The Kurds by contrast 
have defended their claims as both legal and constitutional.  Even so, the deeper 
problem for the Kurds is on the Iraqi side, since they are solving their problems and 
pinning all their hopes around the possible consolidation of democracy in Iraq, but are 
fearful in case such a possibility does not occur.  At present the Iraqi government is 
not working seriously to create any sense of citizenship among the Kurds, and it is 
reasonable to suppose that the democratization of Iraq will be a long process, and not 
easily applied at this stage.  Given the Iraqi status quo, it is necessary to concentrate 
first on the vital issue of coordination and reconciliation among different ethno-
religious groups, so that instead of pursuing their party interests they will give priority 
to Iraqi interests and the future of Iraq.
The basic view implicit in this argument is that federalism has political impacts and 
consequences, not only over the Iraqi community but also over the future policy of the 
neighbouring countries. Certainly Iraq’s neighbours, particularly Turkey, justified 
their opposition to federalism because it entitled the Kurds to control their own 
regional government within Iraq and to control Kirkuk’s oil fields; the consequences 
of this would encourage Iraqi Kurds to establish an independent State and secede 
from Iraq. There was a real fear that such changes in the status quo might reflect 
directly on the Kurds in Turkey and would encourage them to take the same step. 
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Therefore, repeated bombardments of Kurdish territory through ground and air attacks 
by the Turkish government became a recurrent feature, under the pretext of chasing 
the PKK and guaranteeing Iraq’s territorial integrity.
It should be noted here that the KRG’s commercial and political relationships with its 
neighbours and some European countries are contributing increasingly to state 
building. In particular, the point of view which caused the Kurds to be seen by 
neighbouring countries as an existential threat to their vital interests has changed. In 
recent years, political rapprochement has been achieved at high levels through 
opening consulates in the neighbouring countries, thereby enhancing strong 
diplomatic and commercial connections in several sectors. In terms of evaluation, 
these events represent tangible recognition of the KRG and a fundamental and 
geopolitically significant shift in perceptions of Iraq’s post-war era, particularly on the 
part of the Turkish government, which has yielded significant economic benefits for 
both sides. Indeed, the Turkish government seeks, through its good relations with the 
KRG, to influence events in the Iraqi state. It is important at this stage to recognize 
that the position of the KRG in the Middle East may serve as a bridge between the 
countries of the region and Europe. And this in turn will reflect positively on the 
position and status of Iraq in the region.
The Kurds insisted on possessing Kirkuk and reviving its administration under KRG 
control for both national and economic reasons, and were unwilling to concede on the 
issue of Kirkuk, whereas the Arab side constantly tried to create obstacles to any 
move made towards calming the situations in the disputed areas. As a result they
usually prevaricated, and avoided implementing agreements that had been signed 
between them. For this reason, most Kurds were very critical of the Kurdish 
leadership for having failed over successive years to insist on a speedy political 
solution to the Kirkuk issue, instead of repeatedly agreeing to its postponement. 
Indeed, it can be argued that there was negligence on the part of the Kurds themselves
for not having achieved their demands, particularly since, in addition to Kurdish MPs 
in the Iraqi parliament, many senior positions in the Baghdad government were held 
by Kurds (such as president, deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, 
commander of the military, deputy leader of Iraqi parliament). Such people had to be 
held responsible for not having seriously addressed such issues with the federal 
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government. It should be remembered that, despite the ideological differences 
between them, all the Kurdish parties agreed that they would not falter on the issue of 
Kirkuk joining the Kurdistan Region because of their belief that the Kurds had a 
legitimate claim to the city. Despite the process of Arabization in those areas by 
successive Iraqi governments, the Kurds still constituted the majority of Kirkuk’s 
population. Therefore, in order to prevent the possibility of ethnic conflicts and 
separatism in Iraq, Kirkuk had to be included in the Kurdistan region (whether with 
independent or semi-independent management), with a full guarantee of the rights of 
other component groups (Turkmens, Arabs, and Christians) through the distribution of 
managerial positions and in-service facilities.
One of the serious problems between the KRG and Iraqi government concerned the 
oil fields within the disputed territories and whether they would be run by the KRG or 
the Iraqi government, along with the signing of contracts with foreign companies for 
the exploration, development and production of oil in the Kurdistan Region. 
Furthermore, the oil policy’s focus on the subject of returns and allocated rewarding 
of investors became a contentious issue between both sides. A positive point for KRG 
was its possession of an abundance of natural resources, which mean that it could rely 
on itself for securing the supply of oil products for creating a refining industry, and 
could also use these resources effectively for the benefit of its own people and for the 
entire Iraqi population. For this reason, the KRG insisted on running its own natural 
resources and having direct access and control over the oil revenues, as well as the 
signing and implementing of investment deals with foreign oil companies.
In order to find a way out of the political crisis with the Iraqi government, the oil 
contracts in particular needed to be addressed. The best thing to do would be to draw 
up structure for the Law of Oil and Gas in a form that would serve all the Iraqi people. 
All Iraqi factions have become convinced that the only true path to achieving peace 
and stability, ensuring political progress in Iraq, and avoiding territorial disputes, is to 
pass a modern federal hydrocarbons law for sharing oil revenue in a fair and 
transparent manner between the federal and regional governments, otherwise the unity 
and future of the country will be at risk.  Given such conditions, the Kurds believe 
that if the Iraqi government does not cooperate with the KRG, this will lead to 
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delayed oil exports from the Region, thereby causing serious damage for the 
Kurdistan region and for the Iraqi government. 
In the most obvious sense, it is logical to assume that the Kurds have also been among 
the most active and prominent proponents of the development of a stable Iraqi state, 
particularly as the Kurdistan region contains largely unexploited natural resources of 
oil and natural gas; since much of the region’s potential is unused, this makes it an 
important energy source for the international market. Beyond this, the KRG is 
currently leading the way in Iraq by guaranteeing an environment for both domestic 
and foreign investors, by being able to offer a legal framework and institutionalized 
investment activities, and with vast opportunities in a variety of business sectors, 
particularly agriculture, tourism, and hydrocarbons. The Kurdistan Region can thus be 
described as a gateway to, and a potential economic base in the rest of Iraq, due to the 
Region’s success in policy engagement, and with the conviction that Kurdistan’s 
success also Iraq’s success.
Concerning the Peshmerga case, involving relations between the Kurdish forces and 
the Iraqi Army, this became a highly complicated issue between the two sides and 
remains unresolved. For the Kurds, the Peshmerga are considered as a liberating 
power for the Kurdish people throughout their long political struggle, and a symbol of 
steadfastness in the face of the previous regime’s plots and strategies to eliminate the 
presence of any Kurdish entity in the region. Since 1991 to the present, the Peshmerga 
have been responsible for maintaining the security of the Kurdistan Region and 
confronting the threat of terrorism. Since the Peshmerga (or Regional Guard 
according to the Iraqi constitution) undertook the same duties as the Iraqi forces – i.e., 
defence and providing security for Iraq – they ought also to have had an equal share 
of the sovereignty budget. However, although the Iraqi Parliament had specified that 
the financial plan for the Regional Guard was included in the sovereign budget in 
2007, the Iraqi government has to date (end of 2011) refused to pay these dues. This 
has caused considerable difficulties for the KRG which has to pay for the Peshmerga 
from its own budget; this is a serious problem that needs to be resolved.
The KRG faced a major dilemma regarding the security and protection of the 
inhabitants in the disputed areas after the withdrawal of US troops from those areas. 
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From the KRG’s point of view, the departure of the US troops would mean a potential 
increase in its exposure to attack by Iraqi forces; nor would this departure be in Iraq’s 
interests as it would cause significant harm to the political process in Iraq. For this 
reason the KRG tried to persuade the US administration to keep some of its troops in 
the Kurdistan Region in the event of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Had tensions 
between Kurds and Arabs not been resolved the alternative would have been to 
deploy UN peacekeeping forces to protect the disputed territories. In order to reduce 
potential tensions between the Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces, both sides should act 
seriously to develop a joint security agreement to protect people in disputed areas. 
Thus, the most important step in achieving long term security and stability requires 
building national unity and strengthen political reconciliation between Iraq's ethno 
sectarian groups to eliminating the risk of violent civil war.
Given the ongoing unrest in the Iraqi state, some might argue that the US needed to 
have taken a more active role in advising Iraqi leaders on the implementation of 
Article 140, and in resolving other heated issues between the Iraqi government and 
the KRG to create a durable political reconciliation. It was widely believed that the 
US sought success in Iraq, and this goal required the cooperation and participation of 
all Iraqi factions in reconstructing the government and the state. In this context, the 
Kurds were aware of the attitude of the US administration which reiterated the need 
for the KRG to work closely with the Iraqi government in a unified Iraq. At this stage 
the KRG should really have focused on reconstruction and on providing basic 
services, eliminating corruption, and working seriously to recover areas that had been 
withheld from Kurdistan, particularly the city of Kirkuk and its environs.
The disputes between the KRG and Iraqi government ebbed and flowed over the 
years, while their relations suffered from successive crises. I have personally become 
convinced that these crises should be permanently resolved according to the Iraqi 
constitution. Furthermore, the Iraqi factions must work to resolve all the past disputes 
that have dominated the political stage; they should also feel that they have a real 
stake in the federal government, and thus try to reach a federal system that will 
accommodate Iraqi diversity. Iraq’s political parties should try to ease the long 
political stalemate that has directly influenced the revival of sectarian violence and 
insurgency. In this context, it can be assumed that at this stage all Iraqi parties and 
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political factions will have to face the main and historical responsibility for saving 
Iraq’s democratisation and preserving the dignity and rights of individuals. Security 
and stability cannot be achieved by avoiding collective responsibility to protect the 
democratic process, or by rejecting Iraq’s constitutional principles and political 
agreements. From the analysis in this study it seems clear that any parties or groups 
emerging in Iraq may find it impossible to seize the reins of power.
Despite all the differences, there was a common desire between the Iraqi federal 
government and Kurdistan regions to reach compromises; the Kurdish politicians in 
particular frequently announced that they saw themselves as Iraqis and were 
interested in Iraqi affairs while, as a second nation in Iraq, they regarded themselves 
not just as participants but as partners in the political process. The nature of the 
political process in Iraq was characterised by the way agreements, having been made 
outside the parliament, and then sought remedy from the Parliament. Attitudes among 
most of the political parties, whether Sunni or Shiite, had changed towards the KRG 
and the demands of the Kurds, and many of them were unwilling to compromise. But 
despite all the distinctions between political parties and factions, there was broad 
agreement that only negotiations and dialogue would improve the political 
atmosphere and normalise the situation between the Kurds and other parties in the 
political process in Iraq, thereby effectively resolving the outstanding problems.
It is crucial to note that, the KRG’s situation has seen significant development, both 
politically and economically, despite the existence of dissent and corruption inside the 
KRG itself. It is important at this point to recognize that among the main political 
parties (PUK and KDP) as well as the opposition, there is a real intention for political 
reform and for reinforcing the pillars of democracy in order to strengthen their 
position and maintain their gains in the Iraqi State. It cannot be denied that the 
pressures and internal criticisms from the public and from the Kurdish opposition,
particularly towards the two main parties, have had a positive impact. Both parties 
are being forced to make changes and engage in dialogue with the opposition on the 
situation inside the province, as well as meeting demands for transparency in the 
negotiations and agreements that they will have to conduct with Baghdad.
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Ultimately, most of the major problems (as mentioned above) that emerged between 
the Iraqi government and the KRG concerned the constitution, whether in relation to 
Article 140 and the holding of a referendum on the future of Kirkuk, to the Peshmerga 
issue, to determining the Kurdistan Region’s budget, or else to the future control of oil 
resources in the Kurdistan Region. Notwithstanding these difficulties, and in order to 
not lose support and international sympathy for their case, the KRG has recognised 
the need to be patient and not to retaliate against acts of aggression suffered in the 
past, particularly in the cases of Kirkuk and other disputed areas. Indeed, beyond the 
competitiveness and differences among all Iraqi factions, it remains the case that, in 
order to form a true national partnership that will represent all components of Iraqi 
society and achieve the aspirations of all the people, the political situation and the 
constraints faced by the democratic process in the country do require the Iraqi factions 
to sorting out all their disputes, and to establish real stability by reaching a peaceful 
and consensual solution. 
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CHARTS, GRAPHS AND TABLES
NOTE: (The detailed charts, graphs, tables and documents obtained from Kurdistan 
Regional Government, Ministry of Extra Regional Affairs, Erbil in December 2007, 
which is Report on the Administrative Changes in Kirkuk and the Disputed Regions)
Table 1: Administrative Unit of Kirkuk Governorate 1957
District Sub-district centre Number of 
Villages
Total number 
of Villages
Kirkuk Centre of Kirkuk Kirkuk 101
Qara Hassan Laylan 56
Alton Kopri Alton Kopri 61
Haweeja Haweeja 226
Shwan Redan 76 420
Kifri Bebaz Bawa nor 68
Qere Tepe Qere Tepe 105
Sherwana Sherwana 145 318
Chemchamal Chem- Chemal Chem-
Chemal
64 64
Aghjalar Aghjalar 62
Sangaw Goptepe 76
Toz Toz Toz 79
Daqoq Daqoq 62
Qader Karam Qader Karam 93 372
Total 1274 1274
279
Table 2:  Ratio of the Ethnic Population of Kirkuk governorate 
1922-1977
1922-1924 1957 1965 1977
Kurds 65.1 48.3 36.1 37.6
Arabs 20.9 28.2 39 44.4
Turcoman 4.8 21.4 19.5 16.3
Chaldean, Syrian, Assyrian, 
Armenian and others
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Table 3: Ethnic group distribution of Kirkuk governorate in 1974
Kurds Arabs Turcoman Syrian, Assyrian, 
Armenian, Chilean
Total
Population 386000 93000 132000 6000 617000
Percentage 62.5 15.1 21.4 1 100
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Table 4:  Ethnic and religious group distribution of Kirkuk city 1974
Group Kurds Arab Turcoman Syrian, Assyrian, 
Armenian, 
Chaldean
Total
Population 139000 27000 98000 6000 270000
Percentage 51.5 10 36.3 2.2 100
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Table 5: Population of Kirkuk governorate by ethnic group 
1977-1997
1977 1978 1997
Arabs 218755 544596
Kurds 184875 155861
Faili Kurds 388 1105
Turcoman 80347 50099
Armenians 581 116
Syrian, Chaldean 4050 758
Others 180 205
Unknown 3439 3
Total 492,615 601,219 752,743
Table 6: Number of workers in the North oil company in Kirkuk
1958-2003
Year Arabs Kurds Turcoman Christians English Total
1958 40 850 370 900 70 2230
1960 55 1350 500 1100 65 3070
1963 100 1150 700 1400 60 3410
1965 170 1000 800 1350 55 3375
1968 300 875 850 1000 50 3075
1972 900 700 900 1000 3500
1978 2700 500 1200 850 5250
1982 4500 400 1500 800 7200
1988 5200 300 1700 750 7950
1995 6600 260 1800 700 9360
2000 7200 119 1920 600 9839
2003 7300 610 2100 500 10,510
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Table 7: Ethnic composition of the North Oil Company workforce 
1958-2003
Year Arabs Kurds Turcoman Christians English
1958 1 38 16 40 3
1960 1 43 16 35 2
1963 2 33 20 41 1
1965 5 29 23 40 1
1968 9 28 27 32 1
1972 25 20 25 28
1978 51 9 22 16
1982 62 5 20 11
1988 69 3 21 19
1995 70 2 19 7
2000 73 1 19 6
2003 69.45 5.8 19.98 4.75
285
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
80001958
1960
1963
1965
1968
1972
1978
1982
1988
1995
2000
2006
Arabs ِ◌
Kurds
Torcom
an
Christian
English
G
raph(1) N
um
ber of w
orkers in the N
orth O
il C
om
pany in K
irkuk (1958-2003)
286
28.20%
44.40%
48.30%
37.60%
21.40%
16.30%
2.10%
1.70%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
1957
1977
Arabs ِ◌
Kurds
Turcom
en
O
thers
C
hart 2 E
thnic com
position of the population of K
irkuk governorate, 1957-1977
287
218755
184875
388
80347
581
4050
180
3439
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
Arabs
Kurds
Faili Kurd
Turcom
an
Arm
inian
Assyrian
Other
unknown
C
hart 3  E
thnic com
position of the population of K
irkuk governorate 1977
288
544596
155861
1108
50099
116
758
204
3
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
Arabs
Kurds
Faili Kurd
Turcom
an
Arm
enian
Assyrian
Others
un Known
C
hart 4 E
thnic com
position of the population of K
irkuk G
overnorate 1997
289
43150
60950
46910
70377
43746
62519
36974
48493
63441
59994
69200
30918
37892
30450
9168
11978
10079
14752
8237
12635
8197
10395
13606
11814
14543
6293
8286
5734
714
1162
833
954
793
1165
508
803
892
1193
1085
542
590
723
43864
62112
47743
71331
44539
63684
37482
49296
64333
61187
70285
31460
38482
31173
-5000
5000
15000
25000
35000
45000
55000
65000
75000
Tiseen
R
aparin
B
aghdad
road
R
ahim
aw
a
Arapha -
30tam
uz
Brayti
A
lm
as -
Tapa-
Q
oria
Bazary
G
aw
ra
Iskan-
Im
am
qasim
R
izgary
Shorja
H
uria
K
hasa
N
ur
 Persons
Fam
ilies
C
hildern
G
eneral Total
N
ur
M
ixed
T
iseen
B
aghdad 
 R
oad
A
lm
as
Tapa
Q
oriy
a 
H
uria
K
hassa
B
azary 
G
aw
ra
R
ahim
 
A
w
a 
Iskan
Im
am
 
Q
asim
R
izgary
S
horja
K
urd
R
apari
n
B
rayti
K
urd &
 
A
rab
A
rapha-
30July
K
urd
 &
 C
hristian
C
hart 5 E
thnic C
om
position of the Population of K
irkuk C
itye-2007
Source: Iraqi M
inistry of T
rade
290
Table 8: Ratio of the Kurds in Alton Kopri 1947-1977
Year Ratio
1947 70%
1957 50%
1965 25.7%
1977 75.6%
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Table 9: Population of Khaneqin district 1957
City Population Kurds Arab Turcoman
number % number % number %
Khaneqin 24896 18584 74.7% 5901 23.7% 411 1.65%
Saadiya 21779 8829 40.5% 10237 47.1% 2713 12.4%
Qoratoo 4722 4457 93.3% 315 6.7% - -
Maydan 3114 2329 74.8% 785 25.2% - -
Others 3988
6.8%
Total 58499 34199 58.4% 17238 29.5% 3124 5.34%
After adding the new sub-district called Jalawla, which was created after attaching to 
it various sectors with Arab majorities from the district of Qara Tepe, the population 
of Khaneqin district in the census of 1965 was 85,088.
Number of districts plus 
the district centre 
Total 
population
Kurds Arabs Turcoma
n
Others
5 85088 46725 30932 2918 4513
54.9% 36.3% 3.43% 5.3%
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Table 10: Population of Khaneqin district, with consideration of 
population growth three years after the 1965 census
City Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman
number % number % number 5
Khaneqi
n
35836 25836 72.1% 9388 26.2% 612
Jalawla 22606 8534 37.8% 13212 58.4% 860
Saadiya 13864 3422 24.7% 9114 65.7% 1328
Qorato 6785 6280 92.6% 505 7.4% 0
Maydan 4891 3475 71.1% 1416 28.9% 0
Others 3104
3.6%
Total 87086 47547 54.6% 33636 2800 3.2%
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Table 11: Population of the city of Khaneqin and the suburbs and 
districts belonging to it 1977
City Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman Other
Khaneqin 44675 20128 21213 2722 612
45.6% 48.3% 5.85%
Jalawla 28822 5714 22083 715 310
19.8% 77% 2.5%
Saadiya 16846 865 15206 675 100
5.14% 90.2% 4%
Maydan 2562 32 2518 5 7
1.2% 98.2%
Qorato 5950 303 5637 10
5.1% 94.7%
Total 98855 27042 66657 4177 1039
27.35% 67.4% 4.16% 1.05%
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Table 12: Population of Khaneqin city, its suburbs and the districts 
attached to it 1987
Name of 
city
Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman
number % number % number %
Khaneqin 39246 17985 45.8% 19426 49.5% 1835 4.7%
Jalawla 37489 4839 12.9% 32032 85.2% 618 1.7%
Saadiya 24662 1681 16.8% 21658 87.8% 1324 5.4%
Total 101397 24505 24.2% 73116 72.1% 3777 3.7%
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Table 13: Population of Khaneqin and districts belonging to it, 
except Maydan and Qorato 1997
Name of 
city
Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman
number % number % Number %
Khaneqin 49968 19699 39.4% 27237 54.7% 2942 5.8%
Jalwla 46147 6606 14.7% 38639 83.7% 902 1.95%
Saadiya 31874 3155 9.9% 26495 83.1% 2224 6.97%
Total 127989 29460 23% 92461 72.3% 6068 4.74%
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Table 14: Villages and districts that belonged to Khaneqin prior to 
demolition operations
Ser. City Number of Villages Population
1 Khaneqin 80 17,853
2 Jalawla 50 14,980
3 Saadiya 21 4,807
4 Qorato 42 8,835
5 Maydan 45 7,004
6 Total 238 53,479
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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
Supplement 1. Article (58) of the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL) of the Iraqi state for the transitional stage:
a- The Iraqi Transitional government, especially the High Commission for 
solving the disputes of estates ownership and others of the quarters concerned, shall 
take measures for the purpose of alleviating injustice caused by the practices of the 
former regime and represented by the demographic changes of certain regions 
including Kirkuk, through deporting and exiling individuals from their residences, and 
through forced immigration inside and outside the region and settling alien 
individuals in the region, depriving the people of work, and through correcting the 
nationality, and to remedy this injustice, the transitional Iraqi government must take 
the following steps:
Regarding the resident deportees and the emigrated and the immigrants, and in 
harmony with the law of the High Commission for solving the real estate ownership 
disputes, and other legal measures, the government must return, during a reasonable 
period the residents to their homes and properties, if that were not possible, then they 
must be justly compensated.
Regarding the individuals who were transferred to certain regions and lands, the 
government must decide on their position in accordance with article (10) of the law of 
the High Commission for solving the estates ownership disputes to ensure the 
possibility of resettling them, or to ensure the possibility of receiving compensation 
from the state, or the possibility of receiving new lands from the state near their places 
of residence in the governorate which they came from or the possibility of receiving a 
compensation for the cost of transferring to those regions.
Regarding the persons who were deprived of employment or other living means to 
force them to emigrate from their places of residence in the regions and lands the 
Government must encourage opportunities for new job in those regions and lands.
Regarding the correction of nationality the government must cancel all the related 
decisions, and permit the injured persons, to have the right of deciding their national 
identity and their ethnic belonging without forcing or pressure.
b- The former regime also manipulated with the administrative borders and other 
in order to achieve political aims, the presidency and the transitional Iraqi government 
must present recommendations to the National Assembly in order to remedy those 
unjust changes.
In case of un ability of the Presidency to agree unanimously on the package of 
recommendations, then the council of the Presidency must appoint a neutral arbitrator 
and unanimously for the purpose of studying the subject and presenting 
recommendations, and in the case of the Presidency Council being unable to agree on 
an arbitrator, the Presidency Council must ask the General Secretary of the United 
Nations to appoint a distinguished international personality to do the required 
arbitration.
c- The final solution of the disputed lands including Kirkuk is postponed until 
the above measures are completed and carrying out a census of population, just and 
transparent, until the approval of the permanent constitution. this solution must be 
completed in a way agreeing with the principles of justice, taking into consideration 
the will of the population of those lands. 
298
Supplement 2. The four Decisions of the Committee for 
Implementing Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution
Committee of Implementing article 140 of the constitution
No.6
Date: 16.1.2007
Decision No.1
Our Committee, formed according to the Diwan (council) order No.46 dated: 
9.8.2006 held its tenth meeting on the date 10.1.2007 for the purpose of implementing 
article (140) of the constitution of the Republic of Iraq, and for the sake of 
normalizing the situation in the disputed areas, the committee decided as follows:
1. Re-instating all the officials of the original population of the disputed areas 
(Kurds, Turcoman, Assyrian, Chaplains and Arabs who were dismissed or sent 
away or transferred outside those regions for political, ethnic, sectarian or 
religious reasons for the period from 17th July 1968 until 9th April 2003, to 
their former Jobs or similar ones in their original regions, in accordance with 
the law.
This decision is subject to the approval of his Excellency the 
Prime Minister.
Signed:
Hashim Abdulrahman Al-Shibly
Chairman of the committee
/1/2007
No.24
Date: 16.11.2007
Decision No.2
Our Committee, formed in accordance with the Diwan (Council) order No. (46) 
number MRN/48/1373 and dated: 9.8.2006 held its 11th meeting on the date: 
16.1.2007 and for the purpose of implementing article (140) of the constitution of 
the Republic of Iraq and in order to normalize the situation in the disputed areas, 
the committee decided as follows:
First: Returning all the deported and emigrated families, who were deported and 
emigrated from the disputed areas.  to their former regions and apply the 
following mechanism for implantation.
a) The deported and emigrated shall be compensated with a piece of residential 
land which shall be allocated by the state in their original regions of which 
they were deported or emigrated provided that they were not beneficial of  
owning a piece of residential land from the state.
b) All the deported and emigrated families shall be compensated financially a 
sum of only (5) five million dinars, and deported and emigrated families 
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within Kirkuk municipality with a financial compensation amounting to (10) 
ten million dinars.
Second: The Committee of Solving the Disputes of Estate Ownership shall solve 
all cases of estates and confiscated properties and possessed as a result of policies 
of the former regime in the disputed areas covered by article (140) of the 
constitution of the Republican of Iraq and as soon as possible but not later than 
15.3.2007
This decision is subject to the approval of his Excellency the Prime Minister.
Signed:
Hashim Abdul Rahman Al-Shibly
Chairman of the Committee
/1/2007 
No.37
Date: 4.2.2007
Decision No (3)
Our committee formed in accordance with the Diwan order No (46) – No MRN 
/48/1373 and dated 9.8.2006 held its 13th meeting on the date: 4.2.2007 and for the 
purpose of implementing article (140) of the constitution of the Republic of Iraq, and 
in order to normalize the situation in the disputed areas, the committee decided as 
follows:
First: Returning all the settler families in the disputed areas, covered by article 
(140) of the constitution of the Republic of Iraq and especially in the governorate of 
Kirkuk, to their former regions which they came from as a result of the policies of the 
previous regime for the period 17th July 1968 until 9th April 2003, applying the 
following mechanism:
a. Giving them a sum of (20) twenty million dinars together with a piece of land in 
their original regions.
b. Transferring the birth records of the settler's families from the disputed areas to 
the civil records offices in their previous original regions. 
c. The transfer of food coupons of the settler's families from the disputed areas to 
their previous original regions.
d. The transfer of all the remaining official documents of the settler's families from 
the disputed areas to their previous original regions.
h. The sum of the donation should be paid after presentation, by the concerned, 
evidence of the transferring of records of civil situation and the coupon forms of 
people covered by this donation.
Second: The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Trade, and the departments 
concerned, must ease the task of the settler's regarding the contents of (b,c,d) of the 
first paragraph, above.
Third: The ministries and departments concerned must ease the task of the settler if 
he was an official to transfer his job from the disputed areas to his original region.
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Fourth: All the paragraphs of the above decisions must be implemented before day 
15.3.2007.
Fifth: This decision is subject to the approval of his Excellency the Prime Minister.
Signed:
Hashim Abdul-Rahman Al-Shibly
Chairman of the committee
/2/2007
No.38
Date: 4.2.2007
Decision No.4
Our Committee formed in accordance with Diwan order No.46( 
No.MRN/48/1373)
and dated 9.8.2006 held its 13th meeting on 4.2.2007 and for the purpose of 
implementing article (140) of the constitution of the Republic of Iraq and in order 
to normalize the situation in the disputed areas the Committee decided as follows:
First: Cancellation of all agricultural Contracts which were concluded within the 
policies of the demographic change  regions and covered by article (140) of the 
constitution of the Republic of Iraq and particularly in  the governorate of Kirkuk 
and returning the position to what it was before concluding those contracts.
Second: the departments concerned are our authorized to implement this decision.
Third: This decision is to be implemented before the day of 15.3.2007.
This decision is subject to the approval of his Excellency the Prime Minister.
Signed:
Hashim Abdul Rahman Al-Shibly
Chairman of the Committee/ /2/2007
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